WWII: Battle of Midway...why couldn't the Japanese have pressed on and captured the island?

Great Debates
421

Yes, but you see that island was honeycombed with defenses, which obviously were impossible on Midway. We simply did not have that sort of time.

At Tarawa they had well over a year: wiki: A tremendous number of pill boxes and firing pits were constructed, with excellent fields of fire over the water and sandy shore. In the interior of the island was the command post and a number of large shelters designed to protect defenders from air attack and bombardment. …

The Japanese worked intensely for nearly a year to fortify the island.[10] To aid the garrison in the construction of the defenses, the 1,247 men of the 111th Pioneers, similar to the Seabees of the U.S. Navy, along with the 970 men of the Fourth Fleet’s construction battalion, were brought in. Approximately 1,200 of the men in these two groups were Korean laborers. The garrison itself was made up of forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Special Naval Landing Force was the marine component of the IJN, and were known by U.S. intelligence to be more highly trained, better disciplined, more tenacious and to have better small unit leadership than comparable units of the Imperial Japanese Army. The 3rd Special Base Defense Force assigned to Tarawa had a strength of 1,112 men. They were reinforced by the 7th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, with a strength of 1,497 men. It was commanded by Commander Takeo Sugai. This unit was bolstered by 14 Type 95 light tanks under the command of Ensign Ohtani.

A series of fourteen coastal defense guns, including four large Vickers 8-inch guns purchased during the Russo-Japanese War from the British,[4] were secured in concrete bunkers around the island to guard the open water approaches. It was thought these big guns would make it very difficult for a landing force to enter the lagoon and attack the island from the north side. The island had a total of 500 pillboxes or “stockades” built from logs and sand, many of which were reinforced with cement. Forty artillery pieces were scattered around the island in various reinforced firing pits. An airfield was cut into the bush straight down the center of the island. Trenches connected all points of the island, allowing troops to move under cover when necessary to where they were needed.

But yes, the IJN would likely not have done a effective bombardment. If they had 200 aircraft it might have been different. The IJN bombardment would have ruined the airfield and the gas tanks, but not have done that much damage over all. They were not set up for that, they depended on the aircraft to do the point damage.

422

Sorry ; I recognize that in a giant thread like this it can be confusing to figure out what comment is responding to what post, and I ought to have been clearer.

I envision three possible offensive options for the IJN after the historical battle of Midway. All of these have strengths and weaknesses.

Scenario 1: The battleship raid. This is the basic concept that I was most specifically analyzing. In theory, Yamamoto could have grouped the battleships of together and advanced them against Midway in an attempt to cripple the runway there and destroy as many US planes as possible. Historically, it appears that Yamamoto considered this plan a non-starter, but another, less capable officer, or one unable to accept defeat, might have done so.

An attack in this manner would actually be able to bring the kind of heavy guns needed to really put a dent into Midway in theory, but even with his screening force it would have a hard time standing up to all the planes Midway and the USN could put in the air. Alternatively, if the USN carriers focus on the battleships, that leaves the destroyer escorts outnumbered and outgunned by USN surface ships. Under those circumstances, and with a decisive Navy edge in scouting (since the IJN basically has no air cover) I suggest it could have been worthwhile to engage surface ship to surface ship.

Would sending in the cruisers and destroyers have been a good idea for the USN in retrospect? Well, I agree with you that the USN was, at this point, really sloppy. They would undoubtedly have taken un-necessary losses and underestimated the IJN in a fight. But it also might have been the smart play, given that the carriers would have been effectively invulnerable with all IJN air power removed from the scene. Under this situation, Yamamoto and the First Fleet are not trying to occupy Midway or stand up in a prolonged fight. Once it becomes clear that they can’t spend the amount of time required to reduce Midway, they would leave the scene.

Scenario 2: Yamamoto invests Midway, not necessary to invade, but to pull the USN into the decisive battle the IJN expects. In this possibility, Yamamoto and the First Fleet essentially stay on-task, trying to force the USN to come to them. Yes, this is obviously not a great idea as their carrier force is gone, but again, it’s not completely implausible. The problem here is that the longer First Fleet stays in range of Midway, it is open to destruction. They could steam relatively close to Midway at night, but if I understand their position correctly, they couldn’t reach Midway before daylight potentially revealed them. And of course, the moment they came over the horizon, they’re spotted even if every air patrol failed to locate them. The longer they stay, the more they come under sustained attack. As before, any ship that strays could be potentially picked off if the USN is willing to risk a surface ship engagement, but it becomes more risky under these circumstances.

Scenario 3: Scenario 3 is the long-shot of “Yamamoto regroups all his forces and attempts an invasion.” This has all the downsides we’ve discussed so far - it focuses on the tactical situation and ignores the strategic, exposes his ships to much longer attrition under conditions where the IJN couldn’t expect reinforcements, but the USN would receive them, and the IJN forces will be pinned down.

In the end, regardless of whether you agree or disagree, I’m trying to think through two separate ideas: what would the admirals reasonably consider as well as the plausible outcome. In war, even the most conservative commanders have to take some risks.

423

I just don’t understand this. If the premise is that the USN still has two carriers, and the IJN has kindly appeared within visual range of Midway, why would there be a need to send cruisers and destroyers in against battleships—or even other cruisers and destroyers? That doesn’t strike me as the sort of calculated risk that Nimitz expected from Fletcher and Spruance. It doesn’t even fit within the alt-history realm of “What if Halsey had been in command and pursued the Japanese into the night?” It’s like the action off Samar, but with no transports to defend and carriers that were well capable of keeping out of range and over the horizon from battleships while launching aircraft.

Why engage in an unequal fight ship on ship to the advantage of the Japanese when there is still an option to engage in an unequal fight air to surface that would favor the USN, whether going up against battleships or destroyers?

424

OK, now I understand better.

I disagree again, but can be more specific.

First, this is projecting our modern knowledge of the overall situation, including the specific movements of the various forces, and giving a “should’ve, could’ve, would’ve” to the historical commander who didn’t have that knowledge. It also depends on doctrine and technical abilities not available at the time.

There were too many groups of IJN ships out and about and they should have been converging on Midway. However, Spruance didn’t know where all the forces were. Yes, you have the US sending out scouting planes, but especially in 1942, those were really hit or miss. There was no guaranty that Yamamoto would have followed your script and concentrated all the groups together. The cloud cover was such that ships were not getting detected and the scouting planes did not have radar in June, 1942.

It wasn’t a chessboard with the pieces clearly situated.

The reason I’m stressing this is because you can’t forget that’s Nimitz’s orders to not expose the carriers to unnecessary risks without a comparable chance of inflicting greater damage to the enemy. Without knowing for certain the location of the enemy ships, Spruance would have been foolish to detach some of the cruisers and destroyers for a cruiser dual under the shadow of the Japanese battleships. Hell, even if he knew all the locations, it seems like a bad idea. The escorts were needed to project the carriers, not to send them on potential suicide missions.

One reason it was a bad idea is the USN did not have the ability to coordinate attacks like this in June, 1942. Remember the historical chaos of the US plane attacks on the Japanese fleet the previous day. Individual squadrons of planes from three carriers and the island were plotting their own courses to where they believed the enemy would be. Some never even made it and the fighters weren’t where they were needed, when they were needed.

One area where the IJN clearly outclasses the USN was their ability to place a mixed contingent of three types of aircraft, each with it’s own cruising speed, being launched from up to six platforms, and get them to arrive together. The US wasn’t able to do that until late '43.

The various groups were not in contact and there was no way for USAAF pilots to even be able to contact Navy or Marine fliers.

On paper (or a screen) it seems easy, but you have to think of what is required to do this.

The attacking US forces need to be close enough to the Japanese, but not too close. (The Japanese battleships would not have been able to make it with the timing you want, but let’s let that aside for the moment.)

Then, they need to coordinate a sustained air attack on the Japanese fleet to allow the US cruisers and destroyers to advance in close enough to hit the Japanese cruisers. This is another part you will need to explain, because the 8" guns on the US heavy cruisers had range of about about 30,000 yards, or around 27.5 km where the mighty guns of the Yamato could hit targets 40 km away. The idea seems suicidal to me, but maybe I’m missing something. I’m not sure how to sustain air attacks that long and that consistently without very careful and precise planning and coordination.

It couldn’t have happened for one more reason. If the US had the capacity to perform something this precise, let’s look at what else they could have accomplished with that ability. I think they could have been able to ambush the carriers on the morning of June 3rd and sink all four carriers before the IJN’s attack on Midway, without any US losses. They would have been able to start inflicting damage on the surface ships before breakfast which would have convinced Yamamoto to retreat well before lunch.

425

Another reason for the USN not to send away our cruisers and destroyers was for ASW. The only two ships lost by the USN at Midway were both sunk by a sub.

426

Yes, the Yorktown salvage work was looking good, and there was a very reasonable chance she could have survived.

427

The argument here is that sinking as many IJN ships as possible is the desired goal of this encounter and while it may be tempting to believe that, that was not the strategic goal of Nimitz, and consequently the driving force for Spruance.

This is June, 1942 and Japan is at the height of its power. Japan was still threatening the lines of communication with Australia, and the most important weapon America had were its aircraft carriers. Likewise, the most important target in the IJN were its carriers. It made absolutely no sense to endanger US carriers by closing in unnecessarily or sending off the escorts to attack destroyers or cruisers.

428

Drachinifel has scheduled an upcoming live stream on June 19th with guest Jon Parshall, the Shattered Sword author. On Midway, naturally. Time is 11am or 12noon – it varies – local time I assume, UTC+1

It will be recorded for viewing later.

429

Thanks, DD!

430

It was interesting, I watched the recording of it.

Some interesting quotes from him.

When asked if the Japanese took Midway, how long could they have held it. Parshall gave a disclaimer which more people, including myself, should pay attention to, in that no one has that big of a crystal ball to know for sure, but he noted the Nimitz had told the carrier commanders before the battle that they could retaken Midway if they lost it.
The US would have used bubs and B-17s to blockage the atoll then retake.

Another point, not related to this thread, the Japanese believed their own exaggerations and thought they were sinking 4:1 ships for the US. This lead to problems with the end of the war when they thought that the US had more psychological damage than what they actually had.

When asked what Japan should have done if they were really serious about taking Midway, he thought that they should have gone all the way in, waiting for Shokaku to be repaired or sending its air groups the Zuikaku. Perhaps even bringing in the light carriers that were sent to the north.

However, he didn’t talk about the earlier point that the US thought it could be easily retaken. It’s just too small to have many men stationed there.

Parshall has said many times in other places that he’s not a big counterfactual guy, so he doesn’t spend that much time on it.

431

Yeah, people who ask questions like, “If [small thing] [did/did not] happen would it change [big event’s outcome]?” seem to forget that either it was so small as to have no effect, or the reaction to it would be radically different and when you figure in the other side’s reaction to that you’re so far into the weeds of unpredictability conjecture is useless.

432

I would direct you to a book called What If?

The book is real historians entertaining a counterfactual. The rules were just one thing changed (not several) and conjecturing on how things might have played out differently.

Of course, since it is conjecture, you can go anywhere with it but since these were historians they tried to make educated guesses.

It is fascinating because you do, in fact, find that even the smallest things can have profound impacts on how history plays out.

433

My favorite chapter is “What if Aunt May had spider-powers and was a special agent for Admiral Nimitz?”

434

Maybe you should read it before dissing it. It has legit historians, historians of note, writing it. Maybe, just maybe, they have something interesting to say.

435

It was just a joke. “What If…?” is the title of a well known Marvel comic book.

436

I’m a bonafide nerd and did not know that. (of course, I do not know all the things either)

437

And an upcoming series (possibly tied into the current “Loki” plotline?)

438

I’ve read a fair amount of counterfactuals but the problem is the often the people writing them are not rigorous about what is possible and not possible. I haven’t read that book but I presume that it would be better. However, most counterfactuals /alt-his debates have more absurdities than insights.

439

I wouldn’t say “most,” but some certainly do. The best counterfactuals, as WaM wrote, change just one thing and see what flows from there, logically, plausibly and with historical rigor. Winston Churchill, David McCullough, John Keegan and many other reputable historians have written about “what ifs” - it’s not all jive.

440

My personal opinion is that anyone who can’t discuss a counterfactual version of a historical event doesn’t fully understand the event. It’s relatively easy to just recite what happened. But to be able to discuss what could have happened requires a lot more knowledge of the event and of the context around the event.