Are there such things as mind and matter, and if so what is the nature of their interaction?
“Matter” has physical properties.
“Mind” is a process, somewhat like “falling” (although more complex).
I am a physicalist. Clearly there are “such things as matter” (although there are also things like fundamental forces, energy, spacetime and arrangements of these things which are physical but not necessarily matter: “materialist” is therefore rather an old fashoined name for “physicalist”.)
My own mind, after decades of sensory inputs, currently outputs the decision that only the physical exists, that thoughts, concepts, truth and maths are themselves physical in that they are the product of offal-based memories being manipulated and cross-filed by a neural network, and that all this confusion came from a primate evolving brain function and capacity far greater than its ability to understand its physical nature.
The explanation which my offal outputs as its “decision” is that dualisms are, ultimately, arbitrary absurdities: either everything is physical or everything is metaphysical - believing in both receives a serious mauling from Ockham’s Razor.
There are all kinds of hoops to be jumped through to reduce “mind and such things” to the physical: hold them up, and I’ll attempt the necessary gymnastics, although I must warn you that some of my moves will look rather clumsy and unconvincing. Neuropsychology is in its infancy, and I am no expert therein in any case.
However, I believe useful comparisons can be drawn with computers, or the weather. Analyse the activity in a computer chip and the memory domains it references all you like - you will find it almost impossible to guess what is happening on the monitor. And yet what appears on the monitor is still explained by that processor/memory activity. Similarly, we cannot explain every aspect of the weather (and we certainly can’t predict except in short timescales), and yet it is clearly a “physical thing”.
As for the “interaction”, well, even if I did believe in the separate existence of the metaphysical, I have never heard any convincing answer to the question of how the two could interact. What’s your take?
I don’t follow you. It may be difficult for a human armed with no more than a core dump (that is, the raw contents of all the registers and memory) to predict what the monitor display looks like, but that is only due to the sheer volume of information. But computers are invented by humans, each component is well understood, they interact in a predictable manner to produce a result. Obviously there are bugs to be found, but if you give someone the proper software tools to analyze the core dump they will be able to tell you what shows up on the screen with a high degree of accuracy.
Actually you would be able to identify which pixels were being used and in what way and what data was being processed. The only reason you could visualize what was happening on the monitor would be because of previous sensory inputs collected at times when you were watching a monitor.
Feel free to correct me if I am wrong SentientMeat.
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All is pattern. What we term “physical” is a type of pattern. What we term “mind” is a pattern.
For example, an atom is a set of rules for behavior in the pattern we term the “Universe.” Take it apart, you get electrons, protons, and neutrons–all invisible, untouchable, etc., but there in “theory” (which is to say, as behavior aspects).
Mind is a pattern that inheres in matter. But this pattern can also exist without matter as we know it. Hence the Afterlife, which, nevertheless, appears to be a material world to those in it (that is, a similar pattern interface to ours, but by no means identical).
You are assuming the existence of an afterlife or do you have evidence of one?
To slightly paraphrase Nietzsche:
[QUOTE]
“I am body and mind” --so speaketh the child. And why should one not speak like children?
But the awakened one, the wise one, speaketh: “Body am I entirely, and nothing more; and mind is only the name of something in the body.”
[QUOTE]
Everything that is real is either a material entity or is a form or function or action of a material entity. Matter and it’s interactions, forms, and functions is all there is.
Trying again…
To paraphrase Nietzsche:
Everything that is real is either a material entity or is a form or function or action of a material entity. Matter and it’s interactions, forms, and functions is all there is.
I find this worldview to be extremely exciting and life-affirming. It is fulfilling in ways far deeper and more compelling than any supernatural or paranatural worldview.
Since when japan went bye-bye? Welcome home. (Indiana wants me)
Nice description. Pattern. I like that.
Back to the OP:
Mind exists. It is evident by our perception. I experience, therefore I Am, and Mind is what I use to categorize the experiences.
Matter exists. It has effects on other matter within the realm with influence, and therefore exists. As what? We’re still working on that one. As we are on what mind is.
Very well, strumhauke and Greenback, it seems that I must make the analogy a little more realistic.
Imagine, then, that the chip is not simply stamped in silicon identically on an assembly line but grown organically such that no two are the same. Imagine that the system is analogue, not binary, so that each signal can take any value between two thresholds, and that each processing node receives five or more channels. Imagine that the chip requires some kind of chemical moderator that itself changes the nature of each “memory” formed therein. Finally, and most fundamentally, consider that each sensory input which gets placed in memory is effectively encrypted by a one-time-hash, the kind which only the original user can decrypt (ie. examine the physical memory domains all you like, you’ll still need the original user to tell you what it is).
Got all that? OK.
Now remove the monitor!
When all is seen as pattern, then any interaction becomes readily understandable.
I still don’t get the computer analogy–what was the original point?
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I glean that you are proposing that all is metaphysical and denying that physical things “really” exist (I think Lib does the same, but he can correct me too :)). Though I disagree, that is still a perfectly logically consistent position to take. My question is really directed at people who believe that both physical things (arrangements of atoms in spacetime) and metaphysical things (numbers, triangles, truth etc.) exist, not that one is a subset of the other.
In an unfamiliar and vastly complex computer, even though we might not yet understand how a certain application or program arises from the activity of those simple physical components, that that application is still clearly a physical thing and we need not appeal to non-physical explanations or entities.
Our memories are demonstrably physical by nature. Our sensory inputs are demonstrably physical by nature. The chemicals which moderate our emotions are demonstrably physical by nature. Is it so unfeasible a leap to consider that the “mind” is explained by some (admittedly vastly complex) configuration of sensory inputs sorted into memory and moderated by chemicals?
Two questions for all those who consider “mind” to be non-physical:[ul][li]How come atoms of certain chemicals (eg. LSD or alcohol) affect our experience so much?[/li]How come our minds develop from infancy?[/ul]
SentientMeat: OK, I think I see what you’re saying. I was going to post that organic computers, better known as brains, are vastly more complex and difficult to understand, but then I saw that you posted the same thing already.
Not quite, as I think “metaphysical” is the wrong term. All is principle and pattern, principles being those things that cannot be otherwise (left cannot be right, 1 + 1 must always = 2); and patterns those things that are built from the principles and arbitrary elements. But the principles are merely necessary patterns; hence, all is pattern.
What you call “physical” is simply one type of pattern. When we see things this way, the mystery of universals vanishes. The universal “chair” is a pattern without the further addition of rules that pertain to “the chair I’m sitting on right now.”
Yes, you’re correct to oppose that type of thinking. “Chair” is a pattern that does not “exist” in any particular partition of That Which Is (although it required homo sapiens to create it in the form we know); whereas “the chair I’m sitting on now” does “exist” (which, if we examine the word carefully, means to operate in this Universe/large pattern in a certain fashion).
Or, to translate, despite the complexity of both the cause and the effect, we might have no reason to doubt that the cause operates outside a certain circumscribed X region of pattern.
[/quote]
Although I don’t agree with the word “physical,” I don’t disagree–except that these statements refer to the CAUSES involved. The fact remains that consciousness as an EFFECT is of entirely different order of pattern than the “physical” elements that cause it.
No, that’s basically correct. The trouble comes in trying really to understand how one pattern produces the other. We haven’t gotten very far yet.
[quote]
Two questions for all those who consider “mind” to be non-physical:[ul][li]How come atoms of certain chemicals (eg. LSD or alcohol) affect our experience so much?[/li][li]How come our minds develop from infancy?[/ul][/li][/QUOTE]
Yes, the notion of pre-existing “souls” that you are trying to counter is incorrect, as the “soul” is not an object. It is a pattern inhering in what we call “matter.” Aristotle said as much, saying that the soul was the form of the body.
If atoms exist in spacetime then they necessarily conform to some arrangement.
True or false?
That’s true.
Dualism as an endpoint in philosophy doesn’t suffice. Ultimately both aspects of the dual nature and all reality indeed has to come from a singular source (if there are multiple universes, they belong to a single Multiverse and so on). But you’ve made some leaps of logic above. All you show is that the physical aspects of some phenomenon are necessary and correlative. You can’t show if they’re sufficient or that all phenomenon must have such correlates. If there is a dual world/essence bound to the world of our qualia, but doesn’t produce qualia of its own, then that essence can never be empirically detected, ergo the question is closed to the scientific method (or human inquiry in general).
You seem fond of using the label ‘physical’ as if it conveys anything more than this notion that some phenomenas have isomorphic correlates within qualia, meaning that if I see you laugh while you are inside a MRI scanner, some parts of the fMRI display lights up with colors. A physicalist holds that output to be a representation of your physical brain. And everytime you perform an identical action, I see an identical picture on the display. All this inclines me to believe that the two patterns(action & picture) are related and come from a common source, but like I said earlier, all reality ultimately has to come from a single source. That still does not rule out a functional dualistic divide, nor does it exclude the notion that there may be qualia for which there are no correlates in other qualia.
But I guess the true dispute I have is that you assign greater primacy to objects within experience than to the essence of experience itself. You see yourself as an instance(‘person’) of a relatively homogenous phenomena(‘humans’,‘life’) and upon witnessing lack of qualia-correlates of activity after a certain event(‘death’) in another instance , conclude that your own essence of experience ceases, while holding that some particular objects within your experience(‘universe’,‘matter’, ‘energy’) never do.
Agreed. However, I consider that it would be an unnecessary entity, Ockhamly speaking, rather like proposing that the computer application came from another “source” and merely correlated with the activity of the physical components.
You mean, I see a cold brain on a surgeon’s table and consider that no “quale” is either produced or correlated therein? That would be correct. Again, I cannot prove (scientifically, logically or otherwise) that dead brains don’t have experiences.