Is it a fair assessment (in hindsight) that Japan feared the USSR more than US atomic bombs?

Factual Questions
1

Hi

This question has been done to death but I want to get as objective an answer as possible. Was Japan going to surrender anyway prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? More modern research suggests it was. The more prominent/prevailing view is that dropping the bombs was a necessity and saved hundreds of thousands of lives. A more nuanced perspective from foreignpolicy.com gives, in my opinion, a more satisfying/substantive answer. What about Truman’s judgement or forthrightness in his reasons for dropping the bombs? Is there any evidence to suggest that he had any other motives to drop the bomb besides defeating Japan?
I look forward to your feedback.

The nuclear bombs probably saved hundreds of thousands of Japanese lives. American planes would have had to attack several more Japanese cities as they had Tokyo, and would have repeated their attacks on the capital as well. The U.S. Navy would have continued its blockade, and mass starvation could have resulted. The 70th anniversary of the dropping of the Hiroshima ought to be observed with dignity and reflection, but also with thanksgiving and relief.

" But, in 1965, historian Gar Alperovitz argued that,although the bombs did force an immediate end to the war, Japan’s leaders had wanted to surrender anyway and likely would have done so before the American invasion planned for November 1.Their use was, therefore, unnecessary."

"Even the most hardline leaders in Japan’s government knew that the war could not go on. The question was not whether to continue, but how to bring the war to a close under the best terms possible. The Allies (the United States, Great Britain, and others — the Soviet Union, remember, was still neutral) were demanding “unconditional surrender.” Japan’s leaders hoped that they might be able to figure out a way to avoid war crimes trials, keep their form of government, and keep some of the territories they’d conquered: Korea, Vietnam, Burma, parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, a large portion of eastern China, and numerous islands in the Pacific.
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"The destruction of Hiroshima had done nothing to reduce the preparedness of the troops dug in on the beaches of Japan’s home islands. There was now one fewer city behind them, but they were still dug in, they still had ammunition, and their military strength had not been diminished in any important way. Bombing Hiroshima did not foreclose either of Japan’s strategic options.
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"The Soviet declaration of war also changed the calculation of how much time was left for maneuver. Japanese intelligence was predicting that U.S. forces might not invade for months. Soviet forces, on the other hand, could be in Japan proper in as little as 10 days. The Soviet invasion made a decision on ending the war extremely time sensitive.
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"Japan’s leaders consistently displayed disinterest in the city bombing that was wrecking their cities. "

“There were, however, only six smaller cities (with populations between 30,000 and 100,000) which had not already been bombed. Given that Japan had already had major bombing damage done to 68 cities, and
had, for the most part, shrugged it off, it is perhaps not surprising that Japan’s leaders were unimpressed with the threat of further bombing. It was not strategically compelling.”

2

Fear of the USSR would certainly have been one of the factors, not only for the Japanese but the Americans. The last thing the Western Allies wanted was a Soviet presence anywhere in Japan and that made a quick end to the war all the more urgent.

3

The Japanese had gotten a good pasting in the 1939 skirmishes at the hands of some guy called Zhukov and had an obvious interest in not repeating the experience, but also noteworthy is the efforts of the Japanese government to attempt to negotiate an end to the war through the ‘good offices’ of the Soviet Union. A telegram from Togo (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Sato (Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union) on the 21st July 1945 read;

And later on the 25th;

Needless to say the Soviet declaration of war was a slight setback in the Japanese plan to enable Stalin ‘…to acquire the position of advocate of world peace’.

4

Lets just say the High Command had a lousy week. All of these events contributed, as did the coming hunger.

5

Given that the Soviets had already given notice that they didn’t want to renew the neutrality agreement with Japan, and, in between the two missives quoted by Mr. Kobayashi had withdrawn all its diplomatic staff from Japan, you would imagine the Japanese were already quite rattled. Whilst they would not know of the agreement made in Yalta, they would have fast diminishing hopes that a negotiated settlement of any kind could be reached.

The Japanese would not be exactly happy losing Manchuria, as not long before they no doubt felt they would retain it as part of a negotiated end the war. But whether they felt deep worry that the Soviets might actually regard Japan proper as a possible acquisition might be hard to judge. However the US might have felt it was worth pushing the thought processes along a little, and get Japan to make up its mind as to which side they might prefer to give unconditional surrender to. An observation of US actions in newly occupied Germany might have been a good start to such thought processes in addition to facing the nuking of major cities.

6

The Japanese were already seriously considering surrender before Hiroshima. They indicated it to the allies, but a mistranslation (probably deliberate on the part of a Soviet agent in the German embassy) led the US to believe they had rejected the idea.

7

Truman is a mystery. How much did he really know and how much are we assuming he should have known? I’m not really happy with the argument below, but is it fair?

The actual decision to drop the bomb was not nearly as casual as “a simple yes.” Critics of the decision to use the “special bomb” in 1945 are judging men born in the 19th century by the standards of the 21st. Had Truman and his commanders shrunk from doing everything possible to force the war to its end, the American people would never have forgiven them. This judgment no doubt mattered more to these leaders than the disapproval of academic historians a half century later, and rightly so.

8

By what definition does the term “surrender” include keeping one’s government and conquered territories, and having its leaders avoid accountability for their actions?

All Alperovitz has demonstrated is that Japan would have been willing to stop fighting in return for being allowed to keep everything they had already taken by force. By no stretch of the imagination can that be called “surrender.”

9

True. But how many more bombs did the US have? The Japanese did not know. And what would happen if they started dropping those bombs on those dug-in positions of the Japanese troops? And followed up by dropping them on rail communications behind the dug-in troops? And then followed up with an invasion?

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were more in the nature of strategic bombs; but any military person should have immediately seen that it shifted the balance at the tactical level as well.

What naval forces did the Soviets have on their east coast that could have supported an invasion of Japan? What troop carriers and amphibious craft?

10

No there isn’t. The US was reading in real time all of Japan’s diplomatic radio traffic which Japan thought was coded in an unbreakable cypher. From Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire

All three military members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War remained opposed to surrender even after both bombs had been dropped and the Soviet Union entered the war. It was only Emperor Hirohito’s personal appearance at the council indicating his wish to surrender that caused the military to cave and accept surrender.

Not this old chestnut again. I assume you are referring to the Japanese response to the Potsdam Declaration being "mokusatsu" and that it was mistranslated to be a rejection when the supposed intent was more akin to “we’ll think about it.” This is untrue,

In other words, Japan’s official position on the Potsdam Declaration translated in the best possible light was that they were going to ignore it. The Potsdam Declaration was an ultimatum demanding the unconditional surrender of Japan:

Announcing that one intends to ignore an ultimatum is a rejection of it.

11

Thanks Dissonance, and since you seem to have quite an in-depth knowledge on the subject, can you tell me whether the surrender speech given by Hirohito was understood by the masses? As I understand it, the language register he used (if I can call it that) was at a level that was incomprehensible to the masses.

12

This is what I am curious about as well. How was the Soviet army going to get the landing craft necessary to invade Honshu in a timely manner?

13

It certainly took time for the import of it to sink in; the audio quality of the recording wasn’t that good, no Japanese emperor had ever addressed his subjects before, the language used was very formal, courtly and as you indicate unfamiliar to the masses and further was very circuitous. At no point is the word surrender even used. The full text:

This was read to a public that had been fed on the propaganda slogan of ichioku gyokusai (literally 100 million shattered jewels, figuratively 100 million - i.e. all of the Japanese people - die together) for over a year and any sign of defeatism or doubt in the government could lead to a very unpleasant meeting with the Kempeitai or Tokkō. I should probably make note of the Kyūjō incident as well, the attempted coup d’état by Army officers to place the emperor under house arrest, seize the recording before it could be broadcast and prevent the surrender.

14

Not just timely, but the claim was a naval invasion could occur in 10 days. How would the Soviets do that on their east coast, when they had been putting all of their war resources into the Red Army in the west?

According to this calculator, the distance from Vladivostock (the eastern teminus of the Trans-Siberian railway) to the main island of Japan is over 500 miles, over the Sea of Japan. That couldn’t have been bridged by landing craft like in the Normandy invasion which only had to cross 20 miles of the Channel. Only blue-water ships could safely be used for troop transport that distance.

Assume the Soviets could ship troops east on the Trans-Siberian Railway, how could they have got those troops to Japan? within 10 days of the declaration of war by the USSR?

And where would they land safely? even in Japan’s weakened state, wouldn’t they have some forces guarding their ports?

15

Had the Japanese government even reported the terms of the Potsdam Declaration to the Japanese people?

16

One thing about the awfulness of the A-bomb is that by playing up just how terrible it was, it gave the Japanese a way of saving face in a surrender. It could be, as previously mentioned, that the high command was callous and uncaring towards the nukes. But treating the bombs as the ultimate horror provided a convenient excuse.

17

I have two questions about this thread.

  1. As Northern Piper illustrates here, I am confused as to whether we are conflating Japan’s willingness to resist with their ability to resist. I understand that the Japanese may have been willing to continue to fight. However, after 6 August, their ability to do so was almost non-existent. The bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were essentially demonstrations. The fact that they inflicted almost no military damage was our choice. If the war had proceeded past 15 August, the US could (conceivably) have nuked major ports, military installations, airfields, defensive positions, etc. In any invasion, we could have just nuked whatever piece of coastline we intended to attack and annihilated all opposition. The only real limit was how fast the US could churn out fissile material. Why, then, does OP say that the bombings were “not strategically compelling?”

  2. Why would/did the potential Soviet invasion weigh more heavily than the atom bomb? If the Japanese cared nothing for the destruction of their cities, and were willing to suffer continued atomic bombings, why did the threat of Soviet invasion suddenly change their mind? Was it just that they knew they would get better terms from the US than the Soviets?

18

This line from Hirohito’s surrender always cracked me up. Has to be the biggest understatement in the history of understatements…“the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.”

Really?

I recall reading about the military force Japan was facing at that time. Something like… The country was completely surrounded by many US submarines. Not a ship has been able to come or go for months. There’s little oil/gas/food. Something like 16 Navy Battle Groups are barring down on Japan each consisting of a carrier, battle ships, cruisers and destroyers. Hundreds of warships. Half or more of the cities have been flamed. Must be several hundred new, shiny B-29’s in the neighbourhood ready to flame the rest. Thousands of other planes, too. Nukes. Army and marines. They’re all very crabby and want to go home. Bunch of guys in Europe coming your way. …And the Ruskis are coming, too.

All that and I’m sure more… and the guy says…

"the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage."

I have this, to say about that. D’oh!

19

There was a recent(ish) thread about this. I noted there that, if you read the Japanese version of the Wikipedia about this, it comes down pretty heavily on the side of the Russian threat.

Generally, I’d be less inclined to vote with the Japanese interpretation of history, when it comes to Japan, but I can’t think of any good reason that a Japanese historian would choose to go with the Russians over the Americans, while as I can think of reasons for American historians to prefer the American explanation. Most of the historic documentation an American historian would have, would be from the American military, and so it would tend to lean that way.

20

But my question stands: what could the Soviet Union have done to Japan? What resources did the USSR have to affect Japan, more than the US could?