If the emperor decide to Hulk-out and flex his (supposed) authority could he have done so and stopped the war before it started?
As I understand it, that’s actually a highly contentious point.
At the end of the war, the one issue where there seems to have been a consensus among the Japanese political and military elite was the need to preserve the monarchy, in some fashion. In turn, to them, that meant preserving the current sitting monarch.
For those purposes, it was extremely convenient to portray the Emperor as a ceremonial figurehead with no real power, who was therefore not directly involved in war preparations, planning, or decisions, and thus by definition, not guilty of war crimes, crimes against the peace, or crimes against humanity. For those same purposes, it was also extremely convenient to portray the Emperor as finally, at the end, actually exercising his authority to end the war.
As I understand, there have been revisionist histories since the end of the war that have cast that portrayal into doubt. The Japanese Emperor in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s was definitely not an autocrat ala Hitler or Stalin, but it’s a lot less clear if he was truly a ceremonial figurehead, or if he actually had significant power in Japans convoluted decision-making structure. And, again, it’s my understanding that those revisionist histories have implicated Hirohito as being, if not the architect of Japan’s imperial expansion, at the least a willing and enthusiastic participant.
But, again, it was in everyone’s interest at the end of the war to act as if he had only been a figurehead. Not just Japanese conservatives, but also the American occupation authorities, who quickly came to see the monarchy as a vital stabilizing influence, a bulwark against communist agitation and Soviet influence. And, of course, the interests of Hirohito himself.
Fortunately (for FDR) I think it would have not been more than a speed bump in the way of the US declaring war on Germany. Aside from the moral argument, Germany couldn’t offer the US any aid against Japan, and the Commonwealth could and did. And Hitler was so eager to declare war on the US, it’s surprising he waited until Pearl Harbor.
OK, I understand why you mean, but actually while the embargo was a shock, it wasn’t completely a bolt out of the blue.
The military and government of Japan had been discussing all sorts of scenarios from well before July when the US imposed the freeze on Japanese assets and then August 1st when the complete oil embargo was enacted. There had already been over a year of economic measures by the US towards Japan, including cutting off shipments of scrap iron, steel, and aviation fuel to Japan in July 1940. Japan was dependent on the US for iron and steel, and it affected their war time performance.
Before Japan advanced into Southern Indochina, the military and government had had extensive discussions if that would cause further reactions from the US, including an oil embargo, or even war.
It seems to be that the US was more shocked by the attack at Pearl Harbor. The US was expecting that the Japanese were going to do something, but thought it would be limited to Southeast Asia and possibly the Philippines. They were completely caught off guard by the ability of the IJN to sail to Hawaii and cause that degree of destruction. The military was still in peacetime mode and switching to a war footing overnight did cause the reaction you described.
For the Japanese, it wasn’t so much that it was completely unexpected, it was that it forced them into clear choices of damned if you do or damned if you don’t. They were convinced that losing that would be losing their way of life. Lose their dreams of being a major power, (which they believed they were entitled to) or go to war and possibly get destroyed. They believed that caving to the US would put them subservient to the States. Either way, they felt it was an impossible situation, but at least there may be a chance to win by fighting. If they were going to die, it was better to die fighting.
They were convinced that losing that would be losing their way of life.
Up until recently “their way of life” hadnt included aggressive imperialism, the invasion of China with the Rape of Nanking, etc was hardly their way of life. That “way of life” wasnt even a generation old yet.
They could have, should have- withdrawn from China. It was a morass anyway, they were losing.
Is it wrong that I can’t help but draw a line from this to Atreyu’s challenge to G’mork at the approach of the Nothing?
After all, it’s better to go with one’s codpiece buttoned.
d&r
Well… yes, DrDeth, you can say that, and we all agree what they were doing was bad. But the Japanese military leaders of 1941 did not see it that way. Withdrawal from China was not an option to them; that was admitting total defeat and failure, and might well have resulted in the overthrow of the Japanese apparatus of state and their own deaths.
Sure. But the idea that somehow the USA forced them to attack us is bogus. Shattered Sword makes it clear that the war in China was hugely unpopular in Japan. Imperial Japan had changed strategy before, when after Zhukov trounced them, they abandoned the Northern Strategy. So, yes, they could have withdrawn to Manchukuo. They pulled back out of Russia, they had admitted total defeat and failure. So changing direction and strategy wasnt impossible.
Also in the back of Shattered Sword is a analysis of the “invasion” of Midway. Even if fully supported and the IJN had won at Midway, the landings would have been a total failure. The landing forces were actually slightly outnumbered by the defenders who had heavy weapons, etc, and we well dug in.
I agree that Singapore is the obvious model for the “successful invasion of Midway”, but Percival lost because (a) troops defending Malaysia were peace-time soldiers, and (b) his air cover had been removed to Russia.
The city was bombed and the water supply broken: disease was expected. He would have been defending surrounded by a major city of dying civilians: even given that the Japanese commenced a genocide of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia, the opinion in Singapore now is not negative like it is in Australia.
I have no idea what you mean by “peace-time soldiers”. As far as I am aware, they were soldiers, and better-trained than their Japanese opponents. Percival was not deficient in artillery, and had a better than two-to-one advantage in manpower. The Japanese forces did achieve air superiority but lacked the firepower to exploit it. Meanwhile their ground units were taking severe casualties. Adding to this, their supplies were in a critical state just before surrender, and they would likely have to be withdrawn as they couldn’t sustain a long campaign. Gen. Yamashita was straight bluffing with his demands; Percival fought stupidly, then retreated until he pinned himself and finally convinced himself that no counter-attack was possible.
Finally, Percival managed the surrender so badly that his troops were turned into slave labor for years, and thousands died miserable deaths working for their conquerers in inhuman conditions. He made multiple, clearly identifiable mistakes in mismanaging the defences at Singapore, and he was actively warned about these errors by his subordinates.
I think part of the problem is the IJN had two objectives: destroy the American Fleet that would respond to the threat and occupy Midway. If the battle had gone the way Japan thought it would it might have been accomplished but as it turned out, there is no way they could accomplish both simultaneously and their attempt to do so resulted in their loss.
Interesting fact about that. The lone dissenting vote was by Jeannette Rankin, the first woman elected to Congress who also voted against entering The Great War. Thus she is the only person to vote against the US entry into both World Wars.
An interesting question I don’t know the answer to is how much turnover there was in Congress between then. Were there 100 Congresspersons or only 3 who even had the opportunity to vote on both wars?
Even crazier fact, she served two terms total. 1916-1918; 1940-1942
A corrollary to “Half of success is just showing up” is that “Right place right time” is a very powerful factor in human affairs. And “Choosing the correct parents” is just a special case of “right place right time.”
If you read the Japanese accounts of the conquest of the Malay peninsula, the troops didn’t fight. When they were attacked, they fell back. That’s what I mean by ‘peace time soldiers’ – it’s not how Guadalcanal was held, or Italy taken.
The raw recruits in PNG got a lot of flack for falling back when attacked by the Japanese: their WWI commanders thought they should stand and die. But they were at the end of a long and hopelessly inadequate supply chain. The troops on the Malaysian peninsula were entrenched and supplied: they just fell back to Singapore rather than fight.
It is well known that Percival could have continued to fight. It would have meant the death of the civilians surrounding him, which would have placed his troops in a cess pit of pestilence. The people of Singapore seem to have a different opinion about that than the people of Australia.
Personally, I’ve never seen anything that suggests that Singapore would have had any actual value to the British/Americans/Australians. It had no air force, and there was no air force to place there at that stage of the war. Occupation by the Japanese meant the death of male military-age Chinese civilians, and the starvation of allied troops – who were going to starve anyway, who couldn’t be supplied, – and couldn’t even be withdrawn, because there was no way to do that.
And the Japanese didn’t need to ‘exploit’ their air superiority: the English had no armor, or air force, or artillery, bombing had broken the water mains in the city: apart from strafing the infantry, what else do you want them to do?
Percival could have attacked, re-taken the island, then what?
Everything is arguable, but he did come in #2 in our Worst Military Leaders game thread several years back 
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Thanks for sharing that! It was worth the time to listen to it… Sounds like a Hollywood slapstick farce!
: : Shrugs : :
No one here in this thread is arguing for the Japanese or downplaying the horrible nature of their wrongs. No one is saying that the war is America’s fault. If other people have argued that somewhere on the Internet or even on the Dope at other time, it’s irrelevant to this thread.
Yes, the Japanese were completely at fault. Let’s get that out of the way. They were terrible people and responsible for the death of millions. The US was not. That’s not the argument here and I’m not going to make that disclaimer every post.
However, the steps made by the US led to war. (Of course, Japan could have avoided if they had been willing to give up China, but they weren’t willing to, and this goes back to I’m not going to make this disclaimer every point.) However, many contemporary US leaders as well as historians point out that the demands the US was making were ones which Japan couldn’t have tolerated. Dan Carlin points out that the US would not have tolerated these actions if they imposed by other counties on her. I already pointed out that top US military leaders were opposed to those steps because they felt that those actions would lead to a war, and the US wasn’t ready for it.
At 58 pages of text, the paper, JAPAN’S DECISION FOR WAR IN 1941: SOME ENDURING LESSONS, by Jeffrey Record, an instructor at the Air War College and a defense expert, is not a 10 minute read, but he makes this point very convincingly.
(my bolding)
OTOH, it would have been a very difficult decision to postpone intervention in China and Southeast Asia, because moral people hate standing by while innocent people get killed or screwed over by others, especially if we are selling them the necessary material. Japan couldn’t have built their empire in China without US resources and it sucked being the country selling them the oil and iron they needed.