Scylla:
You know, I have to tell ya, its kind of a sad story. Bizzaro Svin was quite popular in high school, football star, that sort of thing – but that’s about as far as he ever got.
He’s working a minimum wage job at the local gas station now, and spends his free time in front of the TV, scratching his belly, drinking beer, and throwing pretzels at Dan Rather.
Svin, on the other hand – admittedly a nerd in high school – actually managed to work his way through college, get out and travel the world, finally settling down abroad to make something of his life.
Funny how things work out, ain’t it?
Shodan:
You don’t?
:dubious:
Well, please allow me to refresh your memory:
….crickets chirping……
No attempt intended. I just wondered if you were aware of it.
Perversely, I’d also like to take out some time and comment on your answers to True/False quiz, posted above:
When George Bush said, “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised,” he was referring to the possession and concealment of a single canister of Sarin nerve gas.
Shodan’s answer: False. He was probably referring to the consensus in the intelligence community that Iraq retained significant stockpiles of WMD, and programs to acquire more.
When it is pointed out to Shodan that the US failed to discover any ”WMDs” in Iraq, Shodan goes frothingly bat-shit insane and insists that we did too find ”WMDs” there. I’ve always assumed that this was one of Shodan’s arguments for continuing to support the invasion. Here, Shodan clearly indicates that his line of reasoning is really nothing more than a red herring: he admits that even if we were to classify this single canister of gas as a WMD, it doesn’t in any sense justify the Bush administration’s pre-war claims.
Shodan obviously felt uncomfortable admitting this so flatly and openly. He therefore added an extra sentence to compensate for it. But as usual, this argument also falls flat on its face, because it relies on a massive rhetorical oversimplification: in this case, the existence of an ”intelligence community consensus.” Did such a consensus really exist?
Well, if we wish to see things as they really are, rather than oversimplify them, the answer is kind of yes and no – but mostly no. There were those in the intelligence community who dissented even from those claims that the Bush administration, and the war supporters, insisted were water-tight. As Tenet noted in his public assessment of the CIA’s pre-war intelligence judgements:
Now, let us turn to the infamous NIE of October 2002, and look at that section of the key judgements that was probably the least controversial – the section on Iraq’s chemical weapon’s capacity:
Was this the CIA’s consensus judgement? Well, I guess that depends on what one means with the word ”consensus.” In Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong, former intelligence analyst Kenneth Pollack (a long time hawk, and hardly a weak-kneed lefty) notes:
(The passage is taken from the linked article, but it requires a subscription to access it). The intelligence community was, in reality, split over the question of Iraq’s ”WMDs.” The Bush administration simply chose to listen to those analysts who supported their pro-war agenda, and represent them as if they were the whole of that community. So – when Shodan relies on the so-called ”consensus” of intelligence experts, he’s really just making it up as he goes along.
The recovery of a single canister of Sarin nerve gas from the Hussein regime is worth the lives of over 1000 US servicemen and women, and the expenditure of billions of dollars of US capital.
Shodan’s answer: False.
Again, this is little more than a bald admission from Shodan that all of his hand-wringing about the Sarin gas canister really isn’t relevant.
When George Bush said, “Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised,” he knew that, in the words of Paul Wolfowitz, “The nature of terrorism is that intelligence about terrorism is murky.” He knew, as George Tenet stressed in his assessment of CIA intelligence on Iraq, that, ”Did these strands of information weave into a perfect picture? Could they answer every question? No, far from it…. It is important to underline the word ’estimate,’ because not everything we analyze can be known to a standard of absolute proof.”
Shodan’s answer: True.
An admission here, by Shodan, that Bush lied in his public assertion of absolute certainty. About time, I say.
George Bush and his speechwriters were personally informed by CIA chief George Tenet, at least three weeks prior to the 2003 State of the Union address, that the CIA possessed no evidence whatsoever of an Iraqi attempt to purchase uranium yellowcake, and that British intelligence regarding such a purchase was unsubstantiated.
Shodan’s answer: True. Another admission of lying.
When Condoleeza Rice stated that the aluminum tubes were “really only suitable for use as uranium centrifuges,” she was aware that the not one single expert in the DoE believed this to be the case.
Shodan’s answer: Don’t know.
Correct answer: True.
In the six months prior to the war, Saddam Hussein “bent over backwards” to accommodate the inspections process, and met every single demand placed upon him by the US and the UN.
Shodan’s answer: False. He did not turn over the nuclear centrifuge parts and plans at least.
Actually, the answer to the above is true. In fact, Blix complained about getting almost too much compliance from the Iraqis. In the end Hussein allowed scientists to be interviewed in private, out of country; he allowed inspections of every weapons dump; he allowed inspections of his palaces; he began immediately disassembling his al-Samoud missiles, when they were found to be in breach of the cease-fire agreement, despite the American troops massing on Iraq’s border; and so on. Despite the above, Shodan would have the reader believe that Saddam still defied UN inspectors by hanging on to the parts of a single centrifuge (probably forgotten), and that this act of defiance somehow justifies the invasion.
Saddam Hussein was never found to be in ”material breach” of UNSC resolution 1441.
Shodan’s answer: By the Security Council? True.
But somehow, at the same time, it is claimed that the material breach of 1441, specifically, serves as the legal pretext for the war. Sorry, Shodan: does not compute.
There are numerous historical examples of rogue/failed states providing “WMDs” to unaffiliated terrorist organizations, even organizations with profoundly different goals and ideologies. (If true, please give at least three examples.)
Shodan’s answer: *Does Taliban support of al-Queda count? Or weapons transfers by the North Koreans? Or French violations of the sanctions against Iraq?
Are you alleging that this kind of support is impossible?
Anyway, I can’t come up with three specific examples off the top of my head, so I have to say False.*
His answer is correct. None of examples count, of course, because none of them involve states giving ”WMDs” or ”WMD technologies” to terrorist organizations.
Naturally, I’m not alleging that this kind of support is ”impossible;” just that its very, very unlikely. The fear that Saddam was poised to give ”WMDs” to terrorist organizations was a lynchpin in the arguments for an invasion – yet not a single supporter of the war can provide a shred of evidence that Saddam planned to do so, or even point to a single historical example of such a transfer.
Libya, North Korea, Georgia and Uzbekistan all could begin the production of nerve gas within a few months.
Shodan’s answer: True.
Which makes the conclusions of the Duelfer report pretty irrelevant with regard to a casus belli, don’t you think?
Prior to the withdrawal of UN personnel in anticipation of Operation Desert Fox, UN inspectors routinely broke inspection protocol by photographing sensitive Iraqi documents and visiting their embassies after working hours.
Shodan’s answer: If this isn’t true, it should be.
It’s true, but you’re wrong, as usual. The espionage gave Saddam an excuse to stop cooperating with UNSCOM. Had the inspectors not been involved in it, Saddam would not have had any legitimate reason for blocking the inspections at all.
Iraq and al-Qaeda had extensive operational contacts and cooperated in the planning and execution of numerous terrorists acts throughout the 1990s. (If true, please give at least three examples.)
Shodan’s answer: Iraq was not involved in planning 9/11, if that is what you are trying for.
True or false only, please. And it was not at all what I was after.
The Bush administration has insisted on the existence of ”ties” between al-Qaeda and Hussein’s regime. This assertion served to justify the invasion as a part of TWAT. I would like to see the evidence that assertion is actually true.