But their loved one’s do.
How does that phrase indicate there is energy loss?
I’m glad you’re content to be ignored, because from this point forward, any response from you that looks like this:
will be ignored because its meaningless. Which they generally are. If you think that
Somehow means that I am arguing that natural behavior automatically means moral or ethical behavior, you will have to make that case in order to have attention paid. Sorting through your stack of labels and picking one you imagine might fit, slapping it on without the slightest attempt to connect it logically is lazy, and disrespectful to your opponents. It is not my job to puzzle out how your mind works and guess at your logical process, it’s yours to explain it.
And this:
Doesn’t cut it, since it’s just a description of the meaning of the fallacy, you haven’t explained why you see my statement as qualifying as that fallacy. Make the case, don’t slap the label. Because I can guarantee you that absolutely no one is impressed - this is so the wrong audience for that sort of thing to be considered anything but lame.
EXCELLENT points! Hat’s off!
Which doesn’t matter, as using brain function and structure as a deciding factor in how we are going to treat a whole species is, appropriately, considered on a species level, not an individual one. At the species level, primate brains trump chicken brains, even though an individual chicken in normal health might be more competent than a particular human being whose brain is impaired for any reason.
Exceptions to the rule do not invalidate the soundness of the rule.
So that argument against using brain capacity and structure as a measuring stick fails completely and need not be bothered with again.
All true. I’m not saying that mine is the One True Way, because these are ultimately personal decisions. The conclusions one draws and decisions one makes are subjective, but the criteria used in these examples is objective, and some are objectively more profound and meaningful, in real terms related to the issue of suffering and the capacity to suffer, than others.
And for the record, I think “the naturalistic fallacy” should always be in quotes. Unlike logical fallacies or rhetorical fallacies, the so-called naturalistic fallacy is itself questionable, as its application depends on the prior acceptance that identifying natural phenomena as good is an error. Clearly, if one has already argued that any such identification is in error, then later using such reasoning would be committing an error. But to just whip it out of the void, well, it kind of begs the question.
I don’t think it is. What does it imply for those suffering from Korsakoff’s syndrome without relatives or loved ones? If we’re going by the suffering caused by the loss of an entity, then the loss of animals to slaughter also causes some marginal suffering in humans (though this kind of suffering is difficult to operationalise: even the existence of the capacity to feel pain in fish was argued in 2003).
For another analogy, we have no data to suggest that infants have this capacity for suffering. If our preposition is that we should avoid causing death in animals that have the capacity to develop the ability to fear death or previously held that capacity, then abortion would be outlawed on that basis.
Nothing.
That’s not our preposition. It’s not even our proposition. Nor is it anyone else’s that I am aware of, not least because it’s not something that has ever existed, (apart from existing at the evolutionary level, of course, but since that will take hundreds of thousands of years, we needn’t concern ourselves) Certainly not in the animals we use for food, that’s for damn sure.
Let’s do this again…
We’re not going by that exclusively, it’s simply an additional layer of suffering that human beings (and other highly developed animals) experience that less highly developed beings do not.
This strikes me as circular if we consider the core components of the argument.
We hold that species level distinctions are valid because certain species are not sentient or cannot apprehend future pain. When examples are given within a species of a lack of that capacity, it doesn’t disprove the notion that species level distinctions are valid.
So what is the logical basis for preserving future pleasure and preventing future pain within a species, but not between them?
Well, whatever it is about the American diet that is causing an epidemic of obesity, diabetes, heart disease, etc, it is probably more due to people not caring whether they eat too much or not, or think it is too hard to get even half an hour of exercise a day (which is likely another big factor, never mind that half an hour of exercise can’t replace a whole day of manual labor or hunting/gathering). Don’t forget also that one of the major foods blamed is not meat but plant-based: cheap processed, easily digested and unsatiating sugars and starches (I know myself that such food leaves you hungry a short time afterwards, even if it was a large meal). This doesn’t have anything to do with humans being omnivorous either, except that they will eat a much larger variety of foods than otherwise (and notably, food that simply doesn’t exist in nature; as Michael Pollen puts it, “edible foodlike substances”).
FWIW, it’s actually possible to eat virtually noting but meat and stay healthy, as the Inuit did (and they now eat/have a more Western diet/lifestyle and guess what?).
Avoidance behavior is characteristic of lots and lots of lifeforms. Just because a centipede doesn’t have nociceptors[sup]*[/sup] doesn’t mean it couldn’t experience its own kind of pain. I think the behavioral characteristics that indicate pain are much more suggestive; after all, it would be absurd to argue that we couldn’t know others were in pain prior to outlining the biological mechanism in humans (or mammals or…), so to then turn around and identify pain with just that mechanism is questionable. (For some, it might just be the naturalistic fallacy.)
*[sub]I don’t know if centipedes have them or not, but not all insects have them.[/sub]
More precisely, we hold that species level distinctions are valid because species are distinctly different a thousand ways, most compellingly in their capacity to experience, understand, anticipate and recover from pain and suffering, as well as their capacity to understand death.
More precisely, when examples are given of human beings, whom we treat as most deserving of the most consideration in terms of pain, suffering, and death, who are not, as individuals, able to experience things the way most human beings do, it doesn’t disprove the validity of species-level distinctions being made.
More precisely…pardon me? I do not undersrtand what you are referring to. What do you consider “Preserving future pleasure and preventing future pain” to begin with?
Please be more specific and clear, using direct examples and plain language. Thank you.
Accident or special pleading.
(this is where the ignoring happens.)
i’m not sure english is his first (or even second) language.
when i pretend that in my mind, it makes him make a LOT more sense. read it as babelfish style mistranslation.
at least i hope that’s the issue.
almost all i read by him makes me tilt my quizzically, like when someone is talking to a dog.
exactly.
this is why no one has ever, in the history of time, heard a baby cry.
in almost all vegans, i hear a conflicting mindset on bugs. some are stringently against killing even cockroaches or mosquitoes, while other know they have to excuse the direct or incidental death of millions upon millions of bugs due to farming, citing lower neural activity as ethical justification.
my question is: would that mean ethically, eating bugs would be ok (as far as vegans are concerned)?
and if so–does that mean eating crab, lobster, crayfish and other invertebrates is ok…?
Unless you consider crying indicative of the implications of future suffering?
What do you consider panic to indicate?
[QUOTE=Gamerunknown]
Unless you consider crying indicative of the implications of future suffering?
[/QUOTE]
future suffering?
note the bolding. you go from talking about the suffering cause emotionally when a person is sad a cow dies to the suffering a fish feels from stimulus pain– then the next thing you say is “infants lack *this *capacity for suffering.”
*what *capacity for suffering? the demonstrative adjective “this,” in english, would default to the immediately previous use of “suffering,” which would have to either be *emotional *or physical pain.
now it’s about the capacity to…what…worry about the future…? you didn’t say one thing about contemplative suffering in the post. not one.
…
wait.
…in your last post, did you just argue with yourself and say that babies do cry from [whatever you meant by ‘this’] suffering?
are you arguing with yourself now?
Yes, I was referring to The Flying Dutchman’s clause in that sentence. My first paragraph consisted of an analogy and a reference to the difficulty of operationalising the capacity to feel pain. My second paragraph consisted of another analogy addressing his point, not addressing my own previous point. I cede that I was less than clear in doing so.
…you talking about that second cow…who seemed to be not real comfortable the contraption that locked down around him? which was a tube that, i doubt, a hoofed, fat animal could get a sturdy footing on?
are you calling that slight spastic reaction “panic?” because you’d be implying he 1. understood what the machine was and 2. understood the intention of the guy approaching and 3. suddenly realized what was about to happen and 4. knew what that meant to his ultimate demise, because he 5. understands the mechanics of mortality.
you’re anthropomorphizing badly.
gross video, tho. thanks for that.