It’s just one of those things where statistics and analysis says one thing and baseball says another. I understand that the ninth inning just feels more important, that managers like to have relievers they can trust and it’s hard to have enough of them, and of course I understand that closers like the way their job has gotten easier and more lucrative. But the end result is that the “best” pitchers get used in the least-challenging situations, which is just contradictory. I hope a more rational view wins out in the end.
In the shadow of Rivera, voters will look at Hoffman’s career WAR (26) at exactly half of Mo’s. Lee Smith is almost as good a candidate as Hoffman, although Hoffman has 120 more saves, but Saves is highly flawed, even for a counting stat. Smith peaked around 45% of the vote, but, per my argument, I think he’d suffer by comparison if he’d come up for eligibility in the wake of a Rivera candidacy.
And Hoffman pitched in relative anonymity, with few big moments, and no handle-bar mustache like Fingers.
Now Hoffman might well have better luck in the Veteran’s Committee.
Mo also has a sterling playoff record. It’s not Smith and Hoffman’s faults that they don’t have those, but if voters aren’t sure how much a big number of regular-season saves are worth, that’s a big point in Mo’s favor that wouldn’t help other closers very much.
I think because managers, almost universally, think the ninth inning is more difficult/important, that it actually becomes more crucial. There’s a tendency to save the best pinch-hitter(s) for the ninth, particularly if there’s again of the left/right advantage. Plus, the one thing about being a closer is the realization that there’s no one “getting your back.” It’s your game to save or lose, no matter how messy the inning gets.
I’m a Red Sox fan, and at the beginning of 2013, Koji Uehara was a 6th or 7th inning guy. As injuries mounted (Hanrahan, Bailey) Uehara, became the closer by the end of June. And while I understand and embrace most sabermetric principles, you’d have a hard time convincing me that Uehara was not much more valuable as the closer than as a middle reliever – even if Koji had shown great ability in snuffing out 6th or 7th inning rallies. Because in Fenway, it’s never over til it’s over.
I’m not sure this means anything. If you pitch badly, you can lose your job. That’s about as much pressure as you can have.
On the other hand, that Uehara example shows why it rarely makes sense to give a closer a huge contract. The few guys who perform very well every year are valuable, but if you don’t have one of those, you may as well try different guys in your bullpen until somebody clicks.
I agree with this. But how many middle relievers are getting considered for the Hall?
I also agree that the 9th inning is more important than, say, the 5th. And I’d say pitching the 9th well is of more than slightly greater importance than pitching the 5th well. The win probability by pitching the 9th well in a save situation is going to be higher than after pitching the 5th in an identical manner. So, let’s just say the 9th is twice or even three times as important as any other inning. A starter is still going to have more than two-three innings per start—if they want to continue starting, anyway. Summing up all of their innings, even if those innings are half as valuable, has to contribute more to a win than the closer’s one inning.
It’s not the closer’s fault that the numbers work out the way they do, and I’d support enshrining the clear best closer for a given era, like Rivera. (I also think Ray Guy should have been in the Pro Football HoF long ago.) But I think the Hall’d be better with a lot more guys that contribute more to the win, like starters, shortstops that hit for power, etc… than closers.
So, Smoltz gets in? I’m convinced. Sheffield too? Or are we re-evaluating the ‘500 HR = Cooperstown ticket’ idea?
The 500-homer milestone is toast. McGwire and Palmeiro and Sosa each have around 600 homers and none of them are anywhere close to induction. Bonds’ chances look dicey at best.
I disagree with your first point. Even Rivera had off days. But if you come in to start the 7th, get a line-drive out, give up a single up the middle and then a double down the line, you’re probably out of the game. Do that in the ninth, as closer, and it’s up to you to clean up your own mess.
Per, eschewing big contracts to closers, I agree. Closers prove to be more volatile, from year to year… even within a season, than starters. It probably has to do with relying on only one dominant pitch and not having a large bag of tools to fall back on. Not to mention that closers don’t get as much maintenance time during the course of a competitive season. Still, however, those closers that do remain consistent over a 10 year span, deserve more recognition at HOF time then their WAR might otherwise indicate.
Uehara being more valuable as the closer than as a middle reliever isn’t a rebellion from sabermetric principles. Uehara was used in high leverage situations and used more often as a closer last year, and his WAR reflects that he was much more valuable as a result.
All of the names you’ve mentioned have the PED cloud hanging over them. So too, did Sheffield. But no one’s claimed, that I know of, that Sheffield was the kind of user that those guys were. Although there was the “I didn’t know the BALCO cream I used one time was dirty,” thing. Which got him in the Mitchell Report..
Aside, I love that the Mitchell Report, written by a director of the Boston Red Sox organization, and surprisingly naming no major players from either the Red Sox or Selig’s Brewers, gets the weight that it does in determining who’s guilty of PED use. Oh, to wave a WADA wand over MLB during the 90s and 2000s and see what it would find…
Obviously. And not everybody is equally vulnerable. Still, if you pitch badly for long enough in whatever role you have, you can lose your job. No pitcher (or player) gets an unlimited amount of rope. I think that’s more than enough pressure, and the fact that closers come and go so quickly tells me there’s nothing psychologically unique about closing.
Being consistently good is valuable even in a situation where your team is probably going to win anyway, but I’m not convinced it’s that valuable. Troy Percival is in the top 10 in saves. Does anyone think he’s a Hall of Famer? What about Francisco Cordero?
Sure, but I believe there’s more WAR awarded to a pitcher that snuffs out a 7th inning rally in a tie game than to a closer that pitches the 9th inning to preserve a 2 run lead. And I think that devalues the closer WAR. Particularly if you’re talking about a game between two teams with very good offenses and playing a ball park that favors run scoring. ( According that theory, Uehara should have continued to be pitched, at times, in the 7th inning in tie games, and not saved for the closer role.)
Meh, the more I read on Sheffield, the more I read of articles and blog posts lumping him in with the Palmeiros and McGwire’s of the world. In that case, yeah, he’s going to have to wait behind at least Bonds, and probably Palmeiro.
Now, now. The only sources of information Mitchell had available to him were the clubhouse rats in New York and the Bay area, who were under duress to talk. It should not be surprising that the names that emerged were mostly from those teams. For that matter, most of them were associates of just this Radomski guy. Point being, Mitchell found it everywhere he was able to look - and if he’d had informants in Boston, Detroit, and Atlanta, there’d certainly be names from Boston, Detroit, and Atlanta in his report.
Plenty of teams came away “clean”, but Boston is not one. David Ortiz’ name was leaked from the 100 Positives List.
I don’t think the voters are inclined to split hairs that way because they’ve kept Piazza and Bagwell out with much less proof than that. PEDs or not, the period means the 500-homer milestone does not mean what it used to.
According to that theory, he should’ve closed some games and been used earlier in high-leverage situations in other games. Maybe that’s how managers will use their top relievers eventually.
What about Dan Quisenberry? Over the course of his 10 year prime, he had an ERA+ of 160 and accumulated about 25 WAR. And for a pretty competitive team, that won a lot of close games. I’d say, outside of HOFer George Brett, Quisenberry was the most valuable player on the 80s Royals.
Quisenberry didn’t even reach the 5% threshold in his 1st year of HOF eligibility and missed out on this year’s vet’s committee as well. I realize he was just about done after 10 years, but still, I can’t believe he didn’t get more consideration. He’s one those players that gets screwed by falling short of the counting stat of Saves, and then gets screwed by modern sabermetricians looking at his career WAR.
Quisenberry was pretty much done after his sixth season. He had a very high five-year peak, but that was the entirety of his career.
I don’t see any indication that any team is moving towards that strategy. And the majority of teams now have GMs/managers that have embraced sabermetrics. And I wonder why? My guess is that they don’t trust that WAR calculations adequately value save situations. If a GM of a contending team ever tried a bullpen by committee and then saw his team flop, he’d be risking his job.
Not quite. If you start the clock in 1979 (where he only had 40 IP, his years 6-9, had him at ERA+ of 152, 174, 154 and 167. True, his IP dropped from an average of 130 to 70 due to injury, but he did place in the top 3 of the CY voting in his 6th and 7th years.
Neither do I.
I don’t think it’s about WAR. I think it’s about conventional wisdom, fear of criticism, and keeping the players happy.