A book I just read on the development and first use of the atomic bomb (“Shockwave”) mentions that the air group training for the Hiroshima bomb drop did some training raids over Japan. During one of those a pilot got the bright idea to bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo and dramatically end the war (the end result was a big crater in the Imperial Garden but no harm to the Emperor). That pilot got raked over the coals when his stunt was discovered. It was thought that killing Hirohito would make it more difficult to achieve peace, a good assumption as it turned out, since the Emperor was (just) able to convince the waverers after the two atomic bomb drops to surrender. Interestingly, accounts of the 1942 Doolittle raid on Tokyo mention that pilots were warned to stay away from the Emperor’s palace, though Hirohito was doubtfully seen at that time as a force for peace and reconciliation.
The historical record indicates motivation for using the Bomb was foremost to end the war ASAP without more casualties, and to give the Soviets (who were already failing to live up to their agreements) a warning.
Absolutely - if the surrender hadn’t come when it did Stalin was all set to invade - and hang on to - Hokkaido.
It is a ridiculous comparison but just for the sake of accuracy: for Britain the war lasted 5 years and 11 months and the States entered the war 2 years and 3 months after Britain
And effective, too. The Japanese Supreme War Council, chaired by the Emperor, was determined to keep fighting even after it received news of the destruction of Hiroshima. It was only after word came of the Nagasaki bomb that the Emperor weighed in and said he thought, as awful as the prospect was, that the Empire would have to sue for peace.
(I wrote my high school senior U.S. History paper on President Truman’s decision to drop the bombs, and have always been very interested in the issue.)
I think that that had more to do with the fact that large segments of the Kwantung Army didn’t accept the surrender order. It wasn’t until the 20th IIRC that an explicit order was issued to those units, and they started surrendering. But even then the Soviets advanced to “occupy” as much territory as they could. Basically the Soviets only stopped when they outran their supply lines. If General Hodge hadn’t arrived in Inchon in early September, the Soviets probably would have occupied the entire peninsula as soon as they could.
I realize things like invading Central American countries didn’t get as much airtime as invading Eastern European countries, but those things did happen. I’m sure the folks in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos probably would suggest they felt more than a little put upon, too.
I’ve read this concern elsewhere, and my question is, “How were the Soviets going to invade Hokkaido with, IIRC, very little amphibious resources?” I doubt that either the British or Americans were going to lend the Soviet Army any LSTs, et al. I also doubt that the Soviets were eager to try and take Hokkaido and potentially get into a blue on blue situation with the rest of the Allies, while there were such vast rewards remaining for them in Manchuria/Korea. The smaller Kurils, and the half of Sakhalin they didn’t already have, sure, but invading Hokkaido would have been another magnitude of difficulty to accomplish.
Commenting my own post (#24), I noted that the decision was to use them before or during an invasion.
How did they go from “Use these to help us invade Japan” into “Wait, let’s use them instead of invading”? I’m sure the prospect of invading the home islands would’ve made the Eastern Front look like the Grenada. Was the plan all along to use them on a cities to induce a surrender?
I don’t believe anyone in this thread has linked to the very comprehensive and provocative Wikipedia article entitled, “Debate Over the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”. In it, the military, political, and moral aspects to the bombings are succinctly, yet (IMO) comprehensively, reviewed.
An interesting fact that I just learned recently: the US Office of War Information dropped leaflets warning the Japanese people of planned bombing raids.
It’s a good question! I’m no expert - maybe one will come along but in the mean time I’d suggest Stalin foresaw more of an occupation than a fully opposed invasion. They obviously had some amphibious capacity as they landed 8000 troops on the Kuriles across several hundred miles of open sea and a full invasion force across the few miles to Sakhalin.
As to blue on blue battles, presumably this was one reason Stalin called off the planned attack on the 22nd August after Truman had cabled Moscow rejecting Stalin’s “helpful” offer to accept the Japanese surrender on Hokkaido.
That’s true. It’s also important to understand that the US spent a ton of effort and time and money building those bombs, and they were worried the Japanese would surrender before they got a chance to use them.
Ya know, no offense but that’s a common dove response, and I think its jingoistic bullshit. I think it too falls under the ‘thinking of nukes as special’ flaw. The US spent lots and lots of money on a lot of things during WWII (we spent billions developing the B29). The A-bomb was merely one of them (and even if it didn’t get used it was successfully tested, so nobody in the GAO would be insane enough to try and claim that the Manhattan project was a waste of money). The Pacific war was the bloodiest carnage the US military had ever seen, and they had seen it every day for nearly four years. The absolute last thing anyone in the Truman administration was worried about was Japan surrendering ‘too soon’.
Agreed. Again this idea is based on hindsight and the knowledge of the fear of nuclear war that followed from from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is no evidence that in 1945 the Administration was thinking, “We must explode atomic bombs in Japan to have more control over the Soviets in the post-War world”. (or to justify the expenditure :dubious:)
There was never a lot of hand-wringing over the bomb because it didn’t do anything the US wasn’t doing already - killing Japanese civilians by the hundreds of thousands. The US set aside Hiroshima and Nagasaki because it was running out of targets. It’s pointless to drop an expensive bomb on a city where most of the people are already dead.
The point is that killing people with an A-bomb is no worse than killing them TNT and gasoline - it’s merely more efficient. Back then that was considered a good thing, not a bad thing. That was the whole point of all the weapons they were making: to kill as many Japanese as possible, as quickly as possible, and as efficiently as possible. It’s only today that we see the atom bomb as a uniquely evil weapon.
In the US they were fully aware that the Japanese knew their situation was hopeless; that the only thing preventing an “unconditional surrender” was fear that the Emperor would be executed; and that the USSR’s declaration - when it came - would likely trigger an unconditional surrender in any event.
The bomb was used because that’s what it was made for. It’s part of the logic of war. You build the weapon, then you use it. It wasn’t built for the sake of looking at. The idea of building it, and then not using it, was never seriously considered.
What was considered was the effect the use of the bomb was likely to have on the Soviet Union. It was hoped it would make them more pliable, when it came to dividing up Europe and Asia.
The idea that we bombed Japan so we didn’t have to invade them was an idea that was conjured up later.
Jingoistic is probably the wrong word but I can’t see the evidence for “What was considered was the effect the use of the bomb was likely to have on the Soviet Union. It was hoped it would make them more pliable, when it came to dividing up Europe and Asia.” Your own argument supports the idea that the Bomb was seen as a straight-forward weapon of war to be used to end the conflict as soon as possible. It doesn’t support the idea that
Can you define “later”, please? Within two weeks of the bombings, Churchill himself noted that their use had saved over a million Allied casualties (and God knows how many Japanese). And, in May 1945, three months before Hiroshima, the so-called Interim Committee listed the saving of (American) lives as a justification for the bombs’ immediate use.
We nuke them once, still no surrender, still have to invade. We nuke them again, still no surrender, still gonna have to invade. The Soviet Union formally declares war on Japan. The two most massive & powerful armies the planet Earth has ever scene are now both simultaneously at war with Japan, still no surrender, still gonna have to invade. The Japanese Cabinet votes and still ties, ties mind you, half for, half against surrender. Still gonna have to invade. The Emperor breaks the tie voting for surrender. A group of hard line Japanese Generals break into the Imperial Palace and place the Emperor, who is* a living god to them*, in ‘protective custody’ all to prevent surrender. Still gonna have to invade. They become disorganized, the coup fails, the Japanese, *finally, *surrender. Finally, no invasion.
Not surprisingly, the Japanese have a different perspective of the bombing.
One of the very rare interesting documentaries on NHK (the national broadcast company) recounted the bombing from the Japanese military intelligence perspective. (Mostly they concentrate on poor us, look how much we suffered from the bombing.)
The intelligence had been able to pick up radio signals from the various bombing groups. Apparently, after becoming airborne, the US forces were sending an uncoded signal designating the bombing group, and then the rest of the message in code, which the Japanese were unable to break. From this information, they attempted to determine cities which were targeted.
Starting some time before the bombings, the IJA intelligence picked up a new group which was only running practice runs over other islands. This purpose of this group was widely debated within intelligence circles. The documentary showed the handwritten logs of the signals and their location from triangled calculations.
At the same time, the Japanese had been trying to develop their own nuclear program. However, they were not successful, and in a typical bureaucratic response, “they” decided that atomic bombs were impossible to build. If we can’t develop them, then those damn Yankees could never. . .
Those within the intelligence program who were aware of the attempted development and also the new bombing group connected the dots, but since the decision was made that atomic bombs weren’t feasible, then higher ups wouldn’t listen.
The signal intelligence picked up the first bomber flying ahead of the group to Hiroshima and then the main group. Again, it was the new group code, in the clear, and then a coded message. The signal was sent shortwave, and the IJA intel thought that it was intended to be received back in Washington.
Even after Hiroshima, because of the official position hadn’t changed, the intel group was unable to chance tactics. Individuals were aware of the lead planes and the main group which only had a small number of bombers. The standard story is as repeated here.
In the documentary, the now aged intel officers cried as they recounted how official stupidity caused needless lives. They new that this could be a second atomic bombing, but HQ refused to listen. Although the primary reason for two atomic bombs wasn’t to send a message, it was because that was what the US had, Nagasaki did force an unspoken understanding within intel that the US did indeed have atomic bombs.
Most of the records from the IJA intel were burned, but these records were among those which survived.
At the end of the war, the IJA leadership were becoming increasingly desperate, clutching at more and more unlikely possible scenarios. The USSR’s entry into the war eliminated one final fantasy, that the USSR would intercede and help negotiate better terms for the surrender.
