Stalin is said to have computed that the destruction the Germans wrought against Russia was roughly the equivalent to about 60 Hiroshima bombs. So he didn’t exactly tremble at the idea of us threatening to nuke him. Which we never really did (threaten to that is), till the Berlin airlift anyway. Even then, only tacitly.
Thing about tyrannical despots, they tend to not worry as much about their citizens as the do their power…
A public speech made by Mao in 1958 demonstrated this point:
So I was, Gray Ghost. Thank you for the correction.
It’s not really accurate to portray it as “invade or use nukes”. Operation Downfall would’ve used multiple nukes on Japanese positions anyway. The choice was use them in lieu of an invasion, or use them during an invasion.
There weren’t really moral qualms about radiation, as it wasn’t understood. Col. Seeman “advised that American troops not enter an area hit by a bomb for “at least 48 hours””. Imagine Hiroshima x10, this time with our own soldiers also dying of radiation sickness.
I’m not sure we could have, at least not how we did against Hiroshima. The Germans were still shooting down a lot of bombers in '44. A run against Berlin would have involved a large number of planes, Hiroshima had 3? 4? which ran like hell when the bomb was dropped. Would that have worked if you had 3-400 planes in the air? What if the plane carrying it was shot down?
We didn’t think the bombs were that big of a deal, given how we ran troops into the mushroom clouds during tests. I wonder if we would have bombed the invasion beaches. :eek:
The Japanese had given up attacking lone bombers. Since firebombing runs came in waves of dozens or hundreds of planes, a lone bomber or two was likely just reconaissance and not worth the effort - since it wasn’t dropping anything, if the attack aircraft were shot down it was a waste of scarce resources. The Americans knew this, and sending a lone bomber was a calculated risk that worked twice.
That attitude might have changed by the fourth or fifth A-bomb; but then the US would just send a pack of 10 or 20 plus escort, making it a puzzle to find the right plane in time.
That reminds me of something. Wasn’t part of the plan to invade Japan to basically use nukes like any other bomb? IE you soften up the defense with shelling/bombing and then the landing troops come in. Did I hear correctly that the plan was to drop the nukes on the Japanese first and then land the troops immediately afterwards? (Curious since I’ve heard the argument the options were bomb or invade but it sounds like plan was always bomb and invade but the Japanese gave up during the weapon test phase of things.)
Damn, knew I should have read the rest of this before posting.
Actually my understanding was the 3rd bomb was being shipped to Tinian and was going to be dropped during the 3rd week of August. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki#Plans_for_more_atomic_attacks_on_Japan
The timing of the USSR’s declaration of war was specifically agreed to as part of a deal between them and the other Allied powers.
I read a few books years ago which held that the idea of a rabid military high command prepared to overrule the Emperor and continue fighting was pure myth. No Japanese officer, including Tojo, would have dreamed of disobeying his Emperor. The Americans nurtured this idea because they felt Japan would be far easier to rule with the Emperor in place, rather than trying him as a war criminal (and there was substantial evidence apparently of his support for the war party).
Just remembered the title of one of them, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy by David Bergamini. This one impressed me at the time by its voluminous detail, well-sourced notes and the author’s encyclopedic knowledge of Japanese politics from the 19th century to the end of WWII.
Three planes:
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Until July 1945 the US (and UK) were pressing hard for the Soviet Union to join the war on Japan. They were very aware of Soviet expansionism and the danger that represented to Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Chinese (always an American obsession!) but desperate to share the burden, and the casualties, of destroying the Japanese army and a possible invasion. By Potsdam this was changing. It was clear the Japanese were nearing collapse due to the blockade and the fire-bombing and the A bomb was a potential game changer but the US was still pressing for a Soviet invasion of Manchuria - although with less enthusiasm than before. It was to get the Soviet’s into the war against Japan that Roosevelt had signed over half of Europe to the Soviet Union at Yalta.
At Potsdam Stalin finally committed the SU to declaring war on 15 August and it was clearly the dropping of the bombs that brought forward the invasion of Manchuria to the early hours of 9 August - just hours before Fat Boy was dropped on Nagasaki - so that Stalin could lay claim to part of the spoils.
As to the OP, that’s mostly been covered. The targets for the first bombs were specifically chosen because they had not previously been damaged, This was partly for maximum impact and partly to get a clear idea of their effectiveness. The actual order to Spaatz from Stimson and Marshall on 25 July (from Potsdam) said “The 509 Composite Group, Twentieth Air Force, will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nigata and Nagasaki … Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff.” Note that there was no separate decision to drop a second bomb on Nagasaki - the order was to drop them as they became available. The United States government could have ordered a halt before the second bomb was dropped but with no clear signals of surrender from Tokyo saw no reason to do so. In fact Fat Man was meant for Kokura but cloud over the city caused Bock’s Car to divert to their secondary target of Nagasaki.
In the end the high command were not prepared to over-rule the Imperial will but it was by no means a certainty. With the mindset of the Japanese military after thirty years of militaristic/nationalist ideology and rhetoric it was not impossible for individual officers to convince themselves that the Emperor was being mis-advised and it was up to them to free him from these evil influences. This is the same reasoning used in rebelling against anointed kings throughout history -“it’s not the King - it’s his advisers”. Remember Japanese history is a succession of leaders ruling in the Emperor’s name while keeping the Emperor himself powerless and in isolation.
There was an attempted coup - but by junior officers, not the high command. A major and a Lt Colonel slipped into the Imperial Palace in the evening of the 14th August. It was a pretty feeble attempt but having shot dead the commander of the Imperial Guards Division they forged orders for troops to “protect” the Emperor and cut him off from the outside world. Fortunately they failed to find either the Emperor or the recordings of his broadcast to the Empire and by the early hours of the next morning other troops had arrived and pursuaded the Guards that they had been tricked.
Having said that, it is quite true a deliberate decision was taken not to try the Emperor for war crimes and to play down his part in the governance of the war in the interest of easier government post-war. Although he did finally break the log jam and order the surrender it was only at the eleventh hour. He had made no serious attempt to prevent the war or to end it sooner despite the writing clearly being on the wall and his people suffering terribly.
Exactly. Using two bombs was specifically planned for the psychological effect of having more than one. One bomb could easily have been (and likely was) seen as a one-time fluke. With the second bomb, the question changes from “Is that the only one?” to “How many more do they have?” Classic gamesmanship.
It could also be mentioned that had there been no atom bomb (yet) and Operation Downfall went ahead, Stalin might have then pursued a counter-invasion from the north (for the spoils). Without an A-bomb we would have been torn between welcoming the Soviets’ help (which, in terms of invading Japan, would have been no small thing) and still wanting to contain them in the post-war world. Suffice it to say that had Stalin invaded Japan with us, along with Korea & Vietnam, we’d also be talking about North & South Japan!
Many people make the same claim about the United States, citing, as you did with the USSR, its delayed entry into the war and its post-war aggression.
Didn’t he also keep fighting for a week or so after the surrender in order to grab more? (IIRC)
That sounds like a ridiculous comparison. Entering a five-year war after the first year is hardly analogous to entering a few weeks from the end, and I don’t see how the U.S.'s post-war “aggression” even begins to resemble the USSR’s.
Well, if it wasn’t for those meddling kids and their six carriers, our plan would have worked!