We’ve argued about the rights and wrongs of the bombs many times before - I’ve even suggested that Fat Man and Little Boy ultimately saved millions beyond the Japanese islands.
But I want to address a more specific question than “was it right to drop them?”; namely if the choice wasn’t there at all, if the Manhattan Project had failed to achieve fruition, if The Gadget had not detonated in the New Mexico desert, what would have happened?
The reason I ask is because of a theory I’ve often heard put forward, which is that the Soviet declaration of war on the 9th August had just as much impact as the bombs - that the bombs merely allowed a face-saving ‘out’ for a Japanese surrender.
The Japanese were in a pretty desperate situation by August 1945 - unrestricted submarine warfare was slowly starving the home islands and the Imperial Japanese Navy was a shadow of its former glory. So, there was no question of them winning even without the bombs. But by all accounts they would have held on for a favourable peace settlement that the Allies could never have accepted.
So, if the Manhattan Project had failed when would the USS Missouri sail into Tokyo bay for the Japanese surrender? Could they have held on until 1946, or even beyond? How many casualties would have been sustained on both sides (according to wiki the 500,000 Purple Hearts made for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion, are still being used)?
And yes, yet another WWII question asked by yours truly. I know I should just build that damn time machine already…
The Soviets had agreed at Tehran in 1943 to turn their attention towards Japan after Germany had been defeated as part of the overall Allied strategy, it’s hard to see Stalin declining a move that would increase his sphere of influence.
He waited until Hiroshima and Nagasaki so they wouldn’t have to fight. I wonder if he would have waited until the invasion was complete before he sent Russian troops.
I’m pretty sure the Soviets were obliged by treaty to declare war, so I don’t see them backing out of that.
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The reason I ask is because of a theory I’ve often heard put forward, which is that the Soviet declaration of war on the 9th August had just as much impact as the bombs - that the bombs merely allowed a face-saving ‘out’ for a Japanese surrender.
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It certainly had a profound impact. The psychology of a bomb that could destroy an entire city AND being attacked on another front by a country that you’d hoped would remain neutral and might be able to help negotiate better terms was devastating to the Japanese government.
That said, I don’t think that the Japanese would have surrendered just because the Soviets declared war and attacked them in Manchuria. The Japanese were pretty clearly preparing for a balls to the wall, all out defense of the home islands. They were indoctrinating their populace with a last ditch mentality to fight to the death…not trying to spin things down. I think that the only thing that would have brought peace at that point was if the allies were willing to make major concessions wrt continued Japanese sovereignty, and continued sovereignty over some of their overseas war prize possessions…and, frankly, that was never going to happen.
They weren’t trying to win…they were trying to come out of it with the best terms they could. Unfortunately, the terms they would settle for were unrealistic. I’ve never seen anything indicating that the Japanese high command would even consider the basic terms the allies were demanding (namely demilitarization, loss of ALL of Japans war prize overseas possessions and unconditional surrender, though this last one was one we did end up modifying in the end).
As for the slow starvation thing, that’s true enough…but, I don’t see any evidence that this was factoring in with either the high command OR the local populace, who seemed to be preparing for a last stand, all out defense of the home islands in much the same way they fought for Okinawa.
Depends on how the initial invasions went. I’ve see a lot of programs on the History Channel that seem to indicate that the Japanese had pretty much guessed exactly where we were intending to land, and had a lot of really nasty and hidden defenses in place to counter those invasions. So…if the invasions completely failed, I’d guess you’d be talking another year or so before a surrender. If they partially succeeded, then I’d guess by the summer of 1946 we’d be in position, after much blood and suffering, to finish the Japanese off and force their unconditional surrender. If the invasions were a total success then, perhaps, the Japanese would have come to the table sometime early in '46…maybe February or March (nasty time to be fighting in Japan though).
He was a wily and supremely cynical bastard, that’s true. But if the war dragged on I can’t see him sitting it out much longer, the Soviets had a vested interest in China, Zhukov had previously pasted the Japanese and he would have been completely untroubled by casualties. Sakhalin and Manchuria were his for the taking, and if he waited too long there was a chance the prizes would slip from his grasp.
On preview @XT; Good points, and don’t get me wrong - I’m not arguing that the Japanese thought about ‘victory’ in the conventional sense (their peace demands were more akin to a Mulligan), merely that even without the bombs the Allies would not have back out of the war or abandoned their demand of unconditional surrender.
Good thread-I am not sure that Truman would have accepted the “million casualty” invasion of Japan-he would have sat back and starved them out. Ironically, this might have made for a better post-war world-Stalin would have streamed into Manchuria-and Mao might never have come to power (Stalin would have a installed a more pliable puppet regime). This would have hastened the Sino-Russian split, decades earlier.
Why would the Allies invade? Just keep the Home Islands sealed off and subject to continual air raids, and destroy the Japanese army on the mainland. All those American, British, and Indian troops might even prevent China going Communist.
The simple fact is we were ramping up TOO invade. This might not make sense today (I admit, it makes sense to me, but it seems a lot of people really can’t see this), but at the time it’s what we were going to do. So, asking ‘why would the Allies invade’ is silly, since we were in the process of invading. There was no way we would simply blockade the Japanese home islands indefinitely…politicians AND the people wanted an end to the war, and any attempt to stretch it out rather than end it, even if that took a large sacrifice of blood and treasure, was going to be resisted at all levels. The ONLY thing that would have changed that equation was if Japan had surrendered, and I’ve never seen any solid evidence that this was a realistic possibility. The Japanese negotiating through back channels, while interesting, is not evidence of anything more than certain factions in Japan floating trial balloons to see what other options they might have…all while preparing their people and military to fight to the last drop of blood if that’s what was needed, and all with the idea that if they could make the US and the allies bleed enough we’d eventually take terms more favorable to what the Japanese wanted. The Japanese military and political leadership was willing to spill as much Japanese blood as it took to achieve that…and the Japanese people were equally willing to make whatever sacrifices they had too.
What evidence do you have that Truman ever seriously considered not invading? Because, to me it sure looks like we were getting all our logistical ducks in a row TOO invade, and that the only reason Truman held back was to try the atomic bomb to see if that would work instead. Had he not had access to the bomb I see zero indications that the US or the allies would have been content with a potentially years long total embargo of the Japanese home islands (and a nasty fight with the Japanese forces still in their overseas conquests). The Russians were moving huge numbers of troops and logistics to their eastern provinces to fulfill their treaty obligations. The US and other allies were equally building up their troops, transport and logistics for an invasion…and that was when we HAD the bomb and planned to give that a try first.
You are correct..by the time of Hiroshima, the Japanese were experiencing widespread famine. Another 6 months, and there would have been massive starvation-and (most likely) riots against the government.
The Japanese people were not keen on suicide/bushido-most of them wanted to stay alive.
Operation Downfall was scheduled to begin in October 1945, with an invasion of Kyushu (codenamed Operation Olympic) to be followed up in spring 1946 with an invasion of Honshu (Operation Coronet). The planners seemed to have thought Coronet would take about 90 days so the war may have lasted until mid July 1946 or so. Possibly longer if the Emperor refused to surrender and resistence continued in the hinterland.
The Soviet Union planned to invade Hokkaido at some stage as well, although I’m not sure how well that would have worked seeing as they had virtually no experience with amphibious landings, and no where near the naval strength the US and allies had.
Maybe not until 1991. A quagmire in Japan could have ignited hostilities with the Soviets and the war could have continued until the eventual fall of the Soviets. Which isn’t much different than what happened anyway.
At Yalta the Soviet commitment had been firmed up to declare war on Japan within three months of the German surrender. The Soviet invasion of Manchuria was launched exactly 3 months after the Germans had surrendered.
I have to wonder if those timetables for Coronet were drawn up pre-Iwo Jima and pre-Okinawa. Okinawa alone took 82 days, and Iwo was 35 days for a 8 sq mile island.
Actually I think it’s my mistake - the planners had prepared casualty estimates for the first ninety days of Coronet. Oh and a great example of forward planning - 500,000 purple hearts were made up in anticipation of the huge number of likely casualties. This stock hasn’t been exhausted yet.
Could Stalin be trusted? Stalin was still pssst that it took so long for the Allies to start a 2nd front. It’s just as likely that Stalin would have waited until the U.S. was fully committed to an invasion (beach landing?) before declaring war on Japan.
Stalin resorted to massed attacks with little regard for Russian casualties when the Nazis were overrunning Russian territory. Would Stalin risk losing massive numbers of troops against the Japanese home island when he knew he needed those troops to hold the territories he had recently taken in Europe?
Japan still had prop planes and jet aircraft hidden in mountain caves plus suicide subs and watercraft. They were also attempting to build their own atomic bomb. They just needed more time. The population was expected expected to fight to the death. The Imperial military mentality was still one of a “one, big, decisive battle” mentality that would allow Japan an honorable end to the war.
Stalin was also aware that the U.S. was working on an atomic bomb and that it would probably work. After the Hiroshima detonation, it would be obvious that WWII wouldn’t last much longer. What better time to get in on the spoils?
As far as when WWII would have ended w/o the U.S. using atom bombs, I would guess 6 months to a year after the invasion(s) had started - 1946/1947.
On Stalin’s behaviour, I’m basing it on how he handled the European theatre - he was willing to risk far greater casualties than necessary to secure the Eastern European theatre of influence and deny the Allies the prize of Berlin. He’d have known which way the wind was blowing in the far East - if he held off declaring war for too long, the potential Soviet gains would be negligible. In other words, I doubt he’d leave the spoils entirely to the Americans and other western Allies.
On bombardment/blockade vs invasion, this was a big debate at the time (and since).
Whether or not the blockade and bombardment alone could have succeeded is another matter - the Allies had already decided by August 1945 that it should be used to supplement the invasion rather than replace it.
