Moral relativism- all that we can say?

Great Debates
41

You know, as temping as they are, there is always a point where even the best analogy fails.

Are our frames really distinct? I did sorta cover this above, with my kookie formula explanation. Are frames translatable? Not, is there a one-to-one correspondence between moral valuations in my frame to your frame, I think this is demonstratably false(since many people don’t have “functions” as moral guides… that is, it is a relation instead of a function). But, hypothetically, if one person could share experiences would they come up with the same moral system? Assuming all humans are created physiologically equal, for the moment.

It would seem to be the case, since we would draw the same understanding from the same experiences.

But, of course, we aren’t physiologically the same, so our frames must be different and, most likely, non-translatable. Hail Eris, here I go again. Now I’ve got the image in my head of mapping the idea of a black hole onto the idea of a moral frame. sigh

I call no more analogies. :stuck_out_tongue:

Ok. Frames are non-translatable; there can be no one-to-one mapping of one frame to another, at least not a guaranteed existence of such a map. No doubt one is still possible. If entire frames aren’t translatable, we would wonder if individual components are translatable. That is, can we understand the elements of another’s understanding.

Of course, else we wouldn’t be having a conversation (though, as the PIT thread shows, this understanding doesn’t come easy :p). So here we are now, Enhanced Moral Relativism:
[li]Our perception of moral valuations are inexorably linked with our perception of the world.[/li][li]Our perception is bounded.[/li][li]The set of an individuals perceptions (and hence moral evaluations) are non-translatable to other frames (which would seperate moral relativism from general relativity, and the blessed analogy fails)[/li][li]Some elements of the set of perceptions are translatable.[/li]
Now, some more ideas. We cannot guarantee if any particular element of a set of moral perceptions can be translatable. We also cannot be have a higher confidence in perception of a successful moral unit (oh no, a quanta?) translation than we were in our confidence of the perception which led to the moral unit itself.

Would you agree with those statements?

42

I’m not sure I can agree with this. Perhaps the issue here is our shift in language from “share” to “translate”. I see no theoretical reason why a moral frame could not be fully “translated” if it could be fully delineated. Now, I have no technique for doing so now, so as a practical matter the point is moot. Once we allow for some elements to be translated, though, we are on shaky ground asserting that other elements cannot be translated unless we have a method for distinguishing between those two subsets. Did you have one in mind?

As I said, I would need to know why you are excepting some moral elements from “translatability”, and how, before I can agree to this.

Correct, if I understand what you mean by “translation”. Is this what you mean:
[li]We perceive moral element E[/li][li]E is not a subset of Morals[sub]us[/sub][/li][li]We incorporate our understanding of E into Morals[sub]us[/sub] (we translate it)[/li]In that case, we can have no more confidence in E than we do in any other element of Morals[sub]us[/sub]. We also cannot have unbounded confidence that {E:element Morals[sub]us[/sub]} == {E:element Morals[sub]other[/sub]}

Is that what you mean?

43

Well, share and translate don’t quite have the same meaning here. I could share some ideas of morality, an element of Morals[sub]erl[/sub], but there is certainly no guarantee you would take it up, or even recognize its validity. To both recognize its validity and take it up is translating that element. We have rotated the moral tensor into the appropriate frame.

It is my understanding that there is no guarantee that one may “rotate” the elements of one frame and end up with another’s frame; that is, it is possible that my moral system could never be understood or incorporated by you even by removing a restriction of bounded perception, simply because the way we understand things is different.

To say otherwise would mean that all frames really were “equal” (note the quotes); that is, what I mentioned before, “Had you seen what I’ve seen you wouldn’t think that way.” Ultimately, for this to be false (or at least not true in all cases), it must lie in the non-translational quality of the frame.

As I said, though, I see no way to guarantee if a particular moral element could be translated. But it seems certain that, because people understand things differently, that one cannot simply translate an entire frame given ideal situations.

More like
[li]I percieve an element of Morals[sub]Spiritus[/sub][/li][li]I incorporate that element into Morals[sub]erl[/sub][/li][li]You do not have a higher confidence in a successful translation than you do in perception which created the element in the first place[/li][li]My confidence in the translation cannot be greater than the confidence of “raw” perceived moral elements [elements which weren’t translated, but which I created by my perception][/li]
In a nutshell, The only thing I’m sure of is that I’m more sure of what I believe than what you’ve led me to believe.

44

Why? It is now simply another element of “what you believe”?

I think the whole idea of “translatability” is a separate issue. Who cares if I happen to take up a particular moral element? That is a transitory property of my individual moral set, it does not imply a property for all moral sets or even a limitation upon the possibilities of my moral set.

The fact that I cannot guarantee you will accept E has no implications for your ability to accept E.

When I said “share”, I was meaning specifically “experience moral elements from a perspective that is indistinguishable from your own.” I cannot share your moral frame. I may be able to share elements of your moral frame. I cannot enjoy unbounded confidence that I share any element with you.

When I say that humans cannot share a moral frame, this is a conclusion based upon empirical observation. I know of no theoretical property of “moral sets” that demands such segregation, but I know of no human capacity which would allow complete reprodution of a moral set. (Damn! – why did you have to call no analogies?)

I really think the issue of “translation” is an unfortunate digression at this point. We should make sure we are clear about what moral relativism is before we worry about how it spreads.

Well, I’m not wure why you felt the need to dissolve the fiction that we were sharing an understanding :wink: . . . But I have a couple of nits to pick with your wording:[ul]
[li]You do not incorporate that element. You incorporate your perception of that element. Your perception may or may not be accurate.[/li][li]The lack of confidence does not lie in the “translation”. It lies in the perception/understanding. You can have exactly the same confidence in a moral element that you perceive today after being informed by Morals[sub]spiritus[/sub] that you do in a moral element that you perceived yesterday without perception of my moral frame. It is your ability to perceive/understand that is bounded. The “translation” is simply an internal method of acting upon that understanding.[/li][li]The distinction between “raw” and “translated” elements is a fiction. They are all dependent upon your perception.[/ul][/li]I think we are generally in agreement, here, but the details can be important.

45

Exactly. But I would say that the perception of an element of your morals is a second order perception; it is a perception of a judgement based on a perception. I may be as confident of it as I am of a first order moral perception, but I certainly couldn’t be more. “The only thing I’m sure of” is a bit off, since it doesn’t allow for a state of equal confidence which I admit could exist.

I think the issue of sharing/translation is very important for it deals with the priviledged frame or equlity of frames.

46

While I probably shouldn’t intrude into a perfectly lovely dialogue which doesn’t need my input, I’ve a couple questions for you’s two. These are questions near and dear to my heart, and you’re the most likely pair of posters to help me hash out some answers. However, if you feel the questions are too disruptive, I’ll just cool my heels until another opportunity develops. Anyway, here goes…

Assuming that discourse is an adequate tool for communicating moral elements between individuals with differing moral frames of reference:[ul][]Is discourse also an adequate tool for comparison of similar elements in different moral sets (E:elementMorals[sub]Spiritus[/sub] & E:elementMorals[sub]erl[/sub]), and[]if such comparisons can be made, can we expect that the differences caused by perceptual inconsistencies, although they can never be completely resolved to any degree of confidence, can be minimized to the point where the elements are effectively equivalent (i.e. E:elementMorals[sub]Spiritus[/sub] prompts the same ethical considerations in Spiritus Mundi as E:elementMorals[sub]erl[/sub] prompts in erislover)?If such effectively equivalent elements can be created between individuals, can moral relativism be nullified within a finite group through discourse?[/ul]

47

Well, now we are regressing back to fundamental phenomenology. This is true for all moral perception, and I thought we had alreadt agreed that we might begin from the point at which human beings perceive moral elements. I don’t disagree with your point, but it slides us back into the whole “conscious::perception” phenomenological quagmire. That can be a fun discussion, too, but I think it will be a long detour if we choose to take it.

This I don’t get. What is a first order moral perception? All moral elements are perceived through the same active mechanism (consciousness). Unless you are arguing for an inherent direct moral “sense” (I Kant imagine why).

Sharing does, translation doesn’t. Translation deals with the modification of one frame in accordance with perceived elements from another frame. If I “translate” element E I can no longer be assured that it is identical to the element E in your moral set. Full sharing of another moral frame would be an assertion of “privelege”. Full translation of another frame is an assertion of (perhaps imperfect) understanding.

I don’t know what you mean by “equality”. Earlier you mentioned a one-to-one correspondence of elements, but this seems to me an irrelevant measure. (WHich I long to illustrate with an analogy, damnit!)

48

[QUOTE
Assuming that discourse is an adequate tool for communicating moral elements between individuals with differing moral frames of reference:[ul]
[li]Is discourse also an adequate tool for comparison of similar elements in different moral sets (E:elementMorals[sub]Spiritus[/sub] & E:elementMorals[sub]erl[/sub]), and[]if such comparisons can be made, can we expect that the differences caused by perceptual inconsistencies, although they can never be completely resolved to any degree of confidence, can be minimized to the point where the elements are effectively equivalent (i.e. E:elementMorals[sub]Spiritus[/sub] prompts the same ethical considerations in Spiritus Mundi as E:elementMorals[sub]erl[/sub] prompts in erislover)?[]If such effectively equivalent elements can be created between individuals, can moral relativism be nullified within a finite group through discourse?[/ul][/li][/QUOTE]

[li] Quibble: discourse is not a tool for comparison, though it can be used to communicate comparisons made with other tools. With that quibble, yes. The word to focus on, of course, is “adequate”. So long as we recognize that any understanding (and the comparisons built upon same) does not enjoy unbounded confidence, we may make comparisons and act upon them.[/li][li]Rather than trust in the dialectical rpocess, here, I would point to the process of communication itself. We may, through communication, achieve a (bounded) confidence that E:elementMorals[sub]erl[/sub] is indistinguishable from E:elementMorals[sub]Spiritus[/sub]. The question of “prompting a response”, I think, requires far more than that a single element be regarded as identical. Except in the most degenerate cases a moral response is informed by more than just a single moral element.[/li][li]Even granting the effectiveness of a dialectical convergence of moral elements, consensus in no way nullifies moral relativism. Each person still reaches that consensus from a distinct moral frame. However – if the consensus were “perfect”, it would create an empirical situation which would make moral relativism irrelevant and unnecessarily complex as an explanation for human morality.[/li]
Now stop be so blasted self-effacing. Your input is always welcome in a thoughtful discussion. If erl and I wanted to discourage “intrusion”, we would be awfully silly to post messages on a public board. :wink:

49

The perception of a moral principle from you is different than one that I simply perceive on my own.

Consider… you perceive a moral element “in the raw.” You have a less than 100% confidence that this perception is accurate.

Now, you share this perception with me. I perceive that perception. I have less than 100% confidence that that perception was correct.

Doesn’t this mean (say both were “actually” 99% accurate) that the net result is I’ve incorporated a moral element with 99% of 99% confidence, or at a 99% confidence rate? Just to put some numbers to it.

More on sharing and translation
Well, I can’t help but use the term from a hidden analogy there. I agree with the use of sharing keeping the element intact throughout the “movement” and that a translation would actually change the element (from the original frame) with respect to the frame it gets incorporated to.

I’m not sure where I’m going with it now. Maybe I’ll remember in a bit.

50

Yep, though accurate carries a number of implications which may trouble us later on. Still, I can’t think of a better way to phrase the concept right now.

I think I see where we are disagreeing. You are talking about the confidence that my moral perception is the same as your moral perception. I mentioned the same problem a few posts ago (We also cannot have unbounded confidence that {E:element Morals[sub]us[/sub]} == {E:element Morals[sub]other[/sub]}).

That is a different question than the confidence we have that E is “accurate”. I see no way to meaningfully compare the two confidence levels in the abstract case: one refers to a confidence in understanding/communication, the other refers to confidence that my individual moral perception is “accurate”. (Shall we try to pin down what we mean by that? If we do not allow ourselves an idealized “perfect morality” for comparison, we must necessarily define accuracy in terms of a personal understanding. For me, this becomes a feedback loop. I have some underlying values which I have determined to be basic to my moral system; individual perceptions are measured against those abstract principalsl; those abstract principals are also continually revalidated against individual moral perceptions. Thus, while I do not derive my morals from utilitarianism, nevertheless utilitarian analysis does play a part in my moral system, primarily as a check on the hazards of uncompromising ideaology.)

Anyway – in the measure of “accuracy”, my moral perception of your moral precept is as direct as my moral perception of anything else (again, barring an inherent and direct “moral sense”.)

51

Hmm. Well, perhaps we cannot combine the two meaningfully, but nevertheless they remain there. I have two sources of confidence loss, while the original perceiver has only one.

Hmm, as far as accurate goes, I agree that we shouldn’t have a perfect moral element on which to judge this “accuracy.” What then does accuracy actually mean? This is interesting. We aren’t sure our perception of a moral element is correct, but correct in what way? I see that, as you mentioned, a “good” way to do this is to gauge its consistency with the core of the system and see if it is either consistent (leads to no consitency problems) or if it is a deeper element… like a new axiom.

Ok, I think we can start letting some analogies slip in, but no way can either of us let them be anything more than an aide for picturing the point we’re making.

At any rate, there is–possibly–more than one source of error in perceiving moral elements from another person. For a moral element to be successfully shared, an understanding of the development of that element (since our understanding of good and evil comes from our understanding of the world) is what truly needs to be communicated. Sharing a moral element necessarily involves sharing ideas on understanding the world.

52

Hmmm – again, we are talking about 2 entirely different things.
[li]I have confidence C[sub]1[/sub] that I am "accurate: in my moral perception of E[sub]Spiritus[/sub][/li][li]I have confidence C[sub]2[/sub] that E[sup]Spiritus[/sub] == E[sub]erl[/sub][/li]C[sub]1[/sub] is independent of C[sub]2[/sub].

It sounds like you are actually talking about translating again, not sharing, though a similar process would need to be used to give us confidence that a moral element is truly shared between frames.

With that caveat, I agree with you as an principa=le of my own relative morality, but it does not seem to hold across all moral systems. Many people, for instance, accept dictation from authority as a valid means of adopting a new moral element. In such a case, it is not necessary to communicate “why” or “how”, only “what”.

53

Memo to self[ul]
Always preview when using subscripts.
Always preview when using subscripts.
Always preview when using subscripts.
Always preview when using subscripts.[/ul]

Um, is there a mod in the house?

54

Hmmm. Yesssss… but, C[sub]1[/sub] is the standard for the confidence in C[sub]2[/sub]. That is, you couldn’t judge the E[sub]erl[/sub]==E[sub]sm[/sub] without having E[sub]sm[/sub], and its corresponding C[sub]1[/sub] in the first place. That is, your measure of C[sub]2[/sub] is dependent on your perception of C[sub]1[/sub].

You say that the degree of confidence in [you] perceiving my acceptance of E[sub]sm[/sub] is independant of your perception of E[sub]sm[/sub]? Hmm.

You don’t feel that such a system which includes a method for adopting “authoritative elements” (AE) implies a method for understanding the world around them?
“I understand that my local police force think that stealing is bad. Thus, I think stealing is bad because they understand the world better than I. I don’t think drinking and driving is bad.”
Some time later…
“It has come to my attention that the local law enforcement declares drinking and driving to be bad.” Wouldn’t you say that that person’s understanding of the world has changed? The fact that they don’t understand the “why” surely doesn’t eclipse the idea that understanding must be adusted, changed, or added to in order to accomodate a new moral element?

55

[QUOTE
Yesssss… but, C[sub]
1[/sub] is the standard for the confidence in C[sub]2[/sub]. That is, you couldn’t judge the E[sub]erl[/sub]==E[sub]sm[/sub] without having E[sub]sm[/sub], and its corresponding C[sub]1[/sub] in the first place.

[/quote]

I disagree. You are treating understanding and adopting as if they are interdependent. This is not the case. I adopt my understanding of E. I have confidence C[sub]1[/sub] that E is "correct.

I have an entirely independent confidence that E[sub]**Spiritus[/b[/sub] == E[sub]**erl[/b[/sub]. This confidence might be greater or less than C[sub]1[/sub]. To illustrate:
[li]You convince me that “E” carries a specific moral valuation.[/li][li]I accept “E”, but it does not accord unambiguously with the core of my moral sytem. I thus have a low degree of confidence in my perception of “E”, though you have convinced me that I should incorporate that element into my morality.[/li][li]C[sub]1[/sub] is small.None of the above implies a limitation upon my ability to understand how erl vealuates “E”. Thus, it implies no bound upon C[sub]2[/sub].[/li]

No – it is dependent upon my perception of E[sub]erl[/sub]

That isn’t the point you raised. You said that communication of a moral element “E” was dependent upon our ability to communicate our understanding of the world. I disagree.

Your ability to communicate “E” to me depends upon my understanding of the world, but it does not require that I correctly perceive your understanding of the world.

Yes, but that change was not dependent upon a better understanding of how the police perceive the world. A moral element “E” was communicated – no deeper understanding of the worldview which leads to the valuation of “E” was required.

56

Note to self:

Pay attention to your damn notes to self!!!

57

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi *
[li]You convince me that “E” carries a specific moral valuation.[/li][li]I accept “E”, but it does not accord unambiguously with the core of my moral sytem. I thus have a low degree of confidence in my perception of “E”, though you have convinced me that I should incorporate that element into my morality.[/li][li]C[sub]1[/sub] is small.None of the above implies a limitation upon my ability to understand how erl vealuates “E”. Thus, it implies no bound upon C[sub]2[/sub].[/li][/quote]

Argh. I convince you that Eerl[sub]1[/sub] carries a specific moral valuation. You accept that Eerl[sub]1[/sub] exists to me, AND you also “see” that this element correlates strongly with your system. This is your C[sub]2[/sub], or, Csm[sub]2[/sub].

For me, it is my Cerl[sub]1[/sub], that is, the perception of a moral element “in the raw.” My Cerl[sub]2[/sub] is the perception of sharing… how confident am I that your perception of Eerl[sub]1[/sub]==my perception of Eerl[sub]1[/sub]? This is not the same as your Csm[sub]2[/sub], which is the confidence you have that I could have perceived the element in the first place. Cx[sub]1[/sub] is the confindence in perception of a moral element period. Cx[sub]2[/sub] is the confidence in the act of sharing in the case of the share-er, and the confidence in the original perception in the case of the share-ee. Did the “copy” action of Eerl[sub]1[/sub]–>Esm[sub]1[/sub] maintain the integrity of the original? Or, is erl’s C[sub]1[/sub] for this element rather low?

Hmm. I suppose I can see that “maintaining the original” sort of “sets” C[sub]1[/sub] to 100% for the action of copying, so perhaps I am yanking my own chain there. As well, it doesn’t really matter whether or not you have confidence in my moral perception abilities, only in your own. Ok. Nevermind C[sub]2[/sub].

I agree here. Let us say, then, that our morality and understanding of the world are inexorably linked, and to change one is to affect the other. This is a more clearly stated version of our original supposition, that our understanding of good and evil is linked to our understanding of the world. It actually can work both ways (depending on the moral perception and frame of the individual), which is sort of interesting.

58

Um . . . I tried to be explicit about what I was calling C[sub]1[/sub] and C[sub]2[/sub]. At no time have I considered the question of whether “E[sub]erl[/sub]” is a vlid moral perception under MoralsE[sub]erl[/sub]. I cannot imagine how I could presume to judge such a valuation except through your assertion.

[li]I have confidence in “E” as a moral perception under Morality[sub]Spiritus[/sub][/li][li]I have confidence that E[sub]Spiritus[/sub] == E[sub]erl[/sub][/li]
Those two confidence levels are independent. Really, let’s keep it to one side of the equation until we are clear. Comparing my confidence levels to yours just muddles things.

And, yes, the link works in both directions.