This conclusion can be deduced from the definitions of God and His attributes, without any further knowledge whatsoever. It is a solution to the logical problem of evil presupposed by the evidentiary problem of evil.
Quite to the contrary, traditional Christian belief posits the existence of Hell. Why would we assume God would not make Hell? Logically, the existence of Hell adds nothing to the evidentiary problem of evil. We are still presented with three possible explanations (deduced from the definition of God and His attributes):
- (Tri-omni) God exists, and this is the best compossible world.
- (Tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is not the best compossible world.
- (Tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is the best compossible world.
And a number of additional premises:
- No suffering is inherently good.
- Some suffering has cosmic instrumental value. (categorical; does not imply such suffering actually exists)
- No suffering with cosmic instrumental value is gratuitous.
- All suffering without cosmic instrumental value is gratuitous.
- There is no gratuitous suffering in the best compossible world.
- We observe lots of suffering.
- Some observed suffering has local instrumental value. Such suffering may or may not be gruatuitous.
- Some observed suffering has no apparent local instrumental value. Such suffering may or may not be gruatuitous.
Now, it may be that a denizen of Hell constantly observes suffering. But without additional premises, I assert he has no rational basis to make an inductive leap and conclude the probable existence of gratuitous suffering.
There are premises that would complete an argument. For example, either of these could inform an inductive argument:
- Absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
- The cosmic instrumental value of suffering is readily discernable by human faculties.
~Max