Ok, I guess someone may as well actually read the ruling;
[QUOTE=The Supreme Court, McCutcheon v. FEC]
The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute.Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect againstcorruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26–27. It may not, however, regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrictthe political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___.
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Significant First Amendment interests are implicated here. Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individual’sright to participate in the electoral process through both political expression and political association… In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole point of the FirstAmendment is to protect individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as useful to the democratic process. Pp. 14–18.
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This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741. Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends largesums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or political parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 359. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights, and the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S. 449, 457 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). Pp. 18–21.
The Government argues that the aggregate limits further thepermissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount, even though Congress’s selection of a base limitindicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in anymeaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley’s fear that an individual might “contribute massiveamounts of money to a particular candidate through . . . unearmarked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U.S., at 38, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckley’s circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive“massive amounts of money” that could be traced back to a particulardonor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Government’s scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or implausible. Pp. 21–30.
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From what I’m seeing here, it seems like a sound decision to me; the aggregate limit on donations to individual candidates does not meet a constitutional standard for limiting the individual’s right to political participation. Perhaps you should be less peeved at the Court for making the ruling than you ought to be at the Constitution for allowing the ruling to be made.