In another thread on Moral Absolutism = Fuzzy Thinking, Moral Relativism comes in for a lot of criticism.
That thread had become concerned about how Morals apply to the real world in practicalities.
My question is, how can we have any moral certainties that are defensible?
Moral relativism situates moral discourse within the social structure of a society and accepts that different groups within and without that society may determine differing moral systems.
Moral absolutism situates morals as springing from absolutes. These must either be absolutes that occur in all human societies by reason of human psychology, or from outside human society by a greater non-human force.
How can these absolutes be determined and guaranteed as meaningful?
If they are located outside human experience, how can we test them? If they are part of human psychology, how do we know they are universal and not culture-bound?
What standing does moral absolutism have and how can it not eventually, inevitably fall back into being only one system of belief within a relaviistic moral setting?
Since morals are defined by society I don’t know that you could come up with some empirical moral certanties. What’s right for one group may not be for another (take multiple wives for example…morally wrong in the US but ok in Saudi Arabia).
That said I would think that a defensible moral certainty would be something (an action) that serves no purpose. Killing someone randomly would fall into this category. I suppose one could argue the purpose is self-gratification but I don’t see how that can be a defensible position in all but the most extreme arguments (such as arguing that I can’t prove to you that I actually exist…which I can’t do definitively).
At some point some items need to be stipulated to move forward. It is useful to agree that we both exist. After that things get fuzzier.
Agreed. But in the other thread, it is implied that Moral Relativism had been disowned by most secular and theist philosphers- a claim that I am not sure is correct. Most searches on Googol come back to a paper by Rachels. This paper is quoted in:
All of these are very interesting, but seem to be aimed at critiquing Moral Relativism without supporting Moral Absolutism.
My feeling is that Moral Relativism is an epistemologically weak claim- ‘we don’t really know where to start’. However, Moral Absolutism is an epistemologically strong claim- ‘There are absolute Values.’ My understanding is that strong epistemolgical claims need considerably more support than weaker ones, if they are to overturn that argument. Now strong claims that are proven may be more useful because they tell us more about ‘What is there in the world’, but in order to do that, they need to prove their point and I cannot see where this has been done.
I think many of the people arguing against the thesis of the other thread are not, strictly speaking, moral absolutists, since that OP argued for flexible application of one moral system rather than true moral relativism. (Sort of “do what’s right until it starts to hurt, and then screw it.”)
Any examination of history reveals that moral understanding differs between societies, and changes within each society as that society’s means and situations change. From this it is clear that no universal moral understanding has been achieved by humanity. -Which does not mean that no moral absolutes exist or can be determined, just that human society as a whole has not reached the point where a common perspective has been achieved.
Personally, I think the key to understanding moral issues contemporally and historically is to take the sociological/biological approach. However, I don’t think this makes me a moral relativist, as I’m convinced that the path to “greater good” is one that can be found in the same way and toward the same purpose by people from all societies. I think the same path was walked by Buddha, by Christ and by Mohandas Gandhi, and can be walked by anyone.
The search for meaning in life must also be a search for moral truths; societies and individuals seem to keep turning up a few of the same ones which are defensible not only within the context of each society but also within the context of human action as a whole. Whether these truths are uniquely dependent on human psychology or are truly universal absolutes is a call I don’t think we’ll be equipped to make until we can compare notes with a non-human society (or more appropriately a non-Terran society).
I once asked a philosophy professor whether morals are absolute, and his answer was, “Yes, because people disagree about them.”
This sounds like a contradiction, but it’s really not. People don’t argue whether oranges are better than Chevys, because they share nothing in common, and cannot be compared against each other. The fact that people can and do argue over morals suggests that somewhere deep down we see a common need that morals should fulfill.
Another approach is to consider humans from a behaviourist standpoint. Ayn Rand took this approach - she started from the Aristotelian axiom that “A is A”, or existance exists outside of the observer, and from that proceeded to build up a framework for an absolute morality. With very limited success, IMO. While she had some interesting insights, her personality flaws and the army of sycophants surrounding her caused her to go way off the track at some point. But still, I think it’s a valid approach.
For instance, humans feel pain and pleasure. Why? Because it guides us towards successful actions and away from non-successful actions. (“Success” in an evolutionary sense, meaning to survive to procreate and create children that have a good chance of also surviving to procreate). So moral actions would tend to maximize pleasure and minimize pain (not just immediate pleasure, but pleasure for one’s relatives, descendants, and in a social community, neighbors and friends). This is basically a re-statement of utilitarianism.
Notice that belief in an absolute morality does not necessarily translate into a belief that actions are universally bad or good. It is possible to be a moral absolutist while accepting that abortion may be moral in one society and immoral in another. It all depends on how all the societal interactions come out in the wash. But the basis of evaluating both actions is the same - to see whether they maximize human happiness, and minimize pain and discomfort.
How can you defend that 1 + 1 = 2?
There are many ways to support absolute morals without excessively rigorous treatment. Consider the Bible, aka, the Argument from Authority. As well, one can support rule utilitarianism with absolute morals, or even some form of eudaemonism/hedonism without much mental excersize at all.
The problem, I think, is making what we, as a current society, would consider a moral absolute system. Too many contradictions, wouldn’t you say?
There is a difference between ‘defending’ 1+1=2, and proving it. For mathematics in all societies, 1+1=2 is useful because to believe otherwise introduces difficulties in counting. All societies ay all times have worked on the principle that 1+1=2, and it can be ‘defended’ that way. However, it is not possible to ‘prove’ it (see Principia Mathematica and Kurt Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem)
The difference with morals that there are no similar definable atributes of moral correctness. Every different society in time and place interprets ‘social obligations’ (which is what morals are) in a different and often contradictory way.
With mathematics, at least it is possible to define 1+1=2 as an axiom that has fairly universal acceptance, and then go on to show the logical progression through various fileds of mathematics. I have not seen such a procedure defined for Morals- the axioms are poorly defined and societally based and the derivation of other rules also seems poorly defined and societally based.
Russel and Whitehead did manage to prove that 1+1=2 in that work.
Wait, correct in that they work like mathematics works? Corect in what way? Surely any moral system will say that the system itself is moral.
There have been quite a few philosophers who tried to set down a moral system. Descartes, Kant, Hobbes… are they to be chastised because, like Russel, people have shown them to be incomplete?
You want to measure morals by society, so it is then no suprise that you ask in the OP, “What standing does moral absolutism have and how can it not eventually, inevitably fall back into being only one system of belief within a relaviistic moral setting?” It stands wherever the absolutist tells it to stand. And it is as strong as the beliefs of that absolutist. Society is incidental, don’t you think? Or are you looking for a moral code that everyone will agree on since it will be systematically laid down? Then, again, we’ve had a few who have done that to a pretty good degree of consistency and thoroughness. Why do you think people haven’t followed these moral systems?
A person who believe that, in order for a given behavior to be wrong and immoral, it must be wrong and immoral * for a reason* is someone who could be called a “moral relativist”. (People who think this way may be more likely to use the term “situational ethicist”). Once you have said that a behavior’s wrongness inhers from a reason that is applicable to the behavior, you have created the possibility (at least the hypothetical possibility) for a situation to exist in which the behavior could occur yet the reason for it normally being immoral fail to apply, and in such a case the behavior could not be said to be immoral.
A more “postmodern” flavor of moral relativism is the one in which it is not only asserted that in order for a behavior to be immoral it must be immoral for a reason, it is also asserted that * every reason is (arbitrarily) socially constructed*, i.e., is an artifact of the culture which reasons or believes thusly. This type of moral position makes it impossible to defend the notion that any behavior is wrong, even in a given specific example. That is, you may believe the behavior of Adolf Hitler to have been immoral, but your reasons for believing that are no more inherently valid than Adolf Hitler’s reasons for believing that what he was doing was good and righteous.
I would describe myself as an adherent of situational ethics as per the first paragraph, but I am comfortable believing in the legitimacy of making value judgments based on perceptions, feelings, context, and so on–a legitimacy ultimately rooted in my faith that, given sufficiently good communication, it would be possible that everyone, regardless of cultural origin, would arrive at the same understanding and conclusion. We don’t have that quality of communication, but that is a different thing than saying, as the posties do, that there is no “there” to converge upon and that our values and beliefs are all entirely malleable and we no more than blank slates onto which history and culture have written.
I’m not entirely clear as to what the terms “moral relativist” and “moral absolutism” mean. I believe in a moral system that applies to everyone in every situation equally, but I believe that this system is ultimately arbitrary and without external justification. Am I a moral relativist or am I a moral absolutist?
Regarding your first paragraph, you define a moral relativist as a person who believes that, in order for a given behavior to be wrong and immoral, you need a reason for it to be that way.
I think that may need clarification. I think, given any set of situations, a human decision can be right or wrong. If you ask for THE REASON why I believe that, then I’m stuck with the answer BECAUSE IT’S WHAT IS RIGHT. I have a reason, but that reason doesn’t deal with social upbringing or society’s views of the situation, it just deals with moral absolutes. So I am a moral relativist/absolutist?
The links pjen provided detail moral relativism very well.
If you fall back on proclaiming something as just plain wrong, in any society, then you are not a strict moral relativist. Just because you feel that moral systems are arbitrary does not mean they are any less absolute to the person who holds such a system.
Moral relativism has two key components. One, a member of one society cannot impose his moral system on a member of another society. Another factor which isn’t mentioned so much is that there is always a moral choice to make in any given situation. Another way to state that was given well in another thread, “That to do something in the name of ABC is wrong, but to do it in the name of XYZ is right.”
Most people are not moral relativists in the strict sense, but do, to some degree, fell that much of morality is cultural. Sort of a hybrid belief system.
I have to disagree. Most of the links detail a straw man. I would think that lines like: relativism is among the most bankrupt of all ethical systems and it makes it impossible for us to even have a meaningful discussion about morality. demonstrate that quite clearly.
erl
I have to disagree with your two “key components”. I see neither of them as inherently necessary to moral relativism, though the first is often associated with it (usually by critics). To me, the key component to moral relativism is a simple statement with profound implications:
Our understanding of good and evil is inseparable from our understanding of the world.
Perhaps the most oft-recognized implication of this is that we cannot have absolute confidence in our moral judgments. The possibility does exist that Hitler had a more accurate moral perspective than Gandhi. Critics (such as those linked to by pjen) attack this implication as requiring moral paralysis and invalidating all judgment. Ths is not the case.
What these critics fail to appreciate is that all human understanding is bound by our reference frame. The moral relativist understands this and treats morality as another example of human epistemology. The moral absolutist may or may not understand this but separates morality from the realm of all other human knowledge. To the relativist, judging the moral qualities of Hitler and Gandhi is similar to judging the aesthetic qualities of an explosion and a symphonic performance. The standard I apply is necessarily bounded by my perception, yet I have no problem valuing one above the other.
Critics of moral relativism claim that it results in moral paralysis. The weakness of this argument is that it depends upon th eaxiom that a man must be absolutely certain about the accuracy of his perception before he can act upon that percetion. If that standard were applied to other areas of human endeavor, we would all be lying naked on an African savannah waiting for a creature less silly than ourselves to come eat us. People act all the time, literally, with less than complete information.
What moral relativism does imply is that our certainty in the righteousness of our actions can never be absolute. That doesn’t mean we cannot act. It does mean that we should be vigilant against false assurity and question ourselves carefully whenever we feel justified in asserting our own moral understanding above someone else’s. We can still fight evil. We just have to make certain that our confidence in each judgment warrants the actions we take. Battling Hitler demonstrably meets that standard. Kicking me neighbor’s ass because he cheats on his wife does not.
Each person must make that evaluation and set his own course. The standard of proof, of course, is relative. Strong awareness of the limits of our reference frame, however, is a strong incentive to use extra caution before branding another human being evil. I don’t think that’s a bad thing.
Your second “key component” is really not a corollary to moral relativism at all. You and I went around that point in a discussion on ethics, and I maintain that an ethic which brands all options in a situation “bad” fails a basic utilitarian analysis. That is really a separate point, though. Neither moral relativism nor absolute morality necessarily take a stand upon the utility of the ethical systems they inspire.
Well, it is like reading the bible as accurate and reading it as a metaphor. Or, in this case, trying to weed out the authors opinions and take the rest from it.
I wouldn’t disagree with that at all. You go on to say:
“Perhaps the most oft-recognized implication of this is that we cannot have absolute confidence in our moral judgments.”
Sure. After the epistemology argument I don’t have absolute confidence in much of anything However, to put these two comments together yields the “societal morality” which critics use against moral relativism. Our concepts of morality are based on our understanding of the world; our understanding of the world is based on the society we live in. Thus, our morals are based in society. Is this not an appropriate syllogism?
Would you then say that absolutists generally feel that morality is not localized in individuals and their perceptions?
I missed that paralysis was the result, I felt that the implication was more that it results in a null state of judgement, wherein “good” and “bad” are more or less semantically meaningless without not only the context but the judge of context. That is, you and I may well be moral relativists (which I don’t think I am, but whatever) and we disagree on the exact nature of a persons actions; did he do a good thing for good reasons or a bad thing for bad reasons? (never mind other combinations, merely that we disagree on whether things were good or bad in this case). What value do we ascribe to it? Why, none. The individual can easily ascribe a value, act according to his thoughts and perceptions, but extend it beyond one individual and things can get complicated (though they mustn’t necessarily be so).
I felt its strength was that it showed the potential for explosive disagreement where there can be no resolution based on equality of opinion and experience, which is what “relativism” is about in the first place. Your personal view in no way invalidates mine. We are both right. You can be fully “good” in attacking Hitler, AND Hitler can be entirely good in killing Jews (which caused you to attack him in the first place, of course, for this example).
This is an uncomfortable position to be in. I think many people can accept that personal judgement is based on their idea about the world around them, and that those differing ideas are what cause differing opinions. But to say that two completely opposite opinions in the same scenario can be simultaneously “correct” is a blow to the reason used to arrive at such a position, isn’t it?
But it implies more than that. Inherent uncertainty in action isn’t a sufficient condition for moral relativism; it can be present in any number of moral forms.
If the reference frame for viewing a problem is paramount in determining the value-judgement placed upon it, analyzing a problem through multiple reference frames (which any individual being would have access to due to the subcultures and such within any society) will no doubt lead to a point where any action can be considered good. In fact, this is most certainly my problem with it; but that, of course, comes with an implicit assumption that actions can in and of themselves be considered good (or, instead of actions, whatever we choose to place the moral judgement on).
Consider my understanding of this position. The morality felt by an individual is based on his or her reference frame. Should a person attempt to form a moral opinion about another person, what would the relativist do? Would she take into account this other person’s frame? Would she place herself in the other frame? Would she merely impose her frame on the other person? Would she combine frames into a hybrid frame to get a compare and contrast method going? Which guides her? Nothing except her own experience, and her experience will more than likely inform her of which path to take, and of course since her experience chose this path she would be right in doing so. And even if her path involved forcing her frame on the other person to render the judgement, she would still be right in doing so, because that’s how she knows right.
Like physical relativity, moral relativity implies no special privilege to any moral reference frame. This seems almost commen sense until the Jews meet Hitler, or in a less extreme example, the starving thief meets the street vendor. Both the thief and the vendor are right in thier negative judgements toward the other? What good does such a system do us other than to remove blame from having any effect?
Spiritus, I truly have a hard time grasping this side of things. I know I must try your patience sometimes, but your lucidity makes up for my thick-headedness.
Nope. Societal morality is not an inevitable consequence of moral relativism. Nothing prohibits an individual from reaching a moral epiphany which is entirely divorced from the societal values among which he was raised. The second premise of your syllogism is not an accurate reflection of reality. Try this:
Our concepts of morality are based on our understanding of the world.
Our understanding of the world may be influenced by the society in which we live.
Thus, our morals may be influenced by the society in which we live.
I am not arguing that most people do accept moral precepts that are supported by their cultural group, but it is not necessarily a determinative or irrevocable relationship.
I would say that a believer in absolute morality thinks either that morality is not defined by their perceptions or that their moral perception is absolutely correct. One fine distinction that should be made: belief that absolute morality exists does not necessarily equate to the belief that humans can perceive an absolute moral standard.
I use the term to describe exactly that situation. It reflects the criticism in pjen’s links that moral relativism leaves one unable to oppose (or even find) evil. Good and evil retain semantic meaning within my moral context, which is the only context from which I will ever be able to make a moral decision. It is also the only context from which I can decide to act upon a moral valuation.
None? That is exactly the argument of moral paralization to which I referred.
I ascribe moral value based upon the best examination I can make from within my moral context. Understanding that I am limited in my perceptions is not synonymous with being unwilling to act upon my perceptions. I lack absolute assurance. Since I also lack absolute knowledge, this is appropriate. And, yes, things can get complicated. Such is the world.
You think the potential for explosive disagreement rests in relativism? I disagree. You need to look further up the chain. Once you accept that moral distinctions can be made, you create the potential for explosive disagreement.
I am unclear on the antecedent you intend for the phrase “which is what relativism is all about”. Do you mean it is about “resolution based upon equality of opinion and experience” or “no resolution based upon equality of opinion and experience”. In either case, I will find reason to disagree, but I was curious to understand your position.
Relativism is “about” recognizing the limitations of the human reference frame. If you feel it has specific implications to conflict resolution or equality, then you will have to demonstrate them.
I note that you did not really address the axiom itself, though. DO you agree or disagree that the axiom “a man must be absolutely certain about the accuracy of his perception before he can act upon that percetion” is inherent in the argument? Do you agree or disagree with the axiom itself?
To quibble: I can see myself as fully good in attacking Hitler, and Hitler can see himself as fully good in killing Jews, and a third party could see one or the other side of that conflict as fuly good. Your phrasing implies that a standard for morality exists outside of human reference. That is the antithesis of relativism.
Please note my rephrasing. At no time are opposing moral decisions considered to be simultaneously correct. Not having the comfort of an absolute moral reference does seem to make many people uncomfortable, though. For myself, I would rather deal with the implicatins of humanity than embrace an illusion of absolute understanding.
Perhaps you could develop an argument for what else is implied by moral relativism. You are certainly correct that other things might be derived from the framework I have suggested, but I fear that the implications you intend are not ones that I will accept without demonstration.
What I said was: moral relativism implies uncertainty in judgment. If you wish to argue against the converse, be my guest. THat has no bearing upon my point.
Each individual has only a single reference frame, though that frame may be informed by multiple influences. It is by no means certain that examination of a situation will lead to a point where any action may be considered good. I cannot, truly, imagine how you would arrive at that conclusion.
Well, you would seem to have a problem with a mistaken idea of moral relativism rather than moral relativism itself. For that matter, the statements “any action can be considered good” and “there is always a good alternative” are not synonymous. Neither is inherent in moral relativism, though.
Well, your understanding is colored by a number of issues, it seems. Not the least of which is the paradox inherent in trying to establish the absolute moral value of a relative morality. If you’ll forgive the point-by-point analysis:
** The morality felt by an individual is based on his or her reference frame.** Yes. Should a person attempt to form a moral opinion about another person, what would the relativist do? It depends upon the relativist. I would. Would she take into account this other person’s frame? It depends upon the relativist. I would try to. Would she place herself in the other frame? This is not possible for humans. Would she merely impose her frame on the other person? It depends upon the relativist. I would not “merely” do so. If my understanding of the context were clear enough and my perceived consequences of failing to do so were profound enough, I would. Would she combine frames into a hybrid frame to get a compare and contrast method going? This is not possible for humans. A relativist might well imagine hypothetical scenarios to try and shed light on a question. It depends upon the relativist, of course. I often do. Which guides her? Say it with me. It depends upon the relativist. Nothing except her own experience, and her experience will more than likely inform her of which path to take, and of course since her experience chose this path she would be right in doing so. Experience? Are you using that as a shorthand for every fac tor which might influence the development of a moral understanding? It seems a bit dismissive. Yes, a relativist would be guided in moral judgments by her moral understanding. I would imagine that an “absolutist” would be, too. And, yes, if a relativist follows a course of action which is accordance with her morality she would be “good” to do so – within her reference frame, of course. The same applies ot an absolutist. And even if her path involved forcing her frame on the other person to render the judgement, she would still be right in doing so, because that’s how she knows right. Yes, within her reference frame. As would an absolutist. Relative morality is not an escape from the lmitations of human understanding. It is a recognition of them. Absolute morality (as a quality available to men) is also not an escape from the limitation of human understanding. It is a denial of it.
It makes sense then, too, unless one requires super-human confidence to judge a situation. This moral relativist has no problem passing judgment on Hitler. I simply do not pretend that my judgment is backed by more than human certainty. I find human certainty more than sufficient to order lunch or choose my friends or catch a football or decide Hitler was an evil person. Why somebody would need absolute assurances to make such decisions is beyond me.
If you want to understand moral relativism, it would help if you stopped asking for absolute evaluations of moral situations. Both thief and vendor might be good in their respective reference frames. Both might be evil in their respective reference frames, too. Human guilt does not exist because human beings always make the decision they feel is right. If you are asking whether I would judge the thief or the vendor morally correct then please be explicit.
Damn. I was composing this response on the fly, answering each point as I read it. Then I come to the end and you say something nice. Is this some insidious plan to make me feel like a pontificating ass for everything I just wrote? Ooooohhh, you’re a sly one erl. Well, I’m too lazy to go back and recompose anyway, so your flattery has been wasted.
As I hit reply
an idea coalesces
Wait! Not haiku thread.
erl
The Hitler and Jews example is one that is so often used as a “cuonter” to moral relativism. I think that I understand why. Obviously, it is an extreme and extremes are often used to illustrate an issue, but I think it goes deeper. At its heart, the “Hitler question” is an emotional argument, not an intellectual one. It reduces to, “how can moral relativism have value if it cannot condemn such enormity?”
The intellectual reason why this argument does not refute moral relativism is because “moral relativism” is not a moral code. Moral relativism cannot condemn Hitler, because moral relativism is not a value system. It is a philosophical approach to issues of morality and ethics. Moral relativists can and do condemn Hilter.
The reason, I think, that so many peole are unsatisfied with an intellectual examination of the “Hitler question” is that we feel so strongly about Hitler, we find the scale of his evil is so obscene, that it doesn’t feel like simple human condemnation is enough. We want the Universe itself to validate our judgment. It isn’t enough that men can find Hitler evil, after all some men did not! We want assurance that our feeling is the right feeling, that such actions Are an abomination, not just for ourselves but for all men and all time. In short, we want an absolute judgment.
I can understand that desire. I can sympathize with that need. But I can’t find reason to believe that the world works that way.
Actually, the more I think about it, the more I think the line has been drawn in the wrong place. The “moral relativist” who believes all moral valuations are arbitrary social constructs that cannot be logically defended in the event of a different of moral opinion probably IS a straw man. (Either that or a poststructuralist, a creature composed of much the same chafflike excelsior).
Perhaps instead, the important difference we actually encounter in moral debates is between
a) absolutists who start off with a very tiny set of moral axioms–people for whom any behavior, in order to be considered immoral, must be shown to be in conflict with one of those axioms; and
b) absolutists who adhere to much larger package of moral imperatives, a mosaic of “do’s” and “don’t’s” that cover most of life’s recurrent questions about moral behavior with a definitive “right” or “wrong” that is so merely because it is so.
By that standard, I may be an absolutist, albeit a very cautious one. I am so cautious that I would insist on the disclaimer that the axiom or axioms are too important and too subtle to ever be put into words without losing meaning and adding unintentional meaning. In other words, I am in a state of philosophical disagreement with the True Believer of Jurisprudence and the Law of Man. You’ll never get it written down and thereby clarify the issue of moral human conduct.
And yet the axioms do exist. Without trying to put it into Words in the sense of definitive exactness, let me say that they pertain to the sanctity of human freedom, the wickedness of coercion, the evil of trying to get your way in a social context without communicating and securing the voluntary cooperation of those affected by your behavior; and also the holiness of acknowledging one’s fallibility versus the evil state of setting one’s self up as infallibly correct. So, while accepting from the outset that this is clumsily worded and open to misinterpretation, I have these things that I believe, and, in any moral argument I’m invited to participate in, I’m likely to point to these ideas and to derive my arguments about a given behavior’s rightness or wrongness from these notions.
Meanwhile, I have problems with people who have a long list of things they believe are wrong “just because they are wrong”, for no reason in particular, yet “absolutely”.
Indeed, it might not shock you to know that I am of the latter type. Maybe its the solipsist in me. Perhaps why that is should be the content of another thread, but never-the-less.
This is, I think, the third thread I’ve been in where moral relativism has been the topic and I’ve been reading up on physical relativity to see what, if any, analogies I can draw from in order to better grasp this.
But the think most crucial that you are quick to pick up on is that of an external judge. It isn’t that I can’t see that a relativistic thief and a relativistic street vendor might consider themselves correct at the same time that gives me the willies (so to speak) but that were it to come to a judge, literally or figuratively, that if this judge were also a relativist he would not be justified in imposing his values on either of the two. To do so would assume, at some level even if not a priori, that clearly someone did something wrong. Or, maybe to put it better, the act of imposing one’s morality on another is to consider that one’s moral system is right and the other’s is wrong. This seems to be more absolutist, even if in a weakened state after recognizing that a degree of arbitrary-ness (sheesh) exists at the fundamental level of moral systems.
Let me try yet another description here. You and I are, for the sake of argument, both moral absolutists. We both recognize that moral systems ultimately derive from unsupportable ideas about morality itself, yet that only ensures we constantly check out that our system is doing what it should by either what it says about itself or by some metaprinciple. In any case, we know what is right given an appropriate amount of data. How on Eris’s green earth, or God’s, or Einstien’s, is this relative? We are absolutely (as absolute as absolute gets, mind you) sure that we are right.
The only way it can be relative is if either both are considered simultaneously; that is, if I consider your idea as well as mine, and consider it as equally tenable (and don’t include my moral judgements in it). Otherwise, all we’ve done is shown that there are more than one moral system. That doesn’t seem relative to me at all. Ask me if [blank] is good and my answer is consistent. Ask you if [blank] is good and the answer is consistent. Where, then, comes the relativity?
I cannot see relativity without an external viewer to the situation; that is, one who recognizes that both positions are equally valid from their reference frames and does not bring his or her moral evaluation into it at all. Even if I were to consider your moral system, it could only be within my frame and so would always fail to move me; or, if it did move me, then the reference frame would be adjusted and the near-absolutist confidence level returns. That is, at any given point, I know what is right.
What am I missing here?
RE: Hitler versus Jews
Well, why other people use it I don’t know as that is never the topic. But I used it because it exactly illustrated what I worry about in such a case.
Topic: killing other people.
Case: Hitler; Result: Bad.
Case: Us; Result; Good.
I mean, it puts that cheesey bumper sticker into a new perspective, “Why do we kill people to show people that killing people is wrong?”
But, not to overplay Hitler as I don’t like using Nazis as an example for much of anything (because it is too emotional) I brought the thief into it. Antoher example where each party was doing what they thought was right, and where their respective rights were at complete odds with each other. Of course, what was implicit in that but not mentioned at all (genius that I am) was that the thief was the kind who felt that the street vendor was in some way stealing from him by not sharing the wealth, so to speak. As I’ve never understood that particular line of thought well, I–in classic form–simply ignored it.
[sub]PS-care if, at some future time, I use that haiku in my sig? Attributed to you of course, but that was a classic IMO.[/sub]
Ahunter3
I am honestly confused at how a person could read my posts and reduce relativistic morality to the categories you have chosen. I find them immensely unsatisfying as a summation of all possibilities.
erl
Where to begin? Okay – let’s do the easy ones first.
Yes, you can use the haiku anytime you please.
You know it annoys me when I ask a direct question and you don’t respond. I believe I only asked 2 or 3 in a very long post. Do you suppose you might address them at some point?
Okay – now the more complicated stuff:
I really thought that I had addressed this issue – more than once, even. Obviously my meaning did not get through, so let me try another tack.
How would you defend, from a relativstic morality, the statement that one man is never justified in imposing his will upon another? Be careful – hidden assumptions will bite the unwary.
If that doesn’t work, then ask yourself teh question, “justified to whom?”
I don’t think that is better put at all. It is a tempting shorthand, but it risks being misunderstood as implying that an absolute valuation for moral systems can exist in a relatistic morality.
One’s moral system is exactly that. Right and wrong are external jugments: no consistent system can rigorously evaluate itself.
Imposing one’s moral values upon another is an exercise of power. Deciding whether an exercise of power is justified is one aspect of each individual’s process of moral evaluation.
The phrase “to consider that one’s moral system is right” bothers me a great deal. In an absolute morality, it is strictly tautological. In a relativistic morality, it is strictly contradictory.
okay – I guess I will do the detailed response again. You and I are, for the sake of argument, both moral absolutists. Okay. We both recognize that moral systems ultimately derive from unsupportable ideas about morality itself, then in what sense are we moral absolutists? Do we believe in an absolute morality which is never apprehendable to human beings? If so, then the moral systems under which we operate are necessarily relative. The only practical difference between this and a general moral relativism is that our reference frames are informed by the ardent belief that some absolute standard exists, even though we will never know what it is. yet that only ensures we constantly check out that our system is doing what it should by either what it says about itself or by some metaprinciple. I think, as I said above, that it means much more than that. As to our system “doing what it should”, what possible metaprinciple or standard can we test it against? If we have some deeper understanding of the absolute morality, then that understanding is our system. In any case, we know what is right given an appropriate amount of data. How? If, as you posit, our system is unlimately derived from unsupportable (unverifiable) ideas, then we can never know that we have the right answer. No amount of data can overcome epistemological uncertainty in the system used to evaluate the data. How on Eris’s green earth, or God’s, or Einstien’s, is this relative? It isn’t relative. It’s self-contradictory. It would be relative if your posit of an unsupported system is correct. It would be absolute if your conclusion that sufficient data will let us know we have identifed the absolute right is correct. The only way it can be relative is if either both are considered simultaneously; that is, if I consider your idea as well as mine, and consider it as equally tenable (and don’t include my moral judgements in it). Well, if you know that absolute morality exists and that neither of us knows the character of that absolute morality, then honesty (if that is a part of your moral system) will compel you to evaluate both approaches as equally tenable. Rigor, regardless of the specifics of your morality, will inform you that, barring a mystical revelation, you do not enjoy a privileged reference frame with regards to identifying the nature of absolute morality. Otherwise, all we’ve done is shown that there are more than one moral system. Well, I’m afraid the inconsistent nature of your example makes it difficult to show much else. That doesn’t seem relative to me at all. Ask me if [blank] is good and my answer is consistent. Ask you if [blank] is good and the answer is consistent. Where, then, comes the relativity? In the realization that neither you nor I nor any other human enjoys a privileged reference frame. Where else could it lie?
External viewers are helpful to illustrate relativistic concepts. They have no bearing on the existence of relativity. If it helps you, realize that we are both external viewers to the thief and the vendor.
I disagree strongly with your last clause, though. The external viewer does bring his moral evaluation into the situation. If he did not, then he wouldn’t be the external viewer.
Are you never moved by something external to your self? Are you assuming that another human beings moral system will be so alien to you that it will have no power to evoke a sympathetic response?
Okay – you can be moved. I have no idea why you assume that near-absolute confidence levels are implied by this. Can you explain that to me? It has not been my experience that every time I make a moral valuation it is accompanied by a near-absolute certainty that my decision is correct.
Well, as a moral absolutist you at least think you do.
As a moral relativist, at any given point I make a decision about what I think is right. The confidence I have in that valuation varies according to any number of circumstances.
An understanding of moral relativism. If I think of a better way to explain it, I will.
One thing that might help, actually, would be rigor of language. (deja vu?) For instance, when discussing a moral relativist, don’t use the terms good and evil or right and wrong unless you specify the reference frame under which they are evaluated. Sometimes exercising care with expression can shed light on the concepts being expressed.
In other words, it disturbs you that there might not be an absolute standard for morality. Okay, this is a slightly different appeal to emotion, but it is still appeal to emotion rather than intellect. Now, one can certainly take as axiomatic that absolute standards of morality exist, but that framework kind of makes this discussion silly. Barring that, one could develop a reasoned argument for why absolute standards of morality must exist. There have been folks to do so, but I have not found any of their efforts to be convincing. Barring that, one cn make the emotional appeal for absolute standards.
It “feels wrong” to you if absolute standards do not exist. Okay. I understand. You are by no means alone in that feeling.
Hmm, I did seem to miss some, so a little backtracking is necessary.
It was indeed based on the idea, IMO, of equality of opinion and experience. That is, to me, the idea of moral relativism asserts not only that more than one idea of morality might exist between a number of people, but that these differing moralities are more or less equal in the strength of their convictions. Moreover, that no moral frame is better than any other, since “better” involves a frame in which to judge other frames, and no such priviledged frame exists. Not that one person using one frame couldn’t judge another, but that that judgement held no more weight than what he was judging. It feels, to me, like those action movies where everyone is pointing a gun at everyone else; the net result is always zero when viewed from an objective, external frame (which surly exists as much as any other frame exists). Because I feel this way, I put “no resolution in”, though that “no” was more of a consequence of my opinion on the matter and not inherent in the idea of what I think relativity is about.
I’m not sure that I felt that it was inherent in the argument, no, but I can see that it may be. I disagree, in some ways, with such a tenet as well. I think it is clear that throughout the course of history many, many persons have acted without complete assurance on success, not to mention the moral consequences of their actions or the moral status of the action itself.
Et tu? Is this like my “I cannot conceive of a moral system which allows me to lie to myself?”
I would disagree with this outright. I know what I think is right. Even if this comes from my own limited reference frame, it is the only frame I have access to, as you also eloquently noted. Recognition of the limitations of my frame in no way smashes a road to absolutist thought. To understand relativity, I need to understand that other reference frames exist outside my own. Fine, I can grasp the idea even if I cannot experience it. Secondly, I need to understand that no frame is any better than any other frame. I cannot accept that. I cannot conceive of an argument that would make me accept that (well, obviously, I guess, or I would accept it ha-ha). My reference frame is ultimately more important than any other reference frame that may or may not exist because it is all I know! Recognizing that I do not know everything does not imply, to me, the requirement that I submit my frame to the level of equality of everyone else’s frames. It isn’t equal, point blank, becuase it is the only thing I know! I don’t know your frame, I can’t experience it, I can maybe approximate it. It is eternally outside of my intellectual and physical grasp; why, then, would I ever, ever consider it as teneble as mine?
As a consequence of this, not only am I right, I must be right, because there is no other standard to compare it to. I am absolutely right, no matter the strength(or lack thereof) of my convictions. Ultimate reference frames? It is the only reference frame! The introduction of forever-closed off reference frames to human morality creates a plurality of tautological justifications for moral opinion!
I find this carries, implicitly, the idea that a standard of right and wrong do exist independant of you. What you think is right–to whom? To you… the tautology, forever locked in a reference frame.
However, to put these two comments together yields the “societal morality” which critics use against moral relativism. Our concepts of morality are based on our understanding of the world; our understanding of the world is based on the society we live in. Thus, our morals are based in society. Is this not an appropriate syllogism?
