I was watching a game tonight, here’s the scenario. Tampa is up 3-1, bottom of the 9th, Baltimore at bat, bases loaded, 2 out. The Tampa coach calls the outfield to play “in” (shallow). Now usually they pull the outfield in so if they field the ball they have a chance of throwing a runner out at the plate. Tampa can afford one run to score, even two runs would only be a tie game. Why would the Tampa coach call the outfield in for this situation? Seems to me, if one “gets by” the outfielder, they lose.
I have never seen it done with two outs. It’s usually done with less than two outs when a deep fly can win the game anyway.
Who was at bat? What was his stats for the game? Had he put any in the outfield all day?
Piniella probably brought the outfield in closer than normal, but not as close as a potential game-ending situation.
The latter is sometimes called “softball” depth and then the outfielders are usually only about 10-15 feet from the edge of the infield. In that situation, you are trying to prevent ANY ball from landing. No bloop hits, nothing.
If the outfield is just brought in close, that is just to make it easier to have a play at the plate on a ground ball single.
Here’s my not-so-expert analysis:
Outfield standard depth:
Routine single: One run scores.
Long single: Two, possibly three runs score.
Blooper single: One, possible two runs score.
Long fly ball: Out.
Outfield pulled in:
Routine single: If not hit directly at a fielder, it will get by the outfield, three runs score.
Long single: Three runs score.
Blooper single: One run scores.
Long fly ball: Three runs score.
The strategy is usually used with the bases loaded in a tied game and there’s less than two outs. The theory is that any long fly will score the tying run anyway, so you station your outfielders close to the infield on the chance that they can either catch a line drive or throw out the runner at the plate. If you remember the Grand Slam Single, you might notice the Atlanta outfielders positioned that way, and that they started leaving the field as soon as the ball was obviously over their heads.
Not sure why it would be done with two outs, though, unless the hitter was a slap hitter unlikely to hit a fly ball.
In last week’s final Red Sox Yankees debacle, the Red Sox played for portions of innings with only two outfielders, with the final outfielder stacking the infield first on one side then the other (depending on the batter). Any outfield hit would score the runner on third, ending the game. Somehow they managed to get out of the inning.
I made some edits in bold. This is JMO, but with 2 outs, the runners are going on contact, and should score from second on routine singles.
Right, but to continue. . .first of all, Brian Roberts was at the plate for the O’s. He’s basically got ZERO power. Small guy with speed. Let’s look at the cases.
Long fly ball: advantage, scenario 1
Blooper single: advantage, scenario 2.
Long single: advantage, scenario 1.
Routine single: tough to say. let’s call it a wash.
So, it looks like scenario 1 has the advantage, but if you weight the possibilities based on what you expect Brian Roberts to actually do, scenario 2 has the advantage. That is, assuming BR gets the ball to the outfield, the blooper single is weighted maybe 75% and the rest are split up among 25%.
Now, that’s kind of simplistic. Maybe Lou thought that a “tie” was as good as a “loss” right there (because his bull pen was torched, or whatever). That would weight his decision towards scenario ‘2’ also because scenario ‘1’ has more cases where two runs score – and we’re assuming a tie is equal to a loss.
That’s maybe giving Lou a lot of benefit of the doubt.
There aren’t many managers that would risk the LOSS on one batter, when the TIE was more easily assured.
It’s a risky call, but if Lou knew the pticher-hitter matchup, the state of his bullpen, and other factors, this is the kind of thing that makes some managers great.