I disagree with much of that, I think there were self-serving or faction-serving elements to all of those critiques. Roman historians as best we can tell had no rigorous code of ethics and “historian” was not a profession that existed in the modern sense, so many of them likely mixed opinion with fact. We also only possess a very small fragment of total written works from ancient Rome. People should be extremely skeptical of ancient texts and the motivations of their authors.
Martin_Hyde, you’re moving the goalposts. You initially said that “they would have been expected to glorify Rome and its leaders of the time.” This was demonstrated to be quite incorrect, whereupon you changed it to a generalized “I think there were self-serving or faction-serving elements to all of those critiques”.
There is some truth to either statement. Yet as far as it goes Green Wyvern is far closer to the facts here. All historians, of every era, have some biases even with the very best of intentions. More to the point, every history ever written will have some errors or simplifications. But Roman writers routinely criticized their own societies, and it was often easy enough to guess their real feelings even when they couldn’t state it outright, as sometimes happened in the Imperial period.
In the case of the Third Servile War, the Roman people in general lacked any kind of good sources for what the slave revolt leaders’ were thinking, both at the time and evidently later, or if they did no reference to it comes down to us. It’s something of a minor miracle that we know even what little we have about Spartacus. We can, in part, thank Crassus for that - though a remarkably clever man, he was also never known for deep foresight, as the Parthians can attest. He murdered a huge number of the slaves when they fell into his hands. Now, while Romans were not, as a general rule, strangers to brutality, this act evidently shocked the public conscience. (It was also deeply stupid, since the slaves were the low-level labor force for much of Italy, but Crassus wanted to look ferocious and murderous for his political benefit.)
From the perspective of the rebelling slaves, we do run into the problem that many of them were foreign to Italy. While undoubtedly possessed of martial skills - probably Spartacus was a soldier and perhaps even a high-ranking one - it’s unclear how much they knew about the extent of Roman power or the geography Rome controlled. Frankly, nobody in the world had terribly accurate maps at this time, nor was education about it widespread. Of course, people traveled widely and there was often great practical knowledge about the world, but it’s hard to comprehend exactly how slave gladiators would have conceived of geography or what they knew about traveling different parts of it. In addition, we don’t know exactly how far they planned for the future. The initial rebellion may have been intended to scatter into the countryside or perhaps capture a ship and flee abroad.
Of course they are. Topics like that are usually covered in History 101.
It shouldn’t be necessary to remind anyone that we should be extremely sceptical of depictions of ancient Rome in Hollywood movies and modern TV series, and in 50 year old high school textbooks, but apparently it is necessary to keep reminding people of this.
If you look into the subject, you’ll find that historiography existed in Greece from the 5th century BCE, and was inherited and extended by Roman historians.
Historian was most definitely regarded as a profession, and accuracy and freedom from bias mattered. Roman historians usually mentioned the sources they were relying on, compared them and discussed their accuracy and any discrepancies between them, and explained their own reasoning in reaching conclusions.
Accounts of the recent history of their own time might be sensitive, but most historians were writing about earlier periods, where they could freely say whatever they liked.
Getting back to the point, I was saying that Roman historians were often critical of Rome rather than offering uncritical praise, and that is true whatever arguments you want to put forward about their motivations.
Livy was more interested with mopal value than historical accuracy.
I think it would be more correct to say that Livy was interested in both moral value and historical accuracy. He certainly always presented views from all sides of any question very convincingly.
He dismisses a lot of the early history of Rome as myth or unreliable, and he doesn’t hesitate to draw negative moral lessons from Roman actions as well as positive.
But it’s true to say that he regards the rise of Rome, in the big picture, as due to Roman moral values. (But then so did Polybius, a Greek historian writing about Rome in Greek for Greek audiences.)
I say this on the basis of having read the whole of Livy’s histories, four thick volumes in the Penguin Classics translations.
Hannibal started the 2nd Punic War by attacking Saguntum and then moving his armies across the Pyrenees. Im not sure what there is to criticize about Rome.
The Carthaginians were shocked because the Romans didnt behave like other states of the times; The Romans didnt negotiate a peace when they were losing battles. In fact, The Romans kept fighting no matter what. This strategy allowed them to bleed the Carthaginians and defeat them. Both states were expansionist and hegemonic. One of the two was going to have to be destroyed.
I suggest you read the detailed history.
Amazon allows you to read quite a large chunk from the beginning as a preview.
Livy’s opening paragraphs are worth quoting because he starts to touch on the motivations of the Carthaginians:
BOOK XXI
Most historians have prefaced their work by stressing the importance of the period they propose to deal with; and I may well, at this point, follow their example and declare that I am now about to tell the story of the most memorable war in history: that, namely, which was fought by Carthage under the leadership of Hannibal against Rome.
A number of things contributed to give this war its unique character: in the first place, it was fought between peoples unrivalled throughout previous history in material resources, and themselves at the peak of their prosperity and power; secondly, it was a struggle between old antagonists, each of whom had learned, in the first Punic War, to appreciate the military capabilities of the other; thirdly, the final issue hung so much in doubt that the eventual victors came nearer to destruction than their adversaries.
Moreover, high passions were at work throughout, and mutual hatred was hardly less sharp a weapon than the sword; on the Roman side there was rage at the unprovoked attack by a previously beaten enemy; on the Carthaginian, bitter resentment at what was felt to be the grasping and tyrannical attitude of their conquerors.
The intensity of the feeling is illustrated by an anecdote of Hannibal’s boyhood: his father Hamilcar, after the campaign in Africa, was about to carry his troops over into Spain, when Hannibal, then about nine years old, begged, with all the childish arts he could muster, to be allowed to accompany him; whereupon Hamilcar, who was preparing to offer sacrifice for a successful outcome, led the boy to the altar and made him solemnly swear, with his hand upon the sacred victim, that as soon as he was old enough he would be the enemy of the Roman people.
Hamilcar was a proud man and the loss of Sicily and Sardinia was a cruel blow to his pride; he remembered, moreover, that Sicily had been surrendered too soon, before the situation had become really desperate, and that Rome, taking advantage of internal troubles in Africa, had tricked Carthage into the loss of Sardinia, and then had added insult to injury by the imposition of a tribute.
All this rankled in his mind, and his conduct of affairs during the five years of the war in Africa, following hard upon the signature of peace with Rome, and subsequently during the nine years he spent in extending Carthaginian influence in Spain, made it clear enough that his ultimate object was an enterprise of far greater moment, and that if he had lived the invasion of Italy would have taken place under Hamilcar’s leadership, instead of, as actually happened, under Hannibal’s. That the war was postponed was due to Hamilcar’s timely death and the fact that Hannibal was still too young to assume command.
That is beautifully written fiction 200 years after the fact. Similar sentiments could be written about the German defeat in WW1.
The Carthaginians lost Sicily because the Romans conquered their cities and drove their forces from it. Carthage never had a chance in The First Punic War. The Romans were also able to evolve their forces and build a powerful navy that allowed them to blockade Carthaginian allied Sicilian cities. The Romans ability to resupply and reinforce their armies in Sicily itself were the deciding factor. The Carthaginians couldnt and were slowly driven from Sicily. This was the same reason that Hannibal couldnt defeat Rome, he couldnt reinforce his armies as could the Romans.
Ironically, Carthage would have had a better chance were they not fighting on a second front against Northern African Numidians. Both Rome and Carthage were expansionist.
I just looked at this again, and realised that you may have missed that I said it was the Third Punic War, not the Second, that Livy regarded as unjustly provoked by Rome.
Any cites for professional modern historians who regard that as being the case?
My understanding of the Punic Wars is that all the history is second hand save for Polybius being part of the Roman Army that sacked Carthage in the 3rd Punic war. Polybius ⢠Histories â Book 3
An excellent modern work on The Punic Wars is https://www.amazon.com/Punic-Wars-Adrian-Goldsworthy/dp/0304352845/ref=sr_1_3?dchild=1&keywords=rome+punic+wars&qid=1620282505&s=books&sr=1-3
Its one of the few books that might be better in an audible edition so we can follow the action on maps.
Wasn’t North where some of those away legions were?
I would agree the Romans likely did not take a slave revolt seriously as a military threat–they certainly took them seriously as a general threat, but probably did not expect them to defeat trained soldiers. That being said, I believe the initial forces that they defeated were more akin to irregulars pressed into quick service, and not Rome’s best troops. I know the praetor that was defeated by him at the base of Vesuvius is very frequently portrayed in fiction as a major villain of the story and generally shown to be inept. He likely was inept, but we also know almost nothing about him save his name and that he supposedly took a force of around 3,000 men. I think at the point that happened there was a perception that Spartacus men were more of a civil uprising or a bad case of banditry, it wasn’t recognized as a military force.
Taking a walled city was difficult in that era with a force still mostly of irregulars, armed with what seized weapons they could find and what bronze and iron they could trade with merchants.
There are a couple histories that record Spartacus defeating Roman consular armies, albeit the narrative is different depending on which historian you read–both histories agree that a force under Crixus was defeated by the army of Consul Lucius Gellus in 72 BC, near Mount Garganus. Appian’s history says that after Crixus’ defeat, Spartacus began to move his main force north, where the other consular army under Lentulus attempted to bar his path–Appian records that Spartacus defeated this army, and then turned to likewise defeat the army of Gellus who had been coordinating with Lentulus in an attempt to catch the slave army between them. Appian then records that the two consuls regroup and engage the slave army near Picenum, and were defeated yet again. Appian’s history marks this as being about as far north as Spartacus gets, and records that he turns around and heads back to Southern Italy.
Plutarch’s history differs in that it does not record Spartacus ever engaging the army of Consul Gellus directly, instead just noting he defeated the consular army of Lentulus on his way north, and that in fact Spartacus took his army as far north as modern Modena which is getting fairly close to escaping Italy. Plutarch then records a clash between Spartacus and the Governor of Cisalpine Gaul, Gaius Longinus, whom Spartacus also defeated. Plutarch’s history than has quite a gap and makes no real explanation of why this is the furthest north Spartacus goes, and does not update on the war until the next year.
It is interesting if Spartacus made it as far north as Modena why he didn’t really try a break out of Italy, especially if as Plutarch records he defeated the armies of Cisalpine Gaul already.
We do know from Hannibal some 130 years before sieging Rome was likely no small affair, Hannibal worked diligently to try to build enough support from Italian cities to get positioned to take Rome, Appian’s history mentions Spartacus had attempted to get the allegiance of some of the cities in his area of operations but was unsuccessful–we do read in both histories that shepherds and peasants did join the slave army for reasons unknown, possibly just general unhappiness with Roman governance.
It’s also interesting the way Spartacus lead the army, if we compare it to slave uprisings in the New World, a big limiter of those uprisings was usually that the leaders were very limited in how much they knew about the geography of the area around where they were enslaved and were massively uninformed on military tactics and operations. This is why a typical New World slave revolt 1900 years later or so was never much more than a really nasty riot in most cases, even the one that lead to the independence of Haiti was not well organized but won on sheer force of bodies. If the histories concerning the Spartacus slave uprising are true he all but had to have had some experience in an organized military context, possibly as an auxiliary with Roman legions, and he had to have had good knowledge of the Italian peninsula and general logistics and strategy, a somewhat odd amount of knowledge for a slave to hold. Several Roman writers mention he had some sort of background in the legions, but there’s no real biographical information on him outside the context of the slave war.
I mean I said this in my very first post on the matter, it was not something I “changed it to”:
If anything about Spartacus rebellion was intended to cast a negative light on Roman society, you can be assured that would not have been written down and recorded for future generations. Until quite recently historians were not expected to be unbiased and entirely truthful, they would have been expected to glorify Rome and its leaders of the time. The only reason we ever have critical information is because Rome was always ruled (in both Republican and Imperials times) by shifting factions of power, as one went out, another came in, and trashing the previous guys in writing was not uncommon.
Maybe it was worded unartfully, but the point being made is that in general Roman historians, and in fact more or less all historians of note before modern times, would generally be writing biased histories that glorified the men of power of their day. For example in the era of Augustus it would be unwise to have written seriously critical histories of his reign. This is a pattern that goes back to ancient Greece and is seen all the way through the Renaissance and the early enlightenment. I then point out that any writings we do find to be critical of leadership, there is usually a political reason for that, which to me means those histories are no more reliable than the hagiographies.
Anyone who was a “writer” of note in ancient times was at least someone of some level of importance. Sometimes maybe the leader of a noble family or faction, but often a cousin or nephew or someone of that sort associated with someone important. Rome both as a Republic and an Empire was typified by ever shifting political factions and alliances that held power at different times. Sulla was denounced as a tyrant once he was safely in the ground, and by those who had been too cowardly to oppose him directly when he was alive. That doesn’t necessarily mean critiques of Sulla were entirely accurate, he was a deceased leader and was being picked apart by his enemies.
If I recall he did go north but eventually turned around and went south.
To the OP: I recently listened to the archived broadcast of Spartacus on the BBC show In Our Time. It’s quite good and I recommend it. The tl;dl is that they don’t really know what motivated Spartacus or what his goals were. They only have educated guesses. One of those guesses is that he didn’t really know, either, and just kind of fumbled along.
In Our Time podcasts are always worth listening to because they feature top experts in the relevant fields discussing the topic with the moderator and each other.
There are 900+ of them available for free download on a wide range of different subjects – science and mathematics as well as history, art, literature, etc.
Here are 50 podcasts on ancient Rome
And the Listeners’ Top 10 on various subjects.
I just want to say that I’m enjoying this discussion quite a lot. You guys are bringing the goods.
As for Spartacus apparently knowing the terrain of Italy well… Is that necessary? Surely he must have had followers who had been enslaved in various places in Italy - couldn’t he just have organized an advisory council or something? I do think he must have been a military man at some point. But that shouldn’t be surprising as captured soldiers were a prime source of gladiators in Spartacus’ time.
Martin_Hyde, nothing you’ve posted is a legitimate reason to simply dismiss historical writing, which is what you’re trying to do. That is emphatically not how history is actually done. Every good historian absolutely weighs the context, potential bias, or simply honest mistakes of any historical work. But good historians never merely dismiss works just because.
Romans did talk about the causes of Spartacus’ revolt, and they even reformed their society partly in response to it. (Perhaps not as far as a 20th-century moralist might like, but that’s life.) Multiple examples have been provided. If you want to drop it, fine, but don’t pretend the contradicting evidence doesn’t exist when it’s quite literally been written out for you.
The issue is not so much “local” as in terms of getting around, especially once the numbers of slaves (well, ex-slaves) the warband attracted began to swell. It’s one thing to try and ask some local recruits what was around ; they probably had some idea of who lived around the area, where food stocks might be, and if there was anything important. But once you’re trying to lead, basically, an army with no firm supply source planning gets really complicated very quickly, and food supplies can run out very fast. In addition, it gets surprisingly easy to take the wrong road or wind up going in circles. Even the relatively small estimates make for a pretty big, and slow-moving, force almost entirely on foot, that has to loot as they go to survive. Plus Rome controlled all the cities and shipping.
Even if they reached Mutina, and we don’t know if that actually happened, it’s a very long way to the borders of Roman power. The closest border was still a long way off, and there was no guarantee of safety beyond that, assuming the group could have made it past the Alps. It might have been possible to reach Noricum, Raetia, or Pannonia but it’s unlikely any of those would have welcomed the slaves.
Nope–that isn’t what I’m trying to do, you seem a little confused. A correct reading of my posts would reveal the only actual point I made was that 1) there is no historical record whatsoever that Spartacus was working for a general abolishment of slavery, 2) it is unlikely that a vanquished enemy of the state on a hypothetical moral crusade would have their crusade accurately recorded by the standard historical style of writing typical of pre-modern times. Since you appear hell bent on implying and reading things that were not in my writing, I will assume there is no further reason for us to discuss the matter as it is likely you will continue this pattern.