I don’t see more than a blurb about this decision at the moment, although there are plenty of articles from back in February when the case was argued, so I don’t have much to link to just yet.
Like most religious accommodation laws & decisions, I don’t think I’m very comfortable or happy with this particular decision (or the recent trend, in general), but I also admit I likely don’t know enough about this case or the legal background to have a firm opinion. It sure does seem that some people (the religious) have more rights than I (an atheist) do, tho.
Your observations seem poor. Have you read the opinion? It’s pretty short.
It is not up to the employer to ask about religious accomodation - no where in the opinion of the court is that stated or implied. The key factor is what motivates the hiring decision. Relgion cannot be a factor in such a motivation. This motivation is independent of the actual knowledge the employer may possess about a prospective applicant. If am employer is motivated in their hiring decisions by a prospective applicants’ religion, that is in violation of the law.
This same rationale defeats your second observation as well. While it is true that an employer cannot possibly know every religion or every religious ritual, this is irrelevant. The key factor is whether the hiring decision is motivated by a persons’ religion.
You are right about this part - Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does elevate religious (and other) accomodations over secular otherwise neutral employment policies. From the opinion:
I found this section interesting (my bold):
I’m pretty sure which way Scalia will vote in Halbig, while Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, ROBERTS, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN joined. We’ll see if they hold consistent in this line of reasoning. I bet there will be defectors from this section in the future.
No, I haven’t read it yet. As I alluded to in the OP, googling the case brought mostly old articles from February and a handful of reprints of the AP story. Thank you for providing a link.
Thanks also for your attempts to clarify things that I apparently misunderstood.
Interesting result, but probably limited in application, since the kind of evidence the EEOC had in this case–that the company obviously thought a religious accommodation would be needed even if it had not been requested or explained by the applicant–is very rarely going to exist. Few HR employees are stupid enough to send the kind of emails they had in this case.
It is emphatically not the case that anyone on the other side of Halbig is going to say “Let’s add words to the law to produce what is thought to be a desirable result!” That’s a conservative straw man, and it deserves no place in your otherwise fine analysis.
I don’t think so. You can’t be “not hired” because of your religion, but you also can’t be “not hired” because of your lack of religion, when a public accommodation is involved.
I concede that the arguments in Halbig are not this straightforward and that none on the court would take this position directly. The isues in Halbig are more complex and the current opinion is not indicative of any justices’ stance in that issue. I personally found that passage interesting, and think Scalia may have phrased that section on purpose to make that rhetorical point. Not meant to be a hijack as I’ve enjoyed your discussion of Halbig in other threads.
Well, the crux of this case is what happens when the public accommodation has to make an accommodation for the prospective employee. I can’t imagine any situation that might arise in which an atheist would have to request an employer accommodation based on her lack of faith. It’s not like my lack of faith compels me to eat more bacon such that I can demand bacon in a kosher cafeteria.
The facts aren’t laid out in detail in the SCOTUS opinion, but they are in the underlying 10th Circuit decision. The initial plaintiff, Elauf, had a friend (Sepahvand) who already worked at the store and the store manager told the friend, who told her, that it was because of the headscarf.
It doesn’t really matter anyway. Most of these cases arise because the plaintiff assumes he/she has been discriminated against. Abercrombie’s staff were just unusually candid.
In my fast food joint, I require all employees to wear a uniform. The uniform has a cross on it. No one ever complained until this atheist guy made a big deal about it, and I fired him. I told him no atheist is working in my restaurant! I showed him, I did!
Which may be a Title VII violation if the atheist sincerely believed it was morally wrong to wear a cross, and believed that with the strength of traditional religious views. I know a few cases when such secular beliefs have been rejected as not having the strength of traditional religious views. Has such a claim ever prevailed?
I mean, that’s an entirely different context altogether, isn’t it? That’s a government actor being subject to the Establishment Clause.
My question is: Although we know theoretically that someone can assert freedom of conscience claims under Title VII (at least the EEOC thinks so), has it been done successfully?
Thanks. Notable, I think, that “Mrs. Young was a member of the Unitarian Church at all times relevant to this lawsuit,” and the Court repeatedly characterized her “religious beliefs” in objecting to the Baptist worship at work. But nevertheless the opinion does call her an atheist, so good enough for an example.
Follow-up question: Has the Court ever upheld an atheist’s Title VII claim objecting to a practice that is not explicitly religious? ISTM, that would show true parity, since of course most Title VII claims are objecting to policies that have nothing to do with religion, like A&F’s “Look Policy.”
