A question about the film The Prestige (major, jumbo spoilers)

[EllisDee]

@Miller

Alright, but doesn’t that indicate that the brain is not the source of your self? If the brain is unchanged, just the data on it erased, how is that destroying “you,” if the brain itself is what makes you “you?”

No, because I contend that the data is part of the structure of the brain. Agreed on your correction that this is a technical problem, not a philosophical one. But I believe this technical problem renders the brain hypotheticals moot.

But as the gun is imaginary to begin with, it can have whatever imaginary properties we wish to impute it

But see, no it can’t. Just like you can’t introduce a hyopthetical measuring device that measures both the position and momentum of a subatomic particle with arbitrary precision. Even the imaginary realm cannot house such a magical device.

I don’t understand that at all. How is the body with the re-implanted memories still you?

I might have to think this one through a bit more, though I am still leaning in that direction.

Lastly, say you wake up in a laboratory, and you see your body on a slab next to you.

You begged the question by saying that I (“you”) woke up. I am me, always and forever, until I die. If a copy of me woke up that would be something different, but in this hypothetical “I” am the one who woke up because that is part of the definition of the hypothetical.

I don’t quite see how the uncertainty principle applies here.

The uncertainty principle makes impossible even the idea of duplicating a human.

[Miller]

@EllisDee

No, because I contend that the data is part of the structure of the brain. Agreed on your correction that this is a technical problem, not a philosophical one. But I believe this technical problem renders the brain hypotheticals moot.

Okay, so removing information from the brain is changing the structure of the brain, and therefore is akin to brain damage, and can make the result into someone who is not “you.” I assume this means that, in the scenarios of your memories being implanted into your clone, or implanted back into you with memories of being in a different body, the result is no longer “you,” correct?

However, if knowledge is structure, doesn’t that mean that every time you learn something new, the structure of your brain changes. So wouldn’t who you are be “killed” every time you learn something new, or every time you forget something you used to know? How much structural change can the brain endure before it necessarily results in the obliteration of the person you used to be? Is Ellis Dee aged 8 dead, because of the massive structural changes your brain has undergone during the process of maturation?

You begged the question by saying that I (“you”) woke up. I am me, always and forever, until I die. If a copy of me woke up that would be something different, but in this hypothetical “I” am the one who woke up because that is part of the definition of the hypothetical.

Alright, let me change it around this way. Right now, someone walks into the room and gives you undeniable proof that you are a programmed clone decanted from a tank last Wednesday, and the original has been killed and incinerated.

Who are you, in that circumstance? How does that knowledge effect how you live your life? How does it effect how you interact with people you know?

Or, to switch it around, someone presents you with evidence that this was done to the person you are closest to. Your wife, say. Do you leave your wife because of this knowledge?

The uncertainty principle makes impossible even the idea of duplicating a human.

That’s what you said in your last post, which is why I asked how the uncertainty principle applied to this discussion.

[EllisDee]

@Miller

That’s what you said in your last post, which is why I asked how the uncertainty principle applied to this discussion.

In my worldview, consciousness is non-transferable. Hypotheticals that introduce the idea of a consciousness being transferred are invalid because they violate a fundamental principal of reality. IMO. So any paradoxes we uncover are meaningless because they assume a different reality.

Imagine a thought experiment that assumes a measuring device that allows breaking past the uncertainty principle. Then imagine this thought experiment raises a paradox. (It almost certainly would, I would think.) That hypothetical paradox is invalid because it assumes that those measured properties actually exist, which in reality they do not. Thus the paradox is only paradoxical in the context of the made-up universe where the impossible measuring device exists. But that is not our world, and thus that paradox is invalid.

Sort of like that mathematical proof that 2=1, where if you look closely you see one of the intermediate steps includes a division by zero. Sure, you came up with a paradox: 2=1. But that paradox is invalid because the basis of it was invalid, and so it becomes meaningless.

But I’ll give these questions a shot anyway:

Okay, so removing information from the brain is changing the structure of the brain, and therefore is akin to brain damage, and can make the result into someone who is not “you.” I assume this means that, in the scenarios of your memories being implanted into your clone, or implanted back into you with memories of being in a different body, the result is no longer “you,” correct?
Yep.

However, if knowledge is structure, doesn’t that mean that every time you learn something new, the structure of your brain changes.
Yes.

So wouldn’t who you are be “killed” every time you learn something new, or every time you forget something you used to know?
No. Change is not synonymous with death. The previous hypothetical changes are; natural growth is not.

How much structural change can the brain endure before it necessarily results in the obliteration of the person you used to be?
I couldn’t answer that any more definitively than I could state when a fetus becomes a person. (Though I am pro-choice.)

Is Ellis Dee aged 8 dead, because of the massive structural changes your brain has undergone during the process of maturation?
I wouldn’t have a problem agreeing with that. To spin it around, that guy I knew in highschool basically reverted mentally to a young child, and I would (and already did) say that the highschool student he was did in a sense die. (Actually, I think we were in our early 20s when he had his accident, but I only knew him a little in highschool and then didn’t see him until after his accident, when I hung out with him a fair amount.)

**Alright, let me change it around this way. Right now, someone walks into the room and gives you undeniable proof that you are a programmed clone decanted from a tank last Wednesday, and the original has been killed and incinerated.

Who are you, in that circumstance?**
I am an artificial person, with less value than the original me. This artifical existence can easily be replicated, so my life is far less valuable than when I thought I was human.

**How does that knowledge effect how you live your life? **
I would likely become much more risk-taking. It would be nice to say I’d put it to good use by joining a high-risk profession like fireman or enlist in the army, but it would be more likely to present as thrill-seeking or crime. Or, equally probable, I’d just kill myself.

How does it effect how you interact with people you know?
I would most likely bail on the people I know. I might or might not explain why before I left.

Or, to switch it around, someone presents you with evidence that this was done to the person you are closest to. Your wife, say. Do you leave your wife because of this knowledge?
No, but this gets into a weird area. I was thinking about the movie AI as an example, when the child robots are marketed as replacements for children who die. Way unhealthy, IMO.

I shouldn’t just pretend that the clone is actually my wife, but I absolutely would. Weakness and denial are easy traps to fall into.

[Miller]

@EllisDee

In my worldview, consciousness is non-transferable. Hypotheticals that introduce the idea of a consciousness being transferred are invalid because they violate a fundamental principal of reality. IMO. So any paradoxes we uncover are meaningless because they assume a different reality.

But the entire point of this thread revolves around a scenario where consciousness is transferred. Remember the movie we were talking about? The Prestige? Where the guy instantly creates a perfect duplicate of himself with a complete record of all his thoughts and memories? The entire movie is a hypothetical about the idea of transferring/replicating consciousness. It seems a little odd to object to the use of physically impossible hypotheticals as irrelevant to a discussion about a physically impossible hypothetical.

No. Change is not synonymous with death. The previous hypothetical changes are; natural growth is not.

What’s the distinction? Why is one kind of change death, and the other not?

I am an artificial person, with less value than the original me. This artifical existence can easily be replicated, so my life is far less valuable than when I thought I was human.

But why? You’re still a human. You still have all the same feelings and senses. How is that more artificial than the life of your original? And if the ability to make endless copies of yourself makes the copies less valuable, why doesn’t it make the original less valuable, too?

I would likely become much more risk-taking. It would be nice to say I’d put it to good use by joining a high-risk profession like fireman or enlist in the army, but it would be more likely to present as thrill-seeking or crime. Or, equally probable, I’d just kill myself.

What’s preventing you from doing that right now? What is different about you that makes you more valuable than an identical copy of you?

I would most likely bail on the people I know. I might or might not explain why before I left.

Wouldn’t you still want to see these people you remember as being your friends? If you liked hanging out with them when you thought you were thirty or more years old, why wouldn’t you like hanging out with them if you found out you were only a few days old?

If you also learned that some proportion of your friends had similarly been replaced, would you continue to associate with those people?

No, but this gets into a weird area. I was thinking about the movie AI as an example, when the child robots are marketed as replacements for children who die. Way unhealthy, IMO.

I shouldn’t just pretend that the clone is actually my wife, but I absolutely would. Weakness and denial are easy traps to fall into.

Yeah, I can see why this situation could lead to a radically different reaction than other situations.

[EllisDee]

@Miller

But the entire point of this thread revolves around a scenario where consciousness is transferred. Remember the movie we were talking about? The Prestige? Where the guy instantly creates a perfect duplicate of himself with a complete record of all his thoughts and memories? The entire movie is a hypothetical about the idea of transferring/replicating consciousness. It seems a little odd to object to the use of physically impossible hypotheticals as irrelevant to a discussion about a physically impossible hypothetical.

My position is consistent, and it underlines the basic difference in our view of the movie.

I do not think that consciousness is transfered in The Prestige, or in any work of fiction. (Star Trek transporters, etc…) I believe that the simulcrum created at a distance has a brand new consciousness created out of whole cloth that has no connection to the original person. In Star Trek this means stepping into the transporter is suicide. In The Prestige this means that the guy in the box (who drowns) is the guy who pulled the lever. The guy in the balcony is a whole new person who is not related to the guy who pulled the lever; he is simply a copy.

Transferring and replicating are two very different things. I can buy into the latter; the former is simply inconsistent with my worldview. Much like Newtonian predetermination is simply invalid, even in a hypothetical.

Hey, yeah, Newtonian predetermination. There’s a good example of an invalid hypothetical because it violates the nature of reality. What if I could measure everything to perfect precision and therefore could predict with complete accuracy your every action. Does that mean you have no free will? No, because the very idea of doing that is invalid, even in a thought experiment. The nature of reality forbids such a thing.

And if the ability to make endless copies of yourself makes the copies less valuable, why doesn’t it make the original less valuable, too?

Again, our basic difference. You seem to see no difference between the original and a copy. I find this bizarre. I see a world of difference between the original and the copy, so my reasoning on which has more value should be obvious.

What’s preventing you from doing that right now? What is different about you that makes you more valuable than an identical copy of you?

A copy is disposable; the original is not.

Wouldn’t you still want to see these people you remember as being your friends? If you liked hanging out with them when you thought you were thirty or more years old, why wouldn’t you like hanging out with them if you found out you were only a few days old?

No. From my perspective, you seem to hold your identity cheap that you’d be fine with a simulcrum taking over your life.

[EllisDee]

Specifically for the movie, from what I can tell there are two different views on the continuity of consciousness:

        -------D
       /
D-----D
       \
        -------D

       
D-----D-----D
       
      X-----C

The first one is based on the premise that both resulting Dantons are equally valid Dantons, with continuous consciousness dating back to the guy who pulled the lever.

The second one is based on the premise that Danton pulls the lever and a separate copy © is created (X) somewhere else. This copy has no effect on the original, and it has no direct connection to the original’s consciousness. It only thinks it does.

I subscribe to the latter. More to the point, I can’t even begin to conceive of how anyone could ever subscribe to the former, under any circumstances. It seems as foreign to me as the idea that free will doesn’t exist because if you do enough measurements you could predict everything that will happen with perfect precision.

[The_Controvert]

I think you’re just being stubborn at this point. I understood your latest example back when I posted the same thing upthread.

In The Prestige, the creator of the machine says the copies are perfect. He is waving the magic wand that causes perfect duplication, nevermind your thoughts on perfect measurement.

To argue the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle makes as much sense as a theatre-goer watching Back to the Future and stating that the movie is about parallel universes because “The Vulcan Science Directorate has concluded that time travel is impossible”.

When you state that entering a Star Trek transporter is equivalent to suicide, do you ignore the beaming that directly sends you from one place to the next?

How about Stargates, are they suicide too? (They are explained as sending you through a wormhole, but maybe your original was annihilated, who knows?)

How do you interpret Nightcrawler’s teleportation (i.e. from the X-men movies)? He has to be a simulacrum by now by your worldview.

What if you woke up with that ability? You’re in bed and you want some orange juice. Before you can react, you are in the kitchen. Is your first thought, I must be a simulacrum, therefore you shoot yourself?

[Grumman]

@The_Controvert

What if you woke up with that ability? You’re in bed and you want some orange juice. Before you can react, you are in the kitchen. Is your first thought, I must be a simulacrum, therefore you shoot yourself?

Why on Earth do you believe the simulacrum would want to kill himself just because the original is dead?

Assuming this is a form of teleportation which kills the user (which isn’t guaranteed, since there are ways that don’t), the death of Ellis Dee is no reason for Ellis Prime to commit suicide. They’re two separate people.

[The_Controvert]

@Grumman

Why on Earth do you believe the simulacrum would want to kill himself just because the original is dead?

Assuming this is a form of teleportation which kills the user (which isn’t guaranteed, since there are ways that don’t), the death of Ellis Dee is no reason for Ellis Prime to commit suicide. They’re two separate people.

You’ll have to ask Ellis Dee:

@EllisDee

Who are you, in that circumstance?**
I am an artificial person, with less value than the original me. This artifical existence can easily be replicated, so my life is far less valuable than when I thought I was human.

**How does that knowledge effect how you live your life? **
… Or, equally probable, I’d just kill myself.

@EllisDee

A copy is disposable; the original is not.

[Miller]

@EllisDee

My position is consistent, and it underlines the basic difference in our view of the movie.

I do not think that consciousness is transferred in The Prestige, or in any work of fiction. (Star Trek transporters, etc…) I believe that the simulacrum created at a distance has a brand new consciousness created out of whole cloth that has no connection to the original person. In Star Trek this means stepping into the transporter is suicide. In The Prestige this means that the guy in the box (who drowns) is the guy who pulled the lever. The guy in the balcony is a whole new person who is not related to the guy who pulled the lever; he is simply a copy.

This just seems transparently and obviously incorrect, on a simple definitional level. When the guy in the box throws the switch, a perfect duplicate is created in the balcony. This duplicate has consciousness. This consciousness is identical to the consciousness of the guy who threw the switch. Therefore, that guy’s consciousness has been transferred a hundred yards or so into the balcony. I see where you’re coming from in terms of how that should effect the way the original views his own existence, and agree with you to a certain extent, but to say that, even inside this sort of science fiction, consciousness transferrance is impossible is directly contrary to the text of the film.

Transferring and replicating are two very different things. I can buy into the latter; the former is simply inconsistent with my worldview. Much like Newtonian predetermination is simply invalid, even in a hypothetical.

Hey, yeah, Newtonian predetermination. There’s a good example of an invalid hypothetical because it violates the nature of reality. What if I could measure everything to perfect precision and therefore could predict with complete accuracy your every action. Does that mean you have no free will? No, because the very idea of doing that is invalid, even in a thought experiment. The nature of reality forbids such a thing.

Here’s the thing, though. Newtonian predetermination is impossible because it violates fundamental laws of reality. But consciousness transferance doesn’t violate a fundamental law, it just violates your arbitrary distinction between replication and transferance.

Again, our basic difference. You seem to see no difference between the original and a copy. I find this bizarre. I see a world of difference between the original and the copy, so my reasoning on which has more value should be obvious.

But what is the difference?

A copy is disposable; the original is not.

Why? If they’re identical, what gives the original more value?

No. From my perspective, you seem to hold your identity cheap that you’d be fine with a simulcrum taking over your life.

I never said that! The fact that there’s an identical copy of me running around out there in no way reduces the value I place on my own existence. But by that same token, if I were the copy, the fact that there’s an original out there would likewise in no way reduce the value I place on my own existence. I may be a clone, or a quantum duplicate, or whatever, but I still exist, I still feel, and I still have the ability to make a life for myself. Why should the fact that I’m technically only a few days old invalidate any of that?

Good job on the diagrams, btw. That’s exactly the way I’m viewing this.

[singular1]

I’m going to break a cardinal Dope rule here - while I haven’t read the whole thread, I am compelled to throw in a comment to anyone who loves this movie. The book is wonderful, and adds an entirely new view of this wonderful experience. Sorry if this is an asshole-ish hijack, but I loved the book as much as the movie, and I just want antone who loved the movie to know the book is a wonderful and unique experience on it’s own.

[fubbleskag]

This just in: book better than movie adaptation - more at 11!

[Nicest_of_the_Damned]

Having just watched a few relevant scenes from the movie again, I’ll take a stab at the questions the OP actually asked. I don’t think it ever gives the answers explicitly but here is my take on it.

As for the specific number of 100 shows, I think it was intended to be short enough to give Borden a sense of urgency but long enough that he wouldn’t possibly be able to resist for the entire length of the run (and possibly also to psyche him out, there is a scene where Borden is himself trying to figure out the significance of 100 shows).

Danton has been playing these cat and mouse games with Borden for so long he probably has kind of gotten into his head and has a pretty good idea of how long the run should be. While there is certainly a toll taken on Danton each time he performs the act and practical issues regarding storage of the bodies, I have no doubt he would have made the run last a thousand shows if he thought that is what it would take.

As for how Danton knew not to appear in the balcony, Bordon had previously been in the audience but this time he went up on stage when Danton invited the audience to inspect the machine. He also creates a minor commotion when he pushes past the stagehand who tries to prevent him from going backstage. I assume Danton must have seen him, though it is never made clear (no shots of Danton glancing in his direction or anything like that).
I think the brother who was executed was the one who loved Olivia (the assistant) and didn’t love Sarah (the wife). As he is being taken away he says he is sorry because he hadn’t wanted to hurt her but he doesn’t say he loved her. And yeah, as someone mentioned earlier I think he was the one who was always kind of a dick (like when he and Olivia meet “Fallon” and Sarah at the restaurant).

It’s not clear exactly how much they “traded off” with Sarah. I have always wondered if either of them actually knew who was the father of the little girl but they both seemed to genuinely love her.

[AClockworkMelon]

In before “It doesn’t matter which one fathered the girl because they’re genetically identical.”

[Alessan]

@EllisDee

Specifically for the movie, from what I can tell there are two different views on the continuity of consciousness:

        -------D
       /
D-----D
       \
        -------D

       
D-----D-----D
       
      X-----C

The first one is based on the premise that both resulting Dantons are equally valid Dantons, with continuous consciousness dating back to the guy who pulled the lever.

The second one is based on the premise that Danton pulls the lever and a separate copy (C) is created (X) somewhere else. This copy has no effect on the original, and it has no direct connection to the original’s consciousness. It only thinks it does.

I subscribe to the latter. More to the point, I can’t even begin to conceive of how anyone could ever subscribe to the former, under any circumstances. It seems as foreign to me as the idea that free will doesn’t exist because if you do enough measurements you could predict everything that will happen with perfect precision.

Can you accept the concept of parallel universes?

Consider the possibility that the universe is constantly splitting into parralel existences, something many scientists actually think is possible. Flip a coin - in one universe you get heads, in another you get tails; from that point on, those two universes continue in their own distinct paths, and you exist in both of them. In both universes you are equally you.

Now imagine that instead of splitting into two seperate people in two seperate universes, you’re split into two seperate people in the same universe. That’s what we have here.

It’s not a matter of duplication - it’s a matter of quantum probability.

@Nicest_of_the_Damned

It’s not clear exactly how much they “traded off” with Sarah. I have always wondered if either of them actually knew who was the father of the little girl but they both seemed to genuinely love her.

I got the impression that only one of them actually slept with Sarah. The way they saw it, *he *was the one who was married to her - the other one pretended to be him from time to time.

[BMalion]

So then how did the magician make the orange tree grow in The Illusionist?

[CandidGamera]

@Tanbarkie

So sure. Only one of each molecule from the original Danton is present, and from that perspective you can argue that whichever Danton got those original molecules is the physical “original.” But at the higher level of abstraction, both Dantons have (at least at the initial moment of duplication) the exact same consciousness as OriginalDanton. It’s just that only one of them is actually using OriginalDanton’s molecules to maintain that consciousness. Do you see how one might consider “both” consciousnesses to be the original in that sense?

No. But thank you for putting it this way, because I think it’ll let me address the points more directly. I hope.

I don’t care than both A and B call themselves Danton, or believe themselves to be Danton, or would react to identical stimuli identically. Neurons are just molecules when you break them down. A and B have identical patterns.

But one of them DID exist five minutes ago, and one of them did not. That is an important difference. One of them once held Danton’s wife’s hand. One of them merely believes he did. You can say, in a sense, they are both “Danton”, but it is also very clear that one of them is the original Danton, and one is not.

I assert that in the act of creation of the copy there is a discontinuity. There is no point at which the copy’s existence is merged with the original. As soon as the copy exists, he is mentally and physically separate from the original, and therefore, a separate person.

[CandidGamera]

@Miller

Hell, now that I think about it, there’s a Star Trek episode that’s a straight up copy (heh) of this situation. There’s an episode where the Enterprise goes to a planet that Riker had been on back when he was a lieutenant. When they get there, they find out that there’d been a transporter malfunction when they tried to pull Riker off the planet, and they’d accidentally duplicated him, leaving one copy marooned on the planet, while the other went off and continued his career in Starfleet. In that episode, which Riker was the “real” Riker? And how does that situation differ materially from the situation presented in The Prestige?

See, if this thread were about Star Trek transporters, then it would be interesting to make the argument. Star Trek transporters convert matter to energy then reconstruct that energy elsewhere - at least in some sense completely destroying the person. Of course, that actually makes the most interesting question : “Does the same person come out of the transporter as went in?”

Unfortunately, it’s also muddled by the fact that Star Trek’s transporter technology is inconsistently represented. (The episode where Barclay’s fear of transporters becomes justified, for instance, shows him conscious and physically intact mid-transport.)

[CandidGamera]

@Munch

Whoops, you’re right. I guess the framing then. (Or the attempted murder from way back when - doesn’t really matter.) I’m just curious what your thoughts are on what responsibilities Danton2.0 has for Danton1.0’s actions, since you’re on the “they’re two different people” side. It gets sticky for me when we start saying, “okay - if they’re the same person (but start diverging after 2.0’s creation), what if they both live?”

Well, look at it differently. What if Danton hadn’t shot the first copy, and further, what if they both were so horrified at the implications after seeing that happen that they decided to retire from magic into a life of leisure.

Who’s Lord Coldlow? Who gets his money?

You can be damn sure that neither Danton, nor the U.K. government is going to recognize the legitimacy of both of them. So how would they answer the question?

One of them is the original, and the other’s a copy. The original is Lord Coldlow, and the copy is, effectively, a younger twin brother. You subpoena Tesla and find out how the machine works, to determine which man is the original.

As for the framing, we don’t have to go to the trouble, as the surviving Danton took steps in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy, so he’s equally guilty with the other Dantons.

[CandidGamera]

@EllisDee

Specifically for the movie, from what I can tell there are two different views on the continuity of consciousness:

        -------D
       /
D-----D
       \
        -------D

       
D-----D-----D
       
      X-----C

The first one is based on the premise that both resulting Dantons are equally valid Dantons, with continuous consciousness dating back to the guy who pulled the lever.

The second one is based on the premise that Danton pulls the lever and a separate copy (C) is created (X) somewhere else. This copy has no effect on the original, and it has no direct connection to the original’s consciousness. It only thinks it does.

I subscribe to the latter. More to the point, I can’t even begin to conceive of how anyone could ever subscribe to the former, under any circumstances. It seems as foreign to me as the idea that free will doesn’t exist because if you do enough measurements you could predict everything that will happen with perfect precision.

Thank you! I thought about an illustration earlier, but didn’t do it. That’s it perfectly.