I agree, using your definition of omnibenevolent. Which is not one I’ve seen used by people who believe in this stuff. And this makes more logical sense than your definition. If someone accepted your definition, they would have to either posit that god does only good, with no reason this should be true, or give evidence that god does only good, which as we agree would be difficult at best.
I grew up in a religious tradition without omnibenevolence, since the Bible has many examples of God just zapping people out of spite with no attempt to show it was for the ultimate good of everyone. So I don’t have first hand of experience how Christian ministers handle this.
No. What would be equivalent to a set of worlds in which at least some have necessary suffering, would be a set of worlds at least some of which grandma makes raisin cookies. And the logic of evidential doubt would absolutely work in this analogous analogy.
This is a very different thing from the knowledge that grandma makes raisin cookies in this world.
This is sad at this point, so let’s cut back to the chase: do you have a cite for anyone that believes plantinga’s argument solves the evidential problem of evil?
Because, apart from you, every cite I can find describes his argument explicitly as an argument against the logical problem of evil, that it does not address (or even attempt to address) the evidential problem (see section 2.2).
This is just utter nonsense. We have two hypotheses: whether a given cookie jar could plausibly be gran’s, or whether a given world could plausibly be God’s (i.e. whether the observed amount of raisin cookies is consistent with the expected amount, given that gran baked the cookies in the jar, or whether the observed amount of evil is consistent with the expected amount, given that God has created this world). Bringing different worlds into the cookie jar example is simply not even wrong, it is completely nonsensical.
As I already told you:
Again, every formulation of the evidential problem of evil appeals to further arguments, including the one in your own cite. There is always a premise to the effect that there is gratuitous evil in the world, i.e. evil exceeding that which we would expect a tri-omni God to permit. Every valid formulation must include something like this: it is the only way such an argument can gain purchase.
Even this cite directly contradicts you. The datum of the mere existence of evil, because it is to non-specific, does not suffice to formulate an argument against God’s existence:
Mackie makes a non-specific formulation about evil (the datum is only that evil exists). Due to this, theists may levy criticisms against the argument [referring here to Plantinga’s FWD] that work in virtue of this non-specific datum. […] Mackie’s non-specific formulation of evil (only stating that evil exists) harms his argument, as this non-specific formulation lends itself to criticism regarding the possibility of God allowing for the existence of evil. […] As a result of the free-will defence and the subsequent defeat of Mackie’s logical argument from evil (1955), the debate has shifted to the evidential problem of evil. […] This may be for a particular reason: as established with the example of Mackie, it is notably difficult to defend a logical argument from evil with non-specific formulations of evil.
So it is exactly because non-specifically pointing to evil, as you propose to do, does no useful work that one reaches for a more specific formulation, appealing to additional information, in actual formulations of the evidential problem. Which, as I’ve said before, is a perfectly valid argument. What’s needed is an appeal to gratuitous suffering, that goes beyond what we would expect with a tri-omni God; merely pointing to evil as such is insufficient:
Plantinga has an easier time providing an issue for the arguments from evil with non-specific formulations about evil, than, let’s say, specific formulations about horrendous natural evils.
Specificity is always arrived at by giving additional information: shrinking the set of world we might find ourselves in. In the absence of this, there simply is nothing for an evidential case to work upon.
Two lengthy replies; seems I’ve really torn it this time 
Before reading them (I need to be in a good state of mind), I just want to say what a shame this all is.
You make excellent points, I often find myself impressed with your insight. But you can never admit to even a teensy bit of error. You could have just said, “ok, it’s going a bit far to say suffering gives us no reason for doubt, I’m just saying it doesn’t rule out an omnimax god” and then we would have moved on, probably to more interesting topics.
But instead we’ve had a hundred posts or more of dodgy logic trying to prop up an undefendable claim – that the evidential problem of evil is solved by an argument that is explicitly about the logical problem of evil. All because you can’t say you misspoke.
And this happens in thread after thread, and not just with me. For heaven’s sake.
Again, I’m explicitly accepting that the evidential problem of evil is valid, and have done so from the beginning; indeed, I was the one to point to it’s explicit formulation. It’s just that you’re claiming that pointing to the mere existence of evil suffices, which is an elementary logical confusion: from the consistency of the existence of evil and that of a tri-omni God, it trivially follows that pointing to evil doesn’t constitute evidence against God. That should’ve taken exactly this much text to clear up: but your unwillingness or inability to follow the logic means I have to try and find a more explicit formulation that gets through to you.
That’s exactly what the evidential problem of evil is. What do you think the distinction is?
I mean, not that I care much either way, but if you’re not gonna read my posts, at least read your own cites. Especially the second one above lays it out nice and clearly (I’ve even provided some helpful quotes for your benefit above): just pointing non-specifically to evil does no useful work, one has to appeal to ‘horrendous’ or gratuitous evil if one wants to make a cogent case. Only if either quality or quantity of evil plausibly exceeds what a tri-omni God should be expected to permit is an evidential case possible.
Fine, I’ll read the essays. It feels already a lot like a goalpost shift, but let’s see.
No, we aren’t. We’re making claims about this universe. That’s all we can ever do.
Here’s an actual example that’s analogous, and I’ll put them line-by-line so it’s clear
The claim is that an omnimax God exists, and wants – all else being equal – for no suffering to take place (because omnimax includes omnibenevolent)
The claim is that John hates the color orange, and wants – all else being equal – to never see it
Each instance of suffering (e.g. people dying in a plague, in a hurricane, trapped under rubble etc) gives us reason to doubt the claim that an omnimax God exists
Each instance of orange (e.g. seeing John is wearing orange clothes, drives an orange car, has an orange home) gives us reason to doubt the claim that John abhors orange
This is true even though we didn’t prove an omnimax God doesn’t exist – perhaps he has to weigh suffering against free will and other excuses?
This is true even though we didn’t prove John doesn’t abhor orange – perhaps his job requires him to wear orange, perhaps an orange car was just the cheapest one, and other excuses?
Once again no. It’s seems you have misunderstood the evidential problem of evil.
In the above example, is even a tiny bit of orange evidence against the claim that John abhors orange? The answer is yes, because, without knowing other mitigating factors are in effect, the minimal amount of orange is zero.
Now of course, if we see John wearing a watch that has one orange hand, or, I dunno, eating an orange, this shouldn’t be very persuasive evidence against the claim that he abhors orange. But that’s the nature of evidence: a little bit of evidence may contribute very little confidence towards a claim, but it’s not nothing; many little observations like this may add together to make a more persuasive case.
The only reason in the ePoE argument that the focus is often on horrendous suffering is because it makes the point more clearly.
Firstly I don’t see how this contradicts anything I’ve said at all.
Secondly, the claim of yours that I have been disputing is that the observation of suffering gives us no reason for doubt. Remember you even bit the bullet and said that if we were in a literal hell we would have no reason for doubt (see my post 219 and your response to it). Now it seems to have shifted to being that only gratuitous suffering would give us reason for doubt, and therefore, in fact, a literal hell would give us reason for doubt.
It’s the exact same thing I’ve been saying since 200+ posts ago:
That’s not how any of this works. You have a hypothesis, and you want to evaluate whether the evidence you have confirms or disconfirms it. That’s not a ‘claim about the universe’, it’s a claim about logical relations between various matters of fact. In the case of God’s coexistence with evil, the hypothesis happens to be whether this is a world in which God exists, but when you’re thinking about cookie jars, dragging in worlds or claims about the universe is just a bizarre category error. (I mean, of course you can add ‘in this world’ or ‘in this universe’ to any claim about matters of fact, but that’s just logically trivial.)
Your example, as always, misses the datum that we ought to expect a non-zero amount of orange,
So this is false; moreover, I’ve shown you explicitly how this may be exactly the other way around, which you continue to just ignore.
Look, it’s literally right there, in every single one of your own cites; I’ve quoted it before, I’ve explained the reason behind it, but it just seems to completely pass you by. So here it is once again (from the IEP version):
There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
This is Rowe’s ‘factual premise’, and it is not reducible to a mere claim of the existence of evil, so it is genuine additional information. This is exactly what I keep trying to get through your skull: since the mere existence of evil and God are consistent, we have to appeal to further arguments in order to furnish an evidential case. This is what Rowe does with the Bambi and Sue-cases: they are intended to make the factual premise plausible, and thus, provide us with good reason for believing in it which, then, makes the existence of God improbable.
By contradicting exactly this point:
The reason that horrendous suffering is necessary for the evidential form of the PoE is that it doesn’t suffice to point to evil ‘non-specifically’, i.e. just claim that each instance of evil gives you reason to doubt the existence of God.
And of course I stand by that, because it’s a logical triviality. Without adding some further argumentation, you have no way to tell whether the evil you’re seeing isn’t perfectly in line with what you should expect, given a tri-omni God. That is exactly what the Master’s thesis you have cited says:
Mackie’s non-specific formulation of evil (only stating that evil exists) harms his argument, as this non-specific formulation lends itself to criticism regarding the possibility of God allowing for the existence of evil.
Because of the FWD, just pointing out that evil exists isn’t enough; hence every formulation of the evidential problem adds more. We can’t deductively exclude the existence of God thanks to the FWD, so we have to introduce further data in order to make an inductive judgment regarding God’s existence. As the IEP puts it:
The probabilistic nature of such arguments manifests itself in the form of a premise to the effect that “It is probably the case that some instance (or type, or amount, or pattern) of evil E is gratuitous.” This probability judgment usually rests on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God’s permission of E. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.
You can’t just point to any instance of evil and claim that this decreases your confidence in the existence of God: that’s just unsound reasoning. Hence, you have to introduce a means by which to decide that there are certain—specific!—instances of evil where it at least seems plausible that God could and would prevent it. That means is the extra information.
Again, logically, all of that is trivial. If p and q are consistent, then the fact that p can’t be evidence against q. The modal logic of this is “possibly p and q, p, hence, possibly q” (of course in fact that’s even redundant, since “possibly p” is a direct consequence of the antecedent). Consequently, we have to appeal to some further premise r that is inconsistent either with the conjunction of both, or with q directly.
Context
The aforementioned theologists spoke of suffering in categorical, not quantifiable terms. When they speak of suffering, they literally mean all suffering. To them, all suffering is categorically necessary, including any perceived injustice in the distribution of suffering; this is derived from first principles of faith, and therefore barring a necessary contradiction, immune to evidence. Plantinga explicitly argues that a rational believer would never expect God to mete out suffering any differently than He actually does, no matter how much injustice she perceives.
To my knowledge, there is no consensus in Reformation theology as to why God metes out suffering the way He does. The non-answer given to Job strongly cautions against any theodicy that claims to be definitive, satisfactory, and explanatory. Plantinga suggests suffering is a necessary consequence of free will, but neither he nor any other theologian would make a utilitarian argument that free will outweighs suffering because they do not judge God by such a standard. They approach the problem of evil as apologists, not evangelists.
Luther on Suffering
Straddling the boundary between the medieval and early modern eras, Luther adamantly believed that salvation comes by the grace of God alone. He denied the medieval ascetic view that suffering is a virtue or a means of merit, and argued that the Law humbles and convicts us by revealing our guilt and inadequacy before God (Heidelberg Disputation, Proof of Thesis 7). Rather, Luther believed that suffering is an inescapable consequence of human sin, noting that even natural evils are the direct consequence of the fall of man (Commentaries on Genesis, Part III, Chapter V). This suffering, together with the profound inner struggles and spiritual anguish that he calls Anfechtung, drives the believer to despair of self-righteousness and opens the heart to receive God’s grace in Christ.
Calvin on Suffering
Calvin agreed that suffering is a consequence of sin, but he went further than Luther. An adherent of predestination, Calvin argued that suffering is also a means God uses for the good of His elect by cultivating patience, spiritual growth, and conformity in Christ (Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles, James 1:3). To Calvin, all suffering and misfortune are preordained by God for the good of His elect.
Edwards on Suffering
Edwards, a determinist in the modern sense, believed in God’s absolute sovereignty (Freedom of the Will). He argued that the end of all creation is the glory of God, by God - in that sense, Edwards was an occasionalist (A Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World). To Edwards, suffering has instrumental value simply due to the fact that it exists, for all things exist to glorify God.
Plantinga on Suffering
Plantinga, being a modern theologist, explicitly confronted the evidentiary problem of evil. I would put him firmly in the “God works in mysterious ways” camp (i.e., he cannot prove a theodicy), though he mentions one possible explanation.
[A]ny noetic structure with no cognitive dysfunction, one in which all cognitive faculties and processes are functioning properly … includes also the proper function of the sensus divinitatis. Someone in whom this process was functioning properly … might therefore be perplexed by the existence of this evil in God’s world—for God, she knows, hates evil with a holy and burning passion—but the idea that perhaps there just wasn’t any such person as God would no doubt not so much as cross her mind. Confronted with evil and suffering, such a person might ask herself why God permits it; the facts of evil may be a spur to inquiry as well as to action. If she finds no answer, she will no doubt conclude that God has a reason that is beyond her ken; she won’t be in the least inclined to doubt that there is such a person as God.
… Still further, in being offered eternal fellowship with God, we human beings are invited to join the charmed circle of the trinity itself; and perhaps that invitation can be issued only to creatures who have fallen, suffered, and been redeemed. If so, the condition of humankind is vastly better than it would have been, had there been no sin and no suffering. O Felix Culpa , indeed! (Warranted Christian Belief, Part IV, Chapter II)
~Max
Growing up, in the Jewish tradition, I was taught that God cursed the earth while pronouncing Adam’s punishment, but this curse was cleansed by the great flood. And so the antediluvian world was blighted, but the world today is fertile.
As an adult, I learned that Christians almost universally reject this interpretation. Augustine, in De Genesi ad litteram, noted that the natural state of the world following the Fall was and is disordered in a cosmic sense. He cites Romans 8:19-22 from the New Testament to that effect. This is kind of central to Christian theology and soteriology (theology salvation) - specifically, the doctrine was developed by Augustine in response to the so-called Gnostics, who generally believed the material world to be an inherently evil illusion. It goes without saying, modern Christianity rejects that notion and holds Christ to be a savior, rather than an ancient Neo offering a red pill.
Therefore, while Reformation theologians like Luther and Calvin moved away from suffering as a virtuous act, they still characterize suffering and natural evil as a direct consequence of humanity’s knowledge of good and evil.
~Max
I agree. Plantinga, for example, believed in an Anselmian God. I.e., what you have been deeming “prescriptive” omnibenevolence - it would be logically impossible for God to do evil, because God is morally perfect. So God does not “choose” to do good, he just is good by nature. That’s what he defended.
Can God do something that does not maximize good while staying omnibenevolent? I think the correct answer is no, because that would be logically impossible. But the traditional definition of omnipotence does not include impossible acts. Thus, if there is such a God, and if there is evil, such evil is necessary, and God’s act of allowing such evil is at least neutral if not good.
Now, I recall that you said this conclusion is circular. That is not so; the problem of evil is an attack on the consistency of Christian beliefs, not a demand for proof of its premises. Any proof of consistency is necessarily circular.
(And sidenote, there are some Jews who agree with the Malbim that Job’s children got what they deserved, while denying Bildad’s argument that all suffering - including Job’s - is retribution.)
~Max
I skimmed Matthew James Cooper’s 2021 paper that you linked to, and curiously, it seemed to speak of Plantinga as if he stopped writing on the subject in 1974.
Plantinga devoted a chapter to the evidential problem of evil in Warranted Christian Belief, published in 2000. Specifically, he addresses arguments by Rowe (much as Half_Man_Half_Wit has: objects to inference from ignorance) and Draper (belief in God not reliant on explanatory power of theodicy).
https://ccel.org/ccel/plantinga/warrant3/warrant3.vii.iv.i.html
The last twenty-five years or so have seen the development of several different versions of the evidential argument from evil. In this section I examine a couple of the best.
~Max
The latter does not follow from the former. You are building on some implied premises which, critically, break the analogy for a traditional theist.
What if I see John in an orange jumpsuit because he’s been arrested? Does that give me reason to doubt that John hates the color orange? What if John’s skin turns orange when he’s out in the Sun? Does that give me reason to doubt that John hates the color orange?
Only certain observations give rise to doubt the proposition. If I see John wearing orange clothes, I doubt John hates the color orange, because I assume John usually chooses his own clothes, and I don’t expect John to choose orange clothes if he can avoid doing so. So we can refine your analogy by comparing God’s allowing people to die of plague to John’s choice to wear orange clothing.
An Anselmian God who allows people to die of plague is not analogous to John choosing orange clothing at all because for God, the alternative is logically impossible. The free will defense explicitly rejects compatibilism - so John choosing clothing requires two possible outcomes. Perhaps a better analogy would be to compare God’s allowing people to die of plague to John’s skin color.
More importantly, the theist’s belief that God exists is disanalogous to our belief that John hates the color orange. We may believe the latter proposition is qualified by evidence, since our belief is likely grounded either in observation or testimony; not so for the theist, whose belief in God is likely axiomatic.
~Max
I’ll note that to me, the discussion wasn’t really concerned with what any individuals or institutions believe, but merely the consistency of omnibenevolence and omnipotence in the abstract.
Having said that, and recognizing that I’m out of my depth here, I think that Anselm had a relevantly different concept of omnipotence from the ‘being able to do everything’-notion that was under consideration. It seems to me he portrayed God more as a kind of ‘unstoppable force’, so that they may not be able to do everything, but rather, to see their will fulfilled no matter what—having unlimited power rather than unlimited ability. This, too, would be consistent with omnibenevolence.
However, I also think that the notion of omnibenevolence that involves choice isn’t quite so uncommon. I’ve above already referred to some relevant passages from Aquinas that at least seem to allow such an interpretation, and he at least allowed for the possibility that God could do evil if they so chose:
[T]he Philosopher [i.e. Aristotle] says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: “If man is a donkey, he has four feet.”
I don’t know what I don’t know. All else being equal seeing an instance of orange in John’s world casts doubt on the claim that John seeks zero orange among things under his control.
The fact that there might be a reason that John is forced to have this or that orange thing doesn’t take away from that.
Otherwise you could never do any inductive reasoning. We can always speculate about mitigating reasons for any empirical observation. Whether we are talking about a little orange or a lot.
This was the reason I picked this hypothetical by the way: because it’s entirely plausible that there might be reasons that force an orange-hating person to nonetheless have some non-zero orange objects that belong to them. But, until I know those reasons, it’s entirely rational for me to take any orange objects as supporting one case over another.
Because we don’t know that. We have no expectation of any amount of orange. The only information given is that John seeks zero orange.
Can you clear up the inconsistency about what you said about hell? If I am living in a literal hell, having my skin burned off daily, do I have any reason whatsoever that an omnimax (including perfectly loving) God exists?
Because in post 220 you said no, and then later you are suggesting that gratuitous suffering does give us grounds.
I’d say no. Both because the obvious option of "don’t create people and stick them in a hell" exists, and because it renders the question moot. If “good” is indistinguishable from “evil” there’s there’s no reason to make a distinction between them or care about them.
That’s a serious issue with nearly all the “pro-omnimax God” apologia in this thread; they mostly revolve around define good as indistinguishable from evil, omnipotent as indistinguishable from powerlessness. And by doing so render the entire issue unimportant gibberish.
It also demonstrates how the whole concept is so nonsensical and in contradiction to reality that supporting or defending it inevitably degenerates into a general rejection of facts, logic, and basic empathy.