2014 MLB Hall of Fame Ballot

The Game Room
221

The proper comparison in not “ninth inning versus seventh inning”. It’s “ninth inning in a game that is definitely known to be a close game versus seventh inning in a game which may or may not turn out to be a close game”. It’s a matter of maximizing the use of your best relief pitcher in game-on-line high-impact situations.

That said, I think the save stat is one of the most ridiculous stats out there, and is an example of a stat literally distorting people’s thinking, and undermining proper strategy.

As one example, in keeping with the above, the optimum time to use an ace relief pitcher would be in a ninth inning tie game, when the game is definitely on the line to win or lose. And keep him in for 3-4 innings if necessary. And as for the possibility that he won’t be able to pitch for the next 3 days, well firstly that’s only a possibility, and second, who says there will be another game-on-the-line situation in the next 3-4 days anyway.

But managers don’t manage that way. They keep ace relievers out of the game in that situation, preserving them for possible “save situations”, many of which involve 2-3 run leads in the ninth inning when any half-decent pitcher should be able to get the job done.

[Perhaps this is really for a separate thread.]

222

Do you think Theo Epstein and Jed Hoyer, in Chicago, worry about conventional wisdom? You don’t think that if they felt a more efficient use of a bullpen projected to a couple more wins that they wouldn’t go for it?

I think distrust in WAR exists, just as it’s taken a decade to reach some sort of consensus (and still not definitive) regarding defensive metrics. WAR assumes too much predictable behavior.

As an example:

I’ve played chess pretty seriously and at a high level of competition. If I’m up against a player that you know has a near-flawless end-game(which is not all that common below the very top level), then I will take more risks before the end game arrives. In a similar fashion, a baseball manager knows that the other teams’ closer is dominant (or is experiencing a dominant stretch of games) then he more is likely to alter his strategy before the 9th inning. And if he knows the other teams closer is lousy, then he’ll play the 7th and 8th inning more conservatively.

223

They’re not managers, so they don’t decide how the pitchers are used.

224

I don’t think WAR being precisely correct or not is really the point. Nobody’s making decisions based on WAR individually. Both WAR and the concept of a leverage-based bullpen are both premised on the same fundamental assumptions about what makes something valuable in a baseball game, is all.

225

This is a circular argument, though, because elite relief pitchers end up as “closers,” no matter if it makes sense to use them that way or not.

If a pitcher went out and put up twelve or fifteen years of seasons like Mark Eichhorn’s in 1986, they’d get some votes. But if you put up just two or three seasons like that someone would make you a closer.

226

At the risk of boring you with another chess analogy, “Sometimes the threat is more dangerous than the execution.” – Dr. Emmanuel Lasker.

And so managers often prefer to hold onto their threat. And, of course, they don’t know that the game will NOT be on the line in the 9th inning and they would look pretty stupid having some 22 year old rookie with control problems closing out a tight game.

And I’m sure that fear causes most managers to be over cautious. But managers don’t know, at the time, that they’re facing the critical situation in a game – that’s only known after the game has ended. So, for instance, they might not bring in their lefty specialist in the 7th inning of a tie game, because they fear that David Ortiz might come up the next inning and they’d already used their lefty.

(I agree that this is a topic for a new thread, but this line of argument was started in relation to WAR and how it devalued closer-candidates’ chances for election. We might have beat this one to death, i think)

227

That guy shouldn’t be in a tight game at all, but it still makes more sense to have him start the ninth inning in a close game than it does to use him in a jam earlier in the game while your best reliever sits on the bench. You are clearly not using your relievers to maximum effect if you refuse to use your best reliever unless it’s the start of the ninth inning and your team is already winning, and that is basically what every manager does.

228

Yeah, I understand your point in that specific scenario, but earlier in the game, the manager has more options than closer/22 year old kid. But what the manager fears is that by the time the 9th inning rolls along, he’s out of options. Back when I was a kid, and roles were not quite as defined, in a close game, the best reliever came in whenever the starter was gassed.

btw, way back before the modern pen setup was established, the best reliever would always come in if the game was tied or close, whenever the starter was gassed – whether it be in the 6th, 7th, 8th or 9th. Look up Dick Radatz’ career with the Red Sox. But, back then, that guy kept on pitching until the end of the game or until he’d given away the lead. That kind of usage is why Radatz’ prime was only 3 years.

229

You do see closers coming in for four and five out saves more than you used to.

The argument that if a reliever were really all that good he’d be starting, since it’s the same inning times seven or so, is misbegotten. For one inning, a pitcher can reach back and give it everything on every pitch, ideally striking out the side. For seven innings, no, he can’t. He has to pace himself, use more than one or two pitches, depend on his fielders, use different strategy in general. If relieving were really only starting for a single inning, then why aren’t *all *relievers former starters?

The top performers at their positions at the time they played belong in the Hall. Relievers and starters do play different positions and need to be compared *within *their peer groups.

230

Sort of: he fears being criticized because that’s what happens if you buck the norm and it doesn’t work out. In reality you’re almost never out of options in the 9th inning. The issue here, to me, is that using closers this way makes them less valuable. That makes it harder for a closer to be Hall-worthy. I’m not that impressed by Lee Smith’s Hall of Fame case and I’m not sure I’ll be impressed by Trevor Hoffman’s. If managers start using closers in more difficult situations, it’ll be easier to identify and then reward the closers who really excel.

Do you have a cite? I thought the trend was still solidly in favor of the three-out save.

231

Really? It always made sense to me why there used to be a lot more SS in the HOF than second basemen. Because a lot of MLB second baseman began at short, but then were converted to 2B because of limited range or insufficient arm strength. I knew that because I played 2B in HS and college, because, although I was a very good ballplayer, I wasn’t a very good athlete.
Then, about 40 years ago, someone noticed there were only 8 2B in the HOF and there became a push to get more elected/selected. Bobby Doerr’s vet selection in the 80’s really surprised me, and I’m a Red Sox fan.

I think currently there are 24 Shortstops and 20 Second baseman, when it used to be closer to 2-1. So your opinion may be in line with that of the BBWA, I’d rather have a top fielding SS with an OPS of .800 than a 2B with similar rankings amongst his peers.

232

There’s a general consensus that SS is a more valuable position than 2B defensively, but you need both. I think it’s a mistake to assume Hall voters are employing any particular logic, especially if you’re looking at a long period of time. Standards and voting keep changing and sometimes people are just left out. By my count there are 11 Major League third basemen in the Hall of Fame because voters still aren’t sure how to compare third basemen to their peers.

Anyway this is kind of apples and oranges. Pitcher is a position and closer is a role, while 2B and SS are both positions.

233

The percentage of more-than-an-inning saves in 2013 was the lowest it’s ever been, 12.4%.

234

And the BBWA still haven’t figured out Designated Hitter.

There’s going to be a sh*t storm ‘a brewin’ five years after David Ortiz retires, particularly if he has a couple more good years before quitting time.

235

I don’t think that’s true at all. There have been very few career DHs who deserved any consideration at all. Who do you think deserves to be in the Hall who was mostly a DH? There’s an argument to be made for Edgar Martinez and… who else?

And while Martinez was a great player, his omission is not exactly a major offense. He’s buried in a huge class and he’s not obviously better than, say, Larry Walker or Tim Raines, so it’s not like they’re leaving out a first-ballot lock like Randy Johnson.

So what, really, isn’t figured out? For that matter, who poses a problem in the future? Big Papi is a great hitter but even he is not a particularly obvious first-ballot choice; he has no defensive value, hasn’t attained any major statistical milestones that scream “gotta be in the Hall” and is generally, like Edgar, a guy who will end up in the mix of a lot of players who were just as good and maybe better.

236

Joe Gordon, Bobby Doerr, Bill Mazeroski, Tony Lazzeri, Red Schoendist, Bid McPhee, and Frank Grant (Negro Leagues) were all chosen by veterans committees in the past 20 years or so, and I’m pretty sure it was in response to the idea that 2B were under-represented.

Over a third of all 2B were by vets committee picks in the last 20 years, and only McPhee was from an era before the HOF, and Grant was special case, as well.

Add to that group Alomar, Sandberg and Carew, and that’s 50% of all the 2B in the HOF. So clearly the perceived value of 2B has grown.

237

But by the team’s designated closer, though, not the long-relief guy who came in with a three-run lead back in the seventh, and was kept in because the rest of the bullpen was gassed that day and he was doing OK? I’m referring to the guy who’s the alleged key getter-outer supreme, the one who normally sees the ninth and only that. Yes, it may be only my impression that some closers are getting stretched a bit lately.

Maybe 2B is easier than SS, but so is 3B, 1B, and the outfield. But there are quite a few of those guys in the Hall, including many who never played SS at all. Go figure.

238

Truth is that you sometimes are, due to another dubious trend these days, i.e. the hyperfocus on righty-lefty matchups.

You sometimes see managers use 3 pitchers in the seventh inning as they do the righty-lefty rotation, and by the time they get to the ninth they have no one left other than the closer, who can’t go more than an inning …

239

What really hasn’t been figured out is whether DH is a role or a position, per your original comment about closers.

Assuming Ortiz has a couple more productive years, when he retires half of the BBWA are consider him a slam dunk for the HOF, 20% are never going to put a lifetime DH in the Hall and 30% will be persuadable. E. Martinez is suffering from relatively the same split, although Ortiz will have to his advantage his postseason success in a big market. But the Ortiz advocates will still have to convince 5 out 6 undecided voters to come to their side. (My case against Ortiz would be that he was put at DH not because he couldn’t field the position, but to extend his career – which it apparently has.)

And the reason there aren’t that many DH exclusions from the HOF, are a) the DH is only 40 years old b) There are few cases of a player, still in his prime, being made a permanent DH.

240

You’re overlooking the fact that Ortiz will be lumped into the suspected PED user pool along with Palmiero, McGwire, Sosa, and the rest.

It’s probably going to be a long road to the Hall for Ortiz, and unless he has a few more monster years, his case will be less compelling than Edgar Martinez’s. His career WAR, and I know it’s a flawed measurement, as it stands is not Hall worthy.