‘Professionals talk logistics’ while true can turn into a hand waving argument. The ability to logistically support a given operation also depends on how large a force needs to be supplied given the opponent’s force, and how much the opponent can disrupt the logistics.
For example in the Pacific War the immediate reason the Japanese failed to push the Americans off any Japanese island base the Americans invaded, starting with the close run affair in the long attrition campaign at Guadalcanal, was arguably lack of logistical support for the Japanese forces ashore. But because the Americans were able to disrupt it. The Allies failed to disrupt the ad hoc/shoe string logistical capability of the Japanese in a series of highly successful Japanese campaigns over huge distances in the early months of the war. The Japanese didn’t suddenly become worse at logistics starting in August 1942, nor was Guadalcanal farther from Japan (closer to some major pre-war IJN bases like Truk) than parts of the Dutch East Indies the Japanese rapidly conquered some months earlier. It’s just that in the early campaigns Japanese air and naval forces cleared away the threat to the limited and highly taxed Japanese merchant fleet to support forces large enough to defeat the generally poorly prepared Allied ones.
Likewise Russia certainly has a enough ships and a/c to to support a ground force in the Canadian Arctic larger than what the Canadians could deploy there. The question would be whether the relatively small Canadian combat air component, a few dozen F-18’s, could inflict unacceptable losses on Russian ships and transport a/c before being attrited into ineffectiveness itself. And/or whether a bridgehead the Russians gained in a given summer could be extended to populated areas of Canada the same year, or have to winter over. It’s more complicated than ‘professionals talk logistics’.
But also consider the basic geography wrt to how remotely realistic this question is. The only Russian air bases within ~1,000 miles of Canada are in the farthest east portions of Siberia near Alaska. IOW it’s ~1,000 miles right along the north coast of AK to reach the northwest corner of the Yukon Territory. One non-hand wave analysis would be relative Russian and Canadian aerial refueling capability to support tactical a/c covering or interdict landing zones in the Yukon, since 1,000 mile radius while perhaps nominally within range of some Soviet tactical a/c it would not be practical without refueling support, but the required capability is not exactly quantifiable off the cuff. It’s relative to Canadian ability to support (pretty short legged first generation) F-18 operations around 1,300 miles from the nearest full fledged Canadian air base (~1,300 to Cold Lake Alberta from northeast Yukon), but also considering the general advantage of the defense in such a situation, for a given number of a/c. But a scenario where Russian a/c could fly back and forth 100 of miles along the north coast of Alaska with no worry about US forces?
But suspending disbelief, another aspect would be Russian precision guided conventional cruise and potentially ballistic missiles to suppress Canadian bases, v no long range Canadian strike capability to pressure Soviet bases.
In reality Canada has next to no military capability to defend its Arctic from Russia, which has to be factored into relative to Russian capability, rather than some absolute ‘the Russians have no logistics’. It’s all relative. If one side can project only a very small force to a given point, the other side only need ‘the logistics’ to project a sufficiently larger force to prevail, and so on up the ladder. The US keeping a reinforced division adequately supplied on Guadalcanal doomed a Japanese force of elements of a couple of divisions poorly supplied. But if the US force on the island had been much smaller, the same Japanese force would probably have prevailed.
Canada lacks any but a token capability to defend its north. But it arguably simply does not need one in the actual general strategic situation where such a Russian operation would be completely unacceptable to the US, and moreover the parts of Canada closest to Russia are ‘screened’ by Alaska.