I hope this is within the forum rules. I am not looking for specific legal advice. I am looking for research help.
The question is:
Does the"clear and convincing evidence" standard outlined in 7 CFR 273.16(e)(6), as applied to an Administrative Disqualification Hearing in a food stamp case, where the claimant is accussed of an “Intentional Program Violation”, mean or imply a lesser standard than what would otherwise be understood in a trial court?
I have a case before a judge that seems to think clear and convincing evidence in this scenario means something other than it normally would. The judge indicated that he’s particularly interested in any federal caselaw on point. Problem is, I can’t find any. Have found several state cases that give a traditional definition/interpetation of the standard. I have access to LEXIS, and I’ve run several searches without much luck. Could be my search-fu is weak. At this point, I’m willing to look at anything…cases, law review articles, other publications.
I can’t think why it would be any different. I googled a little and found a South Carolina state administrative appeal dealing with 7 C.F.R. 273.16, and they defined clear and convincing evidence by citing to the plain old definition in unrelated SC state court civil cases. How is your judge saying the standard is different?
The Judge hasn’t said exactly how he thinks it is different, but he is concerned about practical aspects of enforcement under the Food Stamp Act and applicable regulations. I’m guessing that he thinks that if he holds the agency to a strict standard of proof, it will be very difficult for them to meet that high evidentiary burden. We had a hearing earlier this week, and the judge has ordered both sides to submit briefs on this issue and some other matters.
Thanks for the cite. That case seems to be consistent with cases from other jurisdictions in applying a fairly traditional definition of “clear and convincing evidence” to food stamp cases at the administrative level.
Someone else suggested to me that perhaps my judge is confusing the “substantial evidence” standard that aplies in many appeals of administrative decisions. I haven’t found any authority to indicate that “clear and convincing” means anything other than the plain meaning of the language as used in the CFR.
Also have cases to support my position that the agency bears the burden of proving not only that a prohibited act was committed, but also must prove intent as a separate element.
Unfortunately, this appears to be a case of first impression in my state. We have virtually no law on point, and do not even have a statutory scheme for judicial review of this particular type of agency action. Looks like the best I can do is argue persuasive authority from other states. If I win, I’m expecting the Agency will appeal. If I lose, I’ve already received permission from those above me to appeal.
Think I’d rather stay a simple country lawyer. All this research and writing stuff is complicated.
Both, actually. What few state regs exist pretty much track the CFR, including the “clear and convincing” standard.
Incidentally, there is a provison that requires the state agency to promptly notify the Department of Agriculture any time they get sued over certain things, including the state’s interpetation of the federal reg. I highly doubt our agency here has done that. Thinking about doing it myself, because the same provision (no cite, as I’m at home now, but it is early in the same chapter of the CFR cited above) also allows the DoA to “encourage” a state to settle certain claims.
Also worthy of mention, the case I’m working on is the first of multiple similar cases I’ve filed recently. My state maintains a division between law and equity. I originally filed these cases in Chancery (equity). The Chancellor transferred this case over to our Circuit Court (law). Both me and the Circuit Judge think the case could have been heard in Chancery–but once it has been transferred, it has to stay in the receiving court. Next week, I have a hearing in a similar case, before a different Chancellor. In theory, that case could remain in Chancery–but it will probably get transferred as well.