Story here.
Incredibly sad stuff. Especially considering that Chapecoense were the small team that made it big (Brazil’s Leicester, if you will).
It took me a long time to make sense of the wreckage. The aerial view shows the back of the plane pointed up the hill followed by the wings upside down behind it. No sign of the front of the plane. I don’t see how anyone could have survived that.
They’re saying this was a Cinderella team who came out of nowhere to get this far. Such a sad video posted of the happy players in their seats before the plane took off.
I don’t see much in the way of a fire at the crash site. I wonder if they ran out of fuel.
1600 NM flight in an aircraft with a useful range of around 1600 NM. It is quite possible and would explain the electrical failure.
Colombian newspaper El Tiempo reporting that the plane was originally going to stop in Cojiba, Bolivia for more fuel but did not. Then they were going to refuel in Bogota but ended up not doing that, either. And the pilot was one of the owners of the airline. Which would probably have made the other pilot a bit hesitant to suggest that this wasn’t a brilliant idea. Also some reports that an aircraft in front of them had declared an emergency as they were going into Medellin and they were put in a holding pattern.
Shades of Avianca Flight 52 if true. I just find it shocking to believe that someone would load 70+ people onto a plane with not really enough range to make the trip, flying into bad weather in an airport surrounded by mountains, hope for absolutely no delays or payload miscalculations and glide into Medellin on the last drop and think this is an acceptable risk assessment. Really hoping the cause was something else.
I have access to flight planning software with RJ85 data in it. Out of curiosity I tried a dummy plan from Santa Cruz to Medellin and the computer said “no”. Basically it couldn’t compute the plan because the required fuel uplift exceeded the tank capacity. The uplift includes reserves though, and looking at the book figures you can do a flight of 1620 NM in nil wind and have about 700 kg of fuel remaining. Enough for another 20 minutes of flying.
A good tailwind would improve the fuel situation significantly (and vice versa).
Another factor is there is an option for long range “pannier” tanks that add an extra 1000 kg or so of fuel, about 30 minutes in the cruise, or 200 NM. I don’t know if the accident aircraft had these tanks, however it is known that it did not have those tanks when it flew for a previous company.
Any speculation (or knowledge) why they didn’t stop at those fuel stops or why the co-pilot was less than profession in not protesting? I don’t know, but if a co-pilot is too intimidated to protest when faced with possible dangerous circumstances makes me not feel too badly when he is removed from the flight roster.
Presumably they didn’t stop because they didn’t think they needed to and it costs money to stop. Who knows what was said? Will make for an interesting CVR.
Then the statements “…the plane was originally going to stop in Cojiba…” and “…they were going to refuel in Bogota…” make no sense, because why would those even be a possibility if nobody thought it would be necessary?
Maybe the weather changed unexpectedly during the flight, to a tailwind? And they re-calculated, but over-optimistically?
He may have protested but been over-ruled. You know, the good old “because I’m the boss and I say so” school of management.
In the similar GQ thread, there’s information that the final cause (that is, aside from stupidly pushing the range) may have been a bit of really bad luck: that Avianca flight also had a fuel problem (a leak), was diverted to Medellin, and was on final approach JUST at the wrong moment. The plane that crashed was apparently descending right on top of the Avianca, essentially ignoring the ATC instruction (who was never told there was a second fuel “emergency,” just a “problem”*),until the pilot realized he really couldn’t land just then, and so he turned away from the airport and glided into the mountains moments later.
*Not that the ATC COULD have done anything at that point. Two planes simply can’t land on the same runway at the same time! But maybe if the plane that crashed had been more honest in its communications about its remaining fuel situation, even at the last minute, the ATC COULD have ordered a go-around to the Avianca pilot, knowing that Avianca PROBABLY had enough fuel for a go-around…but even that would have been a tough call to make.
Also, the pilot really WAS the “boss” – he owned the airline! A bit of conflict of interest there – the person who has to worry about the company’s profit margin…is the same person who has to decide whether or not to make an expensive fueling stop.
And the guy who couldn’t figure out how much fuel was necessary (and extra to make things comfortable) to get from origin to destination? Only in South America does such an idiot control an airline?
I agree (if this turns out to be the situation) that he was an idiot, but I’d wager that the chances of an idiot becoming the owner of an airline is about the same on any continent. Heck, “risk-taking” is a GOOD trait for success as an entrepreneur – just not for a pilot.
Of course, my reference to South America was in jest, but I don’t think risk-taking is good for pilots unless they’re plummeting to the ground, where risk-taking is the best option.
Well, it all comes down to the difference between planning the flight and flying the flight. I have no idea what rules this company were supposed to be following, but if it was under our company/country rules, we would require fuel for the trip plus 10% of the trip fuel plus 30 mins. The 10% is termed “variable reserve” because it varies with the length of flight while the 30 mins is termed “fixed reserve” because it is always 30 minutes. We must always land with fixed reserve, if we aren’t going to then we must declare a fuel emergency. On the other hand the variable reserve is there to be used and covers such things as unexpected winds, a bit of icing perhaps, or anything else unforeseen.
When you plan the flight, you may find that you can’t carry enough fuel to meet the above requirements so you plan a fuelling stop on the way. However, when you get airborne and get close to your refuel stop, you can recalculate the fuel requirements based on the distance remaining which reduces your variable reserve requirement because now it is only 10% of the remainder of the trip rather than 10% of the whole trip. You may also have found that the winds were better and you haven’t used as much fuel as expected.
So, as I say, I don’t know the specific rules they were following, but it is not an unusual situation to plan for a fuel stop and then recalculate the fuel requirements in flight and continue on. They didn’t stop en-route because at the time they didn’t think they needed to. Now obviously the results, if it is a fuel starvation event, prove otherwise for their particular flight, but the concept is sound when done as part of a robust fuel planning policy.
The opposite can also happen of course. You plan a non-stop flight only to find that conditions aren’t as favourable as planned so you have to make a tech stop for fuel.
Bad management rather than bad luck. You don’t just run out of fuel with no warning. They would’ve had low fuel warnings for the last 30 minutes of the flight. Ample opportunity to say “hey we are low on fuel, let us in.” Then ATC can chat to both aircraft with fuel issues and work out which is more critical.
Another possible factor is that their fuel gauges were inaccurate. Thorough fuel management techniques will reduce the risk of this being a problem, but it has bitten people who have the best of intentions in the past. And bad gauges won’t affect the low fuel warnings.