Yes, obviously. It’s safe to assume everyone, including you, would agree that we can predict the behavior of some systems. Otherwise science, perhaps even intelligence, becomes completely useless.
However, the point was you were defining Determinism in terms of prediction, which implies we’re talking about the entire state of the universe.
However, predicting the future state of the universe is not merely a practical impossibility, due to limits on what we can know.
It’s explicitly ruled out on logical grounds that I’ll next explain.
Let’s say the universe is at time t1, and we want to predict the state of the universe at t2.
To do that, we’re going to perform some set of calculations, Cn.
The question simply is, when are we going to perform Cn?
If it’s inbetween t1 and t2, then those events need to themselves be part of the calculation: a subset of our calculations is…the entire set of our calculations.
After t2 is ok, but then we’re (uselessly) making a prediction of a past event.
And let’s not get twisted here: the issue is not that the result of our calculations needs to be input into our calculations; that would be potentially tractable, because we could just “guess” a result, and then see if it makes a self consistent prediction. The issue is the calculations themselves need to somehow be a subset of themselves.
Again that’s just you asserting your position again.
I’m asking how can it be different? Why would I make a different chess move when my brain (and/or soul) has been reset back to the former ignorant state?
I was trying to use “universe” to just mean “everything” here: the set of “physical universe, plus anything else that exists”.
If there’s a more appropriate word, let me know.
I don’t want to put the non physical in some separate bucket that we are not allowed to scrutinize.
Because, I maintain that when we actually ask the question of how the soul supposedly impacts our decision making, we realize either the concept itself makes no sense, or, at the least, that there is no reason it grants an escape to the “problem” of our actions being determined.
You’re still looking at the whole question using the paradigm of consciousness being an epiphenomenon of matter, and therefore subject to the constraints of matter.
If, on the other hand, matter is an epiphenomenon of consciousness, then universal consciousness is not subject to the constraints of matter created virtually within itself, although individual consciousness - being the non-individualized consciousness ‘reflected’ and limited through matter - may be to a large extent be subject to those constraints.
That’s an attempt at a very condensed summary of a far larger and more complex argument.
Are you saying that there is randomness involved? That running the same scenario twice will have different results because not all the variables are the same?
I defined deterministic event causation. At no point do I claim the entire universe may be predicted given enough physical knowledge - in fact I asked you to assume that is impossible in the second sentence of the OP:
The point is, you defined Determinism in terms of prediction, and that’s what I am objecting to.
Determinism is defined in terms of the state of the universe being determined by a past state, that’s all.
Saying that what you meant is just that some events are predictable is a complete red herring since everybody, regardless of philosophical position, believes some events are predictable.
This is nothing to do with the point that is being put to you. I am disputing your definition of Determinism.
Anyway, your argument relies several times on defining Determinism as being predictable, so it’s beside the point whether the initial scenario you describe is Deterministic or not.
Not would, could. How could you make a different choice? The answer is because you are not guaranteed to make the same choice - at least, making the same choice in exactly the same situation is not a logical implication. If you are not guaranteed to make the same choice, you can choose differently. If you can choose differently, it can be different. QED.
I did not define capital-D “Determinism” in this topic and I see no need to do so. Here I asked you to assume the physical world is indeterministic, there’s no reason to argue about the pitfalls of universal Determinism. (Perhaps you are confusing this topic with another one?)
You have asserted dozens of times in this thread, and in dozens of other threads that you believe that we “could have chosen differently”. I’m very aware of your position.
The question is, how so? We can see a physical universe, and a brain, and it appears that the brain is responsible for our thoughts, desires and decisions.
Personally, this doesn’t bother me at all, because I am aware that whatever mechanism by which I think (e.g. if we include a soul), ultimately my decisions are always going to come down to a function of my predispositions and the environment in which I find myself.
Now, if you wish to believe otherwise, that’s swell.
But how then, do you suppose decision-making works? How is a free decision made?
I’m sorry to disappoint, but I don’t think ‘how free agency works’ is knowable. My categorization of it as a separate category of event causation is based on the mechanism or process being unknowable.
So, it is just random. Someone doesn’t make a chess move because at the time, based on the information and training that they have, it is the best move they can see, but that they just randomly move pieces about the board, since the mechanism of their decision making is unknowable.
Well, yes, but that is because I was restating your argument, which is what is missing something. And that something is what makes your entire house of cards fall.
Is the decision making of what chess piece to move knowable, or unknowable? If it is knowable, then everything that you have said is incorrect. If is is unknowable, then that doesn’t reflect the reality that I live in.
You would have to enlighten me, I can’t find the fault. Certainly I do not argue that free agency is a form of random event causation.
Are you rejecting the possibility that the probabilities of outcomes to an event are unknowable, or…?
I can admit the possibility that my own decision making process is knowable to me, but not that I can predict it or anyone else’s with absolute certainty or even find a most accurate probability distribution.
