Okinawan opposition has additional weight because the Cold War (and perhaps the early weakness of the JSDF), which ostensibly provided justification for this deployment, is long over. What can it possibly be about, except for confronting China, which is not too far away? What other rationale can there be, except perhaps the inertia of the military-industrial complex?
It’s immaterial. That particular exercise was in the Sea of Japan, but any naval force operating out there in a non-exercise deployment could easily travel towards China and put those exercises to the test. If the US and Japan don’t think they might soon confront someone on the high seas, why have the exercises? Whom might they plan to confront, exept for China and perhaps Russia? In either case, the JSDF can handle it, and if not, it’s their responsibility to gain that ability.
Relationships are one thing, entangling alliances are another, and such deployments increase the risk of an incident spiraling into conflict, not to mention all the other grievous costs associated with this sort of thing, for both the US and the host. It also removes the moral hazard (see below).
There’s no need for a treaty obligation to the South. They can protect themselves. I think Beijing sees the US forces in Korea as more like a vanguard, and, in principle, they don’t want that on their border. I’m not saying it’s sensible (but consider a Chinese deployment in Mexico), but why tempt fate?
The facts on the ground have certainly changed, but the fact is that the Chinese still have the stance that I’ve mentioned, and there’s no upside to playing into those concerns. In the extremely unlikely event of a war between China and the South, that’s all the more reason not to have US forces in the line of fire!
No, I pointed out why Diego Garcia could be very relevant to any confrontation (plus, it’s important to tell the tale of the Chagossians). As for Afghanistan, of course it’s not close to the South China Sea, but in the event of hostilities, surely you’re acquainted with the strategy of opening up a second front?
The article points out that THAAD, assuming it works at all, has little to do with any of North Korea’s equipment, but is far more relevant regarding China, and many in the region realize that.
These things have a way of not staying in the middle, and I’ve already explained the relevance of my links.
Any confrontation between nuclear powers is extremely hazardous. If the regional powers want to resist China’s actions, then they can do so on their own. If there is a conflict, one way to make it less likely to spread is to not have the US involved. Also, having some sort of US involvement removes any moral hazard preventing local recklessness. See Georgia, 2008. As for a precedent, I think it set a bad precedent when (among other things) the Israelis repeatedly laid waste to Gaza, and when the Bush administration invaded Iraq, and when the Obama administration recognized the Honduran coup regime, and, worst of all, when the Clinton administration tortured Iraq with sanctions and bombing. I don’t trust DC to have good intentions, or that there will be good results even if they do. Suppose someone else didn’t like those precedents either, and tried to do something about it. How would you like that? I’d be leery too. Humanitarian intervention is best left to locals, and things can still go very wrong.
Those consequences, whatever they may be, are not as bad as a conflict which is no business of the US.