I, for one, am absolutely convinced that I have done this.
About three years ago I had knee surgery, and was put under general anesthesia. I had recently read a thread here on just this subject that mentioned that general anesthesia, in at least some instances, stops all electrochemical activity related to consciousness.
Common sense shows that personal identity doesn’t depend on material continuity (having the same atoms. The transporter thought-experiment shows that identity doesn’t depend on subjective continuity (thinking and remembering that I’m me), since I wouldn’t voluntarily submit to being murdered if the transporter worked on the far end, by creating a me there, but failed to disintigrate me on this end.
The only plausable alternative short of eliminativism (there is no me) is that identity depends upon continuity of process–that the electrochemical processes that make up my consciousness must occur as an unbroken chain in order for me to maintain my identity.
It is posssible that this stops every night when I go to sleep. It is even possible (and I believe some neurologists would argue) that it happens continuously throughout the day. But it seems undeniable (if the claim about the way anesthesia works is true) that it happened when I had knee surgery (and again last year when I had back surgery). If the technology existed, they could have taken me apart cell-by-cell and put me back together in the next room, and it wouldn’t have mattered because nothing was going on in my brain (besides basic life-support functions). To me, that means I died. I stopped existing.
When I recovered, I had all the memories I’d had before, and felt like exactly the same person, but there is no way to prove that the person who entered the hospital didn’t stop existing and that I didn’t wake up for the first time hours later, having the feeling that I was the same person only because I had neurons in mostly the same places.
(Of course, I know that in at least some cases, general anesthesia doesn’t stop all higher brain activity. Sometimes it only eliminates the formation of memories and/or causes paralysis. So I have no way of knowing if I’m the same person I remember being.)
Having read about all this, I was actually quite uncomfortable going into surgery, and told several of my friends afterward that I was qhite sure the person they had known had died. But the fact is, neither I nor they were that concerned after the fact. Society says I’m the same person, I feel like the same person, and no one is around to complain.
The same will be true of transporters, if the technology is possible. Philosophical concerns will be dropped for social ones. As long as most people coming out feel and act normal, and hardly anyone survives on the wrong end to complain about it, I have no doubt we would all be zooming around the aether to our hearts’ content. No one existing at any given moment in time will have any reason to feel that everything isn’t normal.