Will the real Slim Shady please stand up, please stand up! 
Well, I for one have to agree. I definately would not teleport myself if it works by creating a clone. There was a really good Canadian cartoon I saw on Cartoon Network’s* O’ Canada* that dealt with this exact subject. Any one else see that? It was very well done and I’ve been trying to find it for years but to no avail. :mad:
Yeah, I know. * sigh*
However, in “The Enemy Within,” each Kirk duplicate was not the complete duplicate of the original. Each was only half a man, possessing qualities the other needed and lacked. The brash, decisive Kirk, vs. the compassionate Kirk. As for Tom Riker and Tuvix, well, Rick Berman was not a fan of TOS, and often did not let canon get in the way of a storyline. Witness Captain Archer and the NX-01 encountering the Ferengi 200 years before Picard encountered them. Anyway, any description of a futuristic device is going to miss the mark until the time comes when that device becomes practical and is brought to market. The Star Trek transporter is not the definitive teleporting device, people have often criticized it for not needing a receiving station, for example.
Canon, or not, the true nature of a transporter is unknown in this day and age. I’m willing to accept the possibility that the person who is rematerialized at the other end is not me, but a duplicate with my memories. But, cells in our bodies die and are replaced all the time. Physically, I’m not the same person I was 10 years ago, but I still have my memories and the same sense of self-recognition. So I believe that what makes me who I am trancends the mere disassembly and reassembly of molecules.
I’m curious as to what could possibly be accepted as valid evidence. it there was no scientific test you could make to distinguish the “two”. Even today, you might face the same conundrum if I just walked out of your lab and walked back in later. I might have gone through a transporter in between.
And in a scenario like that, I might be measurably more different if I took a stroll though a park instead of a transporter. I might have sweated, or had a snack, so my mass would probably change. I might have contracted a disease. My DNA might even be different if a virus, or the sun, caused a mutatiom.
Not if that self-awareness is an property entirely attributable to it’s physical characteristics.
Which is why I’ve said (repeatedly) that it is UNPROVABLE. There IS NO valid test to prove that the person/soul/consciousness that comes out of the transporter is the same one that went in. It can’t be done. To say that you and you-prime are the same person is a matter of FAITH, not science. You may believe it to be true; there’s absolutely NO way you can prove it.
I would not go. I believe it disintegrates the original and creates a duplicate on the other end. The discussion of continuity reminds me of the old movie “Invasion of the Body Snatchers” with the pod placed under the bed. The “new you” may be identical and may have all your memories and such but… it’s not you.
What if it was a better you? Smarter, stronger, more resistant to injury or disease. would you willing lie down on the bed and go to sleep if the death to you was painless?
No. Hell no. It isn’t me.
Use the transporter to materialize water from a flood zone to a desert farm area and take the semi’s and most of the trains out of service while transporting goods.
But if the “Other Side” gets it first, we must launch a full nuclear first-strike because they can send warheads into any place in the world without warning and follow with troop transport without sign of military movement.
So, all in all, I can wait.
I’m sure Q could tell. And a Vulcan or Betazoid might be able to. That is, if there is a soul whose existence is detectable telepathically, then it might be perceptible throughout the process–particularly to joined Vulcans. Maybe all the humans are taking the Vulcans word for it.
“Are you out of your Vulcan mind?!”
Dr. Leonard McCoy
I don’t think this really makes a difference. Consider this scenario: You dissolve me in a big vat of acid. Then you filter out the molecules that formerly made up my body, and somehow reconstruct me with them. (Let’s say that you use nanotechnology to do this.) No matter how perfect the “new me” is, he’s not the same person as the me who died. That’s because my body was completely obliterated, and my consciousness went with it. The transporter works the same way. When Kirk or Picard is converted into energy, his body is totally destroyed. The fact that the same energy is used to make his clone is a nice touch, but it doesn’t change the fact that the new guy is just a clone of the original.
The difference between transporters and replicators is basically just their programming. If they were willing to do so, the Federation could easily create a ship that replicates its crew members. In fact, that could make for a great episode if they ever create a series that’s set after Deep Space 9 and Voyager. It would be hard sci-fi, exploring the implications of such a system. On the plus side, casualties could be replaced quickly and easily, and you’d always know exactly how competent a crew member is in a certain area, because he’s just like the last guy. But on the down side, each individual crew member’s life would be totally worthless, since it would be trivially easy to replace him or her. I’d imagine that the crew would soon end up as little more than chattel slaves. For a dangerous away mission, the captain might beam down dozens of crew members, without the slightest concern for if any of them survived. He might even send down a clone of himself, who would almost certainly never see the ship again. For the next away mission, just create another clone of the captain to lead the mission. The new clone doesn’t need to know what happened to his predecessor. In other matters, safety systems would probably be neglected, because any casualties could be replaced with new clones. For that matter, there wouldn’t be any reason to have a doctor at all! If someone gets hurt, you can “rejuvenate” them in the replicating chamber. (In reality, this would consist of disintegrating the injured person and replicating a replacement, but they don’t have to know that.) Alternatively, the Federation might try to develop a philosophy that thinks of rejuvenation as a kinda of reincarnation.
I disagree. Identity (whether of of an idividual, a ship, or an axe that’s had its handle replaced five times and its head twice*) is a matter neither of science, nor of faith, but of SEMANTICS.
If we know that a transporter works, then we know all of the relevant FACTS. We know that a certain lump of matter existing at a certain point in spacetime has various properties, including a structure that encodes various memories and experiences and beliefs, including the belief that that lump is an individual named, say, Alan Smithee. We know that another lump of matter has the same properties, and exists at a different point in space time. If we know how the transporter works, we know the relationship between the lump of matter at each point in space time, and how that relationship is similar to and different than the relationship between the first lump of matter and the one that exists at approximately the same point in space relative to the Earth and a point in time one second prior. We could, in theory, know everything knowable about every relevant lump of matter and quantum of energy at every point in spacetime. We wouldn’t have to believe anything on faith, because we would already have every piece of information that exists, including the conscious subjective experience of every relevant conscious subject.
At one point, a lump of matter existed that had whatever relevant properties go into making up Alan Smithee, and at another point, a different lump of matter existed with the same properties. Perhaps the two had overlapping light-cones; perhaps they didn’t. The only thing we don’t know is what to say about it. Do we call them two Alan Smithees, or one Alan Smithee, or one Alan Smithee and one something else. That’s what we don’t know. Everything else can be postulated as known scientifically without answering that question, because the answer is entirely up to us.
FOOTNOTE TO ABOVE:
Reading the OP, I was just worried about malfunction. Maybe fraud, for I trust no one.
I’m stunned that the overwhelming majority of the thread has been people objecting to it on the grounds that “It isn’t me!” Not that, in the case of it actually happening, I couldn’t hit upon that as an excuse not to try it, but I’m amazed that so many people are hung up on that.
As for the OP’s question: It would depend on the mood I find myself in. If I be my happy-go-lucky death-wish self, why not? If I be a bit more nervous & self-preserving, I would so chicken out.
[digression]
However: If you had a duplicator, & I could get someone to run me through it, say, 8 times without “achieving balance” by destroying the original, I would so do it. This way I can pursue all my contradictory dreams. I’ve wanted that since I was a kid.
Let’s see, one me can be a novelist, one the next Herb Ritts; one or two can go to Africa & hunt elephant poachers; one can direct porn; one can experiment with mind-altering chemicals without addicting the others; & one can go way underground, possibly altering his appearance drastically, in an attempt to be the world’s greatest assassin/provocateur. Most of us would consider plastic surgery to differentiate ourselves, but there are reasons both for & against.
but you don’t get to pursue your dreams. your clones / twins / brothers / blood / whatever do.
Based on this line of reasoning, should anyone ever travel by car? Obviously the person who got out of the car is similar to the person who got in to the car. But even though the person thinks he is the same person, there are slight but detectable differences. So arguably the person who entered the car is dead and has been replaced by the person who emerged.
Well that is certainly one perspective. Of course, there are differences between you at one point in time, and you at another point in time, regardless of whether you get in a car or not, so it isn’t a reason for not traveling. But it does cast doubt on the idea of personal identity and continuity of being.
OTOH, we seem to be the same person at different points in time in some significant and meaningful way, despite the clear differences. If we accept that as the case, then the question becomes what that identity is based on and how we define it. Depending on the answer, you may then find that you maintain your identity across some experiences but not others (perhaps, for example: coma, sleep, severe brain injury, loss of memory, dementia, or transporter accidents), or you may find that your monozygotic twin, biological clone, memories downloaded to a computer chip, android duplicate, and cryogenically frozen corpse are all you, just as much as the person who steps out of the transporter or gets out of your Toyota.
If subjective identity is just an illusion that works, I don’t see why we have a problem. Firstly, of course, let’s assume for the sake of simplicity that there is no such thing as an immortal soul that goes somewhere after you’re dead. In the Star Trek universe, this has most likely been proven beyond doubt, and people don’t have a problem with it.
Imagine the following: Transporter technology has in fact recently been invented, last week, in a top-secret government program. However, before unleashing the technology on the public and driving airlines out of business, the government agency in question has decided to do some… tests.
The following may come as a shock to you, but stay with me: Last night, after you had fallen asleep, a team of agents came to your house and sneaked into your bedroom. They released a sedative gas into the room to prevent to from waking up. Then, they scanned a perfect copy of your dormant self onto a computer chip. Next step - they vaporized you, or dragged your body outside and shot you in the head - it makes no difference, as you weren’t aware of any of this. Bye, bye - you’re dead.
Next, they created a perfect copy of you, sedated and everything, from the information on the chip, and put that in your bed. This morning, you woke up and went to work, as usual, with no recollection or knowledge that you had in fact been killed and replaced with a clone during the course of the night - all you have today is a slight and somewhat puzzling hangover (hey, the technology isn’t perfect yet). Well, you take an aspirin, go about your business, and never suspect a thing. The new you has all the memories of the old you. As far as you are concerned, identity has been preserved. Yesterday’s you had no experience of croaking*****, and you (that is, today’s you) have no idea that you just came into existence last night. As far as you’re concerned, everything is just dandy. I mean, barring the fact that it’s obviously completely unlikely, is there even any way for you to be sure that this scenario didn’t happen to you last night? Does it make any difference to your sense of self if it really did happen or not?
(***** I’m putting this part in just to be nice. Obviously, it doesn’t really make any difference to the scenario if they had instead, just for kicks, woken you up and dragged you kicking and screaming out into the street, before proceeding to club you to death with baseball bats, as long as they scanned you onto the chip first).
I think I just figured out where the food replicators get their raw material. The away team, it’s what’s for dinner.
indeed. just because your replacement / your family and friends / everyone else* knows no better, it doesn’t hide the fact that you’re dead. ignorance is no excuse.
let’s change your hypothetical abit. say there’s a new government health initiative to replace it’s citizens with a better model who are partial with the colour red. they could for example dress it up as a cure-all machine (step in sick, step out healthy) or they could come right out and explain how it works. that should work out okay right? after all with the number of people willing to use teleporters despite knowing what it entails people should be okay with turning themselves in to the scrapyard for an upgrade… right?? 
I read a science fiction story about a related idea. The concept was that there was a device called a jewel. It was implanted in your head when you were an infant. It then spend years recording all your thoughts, memories, and feelings. Because it was absorbing these, it became a duplicate of your brain. But unlike an organic brain, the jewels never wore out. So some time when you were in your twnties or thirties when your physcial brain was at its peak and before it had a chance to start fading, you would go to a doctor. And he would scoop out your brain and destroy it. Then he’d put in some neutral sponge like material to fill your skull. And then he’d turn your jewel on to broadcast. And from that point on it would be your jewel not your brain that would be “you”.
The protagonist of the story was a guy who worried that his jewel was not a exact duplicate of his brain and that if he let the doctor remove his brain he would in reality be committing suicide. Of course his jewel personality would never think so; it would believe he was the same person.
I read The Jaunt. No thanks.