WWI: exactly how did it start?

One of my college professors (who was not a WWI specialist) opined that both sides were near exhaustion, and that the US entry tipped the scales. (Or broke the camel’s back.)

On the other hand, I have read of famine in the Central Powers countries, while the Triple Entente countries could import food from overseas. So Germany’s defeat might have been inevitable.

On the other hand, the collapse of Russia might have given Germany a second wind, or at least a chance to negotiate better terms for peace.

I think that it could have gone off on many different tangents.

… Or if you don’t like history.

I’m strictly a STEM person. History never really interested me. I’ve subscribed to Dan Carlin’s Hardcore History podcast for quite a while now. When I first saw this episode appear, I delayed starting it because 3 hours seemed like an awfully long time for a podcast. When I started it, it became one of those podcasts that, when I got home, I’d drive around the block a few times because I was at a really interesting part. I’d eventually have to just stop because it was all interesting parts.

I really recommend this series, and everything else I’ve heard Dan Carlin do on history.

J.

The short answer is that Germany was itching for a fight with France. The assassination was nothing. If Germany hadn’t wanted a war with France there would have been a lot of words, but nothing. But when it looked like war was possible, Germany begins mobilizing, and staff officers all over Germany are breaking open the seals on their part of the Schlieffen plan. And with Germany mobilizing France mobilizes.

These mobilizations are the key factor in the war. Everyone can see that the sheer sizes of national armies in 1914 is much larger by far than anything in the past, and that due to modern transportation and communication armies can be assembled in weeks. And if you have a massively mobilized army sitting around, and the other guy doesn’t, you can just walk in and brush past the standing army defenses. But of course this massively mobilized army is horrendously expensive, since you are taking the bulk of the productive work force of the country and forming an army out of it.

So you absolutely cannot have your mobilized army sitting there for nothing, the country will be ruined. Either they fight, or they go home. But if they go home, what happens when the other guy mobilizes, and now you’re reversing your mobilization? You can’t, the mobilization plans can’t work ad hoc, you need extensive planning to get troops and horses and gear to the right place at the right time. So the logic of the situation says that as soon as you possibly can you must attack. And the thinking of the time was that the attackers had every advantage over the defenders. Fortifications were all well and good, but could be crushed or bypassed at will by concentrations of attackers.

And looking at how the Germans brushed through Belgium they were perfectly right. The Belgian forts were reduced within a few days. Of course the Germans are going through Belgium so they don’t have to attack the fortifications in France, but even in southern France they are making progress. But of course the main push is through Belgium and on to Paris, everything else is a delaying action with all possible strength put on this offensive.

And the thing is, the Schlieffen plan very nearly worked, the French were on the very ragged edge of collapse when the German offensive faltered. It really could have been the short sharp victorious war and back home for Christmas that everyone expected, it would have been that if the Germans had got to Paris. Compare and contrast WWI, where the offensive halted just outside Paris, and WWII, where the Germans take Paris and France falls and everyone is home for Christmas just in time to be sent to Russia.

Everyone makes a big deal of the trench warfare and how in WWI technology favored the defense. Except at the beginning of the war this wasn’t so. You need massive defense in depth to neutralize the attackers, if they can break through your lines to your rear they can just march on Paris or cut your supply lines. You cannot just sit there and let them attack you. In the early war the massively prepared fortifications don’t exist yet–or rather, there were fortifications but they were bypassed and the French troops manning the border fortifications are useless because they aren’t being attacked, the vast bulk of the German army is pouring through Belgium and into your rear. To be effective you have to abandon your positions and head north to meet the German offensive, except when you do that you don’t have massive trenches, machine gun nests, barbed wire and artillery behind you, you’re marching for days until you flop down exhausted in the mud and have a few hours to dig a hole for yourself.

Your only hope is that the Germans attacking you have been marching for weeks and are utterly exhausted themselves. The army that crushed Belgium like a grape is out of food, ammo, sleep, the men can barely walk. But the same with the French defenders. It came down to a coin flip, and the German advance halted, unable to go on. But if they had managed to scrape up a tiny bit more strength, and Paris had fallen, then all this modern talk about the futility of bravery in the face of machine guns would have never happened. Instead it would all be about elan, and how with enough elan and spirit you could accomplish anything.

And the history of Germany’s quick victories in early WWII show this is quite right. The technology 20 years later wasn’t that radically different, and machine guns still didn’t care how brave you were. Except the Germans managed to smash through country after country, destroying their ability to mount a defense, in just a few weeks. The only time this didn’t work was against Russia.

Her writing might not be up to Tuchman’s standard but for me her’s is the better history. It is wider reaching and more nuanced. Apart from anything else it is based on 50 years more research and scholarship and historical understanding does move on. Always remember historians are writing at a specific point in time - the concerns of a historian in 1962, only 17 years after the end of WW2, are different to one in 2013, 24 years after the end of the Cold War.

But why was Germany itching for a fight with France? They won in 1870. They marched over France, they took Alsace and Lorraine; I can see why France was itching for a rematch, but why Germany? I assume they pulled out of France after 1871 because they realized you can’t run the biggest country in Europe as an occupied power without serious cost to the Fatherland? What would be different in 1914?

Outstanding! Thanks for sharing (the last sentence is priceless).

The new German Stormtrooper tactics had been winning for them. Everyone was exhausted. Likely there would have been a brokered peace, with Germany getting it’s gains in Russia, but having to give everything in the West back to Pre-war.

In the end, this actually would have been a Good Thing.

Note also that* everyone* thought it would be a easy victory and a short war with “the boys back by Christmas”.

Close, but we can change:Britain, France and America agree that Germany threw the first punch, so the whole thing is Germany’s fault. While Germany is still unconscious, Britain& France go through its pockets, steal its wallet, and buy drinks for all their friends. America says this is a perfect opportunity for World Peace, refuses the drinks. America then says it will make everyone play nice from now on, but when America calls home the wife nixes the plan.

Meanwhile, Germany nurses a grudge over being “betrayed” .

France was isolated and weakened in 1871 and Germany had alliances with Austria-Hungary and Russia. So Germany didn’t worry about French enmity over the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.

But France dug in and got to work. It repaid its reparations ahead of schedule and rebuild its economy and its military. It began working on establishing alliances with other great powers like Russia and Britain.

So the hostility between Germany and France endured but the balance of power between them was shifting. Germany saw the war as a pre-emptive necessity. They had to attack France now before France became so strong it would attack them.

Not Kitchener. He was the only significant figure in 1914 who expected it would be a long war and made plans accordingly.

I actually think the cause of it being a World War instead of yet another Euro war is Kaiser Willy and his withered arm.

Kaiser Bill always had a complex due to this issue. And his favorite GrandMother, Victoria had a big cool navy. and even made him a Admiral in it.

Meanwhile, Bismark came up with the idea of Kreuzerkrieg. Build just enough dreadnoughts to squish the French Navy, and a host of coastal defence ships and long range cruisers.

Great Britain would want to stay out of a war, since she couldnt attack Germany directly due to the coastal fleet, and the Kreuzerkrieg would cost the British millions to fight. More importantly, that fleet was not a threat to British rule of the high seas.

That idiot Kaiser Willie changed this by building The High Seas Fleet. Now, Germany was a threat. A threat that had to be taken care of. But he didnt manage to quite build a fleet that could wrest control.

This also cost many Marks, which could have built up the Army.

You’re right. I did oversimplify that. France was the one itching to fight Germany; “revanche” (“revenge”) was the watchword and the return of Alsace Lorraine loomed large in French political and military thinking.

Germany was less interested in fighting France, but they were committed to the Von Schlieffen plan (a quick defeat for France, then move the troops to stop Russia, who would mobilize more slowly) for a two-front war. Their war plan required a fight with France first, and if they delayed and fought only Russia, a later French entry would have left them extremely vulnerable. So they had to declare war in order to prevent France from jumping in after they were committed to Russia and didn’t have the troops in the west.

France was happy that Germany declared war on her.

The Germans had lost the war. The troops were hungry, and the artillary was worn out. They were hanging on in the hope that the Americans would force a negotiated peace.

The English had won. They were refusing a negotiated peace, in the hopes that the Americans would come in and force an absolute surrender.

The Americans declared on the English side. The Germans folded. The English/French got an abject, but not absolute, surrender. The Americans put in a token appearance.

Historical note: Before WWII, the term “revisionist historian” was applied to historians who thought that Russia was morally responsible for WWI.

The German decision to get into a naval race with Britain was stupid. One of the colossal errors of the twentieth century.

Britain and Germany were approximately equal in wealth. But Britain needed naval superiority while Germany only wanted it, No matter how much Germany spent on ship building, Britain was going to spend more to stay ahead. And Germany didn’t have the money to outspend Britain. So it was a race they couldn’t win.

Even trying to compete cost a fortune. Germany was diverting money from its army to its navy. Which was stupid. As I said above, a navy was a luxury for Germany but with enemy nations on both sides, an army was a necessity.

And the naval race drove Britain, which historically had been friendly with Germany, Austria, and Italy, into an alliance with France and Russia, two of its traditional enemies.

I scanned all the way through this thread to make sure I hadn’t been scooped on this. It’s a dissertation by the Extra Credits crew, of all ruddy people, about the causes and origins of World War 1, going more-or-less day-by-day. It’s a four-part video series, of which this is the first part of a playlist that includes other videos:

Also on Youtube, by Crash Course, is a single video explaining the causes and covering much of the same ground, but from a more scholarly and less dramatic perspective. It continues on to another episode about who started the war.

I recommend them both highly.

I don’t think so. It wasn’t a question of number of troops. The problem with the Schlieffen Plan was logistical, in that there was no way to get enough supplies to the front to keep up with the speed of the advance. (Schlieffen’s original plan didn’t take logistics into account at all. Moltke tried, but it was incomplete.)

     Fully agree with you. What I meant by "Tuchman is better" is that her storytelling is much more gripping. I mean, I already knew that the first month of the war ended with the German defeat on Marne, yet the book read almost like a fiction novel while staying (as far as I can tell) factually accurate. I think Tuchman's is also better at describing people and their motivations; by the end of the book I grew quite fond of the guy commanding the 5th French Army (Lanrezac, IIRC), who understood that he was facing the bulk of the German offensive and he was risking annihilation if he simply stood and fought. Without his fighting retreat the miracle on Marne would probably not have happened.  His (Lanrezac's) is a story about having the right people in the right place (in his case by chance, not by design by the French HQ) and what role this can play in war. Also interesting, he was not in command anymore during Marne. 

  MacMillan also relies a lot on describing key people (mostly diplomats and other civilian figures), how they acted and what where their ambitions, including their backgrounds (education, family ties). But, while reading her book, I found myself wondering several times "What kind of story would have Tuchman's wrote out of all this?". Otherwise, MacMillan's book is very insightful. Definitely worth reading.

I think the Tuchman book is also interesting precisely because of the context in which is was written. I don’t know if it was intentional, but obviously part of why it unexpectedly became such a big best seller is that people saw parallels between the situation in 1914 and 1962. In both cases, there were two huge power blocks that supposedly had each other in check militarily, and much of the German strategy for the war was that a devastating early attack before the enemy could mobilize could overcome the stalemate. This wasn’t too different from people who in 1962 were still claiming you could win a nuclear war with basically the same strategy.

It’s all about perception:

Germany (or, if you will, the Kaiser) felt surrounded by enemies, and that Germany, even though it was a first class industrial power, was not afforded the respect that it deserved.

France had been beaten in 1870, yes, but had formed a formal alliance with Russia in 1894.

Even though Russia had been defeated by Japan in 1905, Russia appeared to be engaged in some reforms of it’s army and command systems that might spell trouble after 1916/7. Russia was also laying down more miles of rail lines per year than any other power, and it’s industrialization also appeared to picking up steam. Time seemed to be on Russia’s side, here.

Great Britain had been pushed into the French camp, as well, primarily due to the four German Naval Laws. (A war between Germany and France or Russia would be determined on land, not at sea. So by building the worlds second largest battle fleet, Germany appeared to be making a direct threat against England.)

There were various geo-political crises that the Kaiser perceived to have highlighted Germany’s “weakness” on the diplomatic stage, particularly Morocco of 1912.

Considering the potential internal weaknesses perceived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as the Ottoman Empire, some of the leadership in Germany felt that if war was inevitable, it would be better to fight a war now than to wait until it’s enemies were stronger, and her allies weakened (or gone).

While almost all of the leaders thought that the war would be quick (due to the lethality of their army’s and their weapons), the industrialization of Europe, and the huge growth of it’s population (iirc it doubled in the 19th century), this meant that if a country chose to fight to the bitter end, these countries could absorb huge casualties, and still keep fighting. The industrial and scientific revolutions provided the means for the great powers to be able to (once the infrastructure was built) field and supply millions of men in their armies. In a single generation, Germany was able to field an army three times the size of that which it sent to war against France in 1870!

Somewhat off topic, but in 1962 it was still (just barely) possible to consider a nuclear war “winnable” in General Turgidson’s sense of “I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed, but-”. At the time there were no MIRVs, so countering missiles with missiles was a zero-sum game: you could expend all your missiles trying to preemptively take out the other side’s missiles, but given comparatively low yield and accuracy problems against hardened targets, you would almost certainly miss some or even many; or you could devote missiles to other targets at the cost of leaving yourself open to a swift counter-attack. Only bombers could carry the big multi-megaton devices favored for guaranteed one-shot kills, and they were slow and easier to intercept. One could envision a nuclear war that “depending on the breaks” would cost the winning side something less than national extinction.