I wish there was a stickie for this; it comes up in every thread about the bomb.
Stalin would have declared war on Japan. As others have noted, it was in his own best interest to declare war on a country that was already losing in 1945 and get a share of the spoils.
The Soviets were even forming plans for the own amphibious invasion of the Japanese home islands. While their first objective was Manchuria and the war ended during that campaign, the Soviet staff was working on plans for invading Hokkaido.
My guess is the war probably would have gone on until 1947. Absent the atomic bomb, I think Japan was going to keep fighting as long as it could just as Germany had. And postwar analysis found out that Japan had stockpiled more resources for the defense of the home islands than Allied intelligence had realized.
From everything I’ve read, the American policy was “no first use” on chemical weapons. They had them on hand but they only planned to use them in retaliation to a German or Japanese chemical weapons attack.
I’m not seeing your logic here. Is the Soviets had pushed Mao aside and installed a more pro-Soviet regime (bringing back Wang Ming for example), why would it cause a Sino-Soviet split? Wouldn’t it avoid that?
What kind of force projection capability did the Soviets have in that theater? And what is the climate like in the areas from which the Soviets would have invaded Manchuria – can a large force be supplied and staged in that remote area?
The Sino-Russian split was caused by Stalin’s high handedness ,and (later) NS Kruschev’s hatred of Mao. Had Mao never come to power, Stalin would have had carte blanch to interfere more in China..this would have caused the level of resentment to rise earlier.
The Soviet Union not only had the capability to invade and occupy Manchuria - they used it. Between 8th and 22nd August Soviet armies occupied all of Manchuria, destroying the Japanese Guandong Army, and marching to the gates of Peking. Well over a million men, 3700 tanks, and 1800 self propelled artillery pieces were launched into Manchuria on three fronts. The Japanese resisted as well as they could but they were totally outclassed and destroyed. The climate and terrain were miserable - heavy rain and mud - but nothing Soviet armies weren’t used to.
Stalin was absolutely intent on making sure his forces were occupying everywhere he had been promised at Potsdam and Yalta so invasion - which had been planned for the 11th - was brought forward to the 8th after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima to make sure he was in physical possession if/when the Japanese surrendered. The Soviets also occupied the southern half of Sakhalin Island and the Northern Kuriles for the same reason.
They did think of going for the northern half of Hokkido - it had been included in the original plans to follow the occupation of northern Korea - but backed off at the last minute - it had not been promised to them - when Truman warned Stalin off. Whether they could have done it physically I guess it depends on how much resistance the Japanese could put up. The Soviets had the capability to move the forces but not the specialist equipment for an opposed landing. On the other hand they were not that concerned about casualties and my guess is that sheer weight of numbers would eventually have allowed them to secure a bridgehead.
The Soviet invasion of Manchuria started the day Nagasaki was bombed, and so three days after Hiroshima. It seems, on the face of it, kind of ridiculous to think the Soviets whipped up a gigantic, carefully planned and perfectly executed theatre-wide offensive on a few days’ notice, or even that it was planned and would have been launched only in the event of a nuclear weapon detonation.
On top of that, it’s not like the Soviets invaded just to help their ol’ Allied buddies out, they had their own reasons to stab Japan in the back.
No, that invasion was going ahead, and it was gonna happen on August 9 come hell or high water. It was simpy too good an opportunity to pass up, quite frankly; the Japanese were utterly hapless in the face of an army that by that time was ridiculously better than they were.
Saying a plan was made of the possibility of using chemical weapons is not the same as saying there was any plan to actually use chemical weapons. Military planners make hundreds of plans that they know are never going to come off the shelf. Right up to 1941, the American military was making plans on how it would fight a war with Britain and Canada and Mexico and Australia - that doesn’t mean it was planning on declaring war on those countries.
But if China was being run by a Soviet puppet, that would mute any potential anti-Soviet rift. The Soviet-installed leaders in Eastern Europe all understood that was part of their job.
I’ve never heard of a “face-saving out,” and of all that can be debated about the end of the war, this is one of the points which is clearer. This was not a matter of face. The military leadership believed that they could inflict enough damage on any invading troops that they could negotiate for an end which would not be a total surrender, allowing them to maintain the military-centered government which brought about WWII and which the Allies would not permit.
What would have happened if the US didn’t have the bomb is an interesting question. On one extreme, it brings the question about the Soviet Union’s involvement. Stalin’s agreement to enter the war within three months of Germany’s surrender (which occurred on May 8th, and the USSR declared war on Aug 8th prior to Nagasaki, OK got that out of my system) was undoubtedly made knowing that the atomic bomb was on schedule. Without that promise, it would have been that much worse.
However, let’s say that the Soviet Union decides to keep its promise even if Trinity had been a failure.
While the situation was bad for the Japanese, most history books have it wrong. In the postwar period, the various branches of the armed services were fighting for increased relevance, so the navy emphasized the blockade and the USAAF emphasized the bombing. In reality, while they were both very damaging to Japan, in August of 1945, the US was just able to start to implement some of the early lessons which they were learning from their assessment teams in Germany.
Prior to this, they had not had a detailed understanding of the war economies, but the assessment were showing that they needed to target Japan’s vulnerable transportation system. For example, most of Japan’s food was grown in Northern Honshu and Hokkaido, and targeting trains, lines and bridges would have caused even more starvation.
The initial plans to invade Japan were created based on an overly optimistic assessment of the forces opposing them. They had initially planned on a traditional 3:1 advantage, but in reality the Japanese forces based in Kyushu was closer to a 1:1. However, OTOH, the Japanese had nothing in reserve and the troops had insufficient weapons and ammunition.
On thing which the Japanese did have was a large number of planes to be used in kamikaze attacks, with an estimated 10,000 of them. They were planning on targeting the troop transports. They also had an advantage of the attacks coming from close to land, so they would not picked up as far away as the case of Okinawa.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were evaluating alternate landings, including Kanto (Tokyo) and northern Honshu. MacArthur was pushing hard for Kyushu, which in retrospect is another good reason that the atomic bombs worked.
On the theory that the USSR’s declaration of war was decisive in triggering Japan’s surrender, we have the diary of the Foreign Minister of Japan at the time, Shigenori Togo:
He clearly says that even after one atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war *and a widespread invasion of Manchuria, the hawk faction of the cabinet was still holding out for conditional surrender, their position from after the bombing of Hiroshima but before the Soviet declaration of war.
It’s well-known that even after both atomic bombs and the Soviet declaration that the hawks still wanted to continue. Even after the emperor forced the issue, there were those who would have continued fighting, as the attempted coup demonstrated.
There was a three to three tie in the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War between those who wished to continue and those who were ready to accept surrender. The combination of the atomic bomb attacks and the entry of the Soviet Union finally got the emperor to make up his mind to accept surrender. It’s not known which played a greater role, although many historian believe that the USSR’s entry played the pivotal role.
Over the course of the war, the army had proven itself willing to sacrifice civilians without any qualms, and the hawks allowed civilians to be killed in large numbers as they kept preventing a definitive decision for ending it. One of the last stalling tactic they used was attempting to persuade the Soviet Union into interceding for Japan, presumably by offering territory in Asia. USSR’s entry into the war eliminated that avenue.
Without the atomic bombs, it’s a fair question to ask if the timing would still be the same. Perhaps not. There could be less urgency and although the Soviets were destroying Japanese forces in Asia, Allied forces weren’t fighting on Japanese soil yet.
The emperor was changing his view of the situation and was running out of patience with the military. He is to have said that he was finally realizing the seriousness of the situation during that summer.
Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, among others, was worried if the people would rise up against the government and ultimately the emperor. As the US was changing bombing targets to included transportation infrastructure and was tightening the blockade of Japan and between Hokkaido and Honshu, interfering with transportation of food, coal and other essentials.
Whether the fears of a public revolt were justified is not something I have ever read, there are indications that the emperor would not have held out for the bitter end. Better the military go then the imperial house.
I think a major factor over the atomic bomb was psychological. There was a strong belief in Japan of their national exceptionalism. They subconsciously figured that some last minute unexpected miracle would save Japan from defeat. And the atomic bombs qualified as an unexpected miracle - but they appeared for America not Japan. This shattered the Japanese belief that fate was somehow going to spare them - fate was favoring the other side.
Another more mundane issue was Soviet duplicity. The Soviets needed a few months to get ready to join in the war against Japan (and stake a claim for future spoils) and there was some concern that Japan might collpase and surrender before the USSR could declare war. So the Soviets, which were still neutral, opened a back-door diplomatic channel with Japan. They convinced the Japanese that the Americans were getting tired of the war and might consider a negotiated settlement and were using the Soviets as a clandestine middleman. Japan naturally was encouraged by this apparent evidence that they might still avoid defeat. When the Soivet Union declared war, the Japanese were faced with not only the weight of the Soviet military but also the realization that their hopes of a negotiated settlement had been based on lies.
This has no apparent support from historians or people who are familiar with Japanese. The Japanese were developing atomic bombs but did not have the resources to complete it, and even had there been any shock that the Americans had completed the bomb first, it could have been written off to America’s greater resources, not any Japanese spirit.
The Japanese militarism was based on the belief that the strength of Japan came from the strength of the military, and especially the army believed that they were unequaled in their fighting spirit.
Their belief that they could bear any degree of suffering to inflict a severe punishment on their enemies never faltered to the end. They were also well aware that an unconditional surrender would mean the end of the kokutai, (translated variously as “sovereign”, “national identity; national essence; national character” or “national polity,” it was the system which allowed the military to rule Japan) and with it, the end of the army and its position within society.
Blinded by their beliefs and not willing to accept the end of everything which they valued, the militants preferred to allow the country to be destroyed rather than to quit.
As I posted earlier, the Big Six members of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War were split on the question of continuing the war or not. Nether the atomic bombs nor the Soviet entry changed that. It was the decision by Hirohito to finally accept defeat which tipped the balance.
For the theory of the shock to Japan’s exceptionalism to have any merits, it would have to be either Hirohito himself or Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and it’s clear this was not a concern.
This is backward to pretty much every account of the end of the war, including the journals of the key Japanese players, and more importantly the signal intelligence which the US was intercepting.
The US could read not only the military code but also the diplomat code, and were breaking it faster than the Japanese recipients.
It’s clear that it was the Japanese who were trying to the the Soviets on board. The Soviets where stringing the Japanese along, as there was no reason for the Soviets to hurry.
The idea that the Japanese would surrender at any moment was not a contemporary concern.