I’m reluctant to speak for the boss, but let me make a few quick comments:
(1) The reasoning of the appellate court is a lot more cogent than that offered by the original petitioners. I hope they appreciate the favor.
(2) To put the matter charitably, the law is ambiguous. The court argues that residency as it applies to voters is different from residency as it applies to candidates. But the law doesn’t say that in so many words. The distinction, if there is one, must be inferred.
(3) One of the court’s arguments for its inference is that (a) the statute dealing with candidates says members of the military don’t lose residency when they’re stationed elsewhere; (b) the statute dealing with voters says you don’t lose residency if you dwell elsewhere on "business of the United States; © members of the military are engaged in business of the United States; (d) if residency as used in (a) is the same as residency as used in (b), the clause referenced in (a) is superfluous in light of the clause referenced in (b); therefore, (e) the legislative intent was that residency for voters is different from residents for candidates.
(4) However, an equally persuasive argument, in my opinion, is that the law was carelessly drafted, and the court is drawing an inference where none was meant. The law on candidates says they must be qualified electors. To discover what a qualified elector is, we must turn to the law on voters. The two laws, in other words, must be considered together. The court now asks us to believe that the ordinary word residence, as used in one law, means something different from what it does in a closely related law, even though there’s no explicit statement to that effect. This argument isn’t implausible, but neither is it compelling.
(5) Given this confusing state of affairs, and lacking any clearer statement of legislative intent than we have seen so far, the Illinois Supreme Court in my opinion would be justified in ruling that (a) the seemingly plain meaning of Illinois law is that residents of the state do not lose residency while away on business of the United States; (b) Rahm was away on such business and intended to return; © relying on what he took to be the plain meaning of the law, Rahm diligently took those additional steps he believed necessary to support his claim of residency, namely voting absentee, retaining ownership of his house, paying property taxes, etc.; (d) Illinois statutes do not explicitly draw a distinction between residency as it applies to voters vs. residency as it applies to candidates, and there is no compelling reason to think a distinction was intended; (e) therefore, it would be an injustice to conjure up such a distinction at this late hour and thereby deny Rahm the right to run for mayor of a city of which he clearly and reasonably believed himself to be a legal resident.
Supreme courts, as we know, are capable of rulings that seem far from just, so I don’t predict how this court will rule. I merely observe that no tortured logic is required to rule in Rahm’s favor.