Are you cognizant of what you’ve done in your posts? You began with ‘IJN recon planes never shot down’, to ‘rarely shot down’, to ‘never at Midway’, to ‘not many at Midway’, and now your goalpost is at ‘not shot down before reporting’. It’s a dishonest and weak form of argument.
Do you do this consciously, or is it a reflexive act?
Modnote: Remember to attack the post and not the poster, “another dumb claim” is really pushing it.
Again, with this post.
This is just a guidance, not a warning. Nothing on your permanent record.
Parshall admits he and Tully accepted this criticism of the Japanese wrong in his book, and credits Alan Zimm, the author of * Attack on Pearl Harbor - Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions* and a former naval officer, for setting them straight.
Everything seems to point to an overconfident Yamamoto who just wasn’t worried.
He didn’t believe that the Americans would be there so he ignored other possibilities.
Bolding mine.
Bringing ships back from the dead is actually good practice, as @Little_Nemo writes. They needed to game out the later part of the exercise and the attacks on Fiji and Samoa needed to be evaluated on their own merits.
That’s what they did with Wake. Simply cut off supplies, destroy any planes on it left it to rot. Without supplies, especially av gas, Midway was a worthless postage stamp of sand.
This was actually acknowledge in the orders from Nimitz to Fletcher to protect the carriers first, then save Midway. They figured they could take the island back at their leisure.
The proposed invasion of Midway was actually opposed by many officers in the Japanese military, and the impossibility of keeping it supplied, as well as the lack of strategic value.
The story of how they Japanese command agreed to Midway is interesting although beyond the scope of this thread. However, it must be pointed out that the supply problem was never really addressed by Yamamoto and his staff.
For example, when Vice Adm. Kondo, the man charged with leading the First Carrier Striking Force asked pointed black how Midway was to be supplied was it was taken, Yamamoto’s chief of staff simply said they would abandon it if it didn’t work out.
Strategic war planning for the IJN was the responsibility of the Plans Division of the Naval General Staff, and they initially were very opposed to the plans because Midway didn’t have any strategic value for Japan, and it’s size and location made it too small to really help with an invasion of Hawaii (not that such an invasion would actually be possible). It couldn’t hold enough planes and was too far away, as well as the problem of supply.
Noted, and deserved.
I think this brings us back to a point that has been made before: the historical reality is that it was always going to be extraordinarily long odds that Japan would win the war. And yet they entered into it anyway. So any course of action premised on them realizing the war was lost very early on is simply a non-starter, short of a catastrophic loss far greater than Midway, or indeed any one historical battle, the likes of which the USN was itself not likely capable of inflicting at that moment in history.
Sometimes the only winning move, is not to play. However true, such advice doesn’t do the players much good once the game has already started, particularly if not enough has changed to make them see the folly of it.
Which is kind of where my earlier counterfactual was going, about how the US might have taken a more logical approach to the Pacific War if Midway had in fact been lost. Because inasmuch as much of actual history, and therefore alt-history, focuses on the personalities of those involved, what men like MacArthut, Nimitz, Spruance, Fletcher, and Halsey might have done differently if certain things had gone differently, the folly in that line of thinking is with assuming that (1) the personalities of those involved would not have changed in unpredictable ways, becoming perhaps more or less timid, more or less bold, and (2) that the actual people involved would have been the same. Because I frankly have no idea how the US public responds to news of a catastrophic defeat at sea (when it finds out), and so I have no idea how FDR and Congress respond to a defeat at Midway. Pearl Harbor was bad and all, but it was a surprise attack and it was premeditated to occur when the US fleet would be least capable of defending itself. But then a major defeat at sea, with US forces fully expecting an engagement with the enemy, indeed expecting to have the advantage of surprise itself? That sounds like maybe there’s an ongoing problem in leadership with US forces in the Pacific. Maybe Nimitz, or Spruance, or Fletcher don’t need to be sending anymore of America’s sons to watery graves. Maybe that Halsey guy, who missed out due to ill-health, should be the guy in charge. Or maybe the responsible commanders weather the storm. Maybe the propaganda machine springs into action, and the outcome gets massaged a little in the press. Point is, I have no clue who commands US forces in the Pacific if Midway results in a major defeat for the US, so I have no clue how or what operations are conducted, even as I am still very confident the US goes on to win the war in time.
In short, I could see a failed Midway operation for the US being on par with Kasserine Pass. Heads roll. Leadership changes. The course of the war, if not the outcomes, is altered perhaps immeasurably and unpredictably. Because while the historical Fredendall was sent home de replaced, it seems entirely plausible that, had the US Army by some luck achieved a better outcome, or had there simply been no battle at all, things might have turned out differently for him. Different commanding general, different ways of doing business, different staffs, different plans, different war. Actual history rapidly loses its value as a metric for what might have happened or what certain people would have done after the first iteration because chaos then ensues.
Anyway, Whack-a-Mole, complete change of subject: zeroing in on the hypothetical value of Midway Island to the Japanese for maritime patrol and reconnaissance, both for the surrounding Pacific and for the approaches to Pearl Harbor, and for the interdiction of US forces transmitting within a certain radius of the island… You have asked for a cite about scouting/reconnaissance aircraft losses. Okay. Fair. But before I go delving into the interwebs to find one… what kind of cite are you looking for? What would it take to help change your mind? What are the qualifying conditions you insist will be met for a cite to matter?
Because for my part, I am happy to evaluate Midway’s utility as a base for reconnaissance and anti-shipping strikes based solely off what I understand about things like Surveillance Areas; Classification, Identification, and Engagement Areas; Weapons Release Ranges; Speed of Advance; and so on. When hypotheticals and what-ifs get thrown up, I rely increasingly less on history, and more on relevant concepts of naval warfare to just ponder at whether proposed alternatives are even plausible. That is what has lead me to conclude that Midway Island was never going to serve as a viable base for Japan to keep tabs on the US fleet, or to interdict US shipping for two thousand miles all around: you can’t draw a circle based on half the maximum range for ferrying of whatever patrol aircraft Japan had, you have to take into account what it means to exercise meaningful surveillance and control of an area of ocean.
And then when you’re talking about what might, possibly, be more like a straight out and back reconnaissance, of the sort that might be involved in keeping tabs on a fleet in port, you have to consider that if it’s a nice, simple, straight out and back for the reconnaissance aircraft operating from a known point to a known point, then that makes it a LOT easier to intercept or shoot down the reconnaissance aircraft. Because a scout aircraft at sea, approaching from an unknown vector, spotting an enemy fleet, and getting the hell out of there ASAP (perhaps delaying just long enough to get an idea of course and speed and type/number of ships from as far away as possible) is a whole lot different than conducting reconnaissance over an enemy stronghold that knows it will be the object of reconnaissance flights if countermeasures are put in place.
ASL_v2.0, your post is very long, and too short. Well said.
An interesting twist to this is that the Japanese didn’t understand this at the time and were still wedded to their doctrine of the decisive battleship battle.
The adage of no plan survives contact with the enemy is nowhere more true that prewar carrier doctrine. The US had believed that carriers were inherently venerable to enemy attack so they needed to be operated in small groups in order to minimize the risk. The attack on Pearl Harbor turned that notion on its head and the idea of a large task force was understood, although it took a while to develop.
The Japanese, OTOH, despite pioneering the concept of massing the carriers, still loved their battleships and expected to defeat the USN with them.
Despite the US naval victory here, it wasn’t until the second half of 1942 with all of the sea battles around the Solomon Islands that the USN started to win the war of attrition with the IJN. Those battles were the ones which sealed Japan’s fate.
Sorry if I bounced around a bit. If there is one thing posting on the SDMB teaches you is to never say “never”. A dozen posts will pounce if there is even only one instance in a bazillion where you are wrong.
Then, in my head looking at this, I have never seen stats saying the recon planes were shot down. But then I may have missed that.
But bottom line, recon is of high importance and all sides did it. Was flying recon planes a suicide mission? In all my looking at WWII stuff I have never gotten that sense. While some may be shot down we see plenty of examples of recon planes overflying the enemy and we know that they returned safely because we have those photos.
In the end, I am not sure what you are really complaining about here beyond my slightly wandering verbiage.
The Japanese went to HUGE lengths to capture Midway. Yet many here are suggesting it was mostly worthless to the Japanese even if they succeeded.
I don’t think so and I do not think the Japanese were stupid. They certainly had some blind-spots but were those blind-spots so profound that they would commit to such a massive operation that intrinsically had no value to them?
Put another way, maybe, just maybe, the Japanese actually saw value in holding Midway. I am guessing at what that may have been but surely there was something beyond enticing the US carriers out into a fight.
Recon, as the IJN practiced it, was extremely hazardous. It was mostly done using slow, flimsy, lightly armed and highly flammable cruiser floatplanes. Most of the search arcs would reveal only empty ocean, so those aircraft usually returned safely. The aircrew ‘lucky’ enough to spot American carriers were usually detected by CAP and/or radar, and pursued by fighters with a 100+ mph speed advantage. Sometimes, after reporting a high-value contact, such as an enemy carrier, the recon crews were ordered to stay in contact until fuel exhaustion, with no expectation that they would be rescued.
The huge effort the IJN expended for the Midway operation was ~ 90% for fighting the USN fleet. Capturing Midway was kind of a tacked-on objective.
For a “tacked on objective” they sure went to great lengths to see it done (look at their fleet composition and their effort towards Alaska). They brought a massive fleet along with the carriers including troop transports and support for them.
If all they wanted to do was get the US carriers out in the open they could have gone with a lot less.
You are saying that no one has shown you the numbers, but when numbers have been given in the thread, they seem to be ignored.
For example, you claim that it was “doable” for the invasion to succeed, despite many, many posts showing why it was difficult, and some damn good numbers. For example, this post;
I went on to post:
Actually, there have been many, many posts in this thread talking about the weakness in the Japanese shore bombardment capability, as well as air deficiencies, and I don’t recall any meaningful counterarguments from you.
Your statement “The Japanese had more than enough at Midway to take the island (assuming they got rid of the US carriers).” doesn’t have any supporting evidence. You are also not clear here. Are you talking about a scenario with the US carriers or not?
The argument if the US could have taken islands in the war so why couldn’t the Japanese is not persuasive because of the vast differences in the situations. Can you point to a landing by the US marines which was similar to what would happened? Were there any landings by the Marines where they were outnumbered by the enemy and fighting against a prepared opponent? If not, then the question is meaningless.
At Tarawa, the first Marine contest assault had 35,000 US Marines against 2,600 plus troops.
Seems to me the Japanese captured many islands in the outset of the war.
Maybe they all had ports and the Japanese could just sail up to the docks and unload.
That’s not the same argument, and you aren’t responding to my post.
Your whole post is about how the Japanese suck at taking islands and I pointed out the Japanese successfully invaded loads of islands.
I submit the Japanese were not as incapable as you would have it. Perhaps the US got better at it but that does not mean Japan could not do it.
Were any of those landings opposed?
Were the Japanese ever successful with opposed landings? Especially where they were outnumbered?
Unopposed landings don’t count.
Evidence would be far more persuasive than unsupported opinions.
Did they magic themselves onto the Philippines?
The Japanese launched the invasion by sea from Formosa, over 200 miles (320 km) north of the Philippines. The defending forces outnumbered the Japanese 3-2 but were a mixed force of non-combat experienced regular, national guard, constabulary and newly-created Commonwealth units. The Japanese used first-line troops at the outset of the campaign, and by concentrating their forces, they swiftly overran most of Luzon during the first month.
…
Japan’s conquest of the Philippines is often considered the worst military defeat in US history.[9] About 23,000 American military personnel, and about 100,000 Filipino soldiers were killed or captured.[10] SOURCE
By ‘unopposed landing’, it means no substantial forces were shooting at the invaders as they made landfall. The term doesn’t apply to later combat inland.
How was it similar, how was it different? The problem with examples which are too different is that the comparison is meaningless.
The answer is well known, so it should be straightforward.
Actually, you haven’t pointed out loads of contested landings. There is one deeply flawed example, which can be shown why, but that particular landing isn’t really comparable. I’ll leave aside the Philippines landings for a minute, but we can come back to them if you can give any specific reasons to compare them.
The greater flaw in your logic is not understanding the numbers.
This was an atoll with dug-in troops, with an insane number of weapons. Look at the weapons quoted above: five 5" guns, four 3" guns, twelve 3" AA guns, forty-eight .50 cal guns, thirty-six .30 cal guns.
If you do the math, 2,500 attacking Japanese troops are facing 84 machine guns, or IOW, each machine gun is responsible for shooting 30 troops. That’s not even counting the heavier artillery.
The Marine commander was a veteran of WWI, and knew how to slaughter. Nimitz had personally gone to Midway to inspect the defense one month prior. He told the local commanders that they were expecting an attack from carriers and promised to supply whatever was required.
Make no mistake. This argument does not dependent on any inherent weakness of the Japanese. If the situation were identical but completely reversed, with the Japanese defending the island and the US attacking, and having the same numbers of men but just reversed, I would say with as much confidence that the Japanese would slaughter those poor leathernecks before their boots hit dry sand.
The only difference is that the US commanders simply would have refused this suicide mission.
There isn’t any way for 2,500 troops, of any nation, to land on a reef a couple hundred meters away from the beach, make it through all the obstacles, mines, artillery, and machine guns. And then be ready to face tanks.
You wanted numbers, you’ve got them now.
How do they do it?