"at least 13 of the 23 escapees were convicted al-Qaida fighters, who escaped via a 140-yard-long tunnel ‘‘dug by the prisoners and co-conspirators outside.’’
Yemeni officials confirmed to Interpol that a man considered a mastermind of the Cole attack, identified as Jamal al-Badawi, was among those who escaped."
Let us take at face value (for the nonce) the characterizations of culpability and high Al Q status set forth in the cite.
Does this incident not underline the perils of a foreign policy that promotes nominally compliant goverments (eg, pakistan) which are unable (or unwilling?) to bring the full cooperation of their people along in the effort to advance our interests.
Do we believe that this escape was consummated with no “inside” help?
If so, these guys deserve a movie.
(Steve McQueen, get your baseball ready…)
If there was jailor complicity in the escape, does this mean we must insist on the extradition to the US of any Al Q suspect?
Why didn’t we do so in this case of the Cole bombers?
With 500+ guys at Gitmo (including at least several already cleared for release…) shouldn’t these men (some already tried and convicted) have been there instead of a Yemeni prison?(Disclaimer:No one “should” be at Gitmo, but if anyone is there, why not these guys?)
How are we going to handle the problem of insufficient zeal in the security forces of our nominal allies? In other words, even if we impose “regime change” on the unfriendly, (or force attitude change on the same regime, vide Musarraf) , how do we persuade/compel “the bureaucracy”, as it were, to come along?
Assume, arguendo, that the success of the Yemeni escape represents such a case of diluted enthusiasm for our interests as viewed by the populace. Consider that draconian responses are as likely as not to produce further alienation amongst populations that we desperately need on “our side”.
Presumably we are not going to vaporize Yemen. That said, we clearly cannot succeed in defending our interests without seriously considering the public opinion impact of each and every action we undertake; Some (indeed, many) tactics will prove to be self-defeating when subjected to this analysis.
For debate:
How much restraint MUST we exercise if we are not to fall victim to increasing alienation of the personnel of allied governments, even where the heads of state are nominally compliant. Does a formula “If you are not with us, you are against us” really enhance the prospects of success in this enterprise? I has the virtue of clarity, but it does invite the fence-sitter to choose to be against us, if sufficiently displeased by our behaviour.