Quick version of the facts. Some dude walks up and punches a man because he sees him kissing another man. The State prosecutes him under a hate crimes statute that prevents discrimination based on “sex.” This Justice has ruled against me twice prior, but he is right on this:
Yes, it would be a safe assumption. But was his act discriminatory against men in general, or only because that particular man had a sexual orientation he did not like…a category not protected by statute.
I agree with the OP. While a hate crime law ideally should include protection for people victimized because of their sexual orientation, West Virginia Code § 61-6-21(b) does not. It protects people against crimes “committed against their persons or property because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or sex.” I agree with the judge that in this context the plain reading of sex is gender not sexual orientation.
Are you sure you wanted to use the word ‘gender’ here? Arguing that sex does not encompass orientation is plausible. Arguing the same about gender is going to go poorly.
I’m generally not in favor of hate crime laws. The assailant is already subject to several felony charges, so a hate crime addition should be superfluous. However, in these kinds of cases I always fear a slap on the wrist punishment (like time served and public service) from a sympathetic judge. I’m not sure how to reconcile these two views.
The Payne case is pending cert in the U.S. Supreme Court. The local law school clinic took it from me (after I called them and pressed for it ) They’ve got a hard hitting appellate firm in D.C. doing the official pleadings. Probably a 10% chance of being granted.
The logic I see is that some people are disproportionately threatened by crimes because they belong to some group that criminals target. So this additional layer of threat justifies an additional layer of legal protection.
Not to Monday morning quarterback, but (in Payne) there was no post-verdict motion for a new trial? In Virginia we have the dread Rule 5A:18, which basically says if you don’t do that you’re stuck arguing plain error on appeal.