Why? To me, that doesn’t follow at all. I say you are in no position to conclude the implausibility of a universe of barbed wire and broken glass being the most comfortable world, unless you assert at least the possibility of a comfier world.
~Max
Eh, not really. Thing is the “best of all possible worlds” claim is just another bad-faith attempt to stealthily defuse the Problem of Evil by undercutting one of the qualities that make it a “Problem” in the first place. Omnipotence, in this case.
An omnipotent benevolent god could trivially make the world less evil and reduce suffering, just as a God of Softness could have easily made Barbed Wire World softer. There is no “necessity” with an omnipotent, they can just make whatever they want into reality.
The point in contention is whether any suffering is gratuitous, or if literally all suffering is a (1) necessary and (2) justified consequence of free will.
Now, in classical theism, which the problems of evil were historically designed to attack from within, an affirmative answer can be logically deduced from additional faith-based premises. You don’t have to accept those premises. But if you wish to answer the evidential problem of evil in the negative, you need at least one additional premise to create a contradiction with classical theism.
~Max
Not a single bit of suffering is necessary under an omnipotent being.
You would have to be more specific and say suffering is not a necessary consequence of free will, or assert suffering incident to the grant of free will is not justified, or deny the existence of free will (premise in OP), or assert the existence of unnecessary suffering unrelated to free will.
~Max
Free will is irrelevant, an omnipotent could make suffering simply not exist.
For thoroughness:
Acknowledged; prior cites to Hume, Rowe, Plantinga, and Smith.
Admitted,
I was imprecise, sorry. The evidentiary problem of evil deals with acts of God, not suffering or evil per se. The core question is whether omnipotent omniscient God’s act of allowing suffering (or creating things which will result in suffering) contradicts the principle of omnibenevolence, and the evidentiary aspect asserts more observed suffering makes the contradiction more plausible. If you acknowledge even the hypothetical possibility that sometimes “omnimax” God acts to allow suffering, you have admitted that as a category, God allowing suffering is not necessarily wrong.
~Max
Would an omnibenevolent being create, for instance, a lifeless universe?
~Max
In preference to one full of suffering like this one, yes.
Why? That’s not self-evident. Not that it proves my point, but most people do not commit suicide.
~Max
Because of an irrational survival drive, and because we mortals unlike God have greatly improved conditions in recent history. Historically there was a great emphasis on punishing suicide, both religiously with threats of damnation and by targeting the family because for the great majority of people life was a far worse fate than death.
And at any rate human suffering pales in comparison to the many millions of years of suffering animals.
Well, to shoehorn that into my previous criteria for Mijin to cure the defect in his argument,
~Max
It’s much simpler than that—we need not go into whether God admitting suffering is right or wrong at all. There are only two options. The first is that we should expect exactly zero suffering in a world created by a tri-omni God. This is only possible if the probability of observing suffering, given that sort of God, is likewise exactly zero. This makes it impossible for both to co-occur, and hence, any observed suffering immediately disproves that kind of God. Thus, this is the logical PoE.
The second is that there is a non-zero amount of expected suffering. Then, we know that in a world created by a tri-omni God, at least some suffering should be expected, and hence, observing such suffering, or a certain amount of evil, does not constitute evidence against God. It is, after all, just what’s expected. Rather, one has to argue that there exists suffering that exceeds what is to be expected, given a tri-omni God; then, that suffering gives us grounds to doubt such a being. This is the inductive reasoning of the evidential PoE.
The option that @Mijin proposes, that any and all evil is grounds to doubt God’s existence, is then simply trying to have one’s cake and eat it: it’s not logically coherent. Either any evil (or suffering) disproves God immediately, or there is a certain expected amount, and only what exceeds this constitutes disconfirming evidence.
Which I can, if we’re being consistent here.
Look, in this analogy there is one objective fact: that the universe is full of sharp things.
Everything beyond that is speculation. Among the explanations are:
- An omnimax god exists, and this is the softest of all possible worlds
- It’s not the softest of all worlds, but God is not omnimax and can’t fix it (or doesn’t know, or doesn’t care)
- It’s not the softest of all worlds, and God doesn’t exist
Let’s agree that whatever burden of proof we want to apply to one of these explanations, we should apply to all 3. If the mere fact that we don’t know that (1) is impossible is sufficient, then it should be for the others too.
But we can go further because these explanations are not alike. Because while they all make a claim about God, (2) and (3) are self-contained, whereas explanation (1) needs to make additional claims; it needs some other mitigating factors that are tying god’s hand. And, for a 100% sharp universe to be the maximum soft an omnimax God could make, there’s a hell of an explanatory gap those additional factors need to cover. This is much of why, thinking skeptically, it is the least reasonable explanation in this hypothetical.
To clarify; what I meant was, when we give specific examples like of a school being wiped out by a mudslide, or how people suffered more in the past prior to painkillers, there’s not exactly a rush of people trying to explain how that makes sense in terms of suffering being something valuable to our lives and/or character.
Now, when I threw those out, it was largely in a rhetorical way, so saying you were ducking those questions was a bit mean on my part, I’ll take that back. But, I’ll ask now, how is it useful or good for a bunch of kids to die? Why did people need more suffering in the past?
ETA: Ah and I note you’re jumping across to the free will defence of PoE. So in that case, why is there natural suffering? If there free will in heaven?
A common example used by theists in support of a good god allowing suffering is a child being vaccinated. There is short term pain for a long term good, and the pain is a necessary part of the good. (Let’s assume some minimal pain is required.)
However there are different levels of pain that could be associated with the shot. Ethical doctors develop techniques to minimize the pain. While vaccinating quickly with a sharp needle might cause minimal pain, vaccinating with a big honking needle that hurts for a week might provide the same benefit. Would you say the doctor who uses that needle is maximally benevolent? If there is a god, he is clearly using the big needle for our lives, not the small one.
Thing is, that kind of assumption doesn’t work for an omnipotent, anything they want to happen they can make happen without suffering, or simply make suffering not even be physically possible. They can simply make their ideal world appear from nothing, with no need for any less-perfect precursor.
As I’ve been saying, the meaning of “omnipotence” keeps getting radically downplayed, because doing otherwise makes it impossible to defend the tri-omni god. The tri-omni god is contradicted by even a casual look at the world, so its defenders consistently massively downplay one or more of the “omni” concepts to defend it. Without admitting they are doing so.
Agreed. Analogies where a little suffering is needed to prevent greater suffering don’t make any sense in the context of an omnimax god.
Where I have differed from you a bit is that I’ve entertained the hypothetical possibility of omnimax God needing to balance some other thing, and the ideal universe therefore having some suffering in it. I want to be clear though that I am speaking only in a very technical sense.
Because the best anyone has come up with in centuries of deliberation for “some other thing” is free will.
And even if free will made sense as a coherent thing, the defence still fails for about a dozen reasons. Plus, as I say, questions like “Is there free will in heaven?” then create additional problems.
Where does the notion of a tri-omni god come from? I assumed it was in the Bible or something, but my Presbyterian friend does not believe in a tri-omni God, which surprised me. I thought all Christians did.
The only time I’ve personally seen it referenced is philosophy.
Centuries of power inflation, as far as I can tell. Basically the same thing as happens with comic book characters like Superman, who started out as a bulletproof strongman with superjump whose abilities keep getting inflated by writers trying to top each other. Except there’s no publisher to force periodic “resets” so God finally reached “infinite everything” at some point.
Right. In the Bible, God neither knows all things, nor can do all things, nor is all-good (“good” is subjective, but he doesn’t even meet his own definition of good). So some heavy “power inflation” has happened over time.
Furthermore, philbro “proofs” of God have often rested on claims of a maximal being, or uncaused cause and the like, and so often need to rely on an ultimate / infinite definition.
Although as we see in the PoE, an omnimax God creates problems of its own.