I see Collounsbury’s comments as trying to rein-in unwarranted and excessive optimism, rather than being negative. Sure, it’s a drag to have to stop singing “Ding-dong, the Witch is dead”, and no one wants to hear the guy in the back asking “But what if her sister shows up?” Never-the-less, it’s important to not celebrate before the deed’s done, and we all need to remember that the Witch does have a sister, who could show up at any moment.
I don’t think we’ll have excessive trouble putting ObL to bed, nor do I think we shouldn’t be happy and optimistic, but let’s not start the party just yet.
Sorry, I know it’s off topic, but since I posted it earlier, here’s the follow up:
According to ABC News "PAKISTAN: Islamabad denied an Iranian radio report that Osama bin Laden had fled Afghanistan into Pakistan’s wild northwestern frontier as hardline Islamic groups staged small pro-Taliban rallies in major Pakistani cities. "
Really? Well, I haven’t been a simplistic fool who thinks everything is going to be wrapped up real easy like, so I suppose that makes me a pessimist. That’s okay, I like pessimism, it is healthy.
Of course pessimism in this sense is not the same as defeatism nor throw up your hands in the airism. Spoke appears to having trouble distinguishing this.
I have derided certain people, and I labeled them optimists, yes. I derided them on rosy views and sloppy thinking.
Give me fucking break, Go back through all the threads on this subject and you will find a refrain, “And I am impressed with US policy and I think it is making the proper choices.” The other refrain is “The situation is complex, has a lot of minefields and only well-tuned policy will avoid them [and luck of course]”: I haven’t changed my tune one fucking bit.
Yeah, whatever. Posture all you want. I believe this is best translated as I really wish he had been claiming we would fail in Afghanistan so that I could pretend that my comments so far ressembled some kind of clear-reading, but since that is not the case I’ll simply make vague accusations.
Sustained guerrila campaign? What counts as sustained? 3 months? 3 years? Who counts as Taleban?
You have a talent for not asking the right questions, nor thinking in the right framework.
But just to play your little game, I would guess given current situation that there are three major options:
I don’t see a peaceful no strife Afghanistan in the cards. Too many young men with too many guns who’ve known nothing but war. Too much poverty, too little ability to extend any kind of central control. Of course I’m basing this thinking on what is currently known and excluding for the moment a real, serious tens of billions per year reconstruction effort.
Now the ** real ** question, to what extent can the those elements which represent the Taleban hard core can prevent al-Qaeda’s core (the ordinary foot soliders just don’t matter that much, if this thing is to have any meaning, its the command that has to be gotten) from being taken.
That’s a hard thing to judge. Hiding in Pakistan is undoubtedly their best option, irony of ironies. I’ll give it even odds that they can pull that off for several months. ObL, who knows? On one had his sweet little face is well-known, on the other hand he has pull and money. I give him slightly less than even odds he can find a hideout to keep himself safe for a while. (This all ignores the possibility any of these guys got killed by accident in some bombing raid) It would be foolish to try to predict more than few months out.
So spoke, there you go, that’s my thinking. I’m sure it would be useful for you to give us your detialed thinking on this matter.
Sadly, I think C is correct. My money is on option b with a couple of caveats.
First, there will be a semblance of an effective central government that actually makes vague gestures toward doing things like feeding the population. The West simply can’t afford to allow business as usual in Afganistan. On the bright side, this will dramatically improve the lot of the average Afgani citizen. Given the miserable lot of the populace and the utter failure of previous Afgan “governments,” improving life in Afganistan will be easy. We could subcontract the whole thing out to North Korea and the average Afgani would be better off.
Second, while the outlook for Afganistan itself isn’t all that great, the outlook for the U.S. is excellent if we’re very careful. I think our entire strategy now should be to convince the Afgans (and especially the Pushtuns) that the U.S. will be pulling out just as soon as we’ve dealt with OBL & Co.
Bluster as they will, the Afgans (and the larger Muslim world) are, at this moment, 100% convinced that the U.S. is near-invincible. First, five weeks after engaging in Afganistan, we’ve won a war that the Soviets couldn’t win in ten years. Yes, I know that we haven’t “won the war” and that the entire geopolitcal situation is different etc. etc. The average Afgani tribesman, however, is unable to put all this in context. His thinking is more of the “If it doesn’t fit, you must acquit.” variety. All he knows is that the U.S. is definitely one very bad hombre to mess with.
Second, a few weeks ago, the mighty OBL was the champion of Islam for taking the fight to the great Satan. At this moment, he’s probably fitting himself for a burkha and trying to sneak across the Pakistani border. His followers in Afganistan are dead or on the run. None of this has been lost on the various Pushtun warlords.
In addition, the Pushtun understand – and possibly endorse – our reason for being in Afganistan. Pushtun culture is quite familiar (probably too familiar) with the concept revenge and honor. If you explain to a Pushtun trible elder that OBL came to the U.S. and killed a bunch of people and that we are now duty bound to hunt him down, he’ll understand. He might not like it, or help you, but he’ll understand. This, in turn, means that he’ll likely accept and understand the idea that that we’re there for a limited purpose and will go back home when we’re done. This is very different than how the Soviets were perceived.
The calculations will probably go something like this. “The Americans are very powerful and will make me very dead very fast if I try and fight them. Fortunately, I don’t have to fight them because once they take care of OBL (who is actually a trouble-making foreigner, anyway) they’ll leave. In the meantime, if I’m nice to them, they’ll give me stuff. So, I fight them and get killed or I cooperate with them and they’ll go away soon, leaving me a new Landrover. Hmm. What to do? What to do?”
I’m not trying to be overly optimistic. But I do sense a real opportunity here if we can only take advantage of it.
The Taliban is right about one thing–only one thing. This area is very hard to govern. They became leaders because they had moral suasion on their side, which, due to the kinship with al-Qaeda, they don’t have anymore.
The US cannot make the mistake that USSR did, and cut and run, and put a puppet government that everyone hates in its place. Also, they should help grant women more rights there as well. After all, they are 60% of the country. No leaving majorities out in the new Afghanistan is what we say to ourselves about the situation, right?
“True optimism has nothing to do with any sort of lenient judgment. It consists in contemplating and willing the ideal in the light of a deep and self-consistent affirmation of life and the world. … Optimism and pessimism, therefore, do not consist in counting with more or less confidence on a future for the existing state of things, but in what the will desires the future to be. They are qualities not of the judgment, but of the will.” – an ironic choice, but appropriate.
in this case the “will” is supplied by a desire to participate in the apportionment of power in the post-Taliban vacuum, the knowledge that to harbour yesterdays men excludes you from said participation and the belief that the Taliban will be pursued rather than left to re-group.
(I forget who said it). I cannot see how Afghanistan can self govern and have any stability as they have proven for centuries they can’t do it. I think long term occupation would be the only option which could lead to building some kind of stable social system. Since western countries are not going to do this the only chance I see would be to have a UN protectorate carried out by other muslim countries, preferably those in the region. I’m glad nobody’s looking at me for a solution.
While your general conclusion that a UN protectorate under the guidance of a number of Islamic countries is a suggestion that I think has merit, the quoted phrase is simply bad history (unless you want to make the same claims for Germany and Ireland).
The fact that a region has successfully resisted invasion for hundreds of years, depite its basic tribal structure, would seem to indicate that they are quite capable of self-government when foreign interference is removed. Recent events has probably disrupted their current ability to easily establish a centralized government, but there is no historical evidence that they are incapable of it.
“Simplistic fool?” Well, there are simplistic fools and then there are pompous and arrogant fools. Of course, I won’t name names, since Great Debates is not the forum for trading personal insults.
But then you knew that, didn’t you, Collounsbury?
I haven’t seen anyone say the situation in Afghanistan is “going to be wrapped up real easy like.” You are attacking straw men again.
Let’s review:
The first simplistic argument in the thread was your Soviet analogy. The analogy is superficial and inapt for many reasons. I made a pithy wisecrack pointing out the most obvious of those reasons (thermal imaging technology available to the US). You then created the straw man argument that said pithy wisecrack was the sum total of my views on Afghanistan, and you proceeded to beat the stuffing out of that straw man. Give it a rest, ace.
But hey, maybe you truly don’t understand the flaw in your logic. Is it possible that you do not understand the concept of the “straw man?” Maybe this will help.
Collounsbury also wrote:
Tsk. Tsk.
First personal insults, and now profanity. Ah well, in the absence of a cogent reply, one uses what tools one must, I suppose…
Hey everybody! Did you hear that? Collounsbury says I’m talented! Gee whiz! Thanks, C!
Collounsbury also wrote:
Sure thing, sunshine!
But first, let’s review our respective prognosticating records so far.
Let’s see, while you were telling us last Tuesday that the Taliban were making an orderly withdrawal to more defensible positions (snicker), I was making the following divination:
…which turns out to have been exactly what was going on.
(Whether we have successfully prevented bin Laden from escaping to Pakistan remains to be seen.)
So for those keeping score at home, the prognostication scorecard so far looks like this:
spoke- – 1 Collounsbury – 0
Now what do I think the future holds? Here ya go:
The UN will bring in security forces, and will attempt to establish a coalition government. Northern Alliance commanders will keep their word and cooperate with this effort. The saw what happened when they tried to hold power on their own before. I believe the NA members are capable of learning from past experience. I believe the UN will ultimately succeed. (If they could do it in Cambodia, they can do it here.)
The Pashtun, though wary, will ultimately cooperate with this effort. The people of Afghanistan are weary of war. 20 years of it has been enough. Returning refugees will join the chorus of those seeking peace and stability.
The Taliban will be separated into sheep and goats. Those more moderate elements of the Taliban will merge back into the population, and may even participate in the coalition government.
As for the hard cases among the Taliban, they may try to wage a guerrilla campaign harking back to that conducted against the Soviets. If they do so, they will be crushed for several reasons:[ul][li]Improved technology. Thermal imaging, vacuum bombs and bunker buster bombs mean no more hiding in caves to conduct the war.[]If they try the alternative strategy of “hiding in plain sight” among the population, they will find the populace by and large unwilling to support their efforts. The Afghanis (Pashtuns included) are tired of war, and they have seen how repressive Taliban rule can be. You can’t carry on a successful guerrilla campaign of this sort without broad-based support.[]If the Taliban attempt to conduct a guerrilla war from neighboring Pakistan, the Pakistani government will assist us in tracking them down and crushing them within the Pakistani borders. Those found to be harboring the Taliban will be dealt with harshly. Pakistan will do this not only as our ally, but out of self-interest. (And this is another key reason the Soviet analogy is a stupid one. During the Soviet occupation, the Pakistanis were actively assisting the mujahadeen.)The Taliban have aging and malfunctioning equipment, and they have no source of resupply. Of course, even an old gun can kill you, but an aging rocket launcher may or may not work. They may not have any advanced weaponry left anyway.[/ul][/li]
Yes the Afghanis have deep-seated tribal hatreds. This is learned behavior. Of all people, Collounsbury, you should know that they are not genetically predisposed to act in this way. They are capable of learning other ways of living. After all, Britain was once comprised of warring tribes. Britain evolved, and so can the Afghanis. It is not inevitable that history will repeat itself. The change will not happen overnight, but it can happen, and I believe it will.
We will pour massive amounts of aid into Afghanistan. We will not make the mistake we made after the Soviets won and abandon the place. We are fully cognizant now, if we were not before, that this is not an option. (See, both we and the Afghanis are capable of learning.) In addition to massive amounts of aid and infrastructure assistance, we will launch a massive PR campaign both in Afghanistan and in the Middle East in general. We will succeed (given some time) in building a stable Afghanistan.
Will any of this end terrorism? Of course not. The most we can hope to accomplish in that department is to reduce or destroy the ability of terrorists to carry out mass destruction. By disrupting their activities and finances and by denying them a safe base in Afghanistan, we can perhaps prevent the development of nuclear weapons by terrorists, at least. (Let us hope that bin Laden was bluffing in his recent remarks, and that they do not already possess them.) We’ll still get the occasional truck bomb or anthrax letter.
So there you go. My predictions. Now let’s kick back and see what actually happens.
Really now, I think the contrary. Comes down to judgment in the end, now doesn’t it?
Well, I already made my argument – it was specific and to a point. And it is found above. I frankly don’t see much point repeating it. Again, your grasp of the concept straw man needs some strengthening. The above would indeed be a straw man insofar as you’ve never quite managed to address what I actually argue.
As for the “pithy wisecrack” being the sum total of your views, I can’t bloody comment on what’s not there, in black and white now can I?
I should rather say you might give a rest to this flailing about.
Enlightening I am sure. You should ponder it.
Yes, I am well known for these uncogent replies, aren’t I.
Well, Spoke, why don’t we “quote” what I posted:
Now, you may wish to review the definitio of a “straw man” for your personal edification.
What we find above is not a prediction, now is it? No, it’s conveying the current reporting as it was coming in. As I mentioned above --and you’ve rather nicely decided to ignore-- my entire comments on that matter were relying on current reporting. The NA commanders predicted, then described the initial withdrawal as orderly (by Afghan standards at least).
I am sure if you have trouble following the difference that consulting a dictionary in re “prediction” or “divination” and “reporting”
So, you’ve congratulated yourself for making a fairly obvious “prediction.”
Uhuh. Colour me impressed. I shall forego the pleasure of looking up other spoke prognostications, predictions and analyses on terror.
Genetically predisposed?
Well, spoke, that’s a wonderful piece of logical argument. I am sure everyone will find it obvious where I said or implied Afghans were genetically predisposed to anything in particular.
I am sure they will overlook my posts on the long history of civil war, the unstable conditions, the lack of prospects in finding stable government. I could add the sheer weight of trying to establish a working economy in a land awash in arms, mines, and young men who’ve known nothing but war. My comments in regards to the difficulties of establishing healthy government in impoverished lands should of course be disregarded, they simply red herrings after all.
Yeah, all this points to me thinking the Afghans are “genetically” predisposed to violence.
I am impressed with your facilities for critical thinking and analysis.
Almost forgot our buddies al Qaeda. They’re the reason for this shooting match, after all.
I believe that “al Qaeda” will become, if it is not already, a curse in Afghanistan. Time and again you hear reports of angry references to “the Arabs” from embittered Afghanis.
Al Qaeda will be the scapegoat for the whole war, and for the nation. The moderate Taliban (something of an oxymoron, I know) will use this scapegoat to try to regain some measure of respectability and a voice in the new Afghanistan.
“The leader of the Shiite Muslim faction in the alliance, Karim Khalili, said his group has brought 3,000 troops to Jalraiz, 25 miles outside the capital, to bring pressure on the new administration to share power.”
We’ve been seeing some unusually candid footage in the past few days from the BBC travelling with US Special Forces. On often repeated piece details a helicopter flight into the Hindu Kush stronghold of the Shiite Hazara and the ‘payload’ of half a palette load of freshly minted folding stuff – you then see the some Hazara guy with a bloody calculator doing his sums ! It was obviously quite serious money.
Next morning they were loading up in the trucks and heading towards Kabul.
I see the AP report speaks of 3,000, the BBC saw 1,000 (I guess you get what you pay for) so either there are other factions outside Kabul as well, or the numbers a guessstimate.
It’s obviously apart of the attempt to get everyone out of the mountains and around the table – I believe about 25% of Kabul residents are of the Hazara so it’s deemed important they be there when the goodies are shared out.
This is a wonderful piece of realpolitic. It shows that at least some of the people planning this have been thinking hard about consequences of not getting the right groups involved, and about the most efficient ways of getting them involoved. It ain’t high-minded, but it’s bloody-well effective!
Nope, but “gifts” still involve some guy in funny clothes coming out of the sky with little packages…!
Another examplebut with a twist came to light today. It’s turning into a third world version of ‘Kelly’s Hero’s’:
"Maidan Shahr clashes
Meanwhile, fierce fighting has erupted in Maidan Shahr, a village about 30 kilometres (20 miles) southwest of the capital Kabul.
Northern Alliance tanks are pounding positions held by Taleban forces on the jagged peaks surrounding the village.
The alliance says it is trying to dislodge 600-700 local Taleban fighters and up to 400 foreign volunteers - mostly Pakistanis and Arabs.
The BBC’s Peter Greste reports that the alliance had paid the Taleban commander Ghulam Mohammad some $200,000 to defect - but he took the money and stayed in the hills.
It appears that the Taleban commander feared reprisals for acts of brutality when he was in control of the village.
The Taleban believe they are fighting for their lives and the advancing Northern Alliance have met stiffer resistance than they had expected, our correspondent says. "
There’s money in them thar hills.
I should have added that apart from losing the money, the local NA leader called in US air strikes after the Taliban reneged on the deal. But they didn’t come!
Not only is he a lousy deal maker and $200,000 poorer but he can’t get the Yankies to do the work for him.
If it carries on like this his men might have to do some actual fighting. Dear oh dear…
