Firstly, the three years figure is a gross misnomer. It took a significant period of time to even get the country under nominal U.S. control. It was not until then that any sort of training processes could begin.
New recruits in the Iraqi Army receive eight weeks of basic training. After that time they are in advanced courses in infantry tactics, heavy weaponry and etc.
Pumping out new enlisted men is not that significant of a challenge. Developing a trained and professional officer corps that will keep the men in line and lead them effectively, is. We’ve been doing it in the United States for over two hundred years. Becoming an office in the United States military is usually a lengthy process. A large number of officers are college educated, having spent four years in one of the ROTC programs in colleges throughout the country. A strong nucleus of highly trained officers come through the respective service academies, which are themselves staffed with very knowledgeable, experienced people. The Iraqis don’t have that sort of leadership of their own yet, and it will take a long time before it is there.
For what its worth, the Iraqi Security Forces currently number ~300,000, and around 5,000 are trained every month. You can only recruit and train so many people in any given span of time. You first have to find people willing to be soldiers or police officers, then you have to train them. You do not have unlimited training capabilities, there is only X amount of persons who can be trained at any given time. Because you only have a certain amount of resources and personnel that can be allocated towards training new soldiers and police officers.
Furthermore, aside from just training the military, it has to gradually be given control over the country, and gradually weaned off of military support from the coalition. Before we can leave Iraq we simply have to leave an established police and military presence that can keep the government alive. Whether or not you supported the invasion of Iraq, I think most rational people do not think the Iraqis deserve to be condemned to chaos. However irrational your hatred of the United States military, most persons who are capable of looking at the issue in a balanced manner are aware that the U.S. military is the primary organization responsible for keeping what order there is in Iraq at present.
The situation with the training and deployment of the Iraqi Security Forces has improved consistently over time. As of August, 2006, 5 Iraqi Army Divisions, 25 brigades, and 85 battalions and 2 National Police battalions “assumed lead responsibility for security in their areas of occupation.” These areas represents roughly 65% of Iraq geographically. “Assumed lead” typically means they are responsible for the primary security issues (directly dealing with insurgents and etc–units said to be “in the lead” must have proven they can plan and execute combat operations) but they continue to receive logistic support from the coalition.
However, July in Muthanna Province the Multi-National Force-Iraq relinquished control to the civilian governor of the province and the ISF. It is the first of the 18 provinces to be given provincial control over security matters, and several other provinces are expected to follow (Dhi Qar, Dahuk, Irbil, Sulamaniyah.)
To get back to the topic at hand, the ISF is doing fairly well, all things considered. The problem in Iraq is not really the ISF’s training speed but an increase in sectarian violence. We’ve essentially moved past the “insurgency” phase, moved past the phase where Al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorist groups will be a major factor. We’ve moved to a phase where differing groups of Iraqis are growing increasingly willing to use organized violence as a means of attaining power in the new Iraq. The percentage of casualties in Iraq that are Iraqi-Iraqi violence has significantly outstripped incidents of Iraqi-on-American violence/casualties. The coalition forces continue to be a popular target among some segments of the population, but their casualty rate is quite low in such attacks, compared to a much higher casualty rate in attacks which are Iraqi-on-Iraqi in nature (either different armed groups fighting other armed groups, armed groups fighting the ISF, or armed groups killing civilians.)
The ISF has to be made independent of the growing sectarian conflict, which will be quite difficult to do. If the ISF just becomes a tool in the hands of the Shi’a majority it could end up becoming an organization of repression and terror directed at the Sunni community, we could see eventually a return to the old Saddam-style Iraq, except the former oppressed would now be the oppressors; I do not think anyone wants to see that.