I’m reading Band of Brothers by Stephen Ambrose again, and I just got through the part where E company is in Haguenau. They send a patrol across the river at night, lose 2 men, and bring back 2 German prisoners. Colonel Sink is so pleased that they brought back some prisoners that he orders another patrol for the next night. Major Winters thinks another patrol would be dangerous and useless, so he gathers the men, tells them to sit tight in a cellar for a few hours, then goes back to Sink and tells him the patrol has returned, but couldn’t find any Germans to capture.
So my question is - Winters told Ambrose this long after the incident occurred, well after he had left the Army. Could he be legally prosecuted for this under the UCMJ? (realistically it’ll never happen of course) He clearly disobeyed a direct order from a direct superior under combat conditions. If it had come out the next morning, Sink could have had him court-martialed. Can a person be prosecuted for crimes they committed in the military after they leave? Is it different for matters that are only military crimes (e.g. disobeying an order) vs. matters that are civilian crimes also (e.g. murder)?
I am told that there is no statute of limitations on murder. If you murder someone, then the authority that has jurisdiction can pursue you forever. So, I think you could be prosecuted under the UCMJ even after you returned to civilian life.
My understanding was that the UCMJ applied only to those individuals enlisted in, or commissioned by, the U.S. military. If a murder which you committed while in uniform came to light long after you’d been discharged, you’d be prosecuted by Federal or state authorities (depending on the alleged facts of the case), I believe, but not by court-martial. In the OP’s example, you’d probably get off scot-free for an alleged crime under military law which remained undetected during your term of service.
A common sentence imposed by courts-martial, along with imprisonment, is dishonorable discharge. Now, after discharge, the person in confinement is no longer in the military, but is still subject to the UCMJ and court martial jurisdiction while he is a prisoner.
There are a few other times where this is applies as well, but this is the most frequent time this happens, and makes perfect sense on the face of it.
Section 843 is the statute of limitations. So when I translate it to English I get that discharge does not protect you as long as the SOL has not passed.
Well, I’m not an expert on this stuff, but here’s my read:
(a) says “Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43),” which is the SOL, “a person who is in a status in which the person is subject to this chapter.”
That refers to section 802, which is longer, but here it is:
so it includes anyone who meets these criteria at the time of the prosecution,
“and who committed an offense against this chapter while formerly in a status in which the person was subject to this chapter”
As long as they met the same criteria (perhaps with a different status) at the time of the offense.
“is not relieved from amenability to the jurisdiction of this chapter for that offense by reason of a termination of that person’s former status.”
So if you get discharged and then re-enlist, for example, you are subject to prosecution for your previous conduct, within the SOL. See, e.g., Vanderbush v Smith (1996, ACCA) 45 MJ 590, 1996 CCA LEXIS 346; *United States v Erickson * (2006, AFCCA) 63 MJ 504, 2006 CCA LEXIS 94.
I was just telling my wife that in purely anecdotal evidence, I had remembered that somewhere, I heard of a case where a retired member drawing retired pay can be held liable under the UCMJ (IIRC, the charge was ‘Conduct Unbecoming’ and ‘Sexual Misconduct’). For the life of me, I can’t recall specifics.
However, I wonder if they do stretch what Gfactor posted to include those charges they really want to press. . .
Tripler
I knew I wasn’t completely barking up a non-existent tree. . .[sub]as sapling-esque as it is. . .[/sub]