Moral relativism- all that we can say?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

the idea of moral relativism asserts not only that more than one idea of morality might exist between a number of people, but that these differing moralities are more or less equal in the strength of their convictions.

No, no, no. I realize that this type of statement is often seen, even by proponents of moral relativism. But it is sloppy and can lead to confusion. Each morality is valid within its reference frame. Period. To call them “equal” implies a judgment made from without. An external observer may or may not find the two systems equally valid under his own moral system.

It feels, to me, like those action movies where everyone is pointing a gun at everyone else; the net result is always zero when viewed from an objective, external frame (which surly exists as much as any other frame exists).

Objective? An external frame exists, obviously, but when applying moral evaluation how does one assert “objectivity”? In physics, the analog to this would be the position of “absolute rest”", and it does not exist.

Again, the underlying “need” here seems to be for some external confirmation that one’s moral decisions are “correct”. What can I say? In the end, that cowboy has only his aim and a steady hand to rely upon; he has no way of knowing what you see when you watch the movie.

I’m not sure that I felt that it was inherent in the argument, no, but I can see that it may be.

Well, the argument(s) that I referred to are those that reach the conlusion that moral relativism results in the moral paralysis (i.e. the inability of a person or society to assert any moral judgment.) I see only two ways for this conclusion to be reached: (1) assert the axiom that absolute certainty is necessary for moral action. (2) Mistakenly search for an absolute moral valuation using relative morality.

I focused on the first case, which is not an error is one accepts the hidden assumption. Perhaps I should have focused on the second, which is simply a straw man. It attacks moral relativism for not fulfilling a promise it never made.

me
For myself, I would rather deal with the implications of humanity than embrace an illusion of absolute understanding.

Et tu? Is this like my “I cannot conceive of a moral system which allows me to lie to myself?”

??? I see no similarity between those positions. Perhaps you could elaborate.

me
Absolute morality (as a quality available to men) is also not an escape from the limitation of human understanding. It is a denial of it.

I would disagree with this outright. I know what I think is right. Even if this comes from my own limited reference frame, it is the only frame I have access to . . . To understand relativity, I need to understand that other reference frames exist outside my own. Fine, I can grasp the idea even if I cannot experience it. Secondly, I need to understand that no frame is any better than any other frame. I cannot accept that. I cannot conceive of an argument that would make me accept that . . . My referencec frame is ultimately more important than any other reference frame that may or may not exist because it is all I know!

In disagreeing with me, you provide excellent support for my statement. In one breath you acknowledging the limitations of your moral frame; in the next you assert that your frame is “better” (an absolute judgment) than any other. As I said, absolutism is a denial of human limitation. Even as you pay lip service to the concept you reject the consequences. Clutching the absolute, you pretend the limitations you cannot escape are unimportant.

Recognizing that I do not know everything does not imply, to me, the requirement that I submit my frame to the level of equality of everyone else’s frames.

You are correct. “Level of equality [with] everyone else’s frames” is, in fact, a statement antithetical to moral relativism. Now, within one’s own frame they may find reason to evaluate all moral frames equally, but that is a charcter of their individual morality, not of moral relativism. The implication you rebel against is an absolute standard of evaluation. It is not a part of moral relativism.

What is a part of moral relativism is the epistemological implication that humans have no justification for asserting the nature of an absolute morality. That epistemological implication invalidates, rather than supports, the moral implication which you are mistakenly applying to moral relativism.

As a consequence of this, not only am I right, I must be right, because there is no other standard to compare it to. I am absolutely right, no matter the strength(or lack thereof) of my convictions. Ultimate reference frames? It is the only reference frame!

Intersting. I applaud you for your honesty, but I find the arrogance of this position extremely distasteful. Because you cannot share direct perception of a thing you reduce it below the level of consequence. Have I mentioned before that absolutism is a denial of human limitation? I must say that yours, colored by that dash of solipsism, is an unusual brand. By concentrating so much upon the limits of your frame you manage to declare all else invalid. thus, rather than a limitation your frame becomes the “ultimate measure”.

After all, why let yourself be bothered by human boundaries when it is so much more comfortable to deny that anything of consequence exists beyond those walls. I am reminded of a prisoner pretending that no world exists beyond the bars of his cell.

The introduction of forever-closed off reference frames to human morality creates a plurality of tautological justifications for moral opinion!

Well, it crates myriad reference frames. Perhaps if you told me under which one of those you find tautological justifications of moral opinion I would be able to agree or disagree.

me
As a moral relativist, at any given point I make a decision about what I think is right.

I find this carries, implicitly, the idea that a standard of right and wrong do exist independant of you.

Implicit? Independent of me? I quite explicitely stated that the moral evaluation was dependent on me. I would have to work to find an explicit statement which offered less support for your implication.

What you think is right–to whom? To you… the tautology, forever locked in a reference frame.

Yes – to me. I am the one making the moral evaluation. My moral system is the one that I use to make that evaluation. Yes, this is a tautology. It is, in fact, the definition of a moral avaluation. Definitions are always tautological.

[erislover]

*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi *
To call them “equal” implies a judgment made from without. An external observer may or may not find the two systems equally valid under his own moral system.

This is something I cannot possibly come to terms with, I’m afraid. Why would it have to come from without? Rendering moral systems equal could come from any reference frame, including within the relativist’s.

Objective? An external frame exists, obviously, but when applying moral evaluation how does one assert “objectivity”? In physics, the analog to this would be the position of “absolute rest”", and it does not exist.

I’m not sure I can see this either. How hard is it for me to sit back and say “Both the thief and the vendor think they are right.” My judgemnent need not come into it at all to make such an observation, and I can still notice that if two opposing parties conclude opposite things right, this is a zero-sum moral situation. As a meta-principle, relativism gives us no solution to such a problem. Resolution can come if either the thief or the vendor change their position, or if a third party imposes his own judgement on the two of them. At any rate, I don’t see why an objective, external frame is impossible.

I see only two ways for this conclusion to be reached: (1) assert the axiom that absolute certainty is necessary for moral action. (2) Mistakenly search for an absolute moral valuation using relative morality.

(3)Note, as above, that two reference frames are colliding, so to speak, and that no resolution is possible without something changing either of the two parties’ frames. What is this something? Moral relativism cannot say, since it isn’t about making moral judgements, nor does it provide a method for doing so. The resolution must come from without, a third party imposing its morality on the two, or it must come from within the two parties themselves. More on this in a minute…

??? I see no similarity between those positions. Perhaps you could elaborate.

Just that, in response to my comment, you had said something to the effect of, “Lie to myself? A bit loaded, wouldn’t you say?” To which I note, “Illusion? Etc.” Just a poke, spiritus.

In disagreeing with me, you provide excellent support for my statement. In one breath you acknowledging the limitations of your moral frame; in the next you assert that your frame is “better” (an absolute judgment) than any other. As I said, absolutism is a denial of human limitation. Even as you pay lip service to the concept you reject the consequences. Clutching the absolute, you pretend the limitations you cannot escape are unimportant.

Unless you are reading into my statement I don’t see that I did anything of the sort. I recognized the limitation of my frame, yes. I mentioned that my frame was better, yes. Better is an absolute judgement, of a sort, yes. But at what point did I brush aside everything else? the limitations are important, to be sure, as are other person’s ideas about morality. Should I find that someone else holds an opinion which I find to be an improvement on one of mine, I would (and should, by my morals) adopt it. But your total system comes from your total experience (and such) and as such, it cannot be better for me than my own system(since I do not share your experiences). That leaves us with two conditions; one, your system is of equal value to me, two, my system is better. Can I be certain that our systems are not equal? No. can I be certain that my system is better? No. Does this prevent me from choosing my system over yours? Of course not.

You are correct.

It has to happen now and then, even if by blind chance

“Level of equality [with] everyone else’s frames” is, in fact, a statement antithetical to moral relativism.

I can accept that it may not be implicit in it, but antithetical?

Now, within one’s own frame they may find reason to evaluate all moral frames equally, but that is a charcter of their individual morality, not of moral relativism.

Hmmm. Now I’m beginning to question that it isn’t even implicit in it.

We have a principle which tells us that every moral system is valid under its domain (the reference frame of the individual). That is, the only thing which prevents the range of systems to be different is the domain itself. To keep this in mathematical terms, we are saying that MR does not imply that f(x) must equal f(x+1). But if I am understanding this frame correctly, it does imply that f(x) does equal f(x); or, more to the point, that f((x+1)-1)=f(x). That is, given appropriate changes to a persons frame (through knowledge gained, shared experiences, etc), two systems would become equivalent. More directly, “Well, if you’ve seen what I’ve seen you wouldn’t think that way.”

Or am I missing the forest for the trees?

Intersting. I applaud you for your honesty, but I find the arrogance of this position extremely distasteful.

Because you cannot share direct perception of a thing you reduce it below the level of consequence.

Are you assuming that I am inflexible, or not able to experience things inderectly, or that my frame itself cannot change?

Have I mentioned before that absolutism is a denial of human limitation?

No You don’t say? I don’t see this as implicit in the idea still.

I must say that yours, colored by that dash of solipsism, is an unusual brand.

To quote the great Hagbard Celine, “No, the solipsist thinks the tripper is real.” At any rate, I fear you have extended my comment “your frame is forever outside…my grasp” as implying that I actively ignore everything else. Hardly the case, or I wouldn’t ask to understand your position. I actively support mine, yes; I can never know yours, yes; there is a middle ground here, this is not a dichotomous non-union. You may share ideas that come with your frame; should I see that as advantageous in mine as well, it would seem antithetical to absolutist thought to not include it (absolutist who recognizes limitations, mind you).

By concentrating so much upon the limits of your frame you manage to declare all else invalid.

Not so. Consider a general relativistic understanding of black holes. They are forever closed off to any reference frame outside of it. This does not prohibit one from utilizing aspects of the hole itself. I am closed out from your frame completely, but i may utilize your words as an interpretation of certain aspects of your frame and incorporate it into mine (necessarily, if I am not actively evading experience). The question is, “Can we utilize a black hole for energy?” Can I utilize what I get indirectly from your frame in mine? Of course. Am I still absolutely right in what I am doing? Of course, because there is still no standard by which to judge other than mine.

Implicit? Independent of me? I quite explicitely stated that the moral evaluation was dependent on me. I would have to work to find an explicit statement which offered less support for your implication.

That was stupid of me. Scratch from the record, please.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

erl
the idea of moral relativism asserts not only that more than one idea of morality might exist between a number of people, but that these differing moralities are more or less equal in the strength of their convictions.

me
To call them “equal” implies a judgment made from without. An external observer may or may not find the two systems equally valid under his own moral system.

This is something I cannot possibly come to terms with, I’m afraid. Why would it have to come from without? Rendering moral systems equal could come from any reference frame, including within the relativist’s.

Well, I asked you to be careful with your language. I even specifically asked you to state the context of evaluation when asserting a relative moral judgment. Since you made no qualification for the judgement “more or less equal”, I assumed you were yet again involing an absolute standard to evaluate moralities. I think (for some strange reason) I am getting gun shy about that.

Since you meant to address how a moral relativist might evaluate the two opposing moral systems, the response is simpler. No. Nothing in moral relativism requires that competing systems be judged as equal. Really. Please believe me this time. Moral relativism does not imply any specific value judgments regarding the moral systems of another person/society/intelligent fungi/et al.

I know that this is a common misconception. I think this is because the epistemological position at the heart of moral relativism can influence proponents to decide in their own moral system to evaluate all frames as generally equal (or at least try to). That is a property of an individual morality, not an implication of moral relativism.

me
Objective? An external frame exists, obviously, but when applying moral evaluation how does one assert “objectivity”? In physics, the analog to this would be the position of “absolute rest”", and it does not exist.

I’m not sure I can see this either. How hard is it for me to sit back and say “Both the thief and the vendor think they are right.”

It isn’t hard at all. It also isn’t a moral observation. If you say, “both the thief and the vendor are right” then you have made a moral observation. Of course, now it is not an objective observation. It is a subjective evaluation from your own morality.

I will refer to physics again, since you said you were comfortable with analogies from relativistic physics. Car A and bus B are moving in opposite directions. You observe them from a nearby hill. With your patented erl vision, you see that the spedometers of each vehicle read .5c. You can objectively state, “A and B both think they are going half the speed of light. Damn – I wish I had a car like that”. But once you try to figure out how fast each car is “actually” going, you become a participant in the relativistic equation. All you can do is determin the speed of each car relative to your own motion.

I can still notice that if two opposing parties conclude opposite things right, this is a zero-sum moral situation.

It is only zero sum if one sets the rules of the game to require such an evaluation. Moral relativism sets no such rules. Again, you seem determined to criticize moral relativism because it is not absolutist. If you had simply stated in the beginning that you cannot accept any morality which does not provide absolute standards we both could have saved some time.

At any rate, I don’t see why an objective, external frame is impossible.

I hope that I have made it clear, now. An amoral external frame is possible. Once moral observations/judgments are made, the frame cannot be called objective.

(3)Note, as above, that two reference frames are colliding, so to speak, and that no resolution is possible without something changing either of the two parties’ frames.

???
How does this position allow you to demonstrate the result, “moral relativism prevents a person or society from asserting any moral judgments”? That was the argument which I was addressing in that section of my post. Are you saying that “resolution” is a prerequisite for asserting a moral judgment? If so, under wht frame is this “resolution” supposed to occur? If so, how does this “necessity for resolution” differ from the axiom of “absolute certainty”? What exactly is “resolution” in your nomenclature? How does it differ from “moral evaluation”?

you had said something to the effect of, “Lie to myself? A bit loaded, wouldn’t you say?” To which I note, “Illusion? Etc.” Just a poke, spiritus.

I stand by “illusion”. If one accepts that human moral perception is limited, then the idea that humans beings can operate from an absolute moral position can only be illusory. Now, some people assert that supernatural agents have delivered specific moral instructions to humans. If that is true, then it provides a possible alternative to the illusion. Without such a supernatural agency, however, one is stuck with the illusion.

Unless you are reading into my statement I don’t see that I did anything of the sort. I recognized the limitation of my frame, yes. I mentioned that my frame was better, yes. Better is an absolute judgement, of a sort, yes.

Yes. So apparently my reading was accurate. You assert an absolute valuation which cannot be supported from the limited moral reference frame that you say you recognize. Denial, as I said.

But at what point did I brush aside everything else?

Let’s see:
My reference frame is ultimately more important than any other reference frame that may or may not exist.
not only am I right, I must be right, because there is no other standard to compare it to.
I am absolutely right, no matter the strength(or lack thereof) of my convictions.
Ultimate reference frames? It is the only reference frame!

I think that pretty well covers “brushing aside”.

your total system comes from your total experience (and such) and as such, it cannot be better for me than my own system(since I do not share your experiences).

I think this statement is unsupportable in the general case. It is not beyond possibility that someone else has a moral code which would be “better” (under whatever standard you use for evaluation) than the one you are using now. The key point, of course, is how one defines “better”. For yourself, you have stipulated that someone else might have a particular element of morality which would be better (under your own definition) for you.

With that admission, your statement is demonstrably false for your specific case. All that it requires is a person whose moral code is identical to your except for that one elment you have stipulated is superior. Voila – he has a “better” morality for you than you yourself.

That leaves us with two conditions; one, your system is of equal value to me, two, my system is better. Can I be certain that our systems are not equal? No. can I be certain that my system is better? No. Does this prevent me from choosing my system over yours? Of course not.

As demonstrated above, you cannot discount the third option. Even so, nothing prevents you from choosing your system over someone else’s. What the axiom of limited moral perception (which you have stated you accept) does prevent is any reasoned argument that would support your morality as objectively superior to another. Since you have also accepted the possibility that an element of another’s morality might be superior to your own, you also cannot make a reasoned argument for your morality being subjectively[sup]1[/sup] superior to all other.

Nevertheless, you make that assertion, denying the axiom you claim to accept. I cannot say that you are wrong to do so. I can say that it is not rational to do so.

me
Level of equality [with] everyone else’s frames" is, in fact, a statement antithetical to moral relativism.

I can accept that it may not be implicit in it, but antithetical?

It is antithetical if equality is understood to be an absolute valuation. Re-reading your original statement I think I should have read it to mean an evaluation within your own moral system. In that case, you are correct that it is neither implicit nor antithetical. I made that point in the passage you question next.

me
within one’s own frame they may find reason to evaluate all moral frames equally, but that is a charcter of their individual morality, not of moral relativism.

Hmmm. Now I’m beginning to question that it isn’t even implicit in it.

Why? A&B is not the same as A->B.

The mathematical analogy you supply supports only the idea that two differentiated moral systems can become equivalent if each system accomodates the addition an subtraction of moral precepts. I can accept that. It doesn’t really address the question of evaluating disparate moral systems, though.

am I missing the forest for the trees?

Well, it seems more like your missing the forest because it isn’t made of concrete.

Are you assuming that I am inflexible, or not able to experience things inderectly, or that my frame itself cannot change?

No. I am accepting you at your word that you find your oown morality absolutely correct because it is yours.

I fear you have extended my comment “your frame is forever outside…my grasp” as implying that I actively ignore everything else.

No. I am accepting you at your word that yours is the only moral reference frame that matters.

Am I still absolutely right in what I am doing? Of course, because there is still no standard by which to judge other than mine.

Imagine you decide to write an autobiography. Is your first draft the “absolutely correct” representation of your life? Is the final draft? Do you see no distinction at all between “only one available” and “absolutely right”?

[erislover]

This will be only a short response, as my time has grown limited now. But, there were some things I find I must say now while they are fresh.

I think this is because the epistemological position at the heart of moral relativism can influence proponents to decide in their own moral system to evaluate all frames as generally equal (or at least try to).

I can see that (now). OK.

How does this position allow you to demonstrate the result, ‘moral relativism prevents a person or society from asserting any moral judgments’?

Well, it was based on the idea that moral frames were equal. So…

I stand by “illusion”. If one accepts that human moral perception is limited, then the idea that humans beings can operate from an absolute moral position can only be illusory. Now, some people assert that supernatural agents have delivered specific moral instructions to humans. If that is true, then it provides a possible alternative to the illusion. Without such a supernatural agency, however, one is stuck with the illusion.

Well, I shall let the supernatural agent one slip by. However:
Man cannot have absolute assurance from within that anything is absolute. Thus, absolute belief in anything is an illusion.
Ok, Man cannot have absolute assurance from withing that anything is absolute. My statements to this…
One, it does not involve whether or not anything actually is absolute, merely that we can’t guarantee it is. Two, the statement itself makes a claim which can include itself; that is, I cannot be absolutely sure that I can’t be absolutely sure. So, to me, that implies that one is committing no greater an error in assuming there are no absolutes as in assuming there are absolutes. Each position is just as possible with the given starting point.

To me, then, the only illusion which is there is if someone denies the fact that they could know everything. “Aha!” you say, “But that is exactly what you said!!” There is a not so insignificant difference between knowing everything that could be known as opposed to knowing everything that can be known. I assert that I know everything that can be known from within my frame. However, this does still not mean that I know everything that an arbitrarily aware and intelligent person could know, given sufficient resources. As such, it does not mean I brush aside or even ignore my limitations. I simply don’t focus on them.

With that admission, your statement is demonstrably false for your specific case. All that it requires is a person whose moral code is identical to your except for that one elment you have stipulated is superior. Voila – he has a “better” morality for you than you yourself.

If I could be a part of his frame I would completely agree. But I thought we took it as read that our frames are locked?

I am accepting you at your word that you find your oown morality absolutely correct because it is yours.

Not because it is mine, but because there is no other to choose.

Imagine you decide to write an autobiography. Is your first draft the “absolutely correct” representation of your life? Is the final draft? Do you see no distinction at all between “only one available” and “absolutely right”?

If we accept the axiom that we are limited, then yes, whatever extant copy exists is absolutely correct because there is nothing else to compare it to. If you are trying to compare the information in the book to my actual life you make the error by assuming that the frame set up by the book is my frame, which it cannot be, for neither could you percieve my frame than I could share it with you. Only I could say it was wrong because it was about me. As more drafts are produced, I would be the final judge as to whether or not the book accurately represented me; as it is the only extant representation of me, it must be (tautologically[sub]I think I better add this in[/sub]) correct because, again, there is no standard to compare it to.
I may say it is wrong, and you may say it is right. But we’ve already come to accept that such an event is possible, regardless of whether or not we are absolutists or relativists.

Whew, this post got longer than I thought.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Ok, Man cannot have absolute assurance from withing that anything is absolute. My statements to this…
One, it does not involve whether or not anything actually is absolute, merely that we can’t guarantee it is.

Correct. Well, it guarantees some other things, but those probably isn’t worth gettting distracted over.

Two, the statement itself makes a claim which can include itself; that is, I cannot be absolutely sure that I can’t be absolutely sure.

Well, this is not correct. The reason it is not correct has to do with another of those implied assumptions in context. In this case, my statements about the limitations on human moral perception and what the consequences of those limitations are was meant to be understood as an argument of reason[sup]1[/sup]. Reason cannot provide understanding of an external, absolute morality from a limited human reference frame. Thus, we can be absolutely sure that reason will not allow us absolute certainty once we accept the limitation of the human moral frame. This is simply a recognition of the limits of a tool. It is not a paradox, because the properly phrased conclusion is not an absolute statement about the nature of external morality. It is a statement about the limitations of a particular epistemoilogical set.

Think of the HUP. The absolute statement that we can never measure the exact position and velocity of a quantum particle does not violate uncertainty.

So, to me, that implies that one is committing no greater an error in assuming there are no absolutes as in assuming there are absolutes.

I hope that I have shown why this understanding is incorrect.

Each position is just as possible with the given starting point.

No. Not once it is understood that teh given starting point includes both the axiom of limited human perception and the context of an epistemology of reason. Certainly, if we move beyond the limitations of reason the validity of our arguments will change.

There is a not so insignificant difference between knowing everything that could be known as opposed to knowing everything that can be known.

Um . . . difference in verb tense? I’m not sure how significant I find that.

I assert that I know everything that can be known from within my frame.

I strongly doubt that. This thread is obviously within your reference frame. Can you tell me, immediately upon reading this sentence, what was the 15[sup]th[/sup] letter to appear somewhere in one of my posts?

If not, then you do not know everything that can be known from your reference frame. If so, then I will filel that datum and ask you another question.

It seems to me that you are confusing what is with what can be.

However, this does still not mean that I know everything that an arbitrarily aware and intelligent person could know, given sufficient resources.

It does not mean a number of things, including (it appears) what you think it means.

As such, it does not mean I brush aside or even ignore my limitations. I simply don’t focus on them.

It means that in asserting that your morality is superior to all others you make a statement unsupportable by reason. Thus, you either ignore the limitations of your reference frame, ignore the limitations of reason, or consciously abandon reason as a tool for apprehending morality.

me
With that admission, your statement is demonstrably false for your specific case. All that it requires is a person whose moral code is identical to your except for that one elment you have stipulated is superior. Voila – he has a “better” morality for you than you yourself.

If I could be a part of his frame I would completely agree. But I thought we took it as read that our frames are locked?

You seem to be confusing “share the reference frame” with “rationally understand that the reference frame might exist”. You don’t need to enter another frame. You have already stipulated that other moral frames exist. You have already stipulated that elements of another moral frame might, under your own system of evaluation, be superior to your own. Thus, you have no rational justification for the assertion of your moral superiority.

I am accepting you at your word that you find your oown morality absolutely correct because it is yours.

Not because it is mine, but because there is no other to choose.

[/quote]

That argument is even less convincing. “Only available” is not synonymous with best. Remember, this part of your argument was raised to justify not considering anyone else’s morality as potentially superior to your own.
I don’t need to drive my neighbor’s Porsche to consider it a better car than my Yugo.

re autobiography in progress
If we accept the axiom that we are limited, then yes, whatever extant copy exists is absolutely correct because there is nothing else to compare it to.

I think that I will never understand what you mean when you say absolute. Newton was not absolutely correct before 1905. “Columbus discovered America” was not absolutely correct when they taught it to me in elementary school. The ice in my freezer is not “absolutely cold” because it is the coldest thing I can touch.

If you are trying to compare the information in the book to my actual life you make the error by assuming that the frame set up by the book is my frame, which it cannot be, for neither could you percieve my frame than I could share it with you.

Nonsense. I did no such thing. I asked you whether the book was an absolutely correct representation of your life. Evaluate it under your own frame of reference, if you mean “absolute within my own frame of reference” when you say “absolute”. Then perhaps you could tell me what “absolute within my own frame of reference” means.

As more drafts are produced, I would be the final judge as to whether or not the book accurately represented me; as it is the only extant representation of me, it must be (tautologicallyI think I better add this in) correct because, again, there is no standard to compare it to.

No, if it is a representation of your life then your life is the standard of comparison. Were the Greeks “correct” in their calculations for the circumfeence of the Earth simply because more accurate measurements were not yet available? Are we “correct” in our estimates now? Absolutely correct?

I may say it is wrong, and you may say it is right. But we’ve already come to accept that such an event is possible, regardless of whether or not we are absolutists or relativists.

But you do not just say it is right or wrong. You say it is absolutely right or absolutely wrong.

Frankly, I am beginning to think that your definition of “absolute” is “absolutely wrong”.
[sup]1[/sup][sub]Logical, rational, or analytic thought.[/sub]

[erislover]

**Me:**Two, the statement itself makes a claim which can include itself; that is, I cannot be absolutely sure that I can’t be absolutely sure.
Yeah, I noticed after reading it for a third time the error I had made with that statement. I don’t see that the statement was even necessary to make, actually. Because the principle we adopted about limited perspective only discusses what we can guarantee, it still leaves room for the positions of absolute versus relative. I can be an absolutist, I merely cannot demonstrate why or how I am one. Similarly, one can be a relativist, yet one cannot demonstrate why this option is any better. In the end the path is as axiomatic and arbitrary as any other, can we agree on that?

I still don’t see that accepting limitations necessitates a relative framework.

Um . . . difference in verb tense? I’m not sure how significant I find that.

Well, perhaps I should say the difference between what I can know versus what an arbitrarily intelligent person with sufficient resources can know.

You don’t need to enter another frame. You have already stipulated that other moral frames exist. You have already stipulated that elements of another moral frame might, under your own system of evaluation, be superior to your own. Thus, you have no rational justification for the assertion of your moral superiority.

That simply doesn’t follow. Consider this, spiritus. I, in talking to you about this very topic, am presented with something that I did not know. The instant I find that out, I already know it. In fact, to even say “I didn’t know that” belies the truth very clearly, as in, “Until I knew that, I did not know that.” Well, no shit. The upshot is, at any given moment, I know everything. I can certainly hypothesize that there are things I don’t know. For example, I don’t know anything about the mathematical framework behind the newest version of superstring theory. I also, however, have never come across it; it simply isn’t a part of my frame. Were I to come across it in a web page or some other book, I could say, again, “Huh, I didn’t know that.” (But now I do).

As far as morality goes, which is truly the topic, an entirely analogous situation applies. I had a particular stand on abortion once, fueled by a misconception about a fact of science. As soon as I knew that this element of my thoughts were wrong, my entire opinion shifted, as necessitated by the new idea.

We agree no external, privileged reference frame exists. Thus, to say that someone who has the exact same moral system as me but with one element changed–which I would accept into my own and consider better–demonstrates that my system isn’t the best assumes that there is some external reference frame from which to show that this system is better. I may surely hypothesize that such a system exists, but a hypothetical case for my imperfection is merely mental folly. The moment I find such a thing to be true to me it is already true to me. Only in retrospect did the person have a better moral system than me, the moment I knew about the difference we became equals. Before then my system was still better because I didn’t know any different. It is only if I try to use the frame I currently exist in as a means of understanding the frame that I used to do I then come to the conclusion that I was wrong. So, then, the question is, are we justified in using the present moral frame to judge the past?

Newton was not absolutely correct before 1905. “Columbus discovered America” was not absolutely correct when they taught it to me in elementary school. The ice in my freezer is not “absolutely cold” because it is the coldest thing I can touch.

Again, what is colder than this ice, and how would you know? Why is [so-and-so’s] moral system better and how would you know? I don’t declare my system to be absolute, it is so as a consequence of my own behavior. When I see something as true, better, etc, I adopt it into my system.

It is as if we have a straight line graph with individual points here are there which are infinitely dicontinuous, like the Dirac function of QM, only strung out, one after another. The value is constant, except when it is infinity. I am always right, except for that brief instant when I can’t tell, after which I am right again.

I am always wrong in hindsight. I am always right in the present. I have nothing to say about the future in this regard.

Are you saying that because I can imagine that a system exists which is better than mine I must accept it as a fact that mine isn’t absolutely the best? What could be better than it? I don’t know, but as soon as I do know it will be a part of me anyway, so the question is somewhat moot.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

It is frustrating to attempt discussion with someone who will not define their terms even when you ask them specifically to do so. You use words in a manner which is not consistent with standard English.

I believe I am done with this.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I believe I am done with this.

That was overly harsh. I welcome a cogent discussion or moral relativism and its implications from erl or anybody else.

I will not, however, continue to run in linguistic circles with someone who refuses to take even the simplest steps toward avoiding those linguistic circles.

[erislover]

I really don’t want it to end like that.

Are we “correct” in our estimates now? Absolutely correct?

Absolute 1 a : free from imperfection
Yes, we are. To say otherwise would mean, unequivocally, that we know we are wrong. “The earth is, by our current understanding, 2 miles in diameter.” In what way is this wrong? Is it wrong in that we secretly have divined the answer but cannot measure it? If it is wrong at all it is because we feel that, given better measurement tecniques, we would get a different answer.

So, is this free from imperfection? Given arbitrarily precise intstrumentation, no. Do we have arbitrarily precise instrumentation? No. How meaningful is a hypothesis that cannot be challenged or tested (if it is not axiomatic) to you?

Not very, from the discussions we have gone through. And yet you are asking me to consider that what I know is wrong based on an idea that I am not currently possessing an arbitrarily intelligent brain. I cannot have an absolute standard of measure because we may hypothesize that I am wrong.

That is, because it cannot be demonstrated that I can devise an absolute moral system I can’t have one (note that I am not saying that you are saying one doesn’t exist).

We may take it as given that a consistent, absolute system of morals cannot be demonstrated to exist. I can admit that it is possible I am wrong. To demonstrate that I am wrong, one must find a problem with my moral system. But once a problem is found, then the system is corrected and is, again, a perfect system, by any standard of measure that I have available.

I guess, then, you are saying that absolute moral systems are flawed because we don’t have arbitrarily precise means of obtaining them. I feel absolute moral systems are not flawed because to demonstrate their problems only gives them a means to correct themselves.

I must say that, though you know I admit that human understanding is limited, you insist on feeling an absolute system must have an arbitrarily accurate means of knowing things. This cannot be the case, clearly, as our starting axiom told us as much. However, given any moment, if our system of absolutes lives up to the rulers we have at our disposal to measure them, then all is well. For if we did have arbitrarily accurate rulers, we would have an arbitrarily accurate system. Instead, we have the best rulers we have, and so we have the best system we have. If we knew of something better, we’d have that instead; and so, since we know of nothing better, it must be the best.

The equivalent is criticizing modern physical theories on the origins of matter because we don’t have a particle accelerator the size of our solar system with which to improve them.

Again, truly, I am sorry to have frustrated you to this end. It is never my intent to do such a thing.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Absolute 1 a : free from imperfection
Yes, we are. To say otherwise would mean, unequivocally, that we know we are wrong.

I do not understand your language. In my language, this conclusion makes no sense.

[erislover]

I am going to backtrack to a certain point here, covering some past ground and hopefully clearing up some misunderstandings.
[li]I accept that my powers of perception are not arbitrarily powerful. I accept this as a preson, and for the sake of this thread.[/li][li]These powers of perception leave individuals as isolated points of experience; the definition of a reference frame. I accept this for the sake of argument in this thread; I do not feel this is the case otherwise.[/li]
With the introduction of isolated reference frames, you make me wonder how on earth a person couldn’t be absolutely right since there is no standard by which to compare. I assumed implicitly, and I suppose (now) erroneously, that the present reference frame is not the same as a past reference frame; that is, the you of the present is not the you of the past. The frames are different. Your understanding of yourself as a reflection of the past is just as limited, ultimately, as the guy on the street.

However, as seems to be the case, you do not feel this way. Your reference frame is not static, on this you surely agree, but it is still the same one, much as you are still “spiritus” even though you aquire new knowledge as time progresses. OK, then. Glad we could grasp that.

Things you have said in this thread.
[list=1][li] Our understanding of good and evil is inseparable from our understanding of the world.[/li][li] The standard I apply is necessarily bounded by my perception.[/li][li] Each individual has only a single reference frame.[/li][li] Humans have no justification for asserting the nature of an absolute morality.[/li][li]“Would she place herself in the other frame? This is not possible for humans.” & “Would she combine frames into a hybrid frame to get a compare and contrast method going? This is not possible for humans.”[/list=1][/li]I will not disagree on the first point. I will not disagree on the second point. I will disagree on the third; this is where, IMO, we really start seperating moral relativism from moral absolutism.

But again, let us consider what happens when we add in the rest of the statements. Each individual has only a single frame; it is not possible to experience other frames. So, here we are, on the path to moral solipsism of a sort, and I surely did not bring it in. You reject solipsism itself axiomatically, only to bring it back in in some form of moral phenomenalism to provide the logically unbreakable barrier, through which you presume other form of morality exist just like yours which do not necessarily represent anything better than yours because there is no better out there (all frames which exist are linked to people, by definition, and all people are isolated, by definition of the frame).

So, to partially summarize, we posit others exist by rejecting solipsism; we utilize the idea of the phenomonon to isolate perception from others; so other moral systems must exist which are fundamentally like mine (bound but not possibly complete or demonstratable). Conclusion: we all have no absolute morals.

My problem with this is in what form absolute morals would take. What form would they take? They would stand up to all techniques of disproving them. What techniques do we have at our disposal? Well, this depends on how we view the past, as I mentioned above.

If we decide that the “us” of the past is the same as the “us” in the present, from the perspective of it being the same frame even though it may have grown, shrunk, whatever term applies, then surely there can be no absolutes because we have a simple standard to show ourselves we were wrong, and it is our own frame!

HOWEVER, this seems at odds, to me, with the phenomenological principle we already invoked which isolated us from the rest of perception, including our perception of ourselves. In this case, the only standard we have is the standard we create. In this manner, no form of rationality can apply because all morality becomes definitional. And since definitions are tautological, they cannot be wrong. And so, IMO, we have set ourselves up for an absolute morality.

Is this any clearer?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

I had a long and detailed reply created, which was eaten when I tried to preview. I haven’t the energy to recreate it, so I am going to hit a couple of high points.

Your usage of absolute is bizzare.
You ignore the connotations of the word, which are informed both by other definitions, standards of usage, and by the synonyms listed for the definition you chose to focus upon. Even then, the definition you have cited does not justify your usage.

For most English speakers, “absolute” is not synonymous with “as near as I can tell”.
For most English speakers, “I am right” does not reduce to “I am”.
For most English speakers, words like “perfect” and “infallible” and “correct” do not become redundancies of the verb “to be”.

No argument that I have rpesented is necessarily contigent upon the continuity of identity
This digression is too annoying to contemplate following. The futility of trading posts back and forth arguing over whether the people reading them are teh same people who wrote them is fundamentally absurd. As always, I will leave you by yourself to contemplate different facets of solipsism.

I did not introduce solipsism
I cannot see myself through your eyes, but I can see your eyes and understand that they can see me. You, apparently, can only understand that your eyes work (and work perfectly, of course, since they show you all that you can see.)

"you presume other form of morality exist just like yours which do not necessarily represent anything better than yours because there is no better out there "
I have stated more than once that “becuase there is no better out there” is a statement which cannot be reasonably supported. You have repeatedly failed to address my criticisms and continue to assert the idea as if it were valid. You now have three choices:[ul]
[li]Present a reasoned rebuttal for my arguments[/li][li]Stop using the idea in your arguments[/li][li]Talk to yourself[/li][/ul]
Your summary is marred by sloppy use of language.

Some of the questions following youe summary would probably be clear if you hadn’t been sloppy with language.

I refuse to argue continuity of existence with you
I can see no point to it. I will note, again, that none of the arguments I have presented are necessarily predicated upon continuity.

You might profit from exploring teh distinction between being the person you were and remembering the person you were, assuming, of course, that you recognize such a distinction.

Nothing is clear to me now which was not clear to the person who sat in this chair and had not read your last post.

[erislover]

Continuity of existence
There is no need to argue; I firmly believe in the continuity of my existence. I reject the idea of closed off reference frames, so I have no trouble perceiving myself, or my memories, or thinking about my own consciousness. Since you firmly believe in this as well, I have obviously come to understand what moral relativism is all about.
[li]People do not have arbitrarily powerful means of perception.[/li][li]People are locked inside their permanent reference frames, experiencing others’ frames only indirectly.[/li][li]Morality itself cannot be a demonstratably complete system.[/li]
Did I leave anything out as far as moral relativism goes? Regardless of whether or not we can agree on any implications, I would like to at least have your signature on understanding the principles themselves. We don’t need to be Christian to read the 10 Commandments.

As far as the semantic argument goes, you may read my response here.

[Spiritus_Mundi]

Since you do not wish to discuss implications, I will stick to the phrasing that I used initially:

Our understanding of good and evil is inseparable from our understanding of the world.

And, to make it explicit, add:

Human understanding of the world is bounded.

I’ll see you in teh PIT later, I guess.

[erislover]

*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi *
Our understanding of good and evil is inseparable from our understanding of the world.
Human understanding of the world is bounded.

Whew! Now that we’ve got the whole pit thing out of the way I’d like to restart the discussion of implications.

As such, I would like to start it from what I have quoted above, and forget about any of the convoluted mess above, both my comments and their responses.
Ok…

Our understanding of good and evil is inseperable from our understanding of the world. I cannot begin to imagine disagreeing with this statement. The follow up, that our perception is bounded, is also very difficult to argue with. I cannot imagine doing so. I think the problem (well, my problem) lies in where the boundry actually is.

Where is it? IMO, it is limited to our five senses, of course. Does this mean we are locked in our senses? I hardly think this is the case. When two people converse, they share experiences through experiences (ie-I explain a car wreck and you experience that explanation). If we have already tossed out solipsism and posit that other people exist, I see no need to close off perception at the level of the individual.

That is, I can perceive myself through a mirror, and I can perceive other beings. These beings are very much like the one I see in the mirror. I feel very strongly that we are of the same type of existent. As this is the case, I find it to be a reasonable assumption that, physiologically, we are similar enough that should you explain an experience to me I can trust it as though it actually occurred. That is, I have actually shared your frame of existence. The better you explain it, the closer I am to encompassing your frame. That there is a limit to this bonding is true, at least given current technology. That is, the limit of sharing as “effective communication” goes to infinity is to be the same person. We never actually get there, of course, much like infinite series never actually get to their limit either.

But I get the impression that this still isn’t moral relativism in action…

[madcowmccoy]

i agree that one’s support or lack thereof of moral certainties has much to do with one’s overall worldview.
however, speaking as an agnostic who sypathizes with atheists, i have to regard most moral constructs as extensions of the prisoner’s dilemma. morality maintains order and society’s ability to function. rape, murder, pillaging - a tribe cannot survive long if these are the orders of the day. human beings, thousands of years ago, survived in the ancestral environment by cooperating and enforcing punishments for actions that hurt the group as a whole. such actions also include small infractions like screwing over a friend, being mean in general, etc. others, like the stigma associated with adultery, stem from everyone’s general displeasure at the thought of being cheated on. (whether this is intrisically wrong or right is subjective. to some, cheating on your mate is simply another expression of our nature.) this is a gross simplification, of course, as i have little room to write. but a good book to look at would be robert wright’s “the moral animal.”
one thought that’s occurred to me is this: if there is no god, it can be argued that we ourselves are “gods,” as the one thing we looked up to was a fantasy. in which case, it would seem the task of laying out a moral code was in our hands, not god’s. in which case, we face questions like the ones we’ve been asking. so basically, we find ourselves in the same position “god” must’ve been in when he forged existence - how the hell do i determine what is right and wrong? i mean, look at the ten commandments - almost all of them deal with interpersonal interaction. think: how many sins can you commit on a desert island? besides suicide or worshiping a false god, not many. so how did this god who was basically alone in the universe (even if he had angels or something for company, it’s not as though he would have to answer to them for anything, assumming the traditional judeo-christian god model) come up with laws governing human behavior? i think he did something not unlike what we have to do. he looked at the situation, figured out what laws would be needed to keep humans alive, and wrote those down in stone. and even then, he gave himself room for flexibility. some got stoned for eating meat on a friday, beloved king david got his wrist slapped for impregnating a married woman and murdering her husband.
so if god’s obviously willing to sway this way and that, why can’t you?
that is, if you believe in god.

[Misery_Loves_Co]

Eris’ mention of physical relativism made me think of a test that was performed at some point to take a look at some part of the Theory of Relativity as it relates to Time/speed. In remembering that experiment, I observed something in your (collective) interchanges that might help (???)

I ain’t a physicist, but here goes: Some element of the Theory of Relativity states (IIRC) that as an object approaches the speed of light, time slows to nothing (or something like that - read on). In the experiment I saw they took two synchronized, high-quality stopwatches, started them simultaneously, put one on the fastest plane available and sent it speeding through the sky at high altitude. When they touched down later, they found that these synchronized watches were now a minute out of synch, thus lending some credence to the theory.

To the person on the ground, time proceeded normally. To the person on the plane, time proceeded normally. To their individual frames of reference, time was absolute.

YET. The relativistic effects held true. To the person on the ground, the person on the plane slowed down AND to the person on the plane, the person on the ground sped up.

I submit that many of Eris’ posts are speaking from the point of view of someone on either the plane or the ground, observing the actions from a subjective view. Whereas Spiritus observes as the theoretical scientist, stating and supporting an overlying theory.

Let’s say that the person on the plane dropped a ball. To his perception, that ball takes exactly the same amount of time to hit the floor as it would “normally” (I.E. on the ground), therefore time is “normal” to that person. For arguments sake, the person on the ground can time, with his/her own stopwatch, how long it takes for the ball to hit the floor. To him/her, it would fall slower. The fact that Time is Relative has NO bearing on the amount of time it takes for the ball to hit the floor. Each person can describe absolutely the behavior of the ball in terms of their own time, yet neither statement is inherantly “TRUE” or “FALSE” within the Theory of Relativity. Furthermore, PlanePerson and GroundPerson can each accept that the other exists, that the other’s observations are “true” (relatively speaking) while accepting that that the only absolute is the theory. And the Theory CAN be absolute without destroying its pwn “relativistic” nature because the absolute statement doesn’t intrinsically describe the behavior time on either plane or ground, but only its behavior in relation to each place.

Let’s see if the dog follows:
Morally speaking, to say that Morals are Relative but one can be absolute in their OWN moral belief is not paradoxical. And to say that one can’t evaluate another’s moral belief except FROM the point of view of their own moral belief is axiomatic.

I hope this makes sense to someone besides me. For the record, I want to say that your exchange of posts has given me a mental hard-on. Thank you both!

[Spiritus_Mundi]

erl

I think the problem (well, my problem) lies in where the boundry actually is.

Where is it? IMO, it is limited to our five senses

Well, this is a standard phenolmenological approach, and I think we could certainly frame an argument from here, but it will take some groundwork. If we really want to discuss morality, then we might be able to shift up the ladder a bit and accept that human beings perceive moral elements in their environment. The totality of a person’s perception of moral elements constitutes his moral reference frame, and the boundary of his frame is defined by the difference between his frame and the set of all moral elements in the Universe.

Now, if we can begin here it alleviates the problematic issues of defining consciousness as a sense-based phenomenological entity, etc. Can we agree that consciousness exists and that human consciousness is capable of moral perception?

madcowmccoy
I don’t think it is necessary to bring in the “god identification” unless one defines god “a being who can authorize a moral decision”. It seems counterproductive to me since it is likely to raise a numbe rof side issues which are not pertinent to moral relativism (they may be pertinent to some absolute moral systems, but that’s a different discussion).

MLC
You might want to read the PIT thread that erl started (it is linked in his post above). We dealt specifically with semantical questions regarding the use of absolute under this specific context. You might find it enjoyable.

[erislover]

*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi *
Can we agree that consciousness exists and that human consciousness is capable of moral perception?

Certainly. After the epistemology thread I’m not sure I am ready to tackle the issues there on a message board; or if indeed they can be rightly treated on one.

At any rate, I am asuming you take the phenomenological approach, which is why we were bounded within our own frame. I’m not sure how to develop an idea like that without it, in fact.

But, anyway, I think we can tackle that, with our conscious understanding of the world we would tack on moral evaluations. In fact, I would dare say that consciousness required moral judgements to take the place of instinct. Instinctually there is no good and bad, only reactionary responses. The consciousness handles this by making moral evaluations. No?

[Spiritus_Mundi]

The consciousness handles this by making moral evaluations. No?

Sure. I’m not wedded to any particular explanation for “why” we have moral perception. Yours is as good a story as any (though a bit short on plot ;)).

Anyway – we have now established that people have a frame of moral perception which is bounded in that it does not consist of all moral elements in the Universe.

Now, from what you have posted before I think you have no problems with the assertion that other people also have moral perception, and thus moral frames.

Now – to the meat: are these frames distinct, and what does it mean if they are?

I say, yes. Because I cannot share all elements of your moral peception I cannot share your moral frame. But that is not the same as saying that your moral frame and my moral frame have no elements in common.

To use an illustration from physics:
erl stands 100’ away from me and fires an MP3 playing “Hit me Baby One More Time” out of a cannon. The cannon is silent (Magnetic propulsion, perhaps). The MP3, unfortunately, is not. It hurls toward me at 200 mph! erl and I both suffer the unimaginable horror that is Brittany’s voice, but relativistic effects mean that the cacophony is shifted in pitch. We do not share all perceptual elemnents. We share some perceptual elements (wavelength of light passing through the atmosphere, etc.) to a high (perhaps arbitrary) degree of accuracy. But we do not share physical reference frames because some elements are perceptibly distinct.

Thankfully, when the MP3 finally shatters against teh wall behind me will will share a deep sense of relief.