Cops and cars

[vetbridge]

@Iateyogurt

PEEP.

Well, that’s a relief. If you truly are lateyogurt. Hmmmm…

[RiverRunner]

@Iateyogurt

PEEP.
Amendments don’t mean anything anymore. We like to think we still abide by them, but really they are just garbage from a bygone era. Free speech? Doesn’t exist anymore. I can think of several words I am not allowed to utter in society for fear of being incarcerated.
…
The Amendments should be all-or-nothing, not “gee well he kinda made that guy mad so maybe in this case it doesn’t apply.”

There are all sorts of exceptions to the often invoked and seldom understood “free speech” First Amendment. Most of them are worthwhile, such as the commonly-cited “yelling ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater” instance. Other exceptions are such things as slander, libel, plagiarism, and fraud. These exceptions hardly mean that “Free speech doesn’t exist anymore.” Nor do they mean that the amendments don’t mean anything. All-or-nothing doesn’t work in this case.

RR

[Voyager]

@Gfactor

Probably not. Ohio sovereign immunity law is murky, http://www.dispatch.com/news/special/immunity/badg622imm.html, not to mention we are talking about what a court would have decided fifty years ago. Neverthless, my research suggests that police officers had immunity for such things. If the officer knew he lacked authority to take the vehicle, it might have been a different story. Even then, Blackman’s holding is not crystal clear:

It doesn’t really come out and say that the officer can’t take the car–just that he can’t condemn it. I know I said that the court held that he couldn’t commandeer it, and I think that is a rational reading of the case. But the case would better test the limits of immunity if the officer had demanded possession of the car. He didn’t. Instead, he ordered Blackman to chase the fleeing vehicle. The statute authorized the officer to call upon Blackman to assist him. That’s really all the officer did. Blackman crashed his own vehicle. A subtle distinction, sure, but here it could make a difference.

Thanks for the response. I see that the officer did not actually take or commandeer property, but just the services of Blackman. That makes sense.
So the officer’s knowledge of whether he was authorized to take the vehicle is not important in this case, since he did not actually take it. I’d be disturbed at the implication that it would be better if he did not know if I wasn’t familiar with the principle that inventors should never search for applicable patents they might be violating, since violation without knowledge is better than violation with knowledge.

I don’t know if the case discussed this, but would Blackman have been within his rights to have assisted the officer, but only while driving within speed limits and obeying all traffic laws? Is the officer allowed to, say, order him to violated the speed limit, and if he did, is he liable for damages caused by this violation? Clearly officers in pursuit are immune from traffic laws, but does this immunity extend to one assisting them?

[Gfactor]

@Voyager

I don’t know if the case discussed this, but would Blackman have been within his rights to have assisted the officer, but only while driving within speed limits and obeying all traffic laws?

There’s no clear answer to this question. It’s somewhat academic because the fine for violating the law was only fifty bucks ($627 in 2005 dollars). OTOH, most courts will not excuse a failure to comply with an officer’s command just because compliance would be dangerous.

I’d be disturbed at the implication that it would be better if he did not know if I wasn’t familiar with the principle that inventors should never search for applicable patents they might be violating, since violation without knowledge is better than violation with knowledge.

It’s not as technical as that here. Until Blackman, there was no clear rule prohibiting officers from commandeering vehicles. The officer could claim that he did not intend to violate Blackman’s rights. And *Blackman * doesn’t come right out and say that officers can’t commandeer vehicles. It just says they lack authority to condemn them.

Is the officer allowed to, say, order him to violated the speed limit, and if he did, is he liable for damages caused by this violation? Clearly officers in pursuit are immune from traffic laws, but does this immunity extend to one assisting them?

Most jurisdictions give civilians the same immunity as the police under these circumstances. I’m pretty sure there wasn’t an Ohio case on the issue when I looked.

Here is Judge Blue’s summary of the cases:

Cases involving commands of assistance have come before the courts in three other contexts. First, a number of persons responding affirmatively to such commands have been killed or injured, and either they or their estates have subsequently sought compensation. See Monterey County v. Rader, 248 P. 912 (Cal. 1926); Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726 (N.Y. 1928); Riker v. City of New York, 126 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1953), aff’d, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 620 (1955); Tomlinson v. Town of Norwood, 182 S.E. 659 (N.C. 1935); Mitchell v. Indus. Comm’n, 13 N.E.2d 736 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936); Vilas County v. Monk, 228 N.W. 591 (Wis. 1930); Village of West Salem v. Indus. Comm’n, 155 N.W. 929 (Wis. 1916). Second, persons killing or injuring those commanded have been criminally prosecuted. See Watson v. State, 3 So. 441 (Ala. 1888); Robinson v. State, 18 S.E. 1018 (Ga. 1893); State v. Bertchey, 73 A. 524 (N.J. 1909); Commonwealth v. Martin, 7 Pa. D. 219 (1898); State v. Hailey, 31 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 73 (1847); Weatherford v. State, 21 S.W. 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893). Third, persons arrested by those commanded have sued the latter (with an invariable lack of success) in trespass for damages. See Reed v. Rice, 25 Ky. (2 J.J. Marsh) 44 (1829); Firestone v. Rice, 38 N.W. 885 (Mich. 1888); Moyer v. Meier, 238 P.2d 338 (Okl. 1951); Moyer v. Foster, 234 P.2d 415 (Okl. 1951); Presley v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 145 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69 (1861); Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151 (1847); cf. Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1813) (commanded person called as witness in suit against sheriff). The vast majority of these cases are quite old, but a few are not.

Blue, Jon C., High Noon Revisited: Commands Of Assistance By Peace Officers In The Age Of The Fourth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1475, 1490 n.6 (1992)

BTW, he gives this partial list of state laws requiring compliance with police commands:

Statutes making a failure to obey a command of assistance a criminal offense include ALA. CODE § 13A-10-5 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.720 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2403 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-54-109, 12-11-104 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 150 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-107 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167b (1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1241 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.06 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 710-1011 (Michie 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-44-3-7 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 719.2 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 402 (West Supp. 1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 544.230 (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-304 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-903 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.270 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:6 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-2 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 537 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 162.245 (1991); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 2.15 (West 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 301 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-463 (Michie 1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-14 (1989).

Id. at n.3

[Gfactor]

A new and related article from Slate’s Explainer: The FBI Knocked Over My Barn …Can I get reimbursed? (inspired by the recent search for Jimmy Hoffa’s body on a Milford, Michigan horse farm).