Of course… look how many of the key nuclear scientists were European, from Germany or occupied countries, so the knowledge was there. The Germans did have a program, it just didn’t have the resources (or smarts?) of the American program, and lacked cooperation from non-German scientists.
When you consider for example how many scientists from Europe actively strongly participated in an attempt to defeat Germany and Italy, it says something about the politics around the war.
I think like others here that the modern attitude toward nuclear weapons leads us to attribute the wrong motives. It was just another bomb. After it was exploded, in Japan oe even at the test site, people were milling around ground zero within the hour. Nobody said “maybe we should stay away from the blast site for a while, this has horrible consequences”. So there was no disinclination to use it, whether the target was white or yellow. It was just another bomb, just much more efficient - one aircraft versus hundreds for the same effect with conventional bombing.
I guess one of the questions is whether there was any meaningful targets left in Germany when the device was close to being ready. Taking out a city or army base is pretty useless if there is nothing concentrated left, except for the psychological shock - assuming there is any shock value in converting rubble to dust. They might have just dropped 2 or 3 at low level on the center of Berlin and hoped the repacement high command had more sense. As a tactical weapon, it could be used to take out supply lines and depots behind the lines, but nobody in the age of bomber waves put all their eggs in a basket only a few miles in diameter. I suppose it could be used to clear the beaches before an invasion, but considering the fortifications and tunnels on Iwo Jima, even that would not guarantee a clear landing zone.
I suspect the “drop a few while we re-issue the ultimatum” was seen as one last chance to get the Japanese to cave in before having to spend massive amounts on a home islands invasion. After Okinawa and Iwo Jima, nobody was under the illusion that the Japanese were simply going to give up simply because it was hopeless, but it was worth a try.
IIRC, in the end the USA did modify “unconditional” to include that the emperor was to remain untouched.
In an interview with Akio Morita the founder of Sony, who was part of the Japanese military’s dept of advanced weapons, he said that when Hiroshima was destroyed and they realized it had to be an atomic bomb they were dumbfounded. As said above the Japs decided that an A-bomb was impossible in the foreseeable future, so the scientists were simply amazed not only that we had done it, but in so short a time.
If we had finished the bomb say a year early, I think the only realistic A-bomb target for ending the European war would have been Berlin. Importantly, while Hitler was in town! To essentially decapitate the German High Command, i.e. kill him. Critical to this was the fact that every ordinary German soldier had sworn a personal loyalty oath to Adolf Hitler, so until he wasn’t in command they had to fight (this is why Valkyrie immediately fell apart once it was know that Hitler was still alive). And it was pretty obvious that Hitler was going to fight to his death, and that he was going to take as much of the world down with him as possible. In that context nuking Berlin is pretty much a no-brainer. And, again like post-war Japan, had we been able to do this Roosevelt would never have left the taking of Berlin to the Soviets, so they would never have had a foothold there and there would never have been a GDR (East Germany). Plus ending the war in Europe early would have diminished the Soviet’s foothold everywhere in Europe, so the Cold War might have been very different. Millions might have been spared Soviet brutality, but who knows. Such diminished spoils for Stalin after all they suffered may have made a hot WWIII inevitable!
BTW no one other The United States could have possibly built an A-bomb in that era. It’s not so much the technical expertise (although an atomic bomb is a highly precision instrument) it’s the massive industrial resources required to manufacture enough fissile material (i.e. Uranium 235 and/or Plutonium). In fact this is still the limiting factor in any country’s ability to make one.
A side-issue to the topic of this thread, but I’ve always felt the importance of the Hitler oath has been over-rated. Sure, the members of the German armed forces were required to swear an oath of personal loyalty to Hitler starting in 1934. But it wasn’t magic or anything.
Keep in mind that the soldiers who swore loyalty to Hitler in 1934 had already sworn a previous oath promising to defend the Weimar constitution. But when Hitler took over and told them to abandon that old oath and swear a new one to him, they were all willing to go along with it. Nobody suggested that their old oath prevented them from changing loyalties. Oaths are only binding to people who want to be bound by them.
Just a couple of comments. I think it was Aldiboronti above who mentioned even Tojo would not have been game to go against the Emperors orders- from my understanding Tojo had been removed from office by that time.
As regards using the bomb to send a message to the Soviets, I’m not sure how valid that is. It seems that the Soviets already knew of the bomb- from the History Channel (yeah yeah) I think it was Truman who told Stalin of the existence of the weapon. This was done as much to share the knowledge of its existence as to get one up on Stalin. Unfortunately Stalin didn’t blink. It is assumed that his spies had already told him of it but even so the USA was prepared to tell him of the existence.
And the late declaration of war by the USSR on Japan- hat was sort of like Italy declaring war on France after Germany already had them beaten. Which pissed off the German High Command.
Stalin wasn’t as tough as his propogandists portrayed him, when the Germans invaded Russia he disappeared for several days and is widely believed to have suffered a nervous breakdown.
That apart I’m another believer that if Tokyo had been taken out; there would have been no central authority to authorise a general surrender of the Japanese armed forces.
Not really. At no point did the US spell out that the status of the Emperor would be preserved. After the bombs had been dropped Japan offered to surrender on the terms set out at Potsdam:
This was clearly unacceptable to the Allies as it implied the Emperor was superior to the prospective commander of the occupation forces (MacArthur). The US response was the Byrnes Note stating:
The nearest it got to guaranteeing the role of the Emperor was a statement that the ultimate form of Japan’s government would be
It was the Emperor himself that over-ruled some of his advisers and decided this was acceptable.
The other quick point was
Hideki Tōjō - the General who was Prime Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor - had resigned in July 1944. In August 1945 the Prime Minister was Kantarō Suzuki. I think some of the confusion comes about because the Foreign Minister at the time of the surrender was Shigenori Tōgō. Tōgō was a long time diplomat rather than a military man and had opposed war with the United States when previously Foreign Minister in 1941 - trying right up till the end of November to arrange direct negotiations to resolve US-Japanese differences.