Hah, only because you’ve missed or failed to understand my argumentation. See spoke, I am fully capable of thinking our strategy to date is a good one and seeing possible wrinkles, complications and so forth.
I do believe that throughout my comments that I’ve not posited the US being likely to lose its short-term objectives(*). (Except in the stupid case of the US invading Afghanistan with massive numbers, which would have been a loser)
I simply see the importance of the tools differently. E.g. you will note that my argument (or perhaps you didn’t) was not that the US should not or can not track down the people we want to, but rather the problem was different from what you were/are positing.
Frankly, I think that the responsible folks understand the issues and are planning appropriately. I rather suspect that when the history of the war is written in 20 years that sidepayments and promises to tribal leaders will be up there along with the bombing and the fancy schmantcy technology.
The same for the next steps, good working relationships with key tribal leaders, payoffs and facades of excuses so they don’t look like American tools will be more important thermal imaging in the big picture.
(*: I remain concerned about the long-run picture but with the exception of comments by Bush which strike me as playing to the home audience most of all, I rather like our policy mix to date.)
slight hijack: The reports I read about this indicated that the bodies of the 6 Taliban soldiers who were killed were left in a road and mutilated by Kabul residents, but that the bodies were “removed before dark by the International Red Cross.” The reports last night and this morning about the “rescue” of the international aid workers also indicate that the International Red Cross was involved. I thought that (1) relief agencies had all fled, and (2) that the Red Crescent operated in Muslim areas. Wouldn’t an agency represented by a cross be the first to go in a Taliban-controlled society? Eradicate my ignorance on this one please.
Very true. However, I think we are conflating two things here. In the eyes of the locals, Al-Qaeda is not identical with the Taliban. The Taliban are a primarily local group with a pretty fuzzy membership and a wide range of commitment. Cousin Abdulmajid may be a hard-core member of the leadership cadre or he may just have helped out occasionally when asked to by Cousin Mohamed. The goal has never been hunting down and killing all the Taliban. Most of them can easily blend back into the population and that’s precisely what we want them to do. As one NA commander said. “It’s easy to shave off a beard. If we win, it will turn out that no one was ever a member of the Taliban.”
Al-Qaeda, on the other hand is a predominantly foreign group. Rural Afganistan is not New York City. Wandering groups of Arabs or even Pakistani will stick out like a sore thumb, especially to the locals. Someone will know exactly who they are and where they are. Eventually, someone will turn these trouble-making foreigners in, especially when there’s a reward on offer. (BTW, I think this 25 million dollar reward we are offering for OBL is a big mistake. Offering a 25 million dollar reward to an Afgani peasant is like offering you or me our own personal designer pleasure planet complete with luxury space yacht. It’s both unbelievable and inconcievable. I bet they’d get better results by offering something like a new Landrover! )
Well, yes, Afghanistan is not New York City. It’s Central Asia: an Arab is not of necessity going to stick out like a sore thumb if he’s an old hand in Afghanistan. Recall, some of these guys have decades of experience there. Quite the contrary, his ability to blend could be much higher – but then that depends on his looks, it’s bloody hard to generalize. Arab connections with the area are ancient, hell there were Arab communities in Central Asia when the Russians conquered it. Simply put, from what I have read, much of the al-Qaeda old guard (*) have Afghani and Pakistani experience which makes it dangerous to assume that smoking them out is a foregone conclusion. The same for the Pakistanis. If they’re Pushtu Pakis or other ethnic groups from the tribal zones along the Afghan-Paki border and they’re down south or in their ethnic areas in the border area, assuming they’re going to stick out is a false proposition. The history of these folks participation in the war against the Soviets, their long experience and connections is likely to buy them at least some baraka. Whether it is enough, well that depends.
How much cooperation will be obtained strikes me as a fluid question, solidarity versus greed. Semblance of cooperation versus real cooperation. Above all outside of the Hazari, Ouzbeki, and Tadjik north. Not by far impossible to obtain but not something that is foregone.
That being said, I expect most of the ‘Arab Legion’ foot soldiers are fucked. Any Pakis outside of the overlap areas are probably fucked. A lot of people are probably fucked because some folks are going to exploit the situation and claim so and so was a collabo and bang.
All in all, as I have said all along, I believe that US tactics and strategy so far have been as good as it gets in the real world and I am impressed. However, I find comments here to be mildly simplistic and overlooking a lot of potential pitfalls. For example, if the Taleban had not commenced to break down before Ramadan, the costs of strategic bombing might well have exceeded the gains and things might have spun out. We got lucky, and we may still be lucky but it is a very, very narrow path with mines on both sides.
On that thought, one of the greatest risks is a clumsily aggressive hunt for al-Qaeda without proper attention to nailing down the tribal elders of Pashtun tribes. One of the key errors in the Somali experience was our over-dependence on fancy gadgets and not enough attention to tribal politics, especially misunderstanding the way a tribal society constructs good guys and bad guys. Ham-handed, dead or alive tactics turned Aidid from a widely hated man into a Somali symbol. Contra, Aussie Special Forces operating separately managed to be much more effectively. I believe from private conversations that such lessons were learned and that we will be aggressive & smart. However, it needs to be recalled that in this world alliance structures do not work in the same way that Westerners normally think of. This often gets people into trouble.
(*: The “new” radicalism of certain fundamentalist groups, above all passing into clandestine, guerrilla warfare is often, and I think largely correctly, attributed to the return of the “al-Afghan al-Arab” – the Arab moujahidine from the anti-Soviet war. They form the hard core of the most radical groups.)
Just to add slightly to those comments, I’ll note that at least circa 1979 ( I don’t know what the current state of affairs of those communities are ), Afghanistan included a population of ~2,000,000 nomads. Mostly Pashtun and Turcoman, but also a few Bedouin Arab tribes that have probably been in that region for 1,300 years.
My point is that the locals will know who and where the likely Al-Qaeda members are, especially if they try to disappear into the countryside. People in rural Afganistan will know every person and family in their immediate area. If new people move in, the locals will know about it. Even the nomads, (to the extent there are still nomads) place a premium on kinship and tribal relationships and will immediately be able to identify outsiders, even if they’re actually Afgans who moved in from another district. Foreigners will be even more conspicious, to the locals. If we can properly develop the necessary human intelligence contacts, we’ll likely have too many leads rather than too few.
Precisely so. Strangers, whether Arab or not, will stick out like a sore thumb to the locals in a rural community.
And Collounsbury, again with the “fancy gadgets” cracks? You analogized the situation to that experienced by the Soviets. My comments were intended to point out that technological advances are what separate us from the Soviet experience, and make the Soviet analogy inapt.
This does not mean that technology alone will win the day, nor does it mean that bribes, informants, political gamesmanship and all the other tools of this type of war will be unnecessary.
Give the straw man a rest, will you? You’ve already beaten the stuffing out of the poor guy.
On the other hand, Iranian radio was reporting that Osama had snuk across the border into Pakistan, where there is still enough support for him to keep him hidden. (I’ll see about a link)
No, I don’t think so. First, you assume that the population is going to be against them. Some yes, some no. Even now the Pashtun tribes are apparently split. Further, the country has experienced mass-displacement, refugees flowing back and forth from area to area, to and from Pakistan. The situation is confused, fluid and not at all one where anyone can expect to know every person at any given point.
Again, the al-Qaeda core are old hands in the area, the likely speak the local dialects, they have family connections and in a fluid confused state of mass-displacement I don’t see it as easy at all to assume that these guys will “stick out” at all.
New hands, guys without implicit or explicit clout, they are indeed in a world of shit. But the old boys, the ones with the connections, and ties, I don’t see this as easy at all, whatever gadgets we have.
Well, insofar as Spoke can see my comments above which quite specifically define where I see the analogy to the Soviet situation, I fail to see the point.
Compare your original comment with your newly evolved comments.
Eh. My comments were made in the context of your “Soviet occupation” bogeyman. I notice that you have “evolved” away from that position as well. Now you seem to be trotting out the Somalia bogeyman in its place.
Also, compare your comments a couple of days ago about the “strategic withdrawal” of the Taliban to the rout that actually was occurring on the ground. I think you have given the Taliban more credit (bordering on awe) than they deserve.
Give me a break. My Soviet occupation “bogey-man” as you call it was and is in regards to the concept of massive US troop investment (and as a second indirect analogy to the need to have local allies, and human int, that tech advantage solves not all nor is it even IMO the most important factor). I have and am quite spefically opposed to that former idea. You may be having trouble keeping the concepts straight. In each of these cases, it appears to me that US policy has been on target more or less and understood the dangers.
As for the Somali “bogey-man” – well I fail to see what you’re talking about. For this warning to be a bogey man, I’d have to be saying this is exacely like Somalia and that it’s inevitable. I’ve pointed, contra to that, some similar risks, but that it’s my sense that we’ve learned the right lessons and that we seem to be engaging the right kinds of people. No small difference there, spoke. There is a difference between drawing specific, bounded analogies as descriptors of the possible risks and bogeymen which don’t pay attention to this: e.g. we shouldn’t attack Afghanistan at all cause the Soviets. Clear?
Seems your grasp of the phrase is about as good as that of straw man.
I was relying on reports quoting Northern Alliance commanders at the time, that is at the time of the Taleban withdrawal. What began as an organized withdrawal (apparently timed to avoid as best as possible American strikes), in the eyes of Northern Alliance commanders around Kaboul at the time, obviously disintegrated. Or was unsuccessful.
Time flows. At the time of posting given the information it was correct. It later became incorrect as the Taleban core proved unable to hold the fringe milias in place. Awe indeed, rather appropriate skepticism as I see nothing foreordained in the collapse at that point.
As for the rural people, I’m sure it will be just straight forward to figure out who’s al-Qaeda from all the chaos and refugee flows. Rural folks can smell em after all.
Boy, Collounsbury, you do love a pissing contest, don’t you? Sorry, but I won’t be joining you in this one. (Hey, I don’t want to muck up a thread that you evidently started to distract from your missed predictions elsewhere.)
I am content to allow the passage of time to prove my optimism well-founded.
Actually, I think Collounsbury’s comments to be very optimistic. They’re also eyes-wide-open, and realistic. That realism, and the detailed information that backs it is what I find so reassuring, because to date, he’s identified pitfall after pitfall, and so far, the policy wonks have managed to avoid them. I like knowing where the pits are, and knowing that, I’m quite pleased to see that those in charge seem to know where they are, too.
I’m also a realist, and quite aware that mistakes, bad judgement, and old-fashioned bad luck also happen. I find nothing to criticise in Collounsbury’s caution.
Don’t be ridiculous. Of course they can’t “smell” them. Everyone knows that Afgani peasants have al-Qaedar!
But seriously, I think we’re differing on a very minor point here. I’m sure we all agree that even the “Old Afgan Hands” are far less able to hide in Afganistan than they were two weeks ago. If they are going to claim favors, they’re going to have to go where they’re known. That mean, obviously, that somebody (perhaps a lot of somebodies) knows exactly who and where they are. While I freely admit I don’t have much experience in rural Afganistan, my experience of rural communities is that the village network is quite efficient and that it is extremely difficult to keep secrets from your neighbors and relatives.
As for the refugee flows, it is quite true that there is a good deal of chaos. However, as I understand it these people are mostly headed toward the borders. Al-Qaeda members, however, are headed into the Khush. Therefore, those locals who have remained in the mountains will be keenly aware if, say, thirty armed strangers take up residence in the cave in the next valley.
I’m not saying all this information will necessarily fall into our lap. I’m quite certain that we can muster up a sufficiently ham-handed reserve of cultural insensitivity to make a complete hash of the operation. I’m simply saying that the intelligence is out there and that if we play our cards correctly, we have a shot at wrapping the the al-Qaeda phase of this operation with a minimal amount of additional bloodshed.
True but we know how unreliable that is. Especially before the first date.
Absolutely. Absolutely. I am simply objecting to the idea that they can’t hide.
I’ll grant that freely, but on the other hand if we’re talking passage, I don’t see that as an overriding issue. Long term, yes, there will indeed be betrayals.
On one hand I grant that freely, on the other hand, reports I’ve been reading suggest those who can are in fact heading for Pashtu tribal territories in Pakistan where government writ is short.
Implicit in my thinking was the assumption that the head clique is heading for the surest territory possible, which ironically may be Pakistan.
Indeed, I can fully agree with this. What I am hoping that we will not see actions like what I heard about in re FBI investigations in Yemen where the guys just didn’t understand your hosts don’t have to cooperate with you, and for Arab culture, blunt, American confrontational styles rubs the wrong way big time.
Still, I have good hopes that there are some folks around who understand this and it will come out right.
My last remark was rude. I apologize to Tranquilis.
That said, Collounsbury has been anything but an optimist in re: Afghanistan. In fact, he has derided “the optimists” in this very thread. Only when I called him on the continuing negativity did he change his tune a bit. The the closest he had come to optimism before that was hedging his pessimism, just enough to try to avoid being proven wrong when the situation on the ground plays out.
Come on Collounsbury, take a stand. Will the Taliban mount a sustained guerilla campaign or won’t they?
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