That has nothing to do with half the molecules going to one and half going to the other. You don’t have to divvy up the original matter to make an exact copy. One Danton can keep all the original matter and the other can be composed of newly arranged matter. Maybe you have a real problem with reading?
I don’t have a problem with reading. The original molecules don’t matter. Why should they?
The important fact is we’re talking about a perfect duplicate, physically and mentally.
I gave the checkboard example to help people understand the Ship of Theseus analogy, which was being completely ignored.
Well, what murder? Borden’s? The state executed him. Danton’s crime was framing Borden. Or do you mean some other murder?
Because the original molecules DO matter. To me. I am arguing from the standpoint of physical continuity. If the device creates the duplicate out of thin air, the question can be resolved. If it makes each Danton half out of new material and half out of old, I would argue that NEITHER is the original Danton, and thus the question becomes uninteresting.
There is no reason in the film or otherwise to assume half of the original molecules go to each man, and that is a more complicated way for the device to operate.
If you want to continue on that tangent, do so, but don’t expect me to respond. I am examining the question of whether or not both men can be called the original Danton (hint : No) assuming that one of the two is created wholly anew as an exact duplicate of the other.
But if you truly believed that the new copy is every bit as much “you” as the original, then before you do the split you shouldn’t care which one takes the bullet because “you” will live on regardless.
If I say to you that parallel universes exist and another Ellis Dee will live on regardless, would that argument make you want to shoot yourself in the head?
If I truly believed that what constitutes me would live one, I’d eat a bullet without reservations. That’s my whole point. I simply do not believe such a thing is possible, period. That’s why I’d never eat the bullet. (Well, not for that.) I’d never use a Star Trek transporter, or any form of teleportation at all, nor would I feel comforted in the least by having my memories saved ala Dollhouse. Once my consciousness ends, I died. Piecing together a doppelganger after the fact doesn’t change the fact that I died.
EDIT: Nor would I find any comfort in the memory of waking up on the balconey 99 times before, because I am about to drown and I would know it.
Then I think you must believe in a soul. Or something beyond just atoms.
I’m a hardline atheist. But I have no problem conceptualizing consciousness as an emergent property of the brain.
I do, personally, but I’m not factoring that into the argument. Actually, I’ve repeatedly tried to use analogies with inanimate objects to convey my position. The soul is irrelevant to the argument.
Two objects - be they rocks, apples, people, CDs, whatever - with identical molecular arrangements (including those in a brain governing memory, personality, whatever) are not the same object. Period.
I think it’s more complex than that, and someone stated as much earlier in the thread. Danton does not know how the machine works. Each time he steps into the machine, he doesn’t know if his “physical continuity,” as CandidGamera puts it, will end up in the tank or on the balcony. He knows that one of him will die and one of him will live, but he has absolutely no way of knowing, at the moment before pulling the switch, whether “he” himself will be the one who lives or the one who dies.
That uncertainty is the real horror of Danton’s obsession - and the fact that he looks into that uncertainty and decides that the success of the trick (and the associated success of Danton the Magician) is worth it. He knows that, at best, he will be guilty of murder, and at worst, he will die horribly. And he still pulls the switch, night after night. Because beating Borden is that important to him.
Pulling away from the film and towards the philosophical discussion, I do think that there’s more to discuss than the mere “physical continuity,” and that one of the film’s great strengths is how it makes us question our traditional conceptions of identity. The television shows “Battlestar Galactica” and “Dollhouse” played with identity in similar ways (and, in a somewhat different way, so do movies that play with memory like “Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind”). These works of art get to the heart of what exactly it is that makes us human, and in ways that science fiction is uniquely equipped to examine.
Nobody disagrees with you that physical continuity is one-way - either your molecules came from the original or they didn’t. And in that sense, yes, two identical apples are in fact different objects.
Ellis Dee et al. are arguing at a higher level of abstraction that has absolutely nothing to do with a “soul,” or any other metaphysical entity. Take a hundred billion neurons, hook them up in a certain way, and you get a complex system capable of independent thought, or what we define as “consciousness.” It’s, as ED said, an emergent property of the system. The consciousness there isn’t a tangible “thing” we can see or touch; nor is it really even definable as “those particular neurons.” If you took another hundred billion neurons and arranged them in exactly the same way, you’d end up with a second consciousness that acts, in every way, identical to the first.
The argument that “both” Dantons are the original comes from this angle, and does not have anything to do with their physical continuity. Even ignoring the possibility of an amoebic split, or any other “partial” division of the original matter that composed OriginalDanton, the fact is that the movie presents us, after completion of the “transportation,” with two bodies sharing perfect identity in their arrangement. Both Dantons have the same arrangement of molecules in their beards, their clothes, their shattered legs. And both Dantons have exactly the same brain, down to the deepest level. Tesla says as much when he describes all of Danton’s hats as the original.
So sure. Only one of each molecule from the original Danton is present, and from that perspective you can argue that whichever Danton got those original molecules is the physical “original.” But at the higher level of abstraction, both Dantons have (at least at the initial moment of duplication) the exact same consciousness as OriginalDanton. It’s just that only one of them is actually using OriginalDanton’s molecules to maintain that consciousness. Do you see how one might consider “both” consciousnesses to be the original in that sense?
He would have continuity of consciousness from the point at which the copy was made, though. He doesn’t have physical continuity, but that’s already inherent in any sort of teleportation system. I don’t think it’s particularly significant to the argument here, because the important consideration is the impact of this machine on our concept of identity and consciousness, not its effect on rude matter.
I guess you don’t consume much science fiction, then? Because it’s not really all that original an idea. I mean, the society shown in Star Trek is pretty much founded on that assertion.
Hell, now that I think about it, there’s a Star Trek episode that’s a straight up copy (heh) of this situation. There’s an episode where the Enterprise goes to a planet that Riker had been on back when he was a lieutenant. When they get there, they find out that there’d been a transporter malfunction when they tried to pull Riker off the planet, and they’d accidentally duplicated him, leaving one copy marooned on the planet, while the other went off and continued his career in Starfleet. In that episode, which Riker was the “real” Riker? And how does that situation differ materially from the situation presented in The Prestige?
Again, you’re both misunderstanding the argument being presented. You’re comparing the two people created post-trick to each other. We’re comparing the two people created post-trick to the person who was around pre-trick. Once the split has occurred, of course you have two different people. No one has argued against that. The argument is whether either of those people are different from the one who pulled the switch. And the answer to that is, “No.” At least, not any more different than anyone would be if you compared them to the person they’d been five minutes ago.
This is where I disagree. The moment after I pull the lever, I won’t experience dual-consciousness in both bodies. Instead, I will be in one of the bodies, and a perfect copy of me is created somewhere else. If the body that houses me is killed, I die. Full stop. That there is a simulcrum running around doesn’t do me a lick of good.
No, I am comparing both resulting people with the one who pulled the lever. As I see it, one of the resulting people is the person who pulled the lever, and the other is a foreign copy that thinks it’s the original but is wrong. That nobody can tell the difference is moot.
Here’s a different hypothetical: What if the process of creating the perfect duplicate kills the original you. Would you sign up for the process? (Note that this is my conceptual view of how teleportation in all fiction works.)
That’s the way I see it.
This.
How do you define “me” in this statement? What makes you “you?”
I actually agree with this part. If you duplicate me, then kill me, then I’m dead. That there’s another me running around doesn’t do the dead me any good. But that doesn’t invalidate the idea that both copies were originally the same person.
Whoops, you’re right. I guess the framing then. (Or the attempted murder from way back when - doesn’t really matter.) I’m just curious what your thoughts are on what responsibilities Danton2.0 has for Danton1.0’s actions, since you’re on the “they’re two different people” side. It gets sticky for me when we start saying, “okay - if they’re the same person (but start diverging after 2.0’s creation), what if they both live?”