A memory is a physical thing.

Liberal, above, is definitely on to why this sequence of events you give is lacking.

The brain does a lot of things automatically. Some of them are quite complex too. Some things we do consciously at first, can become automatic, unconscious behavior later. Some behaviour we do automatically and give conscious explanations for afterwards, which sometimes are demonstrably not even true.

I believe that consciousness is only a small, small part of the biological computer, more of an interesting side-effect, if you will, than a fundamentally integral part of the system practically equal to the system itself. I’ve given this some serious thought back in the days that I studied Artificial Intelligence, and came up with the following conclusion, which I’m now basically still waiting to be proven or disproven by science.

First of all, I assume we are a biological computer and purely physical. There is nothing, in this world, that gives me any impression of this being otherwise.*

Evolution went from small, simple, direct things to increasingly higher levels of complexity - more complex forms of interaction, procreation, memory, replication, etc. Things have evolved.

Simple beings receive sensory input to which they react directly. The difference between a thermometer and a coral is quite simply that the thermometer was created, and the coral recreates itself. I see absolutely no reason to bring awareness in at this level. There’s no reason for a coral to be more aware than a thermometer - both interact in similar ways, but the coral does learn and evolve, and recreate. The thermometer does not. This is what makes the coral more alive than the thermometer, or the coral alive and the thermometer not (depending on a progressive rather than absolute definition of alive)

From the coral we can move on to more dynamic memory, which allows us to remember that red things hurt us and green things feed us (for instance birds eating different insects). We remember a color and a sensation, and the next time we see the color we remember the sensation.

The more directly linked the experience becomes with the memory, the more we appreciate Pavlov’s research. This is why experience and memory are easily linked, and it’s tempting to make them equal. One of the questions posed here is if they are. I’d say they are not quite, but can be very similar, depending on the complexity of processing being done.

Let’s look at this again:

I have a feeling it’s not quite that simple. Brain activity is registered as a wave of electricity passing and strengthening existing paths and sometimes forming new paths altogether (brush, sweeping, etc). When we grow up we experience rapid random growths of neurons and pathways in many areas in the brain, which are at that point extra susceptible to new path forming. Hence part of the reason why we can learn certain things better in our youth (brush, sweep).

Bringing Pavlov back into it, let’s say that a dog smells meat and starts salivating. There’s a neural pathway that leads the triggered electrical stimulus from the sensory input to the part that stimulates glands to start producing saliva. Now we ring a bell each time we present the meat. Because the two stimuli occur simultaneously, the brain forms a pathway linking these two stimuli - how exactly this works I’m not sure but it is clear that we are rigged to respond more strongly to combined impulses, so pathways linking these are formed quickly and easily in the brain. Now the bell rings by itself, and sends an impulse through the pathway that links the smell of meat and producing saliva, and saliva is produced by virtue of hearing the bell all by itself. Interesting examples of this process happening is when you see a guitar player moving his mouth while playing.

So far it’s simple. But a vast number of connections (bilions) can form in the brain that are triggered and channel input and output in incredibly complex ways. Some paths form quicker and regress slower (what input they require before activating), and vice versa. But what is clear is that they can, like computers (actually the other way around of course), form complex patterns that allow incredibly complex ways of combining sensory input and physical reaction to that sensory input.

We go back to the bell. This incredibly complex pattern can form all sorts of represenations of the sensory input of a bell, most of these linked to a bell. This complexity can cause us to think of a bell in more and less predictable ways. If we were, however, trained to associate a bell with the smell of read meat, and our salival glands were as strongly asociated with that smell as in dogs, we would often send a stimulus to our salival glands when thinking of a bell.

Does this mean we’re slaves to input, just really complicated reactionary machines? Yes, we are. But why don’t we seem that way? Obviously, the complexity is one. But I think another one is that energy can travel through these pathways without sensory input altogether. Here we may think that we control our thoughts, but the energy will go to the paths most easily stimulated whether or not the energy is mostly circular or whether they are caused by sensory input.*2 After all, we remain a product of our experience and DNA.

Some of the interesting programs we develop is the concept of self, and self-reflection. It forms from observing and starting to symbolize yourself, from seeing your hands, seeing yourself in the mirror, distinguishing yourself from other people like you, learning about your own sensory input and memories, learning language in which you use your own name and I and you forms, and so on. In a sense, you get memories of memories, if you will. You start identifying and remembering some of the patterns in your head. Before you know it, there’s a complex pattern in the brain observing the complex patterns in the brain, and you’ve developed a consciousness, you’ve become self-aware.

Perhaps dreams are the best way of illustrating some of this at work. There’s a distinction we can make between dreaming, sleeping without dreaming, and being awake. It is The different aspects of the brain we’ve discussed is reflected in these three states. When we’re sleeping our deep sleep, our brain regresses to a very low level of activity. We are not self-aware at this point, there is little sensory input being processed, but we are not dead. If we dream, sensory input is still hardly being processed, but the brain activity rises to near awake state. The effect is that because partly because in this sleeping state we don’t really process sensory input, but the level of brain activity has risen, the internal programs are being stimulated anyway. The difference is that this time the preferred pathways are followed with less interference/distraction from sensory input, and so it becomes less rooted in direct reality, and much more driven by memory. The REM during this dreaming part of sleeping coincides with the activation of the visual memory similarly to the saliva and the moving mouth of the guitar player. The program in our brain that observes all this going on is also active at this phase and can therefore again make memories of these reactivation of memories, and because of that we can remember dreams.*3

I’ve tried not to turn this into a book and if I’m going to explain my view on this in more detail, I’m afraid that’s exactly what’s going to happen. So I leave it at that and see what all this triggers in your brain. :wink:

A.

  • After all, every thing we used to ascribe to supernatural causes has been ending up in the dustbin, and not the other way around. I’ve often suggested (mostly to myself) that superstition or religion is that which we desperately want to explain but can’t. It has definitely helped some of us to avoid learned helplessness, which psychologists now is a good thing.

*2 I mean all sorts of input to the brain here, including hormones and such released by organs and nervous systems.

*3 Notice that this theory is supported by dreams, like fantasy, never really containing anything new, always being constructed of memories of things we experienced earlier.

Just to help draw some lines here for interested observers, I disagree with this: I happen to think that an amoeba pretty much is a “ball” in this sense.

I’m not sure it can. A “smell” is actual contact between ‘toxic’ molecules and some kind of chemically responsive sensor, just as the ball responds to the force of Lib’s boot.

I’d say it’s still deterministic, it’s just not Newtonian: you could lay a path of nutrient-rich water bounded by strong salt solution and the amoeba would follow it as surely as the ball’s path.

Again, I’m not sure ‘recognition’ applies to what an amoeba does compared to what a bee or a bird does: it works on chemical statistics (ie. osmosis). One wouldn’t say that a hot air balloon recognises regions of denser air and moves away from them: its buoyancy is not an awareness of the environment, or an indication of “memories of dense air” IMO. I happen to think that cognition as such “begins” somewhere around insects, since I wouldn’t say memory access really characterised anything much ‘simpler’.

And I realise you’re not really debating this point, Stimulus (how many eerily appropriate usernames are in this thread already? :)), just offering up a little speculation to help us focus - for which I’m very grateful.

Even the brain itself recognizes this dichotomy, and dispatches involuntary activity to certain less cerebral portions of itself. That’s how it deals with the deluge of sensory data that it must process. It performs a sort of triage, reserving for awareness those things that it determines are most ambiguous. We’ve all experienced it in driving, for example. Here we are, toodling along, practically oblivious that there even is a road. The brain has determined that, from what you are seeing and doing, all is well, and it gives you leave to daydream, listen to music, or talk on the phone. Often, as you drift in and out of awareness about the road, you cannot even recall having driven the last four miles or whatever. Now, some brains are better than others, but just so we don’t get lost in tangents, let’s just assume something that might be a typical brain. When it senses that something isn’t quite right, it is quick to jerk you back into awareness of the road, and in a split second you are turning your wheels sharply to the sounds of a loud horn and going, “Where the hell did that truck come from!?”. A memory, in this sense then, is the picture that the brain gives you of what it has recorded but doesn’t know what to do with. It is by being aware of that picture that you make a decision. As I said before, it cannot be possible that you react simultaneously with any event because time must transpire between the event and your recognition of it. Once you have a clue that something happened, it has already happened and is in the past. Thus, there is more than just short term and long term memory; there is also immediate memory. The immediate memory is your first conscious encounter with an event. The more significant it is, and the more it relates to other events, the more likely it is to make its way to the more mediate short term and then long term memory. But most immediate memory simply disappears, being replaced from moment to moment by new immediate memory.

Arwin, thanks for that: yes, I should yet again have inserted my standard disclaimer in my question to other-wise that memory formation is only the basis of “experience”, and all kinds of other things are happening in the brain as well. Of course I don;t think that simple sequence explains human cognition and experience in toto.

I’d also note that behaviourism is also a little old-fashioned these days after all kinds of psychological experiments on day-old/month-old/year-old babies and the like - we seem to be hard-wired to a much greater extent than Pavlov or Skinner ever thought possible. And dreams, while fascinating examples of cognition, are perhaps a little too advanced a topic for this thread, where I simply seek to establish the nature of memories of things. But thanks for your input all the same.

Excellent point. I’m happy that that’s cleared up.

OK – I think this coincides with a recent response I gave to one of Liberal’s posts. To wit:

Now, I use the term reflection in a rudimentary sense, which I should most likely make more explicit. This is difficult to do and not overreach; words are fluid. In some sense, I simply mean “memory” – it is the ability to maintain a separate…um…“symbol” from actual stimulus. In other words, a memory of a red ball is different from the direct sensory perceptions of a red ball and reflection is the ability to differentiate between the two. The reason I use the term is that reflection is not limited to sensory memories; it could very well be an internal state or an abstraction (mathematical or otherwise).

This is good. So, for “awareness”, we have the following requirements:
[ol]
[li]A physical substrate[/li][li]“Sensors” (e.g., vision, touch, etc.)[/li][li]Memory[/li][li]A mechanism that can relate memories to perceptions (or other immediate stimulus)[/li][/ol]
Is that an adequate accounting? Did I overlook anything?

Thanks. I just wanted to put a disclaimer in because I don’t want to appear to be attacking a position when I’m not. I could see the line about the “rhetorical trick” being taken the wrong way and I didn’t want it to derail the discussion. (Blame it on too much lurking in political threads; I care too much about this topic to let it devolve due to a simple misunderstanding.)

Well, as has been referenced here a few times already, memory seems to be the direct sensory perceptions, only “fainter”. The ability to distinguish the two thus simplifies to some threshold of intensity.

Indeed. Reflections, as I understand you are using the term, might be superpositions of memories, like Darth Vader and the watering can. The concept of a red ball, as opposed to a specific read ball you might have seen somewhere, could be considered an “average” of all such superimposed memories of 3-D sphere geons emitting E-M radiation of around 700 nm.

We have those things at the very least. And, personally, I’d modify the fourth point to "A mechanism that relates memories to other memories, since “perceptions” are what we seek to explain by our list.

Sentient, I took off my “no argument” hat, but I haven’t lost it’s spirit. Please keep in mind I’m not trying to circle around you to poke you with the same stick. I’ve been attempting, when we reach an impasse, to re-word my inquiries (or try entirely new ones) in the hope of reaching mutual understanding, if not agreement. Some of these inquires are bound to occasionally cross the same impasse.

I think it’s the “spatio-temporal location” part that’s bugging me. Isn’t spatio-temporal location relative to the observer? To rephrase the original question, is the difference in spatio-temporal location that we have identified inherent and non-arbitrary?

If the difference between a newspaper and the memory of a newspaper is the difference in form, and form is spatio-temporal location, and spatio-temporal location is observer relative, wouldn’t you be invoking minds in order explain minds?

It seems to me you could rig up that complete chain with a video camera, a circa ’98 Mac 6100, and a VCR. I have strong doubts that a set-up like that would be aware.

Of course - I would not accuse you of anything so ignoble. I’d just like to make it clear that I’m a layman trying his best here. If anything, it seems like you’re better read and more erudite than me on this subject - how come I’ve got my head above the parapet? Recklessness, that’s why! :slight_smile:

Yes. Heck, it can’t not be.

Is the difference between carbon and graphite arbitrary? Again, we start dancing around in the philosophical minefield of Lib’s “Is the universe real?” thread. Was there a difference between carbon and graphite in the billions of years before cognition? I say there was.

But the relativity of spatio-temporal location is evident in things without minds, like fast particles and black holes. And, to be sure, I cannot explain minds without engaging my own. You could demonstrate this by asking me to explain minds when I’m dead.

Yes, I admit my sloppiness there - see my response to Arwin.

Your description is spot-on; I agree with everything you wrote. Which is why I still can’t parse this sentence: “Therefore, awareness relies on memory of the event”.

Let me ask two direct questions; maybe that will clear it up for me.

Do you see a problem in the simplified chain I described (event–> sensory/pre-cognitive processing of event stimulus–>awareness–>storage of the experience of awareness in memory)?

Isn’t a memory of an event the memory of the awareness of the event?

(IOW, shouldn’t the un-parseble sentence become: “Therefore, memory relies on the awareness of the event.”?

I’m not sure if you got through my long post, but I think you’re almost there - awareness relies on the observation of the observation, or the memory of the memory of the event.

Does that make sense?

I thought I dealt with that, but since the post was addressed actually to Digital, I’ll reprint it here for you, highlight the appropriate portion, and give a bit more commentary. But if you don’t mind, read the whole post for context:

Even the brain itself recognizes this dichotomy, and dispatches involuntary activity to certain less cerebral portions of itself. That’s how it deals with the deluge of sensory data that it must process. It performs a sort of triage, reserving for awareness those things that it determines are most ambiguous. We’ve all experienced it in driving, for example. Here we are, toodling along, practically oblivious that there even is a road. The brain has determined that, from what you are seeing and doing, all is well, and it gives you leave to daydream, listen to music, or talk on the phone. Often, as you drift in and out of awareness about the road, you cannot even recall having driven the last four miles or whatever. Now, some brains are better than others, but just so we don’t get lost in tangents, let’s just assume something that might be a typical brain. When it senses that something isn’t quite right, it is quick to jerk you back into awareness of the road, and in a split second you are turning your wheels sharply to the sounds of a loud horn and going, “Where the hell did that truck come from!?”. A memory, in this sense then, is the picture that the brain gives you of what it has recorded but doesn’t know what to do with. It is by being aware of that picture that you make a decision. As I said before, it cannot be possible that you react simultaneously with any event because time must transpire between the event and your recognition of it. Once you have a clue that something happened, it has already happened and is in the past. Thus, there is more than just short term and long term memory; there is also immediate memory. The immediate memory is your first conscious encounter with an event. The more significant it is, and the more it relates to other events, the more likely it is to make its way to the more mediate short term and then long term memory. But most immediate memory simply disappears, being replaced from moment to moment by new immediate memory.

There cannot be awareness until the brain has formed something for you to be aware of and examine. That something is the immediate memory I spoke of — the first mental picture you get of what has just passed. Thus, awareness arises from that memory. If you’ve become aware of something significant to you, you will store it longer term. Otherwise, it will be replaced and forgotten.

Just to avoid possible confusion, I’ll just interject to say that that is a perfect descritpion of sensory memory, Lib, which shoudl not be confused with short term memory. It seems like you’re calling sensory memory “immediate memory”.

So, is a thermostat aware? It senses the temperature, compares it to its memory of what a comfortable temperature is, and to prove it’s aware, takes action, turning on the furnace if it gets too cold.

See my replies re. the amoeba and, earlier, the pressure gauge, Hoodoo. I don’t think you can say that the thermostat “compares memories” - where are these memories of past states being stored, as they most definitely are in bees and birds?

So it does. I was unaware that there had been any scientific test for it. I just derived it deductively.

I think there’s a need to distinguish between how things are and how things could possibly be. Yes, I think biological memories are the same mechanisms as direct perceptions. It only makes sense, as I said in an earlier post, from an evolutionary perspective. However, when you move into the realm of talking about computers, this restriction is lifted. Just trying to be careful.

Yes, “at the very least” is what I was trying to get at. I believe that Occam is generally (but not always) applicable. With that said, there’s more, pointed out by Hoodoo Ulove:

So, unless we wish to count a thermostat as aware, we’re still missing something. I think part of it is what Liberal was referring to when using the term “deliberate reaction”. It’s what I was trying to get at with the difference between a ball and an amoeba (or a human).

Although we take a similar approach, we turn our heels and part ways at this point. The thermostat has no mechanism by which to formulate a memory of any kind. It is, in fact, not a thermostat in se, but rather a vial, a scale, and something to attach them to. Yes, I know that you can say a human is a brain, a skill, and a body they are attached to, but the sun and a tennis ball are both yellow spheres. The brain provides the mechanism by which memory arises. There is no equivalent organ in the thermometer, and in fact, without a human brain to both make it and interpret it, it may as well be a rock.