Stealing from my own work…
Using the example of seeing a tree, Pirsig notes that
At the cutting edge of time, before an object can be distinguished, there must be a kind of nonintellectual
awareness, called awareness of Quality. You can’t be aware that you’ve seen a tree until after you’ve seen
the tree, and between the instant of vision and instant of awareness there must be a time lag…Quality is
shapeless, formless, indescribable. To see shapes and forms is to intellectualize.
(Pirsig 1974, pp. 221, 224)
…Pirsig is saying there is nothing compellingly meaningful about those visual sensory impressions that automatically tells the person that its source is a tree. If you have seen trees before, you have past experiences with similar visual sensory impressions which are cross-indexed with other experiences, sensory impressions, concepts, social attitudes, and so forth, all of which taken together represent “treeness” to you. But before these sensory impressions can be cross-referenced and interpreted, they have to be felt. This experience, which is nonverbal, nonanalytical, nonconceptual, is entirely located in the present moment, and consciousness consists of “feelings” in both senses of the word-sensation (in this case, visual sensations) and emotion…
This experiencing of self-in-relation-to-tree, which is the romantic mode of knowing as opposed to the classical mode, is also preverbal and preanalytical. A classical analytical response, in its simplest form, is necessary to distinguish between self and tree. Analytical categorization identifies the tree as a tree and assigns objectivity to it, identifies the emotional-preverbal impressions as subjective reactions to the tree, makes separate observations about the appearance of the bark and the length of the branches and color of the leaves or needles, and given sufficient familiarity with trees perhaps makes the determination that the tree is a pine tree; or, for that matter, that it is a seventeen-to- eighteen-year-old Ponderosa pine with a mild case of tree blight.
The newborn infant would not only be incapable of identifying the object in her field of visions as a tree, she would be incapable of knowing immediately that these strange new sensory sensations have something to do with an object that she could touch if she could move in the direction her head is pointed, or even that visual impressions of a certain sort imply the existence of an object in her line of vision.