It is not a relativist’s apology, it is a defense against these rhetorical devices, including calling them out as rhetorical devices in the first place (my bolding):
Yeah I think it boils down to a confusion between morally “right” and logically “right”. These are different things.
It seems an inadequate defence.
Labelling something as a “rhetorical device” says nothing about how persuasive or correct the argument made by use of that device may be, and pre-emptively labelling one’s opponents as wielding “… a theology which is deeply conservative and seeks nothing less than the death of disruptive, disturbing inquiry” (and plenty of similar purple prose) is doing exactly what one is claiming those using the “rhetorical devices” against relativism is doing, only moreso.
I imagine the dialoge could go something like this:
Person 1, Non-relativist: “Your position is contrary to common sense, as you would make no moral distinction between a psychopath murdering a little girl for sexual thrills and a philanthropist giving money to a person made homeless by a natural disaster”.
Person 2, Relativist: “Oh yeah? Well, your use of that table-hitting rhetoric reveals you as a someone employing deeply conservative theology. Clearly, you seek nothing less than the death of my disruptive, deeply disturbing inquiry.”
The problem here is that this sort of argument isn’t going anywhere fast. Obviously person 1 is hardly going to be of the opinion that Person 2’s “argument” is particularly trenchant, are they? It may appeal to the converted, but as logic or debate it’s a failure.
So do you typically find that only people who believe in moral absolutes are able to refrain from murdering little girls?
Is this intended to be an example of the sort of absurd, excessive rhetoric under discussion? 
But that is the point. The anti-relativists want the table-smacking, rock-kicking behavior to end all rhetoric on the matter. But the point of the paper is to illustrate that it cannot serve that function.
I can hardly believe you even read the paper at this point. The discussion of the extreme “bads”—the “Death” of “Death and Furniture”—begins with mentioning the common yet damning indictment: as if relativism allowed such behavior, or as if relativists were helpless in the face of displeasure, sadness, strife, pain, and death. Look no further than the thread on the front page about ethical nihilism to see this very tactic (to paraphrase): surely slavery is bad, surely you can’t deny that! The answer is simple:
This is the mistake anti-relativists make time and time again. I wish to throw out the bathwater, and they’re shoving a baby in there, and every time I take it out they keep putting it back.
Banging furniture or kicking rocks, calling out horrific actions people have done, these are rhetorical tricks. They don’t establish anything. Your “Person 1” doesn’t even exist in this scenario, because the only way smacking a table or mentioning the “unquestionable horror” could serve as a demonstration would be to have already accepted the entire realist scenario, of which these inspiring avowals were the last flourish. Of course that’s convincing—to realists. A relativist wants to topicalize it: how can X stand for Y relative to Z? How can smacking a table establish realism in this debate? How can horrific experiences in history stand for objective morality? You can’t shame me into abandoning relativism because I didn’t adopt it by chance one day. The mere mention of kidnap, rape, or genocide isn’t going to stop me from holding my position—unless I already hold on the side of objectivism the very things which I think are in question.
You mistake my point. I am not here engaging in a debate concerning relativism, but concering the method of argumentation in the paper you have cited.
For example, you complain about the “table-smacking” of the “Person 1” in my little scenario (who, you will I am sure recall, is not me but is merely offered as an example).
My response is that the response advocated in your chosen paper is every bit as much reliant on “rhetorical” devices, if not moreso - for example, labelling of opponents as users of “theology” and wishing to “seek the death” of inquiry.
These are rhetorical tricks, and not, I may add, particularly convincing ones. In a paper whose thesis appears to be (insofar as it is inteligible) that rhetorical devices are no good and shold be exposed for what they are, what gives? Is the claim that relativists should fight fire with lesser, more incomprehesible fire?
Rather, one could “deconstruct” the paper by posing a few basic questions - such as, does the use of rhetorical devices actually bring into doubt the argument made using them? If not, is identifying them as such actually a good counter-argument?
Don’t mistake “truth” for “fact”. Moral relativists like me do not think that facts are relative. A rock is a rock, one plus one equals two. Those are not beliefs but facts, and I can say without a doubt that a pound is heavier by definition than a gram.
The “truth”, as it applies in this discussion, is of course relative. That’s because its a belief and a belief requires minds to believe it, and minds are soggy flesh bags that can go bad, expire, and make up shit to deny stuff it doesn’t like.
Whenever I encounter one of these debates, I always think that the discussion is starting in the middle, with a few assumptions that most people may not realize they are making.
Thus, the topic appears to be “moral relativism”, and everyone assumes they know what “moral” is, while no one has defined it.
Eris uses “systems of judgement” as apparently synonymous for “moral code”, and I accept that, but once again moral is not defined - and hence, immoral remains undefined - except that one is presumed “good” and the other is presumed “bad” - and therefore a discussion of relativism has no firm basis.
So I would like to propose definitions for moral and immoral.
Specifically, that is moral which promotes the survival and advancement of the society; that is immoral which works against the survival of the society. And, in this context, I distinguish the survival of the society from the survival of the individual; morality does not attach to the survival of the individual except when the survival of the individual benefits the survival of the society. Also in this context, a society is any community association of humans entered into for mutual benefit.
Note that, by this definition, we can often only recognize that which is moral or immoral well after the fact. So, from history, we define, for instance, murder as immoral, treason as immoral, public service as moral, and so forth.
Note also that this definition leaves room for lots and lots of different types of societies and political systems, and provides a solid basis for comparing them.
Absolutely there are some flourishes there. The argument doesn’t depend on those flourishes. The point of the paper is that the table-smacking, undeniable-horrors are rhetorical flourishes as well, but they only work because of unstated assumptions which the relativist would like to bring to the front.
As you might expect, if your argument only works when you assume the very things you’re trying to refute, it will not be particularly successful to people who don’t assume the things trying to be refuted.
Feel free to disregard them. I have tried to highlight some of the substance.
Oh no no no. The problem is that relativists are accused of mere rhetoric, which is set aside by table smacking holocausts. Their point is that when you smack a table as an argument, you are merely leaving unstated all the assumptions that go into using this as an argument.
What argument is made by bringing up the holocaust or slavery, or pounding on a table? If a relativist brings up the unstated assumptions needed to turn such avowals (for lack of a better term) into an actual argument, they’re accused of pointless rhetoric. In fact, arguments are reduced to such Stalinization precisely because of the frustration over rhetoric, which somehow isn’t supposed to count. Mere words versus genocide.
Which society specifically and at which period? Societies could be advanced by the painful extirpation and torture of the majority of its members, or the extermination of any competing societies. I don’t think those would be moral actions. The tragedy of the commons also comes into play.
I discussed operationalising moral concepts a bit here. I think normative relativism is seeping into the discussion here a little: why is table banging and rhetorical point scoring any less valid than a reasoned approach to a debate?
I think it makes an interesting point. I also think asking why and how it serves to make that point is a very good question.
Any society at any time. And, if it is true that a society can be advanced by the painful extirpation and torture of the majority of its members, then you should be able to point to some societies that have done that and flourished. The ones I can think of off-hand include the Soviet Union (defunct), and Pol Pot’s Cambodia (defunct). Also, there was Nazi Germany (defunct).
This sampling suggests that societies do not flourish by the painful extirpation and torture of the majority of its members. The one that may have done that and gotten away with it that I can come up with is Communist China. But, while they were doing it they weren’t flourishing and as they’ve morphed away from a society that does that, they seem to be flourishing.
I use “system of judgment” in a very broad way, be it judging truth, beauty, morality, weight… you name it.
The only problem I have with this definition is that it fails to act as a guide. First, there is the open question of what will count as advancement. And second, the success at such an aim (if that itself isn’t open to question) would be available only in hindsight, being a highly contingent matter. So how does this notion of morality guide us toward the future, where we face uncertainty and options that have never been tried? Does warrantless wiretapping promote the survival and advancement of society? How would we actually know if we don’t just do it and see what happens?
I don’t disagree with you that history has given us ample material for building a kind of consensus morality, but this seems at odds with what people look to moral reasoning for: deciding uncertain actions now.
I don’t believe you’ve described how it provides a basis for comparing them. There is a very big problem of atavistic traits which would either 1) paradoxically result in things being simultaneously “good” or “bad” due to external factors or 2) make morality identical with historical judgments. Ancient Greek democracy failed to preserve Ancient Greek societies, but modern democracies flourish (for now?). Wrong in the past but right now? How would we have ever found it to be right now if we agreed it was wrong in the past?
I disagree. They work because they arouse people’s empathy. And morality is primarily about empathy for others.
Don’t get it. How does a moralist who says (in effect) ‘this is horrible, and so your position would lead to horrors not being labelled as such’ “assume the very things you’re trying to refute”? What he’s trying to “refute” is that failing to see horrors as a bad thing is bad.
What “table-smackers” are attempting to use is examples to elicit an empathetic reaction. That reaction may be logically right or logically wrong, but the mere fact of attempting to elicit it is not in and of itself a fallacy.
“Stalinization”? As in, using Stalin as an example?
Seems to me your question answers itself: people use examples because it makes abstract concepts concrete. In the case of moral examples, because it draws an emotional, empathetic response.
That response is not necessarily logically wrong. For example, take slavery–one of your “table-pounders”. Why is slavery “bad”? Ultimately, because slaves are people, too, and most people would not want to be slaves themselves - it’s a straightforward application of the Golden Rule.
Hence, in the late 18th early 19th century, those fulminating against slavery in the UK used the slogan “am I not a man and a brother?”. The purpose was to drive home the fact that Black slaves were humans, just like the onlooker, and so enlist their empathy.
No doubt this was “table pounding” of the deepest dye. However, just because an argument is intended to appeal to empathy does not thereby make it incorrect.
OK, my take (regular dopers may be familiar with me making this argument):
Morality is far from arbitrary (not everyone take relativism to imply this, but many do). We’re a social species and we have social instincts. Broadly; “moral” and “immoral” map to group-benefiting and group-harming behaviours respectively. And we’re wired up to have strong feelings about these actions.
Society tries to steer these feelings, and religions like to add a few arbitrary rules, but the core of our morality is instinctive. We don’t get to define, as individuals, what is good. But most of us want to believe we are the good guy and we’re doing good.
Now, the fact that this instinct exists doesn’t in itself tell us what we should do.
But then, instincts to survive, love, learn etc don’t in themselves tell us what we should do. But no-one would call these things an illusion, or societal conspiracy.
To me there are no moral codes that can be hard coded in text, as morality is a function of intent of the heart of the person, not the action. To me you try to be a good person to the best you know how to, and that’s what you are suppose to do to be morally good. Your actions and the results of your actions are morally irrelevant as they can not be use to judge your intent of your heart.
When someone tried to hard code truths, they are trying to define morality, which is impossible, since morality is from intent of the heart, so by that there are no hard truths related to morality that can be written down.
So you can have a true statement, such as morality is a function of the intent of the heart, but that does not define what is moral or not.
Is it?
It doesn’t. That particular accusation was addressed by the baby and bathwater comment. Just because I reject a realist description of morality doesn’t mean I am then compelled to also reject all the things realists say are bad.
So, relativism is wrong because morals are real? Well, that settles it!
There’s nothing wrong with actual examples. Nothing at all. But putting them forward as that-which-cannot-be-questioned is indeed circular when trying to shore up realism. And accusing your opponents of harboring a position which would actually cause such horrors to come about is really silly. I can’t have a position against genocide just because I don’t think there is an objective morality?
Note there may be an argument that “no, you cannot,” but arguments are “here’s why,” not a mere repetition of accusations of turpitude and stubborn sins of omission.
And that’s great, if you think the golden rule is a moral fact. What if you don’t? Are you forced to condone slavery by some kind of nefarious logical necessity?
That’s right. But to understand the argument as an argument, the moral realist is assuming realism.
At least, so goes one possible argument, yes.
Not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that you can hold things that realists claim are bad as “bad”, even though you reject realist arguments?
Problem here is that presumably relativists mean something different by “bad”. The realist claim is that something “bad” is bad for everyone. Presumably, you don’t (or do you?)
You aren’t addressing the argument, which is about the method of debate and not its merits.
Again, there is nothing “circular” about an appeal to empathy. Yes, it presupposes the listener has the capacity to feel empathy, but most do, so that’s a safe bet.
Also, the question is not whether you have “a position against genocide”. You have already noted that, in terms of personal morality, you aren’t much different from a realist. The issue is whether genocide (or what-have-you) is wrong generally, not just in your opinion.
No-one is accusing you of anything. Indeed, unlike the accusation made by the writer of your paper, I am not theologically dedicated to stifling innovative thinking. 
The reason one uses examples is to persuade. It is not a fallacy to attempt to persuade using rhetoric that appeals to the emotions. That is why your cited paper is unconvincing: it brings up a non-issue (the use of rhetoric by opponents) and then fails to apply the reasoning the authors advance to itself (in that it itself employs overblown rhetoric).
No. A relativist can easily be against slavery.
What a relativist lacks, unless I am mistaken, is grounds for convincing others who are of a different opinion that slavery is morally wrong.
Of course I may be mistaken in that - if so, I look forward to a relativist persuation of the sort I am claiming cannot easily be made.
No, they are assuming that the target audience can be moved by appeals to empathy. Not exactly the same thing now, is it?
Well, me personally, if I think something is bad, then all else equal, it is bad for everyone, in the sense that I would judge everyone in such a way as being bad or having done a bad thing or what have you.
This is the argument. The appeals mentioned in the paper have no merit on their own. Smacking a table is smacking a table. If you want to smack a table and have it stand for all tables everywhere, then yes, you are assuming a lot in advance and just because the expression is nonvocal doesn’t make it justified; and just because the response is technical, doesn’t make it pointless rhetoric.
That is something we agree on. But that is not where the circularity was said to lie.
In fact I probably disagree with a ton of realists, if only because there are so darned many stripes. But rejecting realism is not in itself sufficient to say we disagree about the truth status of particular moral positions.
“Just” in my opinion? If you expect me to act morally, and to recognize moral truths, then nothing will be “just” my opinion.
You, Malthus, know how convenient “you” is in general writing. I understand we’re mostly discussing the paper. 
That was not in dispute. The paper takes this as a given. But it asks
- How does it serve this function?
- What assumptions are necessary for it to serve this function?
- Is that actually the function desired?
- How could it serve the function desired?
In regards to (1): it serves this function by representing how reality constrains us. In the case of furniture, the restraint is physical. In the case of genocide, the restraint is the revulsion.
(2): Nothing much is assumed to elicit sympathetic responses.
(3): No. What was in question was whether the realist claim has any standing, not whether people broadly agreed that genocide/rape/slavery was horrible. The realist position is not built upon a consensus reality, it’s position is that reality is independent of us (objective).
(4): It couldn’t serve this function without a host of unstated assumptions which already constitute realism, or without accepting the sort of representational analysis championed by relativists of the deconstructing type.
Why do you think so? Suppose you believe beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Could I convince you that I thought something was beautiful? I don’t know who I could convince of a moral position that they don’t already have—I’m not a very good debater. But when I have gotten in particular moral debates (which I try to avoid), I look for the minimal set of assumptions necessary to derive a moral conclusion I think is the appropriate one. I never mention that morals are objectively so. And I don’t think anyone has ever used moral realism directly as an argument, either. It’s an assumption that serves no function other than bare assertion, and a position that I don’t see supported in any substantive way. The best defense I’ve seen is Moore’s “Principia Ethica” but my reading was that it was a very semantic argument and that moral sentences can have truth values is not in dispute to me. What is in dispute is the method which one uses to determine the truth of moral statements, and the assumptions necessary to determine the truth of moral statements, and the claims of privilege such methods and assumptions have.