Asymmetric warfare and WW2

Great Debates
21

Missed the edit window…

I did want to agree themenin that the France vs. Poland comparisons are only useful to a certain degree. The reason for this being the Nazi’s view of the respective peoples. As has been said before by me and others, they saw Slavs as an inferior race who needed to be exterminated to make way for German expansion. Whereas they saw France (as well as the UK and the United States) as more or less equals who’s cultures they respected. So in that sense, it is not fair to attribute the destruction of Poland due to the fact that they fought more stubbornly, as Hitler was out to destroy the country anyway.

As an aside, I am always bemused by the fact that Hitler favorably viewed the US as a positive example of what a Nordic people could accomplish when they had their “inferior” races in line.

22

[QUOTE=Sailboat]
It’s worthwhile to cite John Keegan’s opinion, which is generally that the Nazis spent far less effort fighting Resistance forces than we’d like to believe. See his books The Second World War and Intelligence in War.

Here’s an excerpt from a NY Times review of the latter:

Even the storied resistance fighters in occupied Europe working with Allied secret agents to harass the Nazis are not spared Keegan’s relentless rationality. Granting the extraordinary courage of these men and women – courage that nourished hope and revived the honor of conquered peoples – their efforts provoked such brutal retaliation by the Germans, Keegan concludes, that they ‘‘brought nothing but suffering’’ to the resisters and their innocent compatriots. As for the military value of the resistance, it ‘‘harmed the German occupiers scarcely at all.’’

Sailboat
[/QUOTE]

I do believe it was Keegan I read, I think in his history of WW2 though.

I remember at the time thinking that, generally speaking, the casual student of history is lead to believe that resistance to the Nazis was a very significant factor in their downfall (and provide a satisfying sense of correctness - in the form of brutality breeding its own reward in the form of resistance).

Allegedly, this was not true in Western Europe; the most effective resistance was in places with more inaccessible terrain, like Yugoslavia, or in parts of occupied Russia/Ukraine, where it was supported by the Red Army.

The thought that this resistance was over-stated seemed counter-intuitive.

23

France’s surrender, in my opinion, can be directly related to the bloody losses of WWI. (More later, if I have time for it.)

24

[QUOTE=E-Sabbath]
France’s surrender, in my opinion, can be directly related to the bloody losses of WWI. (More later, if I have time for it.)
[/QUOTE]

Agree completely here. As I mentioned about Poland, due to their recent history, they were more likely to fight to their ruin. France on the otherhand, who had bled themselves dry at Verdun for nothing, didn’t want a repeat of WWI.

25

Ironically, the entire disaster which was WWI can also be traced to French military leadership… or lack thereof. The U. S. of A. learned much faster not to assault trenches in the same manner with far less powerful guns. Why the French (and to a lesser extent the German and British) command kept at it remains a mystery.

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[QUOTE=smiling bandit]
Ironically, the entire disaster which was WWI can also be traced to French military leadership… or lack thereof. The U. S. of A. learned much faster not to assault trenches in the same manner with far less powerful guns. Why the French (and to a lesser extent the German and British) command kept at it remains a mystery.
[/QUOTE]

I read a fascinating report on trench warfare that the shells being used to bombard the trenches just weren’t effective like the entente believed them to be. Supposedly, the shells couldn’t penetrate far enough to do that much damage, thus the huge bombardments, like the one before the Marne, didn’t do what they were supposed to have. So that when the infantry went over the top at positions that had supposedly been “softened up” they were really charging into full strength defenses.

Although I would be careful either blame the entente or give the U.S. too much credit in WWI. Both sides repeated the mistake of trench warefare; and the U.S. made a contribution more by being unexhausted by years of battle than any great strategic innovation.

27

[QUOTE=smiling bandit]
Ironically, the entire disaster which was WWI can also be traced to French military leadership… or lack thereof. The U. S. of A. learned much faster not to assault trenches in the same manner with far less powerful guns. Why the French (and to a lesser extent the German and British) command kept at it remains a mystery.
[/QUOTE]

Actually Shirer explains this in another book The Collapse of the Third Republic. It was a popular notion in the French military Academy at the end of the 19th century that the key to French military success was offensive audacity, which would loose something called “Gallic Rage.”

28

[QUOTE=MichaelQReilly]
Although I would be careful either blame the entente or give the U.S. too much credit in WWI. Both sides repeated the mistake of trench warefare; and the U.S. made a contribution more by being unexhausted by years of battle than any great strategic innovation.
[/QUOTE]

I wasn’t actually talking about WWI with that statement. I was referring to the Civil War. It was difficult, but we developed the basic combat doctrines which we continue to use to this day; mobility, concentration, offensive punch, dispersal.

The key was the mobility part. While it was certainly true that the Euro-soldiers were tired and worn down, they also lacked the mobility of U.S. forces. Later on, of course, The Wehrmacht came back and taught everyone a thing or three about mobility.

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[QUOTE=smiling bandit]
I wasn’t actually talking about WWI with that statement. I was referring to the Civil War. It was difficult, but we developed the basic combat doctrines which we continue to use to this day; mobility, concentration, offensive punch, dispersal.

The key was the mobility part. While it was certainly true that the Euro-soldiers were tired and worn down, they also lacked the mobility of U.S. forces. Later on, of course, The Wehrmacht came back and taught everyone a thing or three about mobility.
[/QUOTE]

Thanks for clarifying about the Civil War, I agree with what you are saying. About WWI though, how do you remain mobile and assault positions when you simply lack the offensive weapons to overcome their defenses?

I used to think that the generals in WWI were all conceited, short-sighted morons with little regard for casualties. When I put that question to a very sharp professor that I had, he pointed out that many of the generals when removed from the western front were quite successful; and that the eastern front, which was less geographically constrained, was very mobile and dynamic.

30

[QUOTE=MichaelQReilly]
I read a fascinating report on trench warfare that the shells being used to bombard the trenches just weren’t effective like the entente believed them to be. Supposedly, the shells couldn’t penetrate far enough to do that much damage, thus the huge bombardments, like the one before the Marne, didn’t do what they were supposed to have. So that when the infantry went over the top at positions that had supposedly been “softened up” they were really charging into full strength defenses.
[/QUOTE]

One of the tactics the Germans took to using was to “abandon” the forward positions during bombardments, and pull back out of range. Thus, the artillery ended up falling on noone, after the initial first few minutes. After the artillery stopped, the Germans would then rush back up front (into the handy new shell holes) to beat off an expected attack.

The Allies got wise to this, and would do bombardments in “bursts”, trying to catch the Germans coming back forward, or do attacks without artillery prep, and so forth. None of that really helped in solving the problems of overcoming a fortified defense… at least, not on it’s own.

Smaller unit tactics was found to be the key.

The generals (generally) were all tied up into thinking in terms of Division/Corp/Army, especially when they were put in command of a million men.

Since they honestly could not think of why their meticulus planning failed (with artillery timetables, jump off times, supply levels looked after, paths of advance for battalions all laid out), they tended to blame the grunts. Not enough fighting spirit, or lack of ammo, the weather, lack of reserves, whatever.

“Can’t be my plan. I have gone over it for months. I accounted for every conceivable detail. Must be some other fault not in my control.”

31

“If you mean, “Are we all going to get killed?” Yes. Clearly, Field Marshal Haig is about to make yet another gargantuan effort to move his drinks cabinet six inches closer to Berlin.”

-Black Adder Goes Forth: Captain Cook

32

Why weren’t the populations of France, Holland, etc., exterminated? Perhaps, in part, because until late 1942 the Germans didn’t even know how to exterminate the Jews efficiently (and without leaving a ‘smoking gun’, i.e. millions of bodies).

In Operation Barbarosa (June 1941), following closely behind the Wehrmacht front line troops, were groups charged with the extermination of Jews and other “undesirables”, eg. commisars. These Einsatzgruppen, simply shot their victims, often with a bullet to the nape of the neck. However, reports soon began to filter back to Himmler and his SS cronies that the soldiers of the Einsatzgruppen were clearly not able to handle the psychological burden of slaughtering millions of civilians, including children. Hence, the need for a less personal method.

The result was Operation Reinhard in 1942. By that time, however, the war was beginning to go against Germany (the battle of Stalingrad began in August 1942) and its ability to engage any major effort on the Western Front, including extermination of the civilian population, was severely curtailed.

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[QUOTE=KarlGauss]
Why weren’t the populations of France, Holland, etc., exterminated? Perhaps, in part, because until late 1942 the Germans didn’t even know how to exterminate the Jews efficiently (and without leaving a ‘smoking gun’, i.e. millions of bodies).
[/quote]

Don’t forget the racial factor. The Nazis never had any intention of mass extermination of French or Belgians.

This is partly true. The Wehrmacht itself had some problems with these kinds of massacres, though they managed to inflict a number. SS units, and surprisingly, units of young and old reservists (or auxiliaries or whatnot) were pretty good at extermination.

I understand the real reason they pulled out of using the Einzatsgruppen was sheer logistics. They needed a more efficient way to do it.

34

[QUOTE=smiling bandit]

I understand the real reason they pulled out of using the Einzatsgruppen was sheer logistics. They needed a more efficient way to do it.
[/QUOTE]
Yes, indeed, that was also part of the rationale for the change.