I almost put in “don’t consider an omnipotent doctor” and I should have. The point was that even if you accept some suffering is good, minimal suffering is better
Say in a world with some semblance of free will multiple people compete for a desired partner. One will lose, and suffer. One alternative is to preallocate partners in advance, that goes against the free will (whatever that means) assumption. If the losing person is fine, they may not compete as hard and the best partner might not win. An omnibenevolent god might need a world with some degree of this kind of suffering. Now the level of suffering might be reduced by such a god, so the situation we find ourselves in is yet another argument against one, but the existence of suffering isn’t. (Notice no evil here, just suffering.)
I don’t think anyone tried to tell me there was a tri-omni god in five years of Hebrew School. Any casual reading of the real Bible goes against such nonsense. Christians who came up with the idea have retconned the stories to support it. “God had to drown all those babies because every single one of them would grow up bad.”
And the logical absurdity of a tri-omni god is a very good argument against this “proof” of the existence of god.
The God of the bible is described as limited in many ways, in power, knowledge, or presence (omnipresence being the classical ‘third’ attribute of God). The notion that God is a perfect being comes via the influence of Greek philosophy, through the Neoplatonism of Plotinus via Saint Augustine, on early Christianity, before the rediscovery and integration of Aristotle’s work in the Middle Ages. I think the most influential conception is Saint Anselm’s, who introduced the ontological argument that casts God as the most perfect being imaginable, possessed of all ‘positive attributes’, which, existence being among them, therefore must exist. Were God lacking in, say, benevolence or any other aspect, a more perfect being could be imagined, so God must be omnibenevolent. Furthermore, any finite quality would introduce contingency—If God only knows some things, why those things, and not others? If God only has certain powers, why those?—while with the conception of God as a necessary being, there is no room for such open questions; consequently, all of those properties must be dialed up to the max, so to speak, because that’s the only choice that doesn’t invite follow up questions.
This is an additional premise which is incompatible with classical theism because the existence of God is clasically deduced from first principles of faith. Logical deductions from first principles are not falsifiable by evidence, but may only be disproved by contradiction. But continuing for the sake of argument…
The reason (1) is usually distinguished is because there are independent reasons to believe in God (vary by denomination). The problem of evil is not a tool for proselytization. It is a specific challenge against belief in God. A skeptic who asks to be persuaded that God exists generally goes well beyond the problem of evil, even the evidentiary flavor.
In other words, it is one thing to say, “given your definition of God, the world shouldn’t look like this”, and another thing entirely to say, “your definition of God is only valid if it offers the best falsifiable explanatory power”. Popper would not apply the latter burden to metaphysics generally, including religion.
If you are arguing that explanation (1) requires more claims than (2) or (3), it does not. Your explanation (1) contains exactly two claims which are the negatives of the two claims in (3):
(a) God exists with the traditional three attributes of omnipotence (limited to what is possible), omniscience (atemporal), and omnibenevolence, and
(b) despite the presence of evil, the world is the best possible world.
This second part doesn’t “tie God’s hand”. It is an assertion that this is the best there can possibly be–the technical term is “compossible”, meaning if you try to do better, you run into logical contradictions that even omnipotence wouldn’t solve. As light implies darkness (n.b. Genesis never mentions God creating darkness), maybe God could make a world with no suffering, but that would mean a world with no love. Even Heaven is set against Hell. In fact, God challenges Job to do a better job running the world - the implication is that it would not be possible, and human thinking to the contrary is arguably the result of imperfect knowledge.
There’s a hell of an explanatory gap if you embrace absurdism, too. Whether you choose to believe in an unknown divine purpose (or a known one, I guess), versus lack of divine purpose, is a matter of faith.
Instrumental value to God does not imply local instrumental value. There are two ways to explain the existence of suffering.
The first is a nomological argument: God has created a world with physics and cause and effect and free will, and the result of these relations is a positive amount of suffering. From the premise of explanation (1), this world is the best possible world, so we should expect God to allow exactly this much suffering, because literally no suffering is gratuitous. Thus, the evidentiary problem of evil is solved.
Compare, if we grant explanation (2) or (3), we have no guidelines as to how much suffering to expect; all suffering is gratuitous, with no explanation for why it exists.
The second argument is more specific, but it builds off Christian theology. Consider acts of senseless violence. The suffering that results is a direct consequence of the actor’s free will. It does not necessarily improve the soul of the actor or his victims. But it makes no sense to speak of a world where the exercise of free will never results in suffering. A loves B; B chooses not to reciprocate A’s love; A suffers, for love creates capacity for suffering. In fact, as I wrote above, virtually all Christian theologists view all suffering, even natural suffering, as a direct consequence of free will. Specifically, God cursed the world after the Fall (see Genesis). Perhaps in Heaven there is no need to have physical laws that mandate pain because, the souls having already chosen the path of God, there is no purpose in subjecting them to trials of flesh. But remember, Heaven is traditionally offset by eternal Hell.
~Max
And there are many arguments I could give for why I don’t believe in the existence of God, but those arguments would be completely off-topic in a thread about the problem of evil.
Within the terms of the PoE then alternative hypotheses carry an equal burden. Otherwise we are not reasoning rationally.
I would agree that none can be proven, but few things can ever be proven empirically anyway. But we can gain confidence in particular hypotheses based on observable evidence.
Or put it this way: people of all stripes experience doubts due to the observation of apparently unnecessary suffering. Do you think it’s a convincing solution to just say “You can’t question the omnimax god hypothesis, it’s on a separate tier. Therefore, PoE solved”
It requires extra information / entities though. This is about what we know and don’t know.
Based only on what we know, and all else being equal, the amount of orange an omnimax orange-maximizing god would create is everything being orange. Any other scenario requires some additional entity or factor of which we are not currently aware. Because we are not aware of any reason why maximum orange is not simply everything orange.
Now: is it possible that such external factors exist, that we don’t currently know of? Sure. I’ve said this multiple times.
But right now it’s an explanatory gap. With even a single non-orange thing then an omnimax orange-maximizing God is already not the most parsimonious explanation. And it gets worse with every observation of a non-orange thing because the explanatory gap gets wider.
This may be where we do not see eye to eye. The way I see it, explanation (1) does not require any extra information or entities beyond its own terms to “solve” the evidentiary problem of evil.
If an omnimax God exists, and if this is the softest of all possible worlds, then observed sharpness is not gratuitous. Granting that all gratuitous sharpness gives reason to doubt the existence of omnimax God, if we never observe gratuitous sharpness, we never doubt the existence of God based on observations of gratuitous sharpness. No additional entities or information is required to reach this conclusion.
Furthermore, both explanation (1) and explanation (3) have the same number of terms. The law of parsimony can be a helpful probablistic tool, but it works best when comparing testable hypotheses in a controlled setting–ceteris paribus (all other things equal). Here, we are comparing explanations with two independent, unfalsifiable variables: the existence of God, and the compossibility of a better world. All other things are not equal by definition. Occam’s Razor just isn’t helpful in this situation.
The real disagreement is on the baseline. To a classical theist, it is simpler to start with the assumption that God exists. A world without God would require a number of additional axioms to replace the theist’s moral system. From there, the law of parsimony instructs the theist that this world is probably the best compossible world. To an atheist, the simplest explanation is that the world is suboptimal. To the atheist, assuming this is the best compossible world appears to be an ad-hoc expansion to rescue the existence of God. From there, the law of parsimony instructs the atheist that God probably doesn’t exist. Parsimony is a tool to measure consistency and economy within a system; it cannot objectively adjudicate between different foundational axioms.
~Max
But I didn’t just assert that position; I included my reasoning. And you seem to have just skipped over it.
Without further information, any suffering whatsoever is gratuitous to an omnimax God.
And presumably then, you’d bite the same bullet at @Half_Man_Half_Wit , and say that if we lived in a literal hell, we would still have no reason to doubt, even for an instant, that we were in the best possible world?
Besides, the problem of evil is presented at least as often by theists as atheists. They are coming from the angle that there’s God and “something something free will”, and are still having doubts when they see kids starving, say. Because this kind of assertion doesn’t sit well with how we normally evaluate claims and perform inductive reasoning.
I am trying my best to identify where and why we disagree. “Without further information” implies knowledge of some information. What knowledge are you assuming?
You laid out three possible explanations to the evidentiary problem of evil. For simplicity sake, they can be compressed into two:
- (Tro-omni) God exists, and this is the best compossible world.
- The (tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is not the best compossible world.
We agreed that (I am proposing the nested premises for agreement):
- any gratuitous suffering is incompatible with the existence of tri-omni God
- (gratuitous suffering means suffering not necessary for the best compossible world)
- we observe lots of suffering
- some observed suffering has local instrumental value (“locally justified suffering”)
- (locally justified suffering may or may not be gratuitous)
- some observed suffering has no apparent local instrumental value (“locally unjustified suffering”)
- (locally unjustified suffering may or may not be gratuitous)
- in theory, suffering can have non-local instrumental value (“cosmically justified suffering”)
- (cosmically justified suffering is not gratuitous)
You then argue that without further information, the more locally unjustified suffering we observe, the more reason we have to conclude gratuitous suffering exists. If gratuitous suffering probably exists, then explanation (1) is probably wrong.
Is this accurate?
I want to know why observing more locally unjustified suffering gives us confidence that gratuitous suffering exists.
If we want to test explanation (1) as a hypothesis, we would need to prove the existence of gratuitous suffering. Merely observing locally unjustified suffering does not provide evidence against the hypothesis unless we have reason to doubt such suffering is cosmically justified. Whether observed suffering is cosmically justified is unfalsifiable without additional information, i.e. cosmic knowledge.
~Max
I’m happy for us to proceed with only evaluating these two claims, as long as we aren’t claiming these are the only two options and thus one is true by elimination.
Yes…I mean the framing of gratuitous suffering already seems to imply an expected “threshold” of suffering, and I am questioning that. However, my position could be described as implicitly having an expected threshold of zero suffering, so OK let’s proceed.
Agreed of course.
Well, for humans, yes. Since we are neither omnipotent nor omniscient, there are lots of times we cause some suffering with the aim of benefitting the person or society overall. Whether the same applies to a God is the whole thing in contention so cannot be allowed as a premise.
Sure to both.
No. I argue the more suffering of any kind we observe the more we should doubt the claim of an omnimax god.
Let’s take the classic example of locally-justified suffering: giving someone an injection to prevent them from getting a nasty disease. There’s an explanatory gap both for why god created the nasty disease and why he couldn’t give humans a way to prevent the disease without a sharp scratch.
So overall I think it’s a bit of a red herring to look at the cases of locally justified suffering that we are aware of, because they are down to human limitations. What we’re interested in, is if there is such a thing as locally-justified suffering to an omnimax God.
(Missed edit window): Locally-justified or cosmically-justified.
The only other possible explanation is:
- (Tri-omni) God does not exist, and this is the best compossible world.
Why? Is there an argument behind this? Does it require more admissions? Are you sure you aren’t accidentally assuming the conclusion–that this is not the best compossible world?
So if I understand you correctly, you argue that without further information, the more suffering we observe, whether locally justified or locally unjustified, the more reason we have to conclude gratuitous suffering exists. If gratuitous suffering probably exists, then explanation (1) is probably wrong.
Is this accurate?
I still want to know why observing more suffering (locally justified or locally unjustified) gives us confidence that gratuitous suffering exists. Whether observed suffering is cosmically justified is unfalsifiable without additional information, i.e. cosmic knowledge. At most we can only say observed suffering appears locally justified or locally unjustified.
~Max
Right, and indeed this is a possibility we should take seriously, right? Because all the arguments based around “best world because free will” or whatever would apply equally with or without God.
Anyway, I’m happy to put it aside. My concern was only that reducing a list of possibilities is often followed by a proof by elimination. But you didn’t do that, so never mind.
I think it’s a little disingenuous to quote that part of my response, because once again: I don’t think we should be setting any kind of “threshold” of anticipated suffering. But if pushed to say what level of suffering I would expect, the answer is no suffering at all. That’s because of the definition of omnibenevolent.
Just as the expected amount of meat in a vegetarian’s fridge is zero. Finding a steak or whatever in their fridge doesn’t mean that they are lying about being vegetarian. But my expectation was zero, based on the definition of a vegetarianism.
I would phrase it as the less confidence that we should have that an omnimax god exists.
Observing apparently gratuitous suffering (e.g. a hospital being wiped out by a tornado) give us reason to think there’s gratuitous suffering. Hence why this problem even exists.
Why do you think that theists often experience doubts about God’s existence following tragedies?
I apologize if my selective quoting appeared disingenuous. I was trying to isolate the part that didn’t make sense to me.
Why would we expect a vegetarian’s fridge to have no meat? No, really. What are we assuming about the vegetarian’s nature, and why is that analogous to (tri-omni) God’s nature? What are we assuming about the vegetarian’s power over his fridge, and why is that analogous to (tri-omni) God’s power over the world?
The way I see it, a vegetarian does not consume meat, by virtue of his being a vegetarian. That does not necessarily mean that a vegetarian’s fridge must have no meat. A vegetarian might have other perfectly valid reasons for storing meat in his fridge, other than consumption. However, we generally assume that a person controls the contents of his fridge, and stores food in his fridge for consumption. That is why it is reasonable to generally expect a vegetarian’s fridge to have no meat. The proposition states that a person generally only stores food in his fridge for consumption, and until individual circumstances disabuse us of the applicability of that proposition, the more meat we observe in a person’s fridge, the more probable it is that this person consumes meat, therefore the less probable it is that this person is a vegetarian.
How would you complete the analogy to (tri-omni) God? Would you rely on a general proposition, and if so, is it “additional information” not covered in the existing admissions?
I can think of ways to answer my own question, since I am not a theist, but I don’t want to put words in your mouth. You might have better answers.
Humans are irrational sometimes. That isn’t necessarily a bad thing–rational thought only takes you so far. But I don’t think such doubts are rational. Neither does Plantinga.
~Max
No worries 
Because the definition of a vegetarian is someone who doesn’t consume meat, while a steak in a fridge is typically being preserved for later consumption.
Now, I’ll make this explicit once again: finding meat in a vegetarian’s fridge proves nothing. There are dozens of potential explanations for why it would be there. It’s why this hypothetical was chosen. Because it’s not proof, but it’s also not nothing, and more observations of this kind would give us increasing reason to doubt the claim that he is vegetarian.
Plus of course there’s a need for an explanation. Based only on the known facts there’s no reason why he would have steak in his fridge. There needs to be some external thing, like a wife who eats meat or whatever. And the more situations, the more explanatory ground that needs to be covered.
No; plantinga’s argument is about the logical problem of evil, and I have spoken only about the evidential problem of evil.
You didn’t make it explicit, so I’ll ask again: do you bite the same bullet as HMHW and claim that even if we lived in a literal hell, with our skin being burned off every day – and heck, we can throw in that God is visibly laughing at our suffering (since there could hypothetically be a reason for omnimax God doing that too) – we would still have no reason to doubt that we live in the best possible world, created by a perfectly loving God?
In your own words, how is this analogous to tri-omni God? Would you rely on a general proposition, and if so, is it “additional information” not covered in the existing admissions?
I propose that there is a need for an explanation because “steak in a fridge is typically being preserved for later consumption”, typically by the owner of the fridge. We expect a vegetarian’s fridge to have no meat only so long as we believe the typical relation between refrigerated meat and the fridge owner still holds. How would you complete the analogy to (tri-omni) God?
You are mistaken. I cited it above–forgive me for not having the reference handy just now (on my phone). Plantinga presented a free will defense to the logical problem in the '70s, but he wrote on the evidentiary problem of evil in the '00s and concluded a rational believer would be unfazed.
This is a much more complicated question than it appears. If you do not sense God’s love, you are incomplete in a way that defeats the basic belief in God which distinguishes a believer from a non-believer. Incomplete like a child who does not have the mental faculty of persistence. This hypothetical strongly suggests a lack of what Plantinga called the sensus divinitatus. But the sensus divinitatus (and basic belief in God) is not something arrived at by rational thought or weighing of evidence. It is the starting point. If, in such a Hell, you still retain the sensus divinitatus and believe in God, then it is irrational for you to doubt the existence of God due to the extreme suffering you witness. To conclude otherwise would be like doubting the existence of the sun because you are getting sunburn.
~Max
But one could doubt the omnibenevolence of such a god.
This strikes me as a rationalization that may carry weight only within certain theological circles. The “starting point” described here is still a theory, not a universal datum, especially given the vast diversity of religious experience across cultures. Monotheism and divine love are highly abstract notions rather than basic or self‑evident truths. Invoking what Plantinga calls the sensus divinitatis in a logical debate with a non‑Christian or a non‑monotheist risks coming across as dismissive, both toward non‑believers and toward believers whose spiritual intuitions differ. It also suggests an unwillingness to examine one’s own assumptions about what truly counts as basic and what does not.
No, the argument is explicit that no amount of suffering leads a rational believer to doubt the omnibenevolence of God.
What I want to argue first is that if classical Christianity is true, then the perception of
evil is not a defeater for belief in God with respect to fully rational noetic structures—any
noetic structure with no cognitive dysfunction, one in which all cognitive faculties and
processes are functioning properly. From the point of view of classical Christianity (at any
rate according to the model of chapters 6 and 8), this includes also the proper function of
the sensus divinitatis. Someone in whom this process was functioning properly would have
an intimate, detailed, vivid, and explicit knowledge of God; she would have an intense
awareness of his presence, glory, goodness, power, perfection, wonderful attractiveness, and
sweetness; and she would be as convinced of God’s existence as of her own. She might
therefore be perplexed by the existence of this evil in God’s world—for God, she knows,
hates evil with a holy and burning passion—but the idea that perhaps there just wasn’t any
such person as God would no doubt not so much as cross her mind. Confronted with evil
and suffering, such a person might ask herself why God permits it; the facts of evil may be
a spur to inquiry as well as to action. If she finds no answer, she will no doubt conclude that
God has a reason that is beyond her ken; she won’t be in the least inclined to doubt that
there is such a person as God. For someone fully rational, therefore, the existence of evil
doesn’t so much as begin to constitute a defeater for belief in God.1
1 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 486. https://www.ccel.org/p/plantinga/warrant3/cache/warrant3.pdf#page=524.
~Max
Mijin’s question about whether a theist in living hell would “bite the bullet” or start doubting God, as I see it, asks for rationalization actually put forward by theists. Necessarily, what works for them is not universal but builds off their belief system. Again, the problem of evil is not a tool for proselytization.
~Max
I’m not convinced this argument holds even within the circle of Christian believers. I live in a country where Christianity has been the dominant tradition since its earliest days. Today, 97–99% of the population are Christians. And yet only a select group would appeal to the sensus divinitatis in this context. I’m sure most of them do not regard it as a basic metaphysical intuition.