"A War We Just Might Win"

[Hentor_the_Barbarian]

Despite Bush’s repeated statements that the report will reflect evaluations by Petraeus and Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, administration officials said it would actually be written by the White House, with inputs from officials throughout the government.

And though Petraeus and Crocker will present their recommendations on Capitol Hill, legislation passed by Congress leaves it to the president to decide how to interpret the report’s data.

LA Times

I wonder how those of you awaiting the September report in order to make your determination about the course of events in Iraq will regard it now.

I wonder how a supposed “straight shooter” like Petraeus would allow the politicization of his assessment in such a baldfaced fashion.

[Squink]

Well, if Petraus is actually a “straight shooter,” and the Bushies screw around with his report, he’ll resign.

[RedFury]

Alright, let’s start with the good news:

Petraeus says he will propose troop cuts

'cept if you go beyond the headline, you’ll get to this part:

@Petraeus

The top American commander in Iraq said Wednesday he was preparing recommendations on troop cuts before he returns to Washington next month for a report to Congress, and believes the U.S. footprint in Iraq will have to be “a good bit smaller” by next summer*. – my highlights.

But he cautioned against a quick or significant U.S. withdrawal that could surrender “the gains we have fought so hard to achieve.”

*****A mere two more FUs.

And although the article mentions it, I believe the REAL headline is this one:

Toll In War’s Deadliest Bombing Hits 250

or this one:

Tuesday: 322 Iraqis Killed, 6 GIs; 412 Iraqis Wounded

Yep, sure seems that the resistance is on its ‘last throes’ and that by next summer The Green Zone ought to be inhabited by a couple of dozen bureaucrats or so. Oh, and of course, “a good bit smaller” US occupying force. Whatever the fuck that means.

Some gains. And some surge.

[Measure_for_Measure]

@Squink

Well, if Petraus is actually a “straight shooter,” and the Bushies screw around with his report, he’ll resign.

Petraeus is a careerist. He is also competent. I think he should stick around. Smart citizens will interpret his remarks with some care.

Separately, expecting a highly visible public official to be a “Straight Shooter” is inane. Politicians get burnt when they speak with candor. There’s nothing wrong with oratory and public diplomacy, provided the listener is a critical thinker, as opposed to a sentimentalist.

[Tuckerfan]

@RedFury

Alright, let’s start with the good news:

Petraeus says he will propose troop cuts

'cept if you go beyond the headline, you’ll get to this part:

@Petraeus

The top American commander in Iraq said Wednesday he was preparing recommendations on troop cuts before he returns to Washington next month for a report to Congress, and believes the U.S. footprint in Iraq will have to be “a good bit smaller” by next summer*. – my highlights.

But he cautioned against a quick or significant U.S. withdrawal that could surrender “the gains we have fought so hard to achieve.”

At the rate things are going, there won’t be any troops to withdrawal.

Army soldiers committed suicide last year at the highest rate in 26 years, and more than a quarter did so while serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a new military report.

The report, obtained by The Associated Press ahead of its scheduled release Thursday, found there were 99 confirmed suicides among active duty soldiers during 2006, up from 88 the previous year and the highest number since the 102 suicides in 1991 at the time of the Persian Gulf War.

The suicide rate for the Army has fluctuated over the past 26 years, from last year’s high of 17.3 per 100,000 to a low of 9.1 per 100,000 in 2001.

Last year, ``Iraq was the most common deployment location for both (suicides) and attempts,‘’ the report said.

[RTFirefly]

Michael Crowley of The New Republic reports:

this evening I heard an NPR program (audio here) on which O’Hanlon was a guest, and I was struck by how self-defeatingly thin his argument for a continued occupation was. O’Hanlon readily conceded that he can’t construct a “convincing theory” for how political reconciliation might be achieved–and moreover that his argument for patience amounts to “a gut level… theory of hope” that somehow things will get better.

And that’s the war proponent whose testimony this thread is based on.

Lordy.

[RTFirefly]

And more success stories from Iraq:

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) – The women are too afraid and ashamed to show their faces or have their real names used. They have been driven to sell their bodies to put food on the table for their children – for as little as $8 a day.

[marshmallow]

Many interesting articles have been coming out recently with regard to the Basra situation, with many juicy, scandalous quotes. A new fly in the ointment it appears…

Ostensibly, the British forces will hand over control of Basra to the Iraqis in the near future. In reality, they never had control and the situation has been degrading ever since last year, with insurgents calling the shots. The Bush administration is not happy about the pullback and has made it very clear to their British counterparts.

Basra is very important. It’s Iraq’s second largest city, a critical port, is surrounded by most of Iraq’s proven oil reserves, is the main exit point for Iraq’s oil exports due to the shutdown of the north, and is a massive artery for supplying U.S. forces in the rest of the country from Kuwait.

Considering that last point, will the U.S. be forced to intervene? What will this mean for the surge in Baghdad? The British couldn’t control Basra with 8000 troops. I suppose this kills “the British know how to handle counter insurgencies because of the Northern Ireland campaigns” idea, despite the fact that, from what I can tell, it’s basically true. They’re not as um…aggressive as us Yanks, let’s put it that way, and they were using foot patrols and ‘soft diplomacy’ back when we still zoomed through neighborhoods in armored convoys, shooting anything that moved. That’s a shame, since it seemed like for a time like things might hold together (if you’ll recall, Basra was hailed as a success story back in the day).

This all brings up another kernel of truth, not pointed out enough. It’s not just a civil war, it’s a civil war in a civil war. The southern portions of Iraq are overwhelmingly Shia. There’s not a whole lot of Sunni around to create trouble (or al-Qaeda, as Bush and friends would have us believe). Yet, it’s broiling in a civil war between the SCIRI, the Fadhila, and the Sadr movement. I can only expect it to get worse with the British leaving en masse – whoever controls Basra controls the oil and hence access to a money river with which to fight their enemies. Also, controlling Basra will allow whoever’s at the helm to really put the federal government’s balls in a vice, if they so choose (most of the fed’s money comes from that oil revenue). And with the controversy surrounding Maliki’s firing of the Basra governor (who refused to step down and called Maliki’s government “the new Baath”) it’s a distinct possibility, if things continue down this road.

[RedFury]

The Iraq war as we see it Seven U.S. soldiers speak

…As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins.

It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at U.S. taxpayers’ expense.

Much more at source.

[RTFirefly]

"He would have finished him off then and there, but pity stayed his hand. It’s a pity I’ve run out of bullets, he thought, as he went back up the tunnel. . . "
–Bored of the Rings

Which is by way of introducing the following two stories:

US forced to import bullets from Israel as troops use 250,000 for every rebel killed

US forces have fired so many bullets in Iraq and Afghanistan - an estimated 250,000 for every insurgent killed - that American ammunition-makers cannot keep up with demand. As a result the US is having to import supplies from Israel.

A government report says that US forces are now using 1.8 billion rounds of small-arms ammunition a year. The total has more than doubled in five years, largely as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as changes in military doctrine.

“The Department of Defense’s increased requirements for small- and medium-calibre ammunitions have largely been driven by increased weapons training requirements, dictated by the army’s transformation to a more self-sustaining and lethal force - which was accelerated after the attacks of 11 September, 2001 - and by the deployment of forces to conduct recent US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq,” said the report by the General Accounting Office (GAO).

Estimating how many bullets US forces have expended for every insurgent killed is not a simple or precisely scientific matter. The former head of US forces in Iraq, General Tommy Franks, famously claimed that his forces “don’t do body counts”.

But senior officers have recently claimed “great successes” in Iraq, based on counting the bodies of insurgents killed. Maj-Gen Rick Lynch, the top US military spokesman in Iraq, said 1,534 insurgents had been seized or killed in a recent operation in the west of Baghdad. Other estimates from military officials suggest that at least 20,000 insurgents have been killed in President George Bush’s “war on terror”.

John Pike, director of the Washington military research group GlobalSecurity.org, said that, based on the GAO’s figures, US forces had expended around six billion bullets between 2002 and 2005. “How many evil-doers have we sent to their maker using bullets rather than bombs? I don’t know,” he said.

“If they don’t do body counts, how can I? But using these figures it works out at around 300,000 bullets per insurgent. Let’s round that down to 250,000 so that we are underestimating.”

Pointing out that officials say many of these bullets have been used for training purposes, he said: “What are you training for? To kill insurgents.”

Bullet Shortages Hurting Police Training
Delays In Acquiring Handgun And Rifle Ammunition Lead Many Police Depts. To Slash, Modify Weapon Courses

Troops training for and fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are firing more than 1 billion bullets a year, contributing to ammunition shortages hitting police departments nationwide and preventing some officers from training with the weapons they carry on patrol.

An Associated Press review of dozens of police and sheriff’s departments found that many are struggling with delays of as long as a year for both handgun and rifle ammunition. And the shortages are resulting in prices as much as double what departments were paying just a year ago.

“There were warehouses full of it. Now, that isn’t the case,” said Al Aden, police chief in Pierre, S.D.

Departments in all parts of the country reported delays or reductions in training and, in at least one case, a proposal to use paint-ball guns in firing drills as a way to conserve real ammo.

Forgoing proper, repetitive weapons training comes with a price on the streets, police say — in diminished accuracy, quickness on the draw and basic decision-making skills.

“You are not going to be as sharp or as good, especially if an emergency situation comes up,” said Sgt. James MacGillis, range master for the Milwaukee police. “The better-trained officer is the one that is less likely to use force.”

The pinch is blamed on a skyrocketing demand for ammunition that followed the start of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, driven by the training needs of a military at war, and, ironically, police departments increasing their own practice regimens following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

[ElvisL1ves]

@Hentor the Barbarian

\I wonder how a supposed “straight shooter” like Petraeus would allow the politicization of his assessment in such a baldfaced fashion.

An explanation (from back in May), for the benefit of those who’ve chosen him as the current receptacle of their absolute trust:

Russert: The Republican Congressmen then went on to say: “The word about the war and its progress cannot come from the White House or even you, Mr. President. There’s no longer any credibility. It has to come from General Petraeus.”

And ever since, we’ve been treated to demurrals from all the usual sources, including Commander Guy himself, that “we should wait for General Petraeus’ report in September”. That’ll be September 11, btw, it just got announced. Anybody think it will change Bush’s mind?

[marshmallow]

HA! 9/11 is the gift that just keeps on giving, isn’t it? Pelosi and Reid might as well make out the blank check right now and prepare their recycled Republican talking points from May. “B-b-but the troops! Stranded! Fuel! Bullets! Al-Qaeda!”

[tagos]

@RedFury

The Iraq war as we see it Seven U.S. soldiers speak

Much more at source.

Such as this:

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

I wish the Usual Suspects would remember testimony like this next time they feel the urge to castigate those of us in the Reality-Based Community with their excited news of soldiers trained, police equipped etc.

But the Administration supporters are right on one thing - Iraq isn’t like Vietnam. At least there we weren’t explicitly arming both sides of a civil war as part of the strategy like we are in Iraq.

[JKellyMap]

@Martin Hyde

Too many Democratic leaders have tied their hands around Iraq being a failure, they now have a self-interested desire to see Iraq be a failure.

This may be true. BUT, to cite a well-worn observation that is roughly parallel to this, “just because you’re paranoid doesn’t meen the world isn’t out to get you”. If the Dems help oush forward the right actions, even for the wrong reasons, I say go for it.

(But, looking at this crop of Dems, I doubt they’ll really do much of anything.)

[ElvisL1ves]

O’Hanlon protests that they didn’t get all their information from military-run dog and pony shows in the Green Zone; they got some from talking to other people who’d received the same treatment. :rolleyes:

And even so:

In the end, even if Iraqis cooperate more at the local level, our strategy for Iraq probably cannot work absent major national political cooperation across sectarian lines.

If only there was a basis in fact to believe that could happen.

[RedFury]

@ElvisL1ves

And even so:If only there was a basis in fact to believe that could happen.

But of course. Read on: Iraqi Factions’ Self-Interest Blocks Political Progress

…In part, of course, Iraq remains a place pocked by violence and fear, which makes compromise difficult. But more important, say Iraqi political commentators and officials, Iraq has become a cellular nation, dividing and redividing into competing constituencies that have a greater stake in continued chaos than in compromise.

In most areas, for most Iraqis, the central government today is either irrelevant or invisible. Provinces and even neighborhoods have become the stages where power struggles play out. As a result, Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds — or elements of each faction — have come to feel that they can do a better job on their own.

“No one can rely on the political participants who lack a common view of the public interest,” said Nabeel Mahmoud, an international relations professor at Baghdad University. “Such a concept is completely absent from the thinking of the political powers in Iraq’s government, so each side works to get their own quota of positions or resources.”

[Measure_for_Measure]

As far as I can tell, claims that the surge is working are mostly based upon seasonal effects. Violence drops in June/July every year because it’s really hot in Iraq during the summer.

When June/July 2007 is compared with the same months last year however, the results are not pretty.

There are more sophisticated methods for seasonal adjustment, which might or might not work with this short time series. But before I consider attempting such an exercise I’d like to know which metric is suppose to show that the surge is working. The only hopeful figure I know of has to do with telephone service. Brookings .pdf here: too bad there’s no version in Excel.

---

Regardless though, to the extent that the Iraqis are disinterested in political reconciliation, this number crunching is a side show. Too bad we can’t try aggressive diplomacy.

[RTFirefly]

More on troop morale:

Pollack and O’Hanlon had this to say about troop morale:

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

They’re ‘experts’ so they ought to know, right? Odd that they don’t know about a survey of U.S. troops in May:

The latest in a series of mental health surveys of troops in Iraq, released in May, says 45% of the 1,320 soldiers interviewed ranked morale in their unit as low or very low. Seven percent ranked it high or very high.

Or that the ‘surge’ strategy of putting troops in the neighborhoods is creating rifts among the troops, contributing further to the morale problems:

Most troops in Iraq expected 12-month deployments. Those were extended in May by three months for the troop buildup. Thousands already were on their second or third deployments.

The result is a fighting force that includes many soldiers who are worn down, just as Petraeus, who took command of the war six months ago, is asking them to adopt intense counterinsurgency tactics. Those strategies emphasize living “outside the wire,” in military-speak, in outposts that put troops close to Iraqis. The theory is that people will come to trust the soldiers and share information needed to quell the violence.

But these posts often lack basic amenities such as running water, flush toilets, telephones and Internet access, which troops at the forward operating bases enjoy, along with food courts and athletic facilities. Being on the front lines, troops in outposts also face greater danger than those at bases.

<snip>

But the disparities in living and working conditions among soldiers heighten resentments, chipping away at morale. So does the feeling that the mission is futile, a belief fueled by the Iraqi political stalemate and the unreliability of Iraqi forces.

“There are two different wars,” said Staff Sgt. Donald Richard Harris, comparing his soldiers’ views with those of commanders in distant bases. “It’s a dead-end process, it seems like.”

Asked to rank morale in his unit, Harris gave it a 4 on a 10-point scale. “Look at these guys. This is their downtime,” he said, as young soldiers around him silently cleaned dust from their rifles at a battle position south of the capital. A fiery wind blasted through the small base, an abandoned home surrounded by sandbags and razor wire.

“It sounds selfish, but if we just had phones and Internet service,” said Staff Sgt. Clark Merlin, his voice trailing off.

Their unit was supposed to go home this month but its tour was extended until November. That means three more months of using plastic sacks for toilets, burning their waste and hoping for packages from home.

“I think the extension has been 99% of the reason morale is low,” said Merlin, rating it 4 or 5.

Counterinsurgency expert Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations said the “two wars” issue is common in conflict zones as front-line soldiers grow to resent troops at the bases and come to believe their commanders are out of touch with the realities in the field.

“But this kind of war really highlights it,” Biddle, who has advised Petraeus, said of Iraq.

[Sam_Stone]

Shia, Sunni and Kurdish parties achieve consensus

Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, and fellow leaders in the country have reached consensus on key areas of national reconciliation, under mounting US pressure to demonstrate political progress on the eve of a key report to Congress on the Baghdad security “surge”.
The Shia prime minister appeared on television flanked by Jalal Talabani, the country’s Kurdish president, and the Sunni vice-president, Tareq al-Hashemi, to announce a deal on easing restrictions on former members of the Ba’ath party joining the civil service and military.
…
Agreement was also reported on holding provincial elections and releasing detainees held without charge across the country, two more of the “benchmarks” set by the Bush administration for political movement it hopes will stave off mounting congressional demands for a withdrawal from Iraq.

And responding to the editorial of those seven vets in the New York Times:

Iraq Vets Respond

ON SUNDAY, seven soldiers from the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division stationed in Iraq penned a passionate opinion piece in the New York Times that further illustrates the complexity of what is “really” happening in Iraq. Of the almost 3,000 soldiers from the Army’s storied 82nd Airborne Division currently serving in the hottest of Iraqi neighborhoods, seven felt confident enough in their misgivings to sign an opinion piece. They should not be surprised that many of their comrades–including the seven undersigned here–find their work to be misguided.

The 2nd Brigade is responsible for two dangerous areas of Baghdad: Adihamiyah and Sadr City. Airborne troopers there have seen the worst al Qaeda and the Mahdi Army can throw at them and the Iraqi people. But the whole story is that the Iraqis and soldiers in their sector have not yet been fully affected by the surge of troops and operations, which have barely been in place two months.

Currently, American and Iraqi Forces are clearing sections of southern Baghdad before turning north to the 82nd Airborne’s neighborhoods. As such, the portrait these soldiers painted, while surely accurate and honest, is more representative of pre-surge Baghdad: sectarian strife, lawlessness, and indiscriminate slaughter.

This is not, however, the picture elsewhere in Iraq, or even most of Baghdad. Additional American combat brigades first surged to the outlying areas around the capital, disrupting the flow of suicide bombers and car bombs and denying haven to al Qaeda.
The result? Attacks against civilians are at a six-month low and large al Qaeda-style truck and suicide bombings have dropped 50 percent in Baghdad. With additional troops and a sound strategy, the same results can occur in even the worst areas of Baghdad, including the 82nd Airborne’s sector.

Take Anbar Province. In 2006, al Qaeda controlled the capital of Ramadi and Marine intelligence officers declared the province effectively lost. A leaked Marine Corps report concluded, “the prospects for securing western Anbar province are dim and there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and social situation there.”

Today Ramadi is peaceful and Anbar no longer a haven for al Qaeda. The tribal awakening that brought about political reconciliation and stability in Ramadi and Anbar primarily resulted from an improved security environment provided by American forces. Americans not only cleared Ramadi, they also held it by occupying over 65 outposts.

This security environment allowed local tribal leaders to stand up to their former al Qaeda occupiers, and now American and Iraqi forces are improving security beyond Anbar in places like Diyala and Babil Provinces.

The 82nd Airborne soldiers quoted an Iraqi saying, “We need security, not free food.” We could not agree more, and what American and Iraqi forces are doing now–for the first time in this war–is providing lasting security at the neighborhood level after driving insurgents out.

We understand the frustration our fellow soldiers feel. All of us were in Iraq before the “surge” and lament never seeing a coherent, security-based counterinsurgency strategy. In truth, we were only clearing–not holding.

But we also know what’s possible when even small portions of counterinsurgency strategy are applied. Insurgents are exposed, leaders stand up, and stability occurs. General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker understand the principles of counterinsurgency and are applying them up and down the chain of command. It’s unfortunate that soldiers in the 82nd Airborne have not yet benefited from the new strategy, but it will ensure that their actions, and those of their fallen brethren, will not have been in vain.

Meanwhile, we applaud our brothers in the 82nd Airborne for their courage under fire, thank them for their commitment to our nation, and pray for the recovery of their injured co-author.

This letter was submitted to the New York Times - which refused to publish it. Small wonder some people only hear one side of the story.

[elucidator]

The first is certainly inspiring, being another in a long list of acheived concensus. Are we assured then that actual political action will be taken once the Parliament returns from vacation, tanned, rested and ready? You are welcome to.

As to the second, coming as it does from the strictly non-partisan and unbiased Weekly Standard, there may be another reason that the New York Times declined to publish, aside from its long-standing commitment to the destruction of everything that is good and holy. I point to these figures…

…Attacks against civilians are at a six-month low and large al Qaeda-style truck and suicide bombings have dropped 50 percent in Baghdad…

Lets just say that these numbers are open to some criticism. May I assume that you are already entirely aware of those criticisms?