Considering that Japan had more than a few ‘Hiroshima’ sized events already with the firebombings of Japanese cities(100,000 dead in Tokyo alone) why would the Japanese leadership consider the Abomb any different. The fact that they didn’t surrender after the fire bombings or even after Hiroshima makes believe that the millions Russians waiting to storm the mainland from Siberia probably played a bigger role. Faced with inevitable defeat they decided to surrender to the US rather than face complete annhialation by the Russians. I am no expert. Can someone with the know-how please give me the straight dope?
Get yourself a copy of Imperial Tragedy by Thomas M. Coffey.
The surrender was already in the works even before Hiroshima. Emperor Hirohito didn’t want the war in the first place - it was pretty much the Army’s idea. By the time of the A-bomb attacks the Army was still convinced that Japan could win; the Emperor and his closest advisors knew they couldn’t.
As you said, Japan was decimated already. After the first A-bomb, there were quite a few people in the Japanese army who refused to believe that it had only been one bomb. Encounters with survivors revealed people with burns only on the parts of their bodies that had been exposed - skin covered by clothing appeared untouched. This led many in the army to believe that it was the light of the bomb’s flash that was dangerous - they therefore advised people to wear white clothing with long sleeves to protect themselves. They didn’t understand the effects of radiation, and of course the survivors they met died shortly. Enough survivors of the initial blast had died of radiation poisoning by the time the second bomb dropped on Nagasaki to dispell the idea that white clothing was adequate protection. Remember, the army officers weren’t scientists, and nuclear technology was brand new. It didn’t take long for Japan’s nuclear scientists (they had tried and failed to build their own A-bomb) to spread the word about what had really happened.
So while many top-raking army officers still believed the war could be won, the atom bombs changed everybody else’s minds. The surrender had to be prepared in secret, though, and when the Emperor announced it to the public, it was worded in such a way that it didn’t come right out and say “we have surrendered”.
So yes, it was the A-bombs that provided the final push to surrender.
Did the Russians have a naval presence in the Pacific capable of transporting significant numbers of men across the Sea of Japan?
My understanding was the threat that Tokio would be next that lead to the surrender.
The A Bomb was the last, but definitely not the only straw. Looking for one or two reasons is an oversimplification. The A bomb was horrible, but much of the Japanese military saw it as not much worse then the fire bombings, and assumed that the US could only deliver a limited number of nuclear bombs. True enough for the first few months, but after that they would have been churned out on an assembly line.
Conventional bombing was destroying Japanese cities, and the Allies had totally strangled shipping - I think there was one month in 1945 when not a single Japanese merchant ship reached Japan. This cut off the import of rare minerals needed to harden steel and make the alloys for Japanese industry - by the end of the war, Japanese aircraft engines had become notoriously unreliable. There was no oil - Japan could only produce a percentage of their needs from Japanese wells, and their refineries had been heavily bombed.
The Imperial Navy had ceased to exist, as had all effective means of supporting the Japanese army overseas. We had sunk the ferries used to transport goods and soldiers between two of the larger islands; and we did not realize it at the time, but that also destroyed the way of transporting the rice harvest. That’s way a few months later McArthur had to make that bayonets or food statement. The Japanese had stockpiled thousands of aircraft and hidden whole divisions in preparation of the Allied invasion, but now they were facing starvation even without the Allies landing, and the prospect of A bombs being used in front of the advancing ground troops.
The Japanese were concerned about the Russians - after all, they had already fought and more or less lost a small war with them right before we entered WWII.
The Japanese had tried to offer a deal to Stalin, that amounted to an alliance between Japan and Russia and against the rest of the Allies. That was their only diplomatic hope left, the rest of the world either was against them or saw how hopeless their situation was.
The Russians realized that the Japanese were already beaten, and simply strung them on in order to get an advantage in positioning their troops. When the Russians finally did decline the offer, a majority of the Japanese cabinet saw there was no alternative other than surrender. So the answer is the A bomb, and the Russians, and their general overall defeat.
The Russians were to attack the Japanese in China.
Did the Allies not already agree to refuse an offer of surrender from any Axis country if it was directed at only one of the Allied nations?
I’m not sure about the Allies, but the Axis countries had an agreement amongst themselves that there would be no “single surrender”. In other words, they were to either win together or surrender together. Of course, Neither Germany nor Italy honored the agreement, so by the end of the war Japan was fighting alone.
I believe Japan’s surrender was directed to several countries. Here is the message which Hirohito read on the radio, announcing the surrender to his people:
"To Our good and loyal subjects:
"After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.
"We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration.
"To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors, and which We lay close to heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan’s self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone – the gallant fighting of military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people, the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.
"Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is indeed incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects; or to atone Ouselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers.
"We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our Allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia. The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the field of battle, those who died at the their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely deaths and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day. The welfare of the wounded and the war-sufferers, and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood, are the objects of Our profound solicitude. The hardships and suffering to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects. However, it is according to the dictate of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way to peace for ten thousand generations by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable.
“Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, We are always with you, Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity. Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world. Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude; foster nobility of spirit; and work with resolution so you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.”
The offer wasn’t quite as YPOD recalled. The Emporer’s cousin had conveyed an offer to surrender to all the Allies through Stalin. At this time, the USSR was not at war with Japan, but was planning their invasion of Manchuria and was positioning units for that offensive.
The substance of the offer was a surrender with one condition: that the person of the Emporer would not be harmed. Although the Allies had demanded the unconditional surrender of all Axis nations, they did, in fact, accept this condition 4 months later.
Wow, the Japanese really did manage to surrender without making it sound like they were doing so on unconditional terms :eek: Some nice spin there.
Not long ago, I saw a show on the History channel that took the opposing view, that is was fear of the Soviets that prompted the Japanese to surrender. The Japanese, the show contends, did not know the magnitude of the attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because of slow communications due to the shattered infrastructure. They knew something bad had happened to Hiroshima and Nagasaki but were unclear as to what. On August 9, the same day Nagasaki was nuked, the Soviets invaded Manchuria and within days shattered the already weakened Kwangtung Army. The Japanese didn’t have any forces that could stand up to the Russians in mainland Asia, and because they feared Stalin, the Japanese caved. At least, that’s what the show said.
As someone already pointed out, though, the Soviets didn’t have a Pacific navy at anywhere NEAR the scale they would need to invade the home islands, so total conquest by the Reds would have been impossible for years. So maybe it was the nukes after all. Since all of the people in the room when surrender was being debated are dead, we’ll never know for sure, but no doubt it was a combination of both factors.
Of course, that didn’t stop a bunch of true fanatics from trying to execute a coup to take over the government to keep the war going, btu that’s another story.
Not really. The Japanese language is different from ours, and their manner of expressing things is different. What appears to you to be spin is the Japanese way of saying they lost the war. English is typically literal and direct; Japanese is literal, but indirect. Other languages are more different still (Arabic is typically non-literal, in that metaphor and exaggeration are liberally used, but direct and straightforward, like English but unlike Japanese.)
In Japanese, negation and negative comments tend to be avoided or expressed in circuitous fashion. Outright negation is considered slightly rude and is usually avoided. If you were to ask a Japanese movie clerk for a ticket to the 9 PM showing of Spider-Man 2, when the show was sold out and no tickets were available until the 10 PM show, the clerk might say something along the lines of “Would you like to see the ten o’clock show instead?” That sounds to you like they’re changing the subject, but to another Japanese the clerk is clearly stating that the 9 PM show is sold out.
When the Emperor stated, “Despite the best that has been done by everyone … the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest,” that sounds to you like spin. But to a Japanese, it was an unambiguous statement that the war had been totally and utterly lost (something most Japanese already knew anyway.)
Similarly, the last paragraph, which speaks against “Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world,” sounds to you like “keep a stiff upper lip.” To a Japanese it meant “We’re hosed and the Allies are in charge. If you rebel or resist, they’ll kick our asses. Do what they say.”
It’s just a different language.
I saw the history channel special that brain damaj mentioned and it is one of the sources of my confusion. The special seemed to be pretty firm in their conclusion that the Russians were the main reason for the surrenderd, not even entertaining other contributing factors.
Most people I have spoken with who support the using of the Abomb during WWII seem to think that we had two choices 1: Lose up to a million servicemen in a Japanese mainland invasion or 2: Use the Abomb…so the obvious choice is the latter.
Is this a true delimmna? What does the picture look like without the Abomb?
"If ya can’t take the heat, stay out of Nagasaki" -Give 'em Hell Harrysan
According to an article I read by a veteran who was part of the occupation force in post WWII Japan, a mainland invasion would have been MUCH more difficult than than military analysts believed. Every aspect of Japanese society and what remained of the military was geared for a suicidal defence of the home islands. Hundreds of wooden motor boats packed with explosives were hidden along the shores to destroy landing craft and tunnels were dug for fighters (mostly women and children) to hide and attack allied forced form the year. Barring eventual surrender, what followed would have likely been a combination of Iwo Jima and Vietnam, but on a much larger scale. It’s hard to estimate losses, but in that scenario, a million U.S. casualties seems like a optimistic estimate, and Japan would have been almost completely depopulated. Don’t forget that for every American killed, 5-10 Japanese would have been killed by the superior firepower of the U.S.
Not only did the nukes save American lives, they saved possibly TENS of millions of Jaoanese lives. Even without an invasion, famine and disease were killing Japanese civilians by the truckload. Ironically, by killing several hundred thousand, the nukes saved Japan.
Personally, I can think of a few U.S. cities that a good nuking would improve.
One of the most confusing aspects about Japan’s eventual surrender is the number of stories about how they “tried” to surrender but were rebuffed. The Allies had quietly (for obvious political reasons) agreed to allow the emperor (or at least the institution of the emperor) to remain, and the Potsdam Declaration I believe it was, promised the survival and independence of the Japanese people.
Japanese hardliners still held out the possibility of a negotiated settlement which would involve no occupation of Japan, no Allied trials of war criminals, no time table for Japanese military withdrawl, and no financial indemnities - almost a truce in place, with Japan keeping what they alread held. This of course, was a no deal situation with the Allies.
If I remember correctly, all the Japanese had to surrender was to broadcast on radio their governments agreement to the Potsdam Declaration, which was eventually how they actually did it. There was no need to send the Emperor’s cousin to Russia to arrange anything, and there are several stories about how various businessmen or diplomats “tried” to arrange a surrender, but the racist/communist fearing/bloodthirsty/lets test the A bomb Allies refused. When the final Japanese decision was made, there was no problem in communicating it to the Allies. That is not to say that there were not horrendous problems within Japan with the Army trying to keep the war on, an attempted coup and so on. But the hostilities stopped once the final broadcast was made (there was an earlier broadcast which said something like the Japanese government will announce the agreement - which, together with some bad weather, stopped the air raids for a while - but they resumed when no announcement came).
An interesting side note to all of this is when, following diplomatic custom of formal paperwork, the Japanese asked (I forget) either the Swiss or the Swedes to communicate a note to the US government. Everything was great, everyone was excited, but no one knew to whom, according to protocol, the note should be addressed. A document this important and historic could not wait. So the secretary who typed up the final draft saved the day - she simply made up a fake name, and the ambassador delivered the note to the State Department. I don’t think anyone noticed at the time that there was no “George Smith” (or whatever) there. So the lesson is - be nice to the little people, they are the ones who make the world work.
RickJay is correct about the differences between how the Japanese say things and how we say things. That is part of it.
However, the radio broadcast has its own peculiarities that don’t come across in the literal translation. The speech was very carefully written by committee after much debate about the wording. There were numerous ways to say the same thing in the Japanese language, and they had to find the exact way to convey the intended message. There was some archaic Japanese included in the speech. The reason for all the debate by the Emperor and his advisors and speechwriters was that they needed to notify the people of the surrender, without actually coming right out and saying “we have surrendered”.
They chose deliberately ambiguous language so that the speech could be saying “we have surrendered” but could also be saying no such thing. This was because they needed to leave the army in doubt, because of the coup attempts already mentioned. They feared that, if they came right and announced the surrender, the army would go completely out of control. So the language of the speech created enough doubt that, by the time the army figured out exactly what the Emperor meant, it was too late for them to do anything about it.
The official surrender was transmitted through Switzerland.
Again, I highly recommend Imperial Tragedy, the book I mentioned in my first post. The book explains all of this much better than I can. The book is based upon interviews with the Japanese people who were actually involved with the events in question, as well as many official documents and books by Japanese historians.
The JCS meeting with Truman where he authorized the invasion of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) with a follow-on invasion of Honshu (Operation Coronet) made no mention of casualty estimates. In fact, there were no estimates in the planning documents that have been preserved.
The casualty numbers are a post-war invention. Although the JCS and the President did know that an invasion would be costly, especially given the contemporaneous losses being experienced on Okinawa, they never attempted to quantify it.
The first mention of a specific figure was in an article “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb” in the Feb. 1947 issue of Harper’s Magazine written by former Secretary of War Henry L Stimson. He never claimed it was an estimate supported by planning and intelligence sections, it was Stimson’s personal guess. The figure that he initially used was 250,000 casualties, or a quarter-million.
Through repetition, exaggeration, and misstatements by politicians, textbooks, etc. that figure has climbed to 1,000,000 deaths, which has become “received truth.” In fact, it never existed.
A note about the History Channel: It is an entertainment network, and it’s view of history is sometimes poorly-researched or confined to secondary sources. I always compare their documentaries to other sources. The History Channel is best at getting people interested in a subject, after which they read more on their own and investigate it further, as you are doing.
And lastly, the contention by returning veterans that there were thousands of suicide boats and kamikaze planes is indeed correct. What is commonly forgotten is that they had almost no fuel for them, rendering them superfluous.
One factor that magnified the impact of the Soviet declaration of war was psychological. The Japanese government was still under the illusion that they could negotiate an end of the war on favorable terms. The Allies had no intention of accepting these terms. But the Soviets needed time to get their troops into position for an attack on Japan and did not want Japan to surrender early. So the Soviets encouraged the Japanese hopes of a negotiated settlement and offered their services as a neutral power to facilitate diplomatic talk between Japan and the Aliies. The Soviets then kept stringing out the discussions right up to the moment they declared war. The Japanese who had thought they were on the verge of acceptable armistice suddenly realized they had been bamboozled.
Almost no fuel perhaps. But enough to travel the distance they needed to perform their mission.
My father, a tanker in Europe after D-Day, had been transfered to California and was preparing to board ship for an undisclosed destination in the Pacific when the A-bombs were dropped. He said it was pretty much an open secret that they were to take part in the invasion of Japan.
From a personal point of view I don’t care how many Americans may or may not have died in the invasion. Zero is a much better number.