Yeah, the job of the WV Supreme Court is to apply the laws of the State as passed by the legislature, with respect to relevant portions of the State and Federal constitutions and precedent, and while there’s an argument you can make on either side of having hate crime laws it’s clear that sexual orientation isn’t a relevant class in WV hate crime law so the Supreme Court had very little proper leeway to rule otherwise.
Do you have a cite for that?
Legal question:
The hate crime statute in question reads:
If any person does by force or threat of force, willfully injure, intimidate or interfere with, or attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with, or oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of the state of West Virginia or by the Constitution or laws of the United States, because of such other person’s race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or sex, he or she shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Does “because of…sex” include deviation from traditional gender roles, which would apply to some men (or women) and not others, or must it be a hatred for all men (or women)?
These law really are not a model of clarity. What if I punch someone because I saw them coming out of a Trump rally? Is that “political affiliation”? What if I said I would have punched any Republican or Democrat who attended the rally, so I was not motivated by an individual’s party choice, only my hatred of Trump voters?
What if a criminal has some old fashioned unusual ethic that when he attacks people, it will only be men as he “does not hit women.” Is that eligible for the enhancement?
If it is, then are we faced with the silly prospect of telling this guy that he is committing a serious felony by only attacking men, that for the good of society, he must start punching women as well. If he does that, his crimes are now misdemeanors instead of felonies. That’s absurd.
There is a case going through Federal courts right now that hinges on the very question you ask. The 7th Circuit made a ruling that it was.
A further hypo: Suppose I am a criminal looking for someone to rob on Sunday morning. The banks are closed, but as I am driving by, I see a large church in session. I know that they take a lot in the collection plate. So, I go in an steal.
Did I steal “because of…religion”? In a way, I did; it was Sunday, there was money to be had. If that was a skating rink that was closed, I wouldn’t have broken in. I knew that the Christian religion, with its policy of meeting on Sunday mornings, gave me an opportunity to steal.
But that seems to not fit the purpose of the law which undeniably only meant to prevent me from committing senseless acts of violence because of my personal hatred against Jews, Catholics, etc.
These laws have the potential to be applied unfairly broad, and I think that the Court did the proper thing by restraining its application.
No, the law is not encouraging anyone to commit crimes. It’s against the law to punch people, male or female.
But there’s also the reality that people like Stewart Butler exist. They don’t commit crimes based on a general desire to commit crimes. They commit crimes based on their hatred for members of a specific group.
By enacting hate crime laws, society isn’t telling Stewart Butler we want him to start punching straight people. Society is telling him we want him to stop punching gay people. Hate crime laws are a response to the existence of hate crimes.
And a month earlier, the 11th Circuit ruled that it wasn’t.
Similar to the argument defending this decision, Congress has specifically declined to add sexual orientation to the federal anti-discrimination laws.
Of course society doesn’t tell Butler to start punching straight people. It would, of course, encourage him not to punch anyone. However, the way the system is set up, if he’s going to punch anyone, he should punch everyone indiscriminately as he would suffer less of a penalty than if he only punched gay people.
This result directly flows from hate crime laws.
No, that isn’t a reasonably expected result. Sure, you are giving a logic chain that holds together but only if we ignore how humans actually work. People like Butler aren’t going to make the conscious decision that “hey, I really want to punch gay guys but the only way to beat the hate crime laws is to punch everybody and just hope I get lucky and manage to hit a few gay guys”
And we can all guess how the current Supreme Court will rule, sadly.
While I think the 7th Circuit is correct to rule as it did, you’ll get nothing from me supporting hate crime enhancements in general, for the very reasons you describe. It’s hard enough to prove criminal intent, reliably assessing someone’s exact motives for a crime adds a whole other layer.
Some of us hope that they’ll faithfully interpret the law written by Congress. Why is that worthy of a “sadly” in your mind? If you want the law changed, petition Congress to do it, don’t hope that the SCOTUS will make something up for you.
Because for most of us, the suffering of our fellow human beings IS sad.
No, laws do not cause crimes. That’s a ridiculous conclusion. Laws punish crimes and by doing so deter the commission of crimes.
People like Stewart Butler aren’t punching people, straight or gay, because it’s illegal. They’re punching people for their own reasons. Laws against punching people are a response to the crime; the crimes are not a response to the law.
Butler isn’t indiscriminately punching people. He’s deliberately punching gay men. So the law follows the crime.
Or to put it as I indicated in my admittedly terse response to Miller, the two cases aren’t even remotely apposite. When the KKK person lynches the black person, it matters not whether the reason is because the black person is uppity or not, or whether the message is for “uppity” blacks or not. “Uppity” inherently requires “blackness” (you can’t be “uppity” and “white”, because “whites” don’t have any “up” to go). Therefore, there’s no true distinction to be made.
But in the case of males and homosexuals, it matters not which direction we look, because “homosexuality” doesn’t require “maleness”. If I lynch the male homosexual, it’s not going to be intended to send a message to “males” in general, because homosexuality isn’t something that requires being “male”. Thus, the two situations aren’t in any way equivalent, except for the surface similarity of one group having some members that are a subset of the other.
Isn’t the message “Men, don’t kiss other men”? Like I said above, this seems like a case of enforcing traditional gender roles: men are allowed to kiss people, just not other men.
Further, I think the statute itself references the idea that this kind of violence is aimed at controlling behavior:
any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him or her by the Constitution or laws of the state of West Virginia or by the Constitution or laws of the United States…
Medgar Evers, for example, wasn’t murdered for being black, but for using the law to challenge the system that kept black people excluded from white society.
Yes, thank you, that is in fact what I meant. Further, I meant that ‘gender’ is a complex, multifaceted societal construct that definitely does include sexual orientation. If the law said ‘gender’, I would argue that it definitely did apply to the situation in the case. Because it says ‘sex’ (and not ‘gender’ or ‘sex or sexual orientation’), I think the judgement of the court is a reasonable one.
Of course, I would very much like the state legislature to correct this law so that it would apply this situation, but that’s a different question.
Wow. No, that’s not even slightly correct. “Uppity” absolutely can be applied to white people - usually white women, but certainly any lower class white person who puts on airs can (and, historically, has been) described as uppity. In the specific case of racial violence against black Americans, though, “uppity” almost always meant, “acting like he’s as good as a white person.” A white man who shakes a white woman’s hand will not be attacked. A black man who shakes a woman’s hand will be attacked. The sole distinction between the two situations reveals the locus of discrimination: the color of the actor involved.
Now, apply a similar syllogism to the situation at hand. A woman kissing a man will not be attacked. A man kissing a man will be attacked. What is the distinction between those two situations? What is the locus of discrimination?
Lynching absolutely sends a message to other males: don’t be gay. Or, more generally, don’t violate established social norms regarding acceptable expressions of masculinity. The assailant in this case saw two men engaging in behavior he believed men should not engage in, and attacked them for it. This is not, I would argue, something that affects only the gay community. Witness, for example, the extent some straight men go through in order to not be seen as gay. How many straight guys out there won’t wear a pink shirt? Why? At least in part, out of fear of how they’ll be treated by other men for violating a masculinity norm.
I tried to hint at this next point in my previous post, but using the KKK in my example may have obscured it. But bigots - even violent bigots, like the Klan - generally are not genocidal. Even the most inveterate, knuckle-dragging cross burner will argue that he’s okay with black people who “know their place.” This dichotomy is even more stark when it comes to sexism. The number of people out there who actively, violently hate everyone of a particular gender is very, very small. Instead, you have people who are able to maintain normal, non-violent relations with women who are willing to stick to particular roles and behaviors, and who react violently to women who do not.
The compelling argument against my position - which you have not managed to come any where near - is intent. The West Virginia legislature almost certainly did not intend to protect queers when they passed this law, and their steadfast refusal (the chicken-dicked motherfuckers) to adopt protective legislation for their queer citizen seals the question. The decision is correct, I think, on the merits of the law as its drafters clearly intended.
Not, god help us all, because “white people can’t be uppity.”